

FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY — HELLAS
INSTITUTE FOR MEDITERRANEAN STUDIES

Halcyon Days in Crete V
A Symposium Held in Rethymno, 10-12 January 2003

PROVINCIAL ELITES *in the* OTTOMAN EMPIRE



Edited by
Antonis Anastasopoulos

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A.A.

ABBREVIATIONS

BOA:	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
<i>ActOrHung:</i>	<i>Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae</i>
<i>ArchOtt:</i>	<i>Archivum Ottomanicum</i>
<i>BSOAS:</i>	<i>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</i>
<i>ÉB:</i>	<i>Études Balkaniques</i>
<i>IJMES:</i>	<i>International Journal of Middle East Studies</i>
<i>IJTS:</i>	<i>International Journal of Turkish Studies</i>
<i>JAOS:</i>	<i>Journal of the American Oriental Society</i>
<i>JESHO:</i>	<i>Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient</i>
<i>JTS:</i>	<i>Journal of Turkish Studies</i>
<i>OA:</i>	<i>Osmanlı Araştırmaları</i>
<i>RMMM:</i>	<i>Revue du Monde Musulman et de la Méditerranée</i>
<i>ROMM:</i>	<i>Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée</i>
<i>SF:</i>	<i>Südost-Forschungen</i>
<i>TD:</i>	<i>Tarih Dergisi</i>
<i>TED:</i>	<i>Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi</i>
<i>VD:</i>	<i>Vakıflar Dergisi</i>
<i>WZKM:</i>	<i>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes</i>
<i>EI²:</i>	<i>The Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> , New Edition (Leiden 1960-2002)
<i>İA:</i>	<i>İslâm Ansiklopedisi</i> (Istanbul 1940-1979)

Note 1: A simple system of transliteration from the Arabic into the Latin alphabet has been adopted, and most diacritical marks have been omitted; *ayan* and *hamza* have been maintained in papers referring to Arabic-speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire only when they appear in the middle of a word.

Note 2: No final -s- is added to collective nouns, such as *ayan*, *ulema*, and *reaya*, when they appear in the plural.

INTRODUCTION

Antonis ANASTASOPOULOS

The term 'provincial elites', when used in the Ottoman context, is most readily associated with the *ayan*, the Muslim notables who held a dominant place in the Ottoman provinces from at least the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth century. However, the twenty-one papers,¹ which were presented in the course of the Halcyon Days in Crete Symposium on 'Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire' (Rethymno, 10-12 January 2003), expanded the meaning of the 'provincial elites' well beyond *ayanship* by covering a wide range of topics extending over the period from the fifteenth to the early twentieth century.

Elite studies have mostly flourished in the fields of sociology and political science with particular reference to industrial and post-industrial societies, and the first thing which can be noted about the term 'elite' is that it is rather vague. In brief, its three basic meanings can be codified as follows: i. 'top people' in every category of human activity, ii. wielders of power, iii. those whose opinions and actions count most.² The elite is by definition a minority group, as it includes those who are thought of as belonging to the top of the social ladder, but it is not a social class. In fact, the concept of the 'elite' was originally developed in reaction to Marxist class analysis: the connotations of class are primarily economic, while the concept of the elite largely refers to political power.³ Nevertheless, the two notions intersect and there was a certain degree of amalgamation between Marxist and elitist approaches in the course of the twentieth century.⁴

1. Professors John C. Alexander, Barbara Kellner-Heinkele and İlber Ortaylı were unfortunately unable to submit their papers for publication.
2. The formulation of the three meanings of the term is from G. Moyser and M. Wagstaffe (eds), *Research Methods for Elite Studies* (London 1987), xi.
3. See J. Scott, 'Introduction', in idem (ed.), *The Sociology of Elites*. Vol. 1: *The Study of Elites* (Aldershot and Brookfield 1990), ix. For a defence of the notion of the elite and for its use in French historical writing, see J.-Ph. Luis, 'Les trois temps de l'histoire des élites à l'époque moderne et contemporaine', in M. Cèbeillac-Gervasoni and L. Lamoine (eds), *Les élites et leurs facettes. Les élites locales dans le monde hellénistique et romain* (Rome and Clermont-Ferrand 2003), 37-49. Cf. the apologetic tone of the 'Introduction' to G. Chaussinand-Nogaret (ed.), *Histoire des élites en France du XVI^e au XX^e siècle. L'honneur – le mérite – l'argent* (n.p. 1991).
4. Scott, 'Introduction', xi-xiii.

Defining the ‘elite’ too broadly as ‘top people’ in every category of human activity is of little analytical use from the point of view of the social sciences. The association of elites with power, political and economic, is on the other hand much more useful, and has in fact been extensively used, both theoretically and empirically, as a means of identifying elites. In this context, political power as a defining characteristic of elites needs to be extended beyond participation in formal government institutions, if it is to be meaningful;⁵ actually, ‘power’ should be taken to also include ‘influence’, as suggested by the third of the afore-mentioned meanings of the word ‘elite’.⁶ The elite is by no means simply a conglomeration of individuals who happen to possess wealth and prestige, but are otherwise socially inactive or negligible.⁷ On the contrary, the elite is a group of leading people with at least some self-consciousness of their status as such. They constitute a power group, which interacts with other social groups and classes, and defends its position, while at the same time its members belong to social classes (rather than to just one class).

In the Ottoman case, treating the *ayan* as a conscious, integrated elite group (very near to a class) which possessed the ‘three c’s’ (consciousness, coherence, conspiracy) of political elites according to Meisel⁸ is, I think, best illustrated in historical narratives which interpret the *sened-i ittifak* of 1808 as the result of negotiation between *ayan* as a unified, rather homogeneous, Empire-wide bloc and the central Ottoman government (whose basic representative, Grand Vizier Bayrakdar Mustafa Paşa, however, also happened to be an *ayan*).⁹

Whether the elite is an integrated group drawing its members from a specific socio-economic pool or whether multiple competing elites may exist at the same time in a given place or entity has long been a matter of methodological discussion.¹⁰ In the same vein, it is argued that elites serve among other things as “symbols of the

5. See the notion of ‘power elite’ introduced by Wright Mills (*ibid.*, xi).

6. According to Chaussinand-Nogaret, ‘Introduction’, 12, the elites are “cette fraction de la population où se concentrent puissance, autorité et influence”.

7. See Scott, ‘Introduction’, ix.

8. *Ibid.*, xiii.

9. See, for instance, B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London – New York – Toronto 1961), 441-42: Lewis refers to the *ayan* as a “social group or class of old and new landlords” and “gentry”. Compare the difference in tone in S. J. Shaw and E. Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol. II: *Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975* (Cambridge 1977), 2-3, and R. Mantran, ‘Les débuts de la Question d’Orient (1774-1839)’, in *idem* (ed.), *Histoire de l’Empire ottoman* (n.p. 1989), 437-38. More recently, A. Salzmann treated the *ayan*, in the context of the *sened-i ittifak*, as “the third estate” and “the gentry”: A. Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State* (Leiden and Boston 2004), 186-87.

10. Scott, ‘Introduction’, xii.

common life and embodiments of the values that maintain it”.¹¹ Whether such sets of values can be considered universal or not is an issue related to the one just mentioned. If we accept the existence of more than one elite group in a given social formation, we should be able to find variations or even conflicting interpretations of the prevailing values in different segments of the elite, and, thus, be able to draw a more nuanced picture of society.

The notion of the elite has universal application. The vagueness of the concept, on the one hand, weakens it as a tool for historical analysis and may obfuscate comparison, but, on the other, it renders it rather flexible and allows it to be used in a multitude of contexts, modern and pre-modern, Western and non-Western. Let me cite here two random examples, one Ottoman and one non-Ottoman, of the application of the notion of the elite to pre-modern Islamic societies. I think that these examples demonstrate the flexibility, rather than vagueness, of the notion (as they refer to specific social groups), and its adaptability to differing contexts. Petry and Marcus’ descriptions of Muslim elites do differ, predominantly in the relative position of the elite in the overall social hierarchy but also in some of its attributes, but they, too, coincide in the association of the elites with power, which is, in their cases, rather narrowly identified with authority emanating from or, at least, sanctioned by the state.

In his study of fifteenth-century Cairo, Petry treated as the elite those who stood between the “ruling Mamluk military caste” and the “masses upon whose labor and obedience the ruling class depended”; the elite “staffed the bureaucratic, legal, educational, and religious offices of the state, and determined the course of intellectual inquiry”.¹² Petry – like several other students of the Arab lands – benefited in his categorisation from the survival of contemporaneous biographical dictionaries, which can serve as guides as to whom Muslim authors of the pre-modern era considered socially important.

Marcus, in his study of eighteenth-century Aleppo, on the other hand, also refers to a tripartite division, but this time the elite are placed in the top social category, which may be explained by the fact that Ottoman Aleppo – unlike Mamluk Cairo – was not the seat of central government, nor did it possess a royal house or court of its own: members of the city’s elite “were distinguished by great personal wealth ... [but] ... also boasted prestigious lineages and held high positions in the religious establishment, the administration, and the military”. Second came a larger group of

11. S. Keller, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (ed. D. L. Sills), s.v. ‘Elites’.

12. C. F. Petry, *The Civilian Elite of Cairo in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton, N.J. 1981),

3. Petry notes that this threefold social division reflects the view of the chroniclers of the Mamluk state.

people whom we might call the ‘middle class’, that is, those who “possessed property, a comfortable life-style, learning, good occupations, and other attributes considered desirable by their community”. The mass of the inhabitants of Aleppo belonged to the lower social stratum, those who “could claim little or no wealth, prestige or influence”.¹³

*

How then does the notion of the elite apply to the Ottoman case and the theme of this volume? What are the particular characteristics of Ottoman provincial elites, if we wish to go beyond very broad definitions with universal applicability, such as the one given by Peter Burke several years ago, when, in his book on seventeenth-century Venice and Amsterdam, he defined elites as “groups high on three criteria; status, power and wealth” (which is not that far from Marcus’ lineage, high positions, and wealth)?¹⁴ The elite is, as already noted, a minority group with a leading role in society, but it is not easily delineated, because elites are in principle inclusive rather than exclusive. However, when examining formations where the applicability of class analysis is on the whole disputable,¹⁵ the notion of the elite provides a useful analytical tool. As in most fields, Ottomanist historians generally tend to give priority to political over economic power as a primary characteristic of the elites – as Michael Ursinus puts it in his paper in this volume, provincial elites “have a vested interest in local affairs”.¹⁶ Wealth is another important trait of the elites, but comes second in

13. A. Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century* (New York 1989), 38. Marcus does use ‘class’ as a social category, and introduces several further indicators, such as religion, profession, and sex, which render the overall picture more complex.

14. P. Burke, *Venice and Amsterdam: A Study of Seventeenth-Century Élites* (London 1974), 9.

15. K. Barkey refers to ‘classes’ in her *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca and London 1994), but also points to the limitations of this notion in the Ottoman context: pp. 22, 23, 30 n. 15, 232-35.

16. Ursinus’ discussion of the notion of the Ottoman provincial elite (taken from his paper in this volume) is succinct and to the point: “the *çiftlik sahibleri* of Manastır constitute an obvious case in point [i.e., a provincial elite] since they were by definition locally rooted, had a vested interest in local affairs (not least for their own good), and tended to assume the role of intermediaries between what they regarded as their locus of (financial or fiscal) interest on the one side and officialdom on the other (unless they had been promoted to officialdom themselves). Predominantly Muslim, they include not only members of the military, the learned institution, religious personnel, administrative staff and artisans, but also, more occasionally, dervish *şeyhs*, women and even non-Muslims. Yet however many diverse elements of society and members of different social strata they may include, they are united in the fact that they are in possession of one or more former peasant holdings worked by farm labourers for which they are fiscally responsible”.

rank; even though power and wealth usually are interlinked, political authority or power or influence seems to be the elite's most crucial characteristic from a historiographical point of view. As for how wealthy someone needed to be in order to be counted among the elite, wealth, like power, is a relative rather than absolute quantity. In other words, what great power or wealth means depends on the particular conditions and circumstances of each locality and era. Besides, whether a certain level of power or wealth is a precondition for considering someone a member of the elite is connected with how restrictively one wishes to define the elite; some would argue that even within a single society, there are several layers of elite, and, thus, several layers of wealth and power should be taken into consideration.

But before proceeding further, we may ask whether the Ottoman state and society themselves recognised the existence of provincial elites in the Ottoman realm. I believe that they did, and that it does not take much to prove it. The very use of the terms *ayan* and *ayan-ı vilâyet* in describing a certain group of people is in itself one piece of testimony to this (the same applies to other words such as *derebeyler*, *vücuḥ*, *iş erleri*, *söz sahibleri*, *muteberan* and *kocabaşılar* in several historical stages and instances). The fact that central authorities addressed particular persons and groups other than state representatives when sending decrees to the provinces is another. Representation of the population of a region by a small or larger group of people from among themselves is yet another. But, having made this remark, I do not think that we absolutely need to seek to identify whom the Ottomans thought of as the provincial elite.¹⁷ Such an endeavour is undoubtedly useful, but we should not forget that the term 'elite' as it is used by scholarship is a modern invention with a particular (even if vague) content. This modern notion is applied to the pre-modern (for the most part of its history) Ottoman polity and society for research purposes; in other words, we invent, we do not re-invent or unearth.

A second issue to be dealt with is whether we should refer to an Ottoman provincial elite or elites. I would rather speak of 'provincial elites' in the plural, in the sense that there was not just one monolithic elite either in space or time, given that the Ottoman Empire occupied a huge territory with a variety of political, social and moral traditions, and also was a constantly evolving state and social formation which covered a time span of over six centuries. The sole reason for using 'Ottoman provincial elite' in the singular would be, I think, in order to avoid the misconception

17. For an overview of how Ottoman elite intellectuals divided and viewed society, see M. Sariyannis, "“Mob”, “Scamps” and Rebels in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Some Remarks on Ottoman Social Vocabulary' (forthcoming in *IJTS*, 11/1 & 2 [2005]) in conjunction with his «Περιθωριακές Ομάδες και Συμπεριφορές στην Οθωμανική Κωνσταντινούπολη, 16^{ος}-18^{ος} Αιώνας» [Marginal Groups and Attitudes in Ottoman Istanbul, Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries], unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2005, 79-107.

that Ottoman society was a loose and fragmented entity, composed of various social and confessional groups with only nominal contact or interaction among them. On the other hand, it is incontestable that Ottomanist historians on the whole tend to associate the provincial elites with one particular group in different historical phases of the Empire; thus, the Ottoman provincial elite is, for instance, in the early centuries primarily but not exclusively associated with the *sipahi* cavalry. In the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries provincial elites are mostly but again not exclusively associated with the *ayan*. In the late phase of the Empire, following the *hatt-ı şerif* of *Gülhane*, elites are associated, still not exclusively, with members of the state and local government apparatus, as well as with powerful landowners and the rising bourgeoisie.

Obviously, this picture is over-simplistic. It fails, for instance, to take non-Muslim elites into account. They, too, were part of the multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-faith, multi-layered, yet unified Ottoman society, which, despite the existence of significant rifts within, shared certain basic common experiences and values, and above all what might be called its ‘Ottomanness’.¹⁸ There is plenty of evidence which suggests that non-Muslim elites largely aspired to inclusion in the Ottoman elite and not to separation from it (consider, for instance, their participation in tax-farming and local security forces, as well as their attempts at assimilation in terms of attire, material culture and symbols of power).¹⁹ Furthermore, there are other categories of individuals, which expand even further the notion of the elite, and Ottoman provincial elite more particularly. Consider, in this respect, the issue of intellectual elites, as Aleksandar Fotić and Pinelopi Stathi point out in their papers in this volume.²⁰

18. See also the argument of Pinelopi Stathi on p. 78 of this volume. On non-Muslim elites, see, in particular, Svetlana Ivanova’s paper.

19. This is also the view of Nikos Svoronos, whose brief overview of the history of the “Greek nation”, written in the 1960s, was only recently published and became the subject of much debate in Greek academia: N. Svoronos, *Το Ελληνικό Έθνος: Γένεση και Διαμόρφωση του Νέου Ελληνισμού* [The Greek Nation: Genesis and Formation of Modern Hellenism] (Athens 2004), 90-91. Cf. G. Veinstein, ‘Le patrimoine foncier de Panayote Benakis, *kocabaşı* de Kalamata’, *JTS*, 11 (1987), 211-33, and, on the inapplicability of clothing laws, R. Murphey, ‘Forms of Differentiation and Expression of Individuality in Ottoman Society’, *Turcica*, 34 (2002), 137-38.

20. Both Fotić and Stathi discuss how ‘intellectual elites’ may fit into the notion of the ‘elite’. Even though the historical context differs significantly, it is, on the other hand, worth considering the methodological points made by I. Savalli-Lestrade, ‘Remarques sur les élites dans les *poleis* hellénistiques’ and É. Perrin-Saminadayar, ‘Des élites intellectuelles à Athènes à l’époque hellénistique ? Non, des notables’, both in Cébeillac-Gervasoni and Lamoine (eds), *Les élites et leurs facettes*, 51-64 (esp. 51-52) and 383-400 respectively.

Was nobility a characteristic of Ottoman provincial elites? There was no formal provincial aristocracy in the Ottoman Empire – with the possible exception of the *sipahi* cavalry with its peculiar state-dependent status (*seyyidship* was, of course, another distinctive kind of nobility, but not exactly an ‘aristocracy’), but descent was a factor in determining the members of the elite, even though it was not the only one and maybe not the single most important. Let’s say then that descent from a powerful family provided a good starting-point and an advantage over rivals who did not possess it. A tendency towards ‘informal’ aristocratisation is in fact obvious in the Ottoman Empire, particularly during the eighteenth century, both at the centre and in the provinces, as indicated by the fact that high offices and important positions were controlled by a limited number of powerful families, as well as by the increasing use of family names which identified important people as belonging to particular families.²¹

Could we say that members of the provincial elites were those who stood between, on the one side, the state and its agents, and, on the other, the populations of their regions, acting in fact as political brokers? I think that we could. Obviously, this is largely a state-centred approach, which emphasises par excellence the formal or semi-formal political aspect of the role of the elites. Elite are in this case those whom the state recognises (or at least accepts) as such, those to whom the people delegate authority of representation, those who are involved in formal procedures, such as tax-farming and tax collection, and interact with state agents as representatives of their districts. It may be a particularity of the Arab provinces – or, rather, of approach – but Ehud Toledano coincides with Marcus in providing an even more restrictive definition of Ottoman elites along these lines. Toledano, who distinguishes between “Ottoman elite” and “local elites”, with “Ottoman-local elites” being formed in later times, argues that elites are primarily identified with office-holding and government appointments, which are treated as “the key to power-elite status”.²² The

21. Ottoman archival sources provide plenty of evidence for this phenomenon. For the aristocratisation of the *ulema*, see M. C. Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600-1800)* (Minneapolis 1988).
22. E. Toledano, ‘The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research’, in I. Pappé and M. Ma’oz (eds), *Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from Within* (London and New York 1997), 150-51, 154-56, 159. Cf. T. Shuval, ‘The Ottoman Algerian Elite and its Ideology’, *IJMES*, 32 (2000), 323-44 (see, esp., n. 98) and also the division of the population “in a Near Eastern city” in H. İnalcık, ‘Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration’, in T. Naff and R. Owen (eds), *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History* (Carbondale and Edwardsville – London and Amsterdam 1977), 37. See, on the other hand, Martin Strohmeier’s description of Damascene notables (pp. 349-50 in this volume), and also Eleni Gara’s discussion of whether Balkan provincial elites may be restricted to office-holders and her juxtaposition of political to social elites (pp. 135-38 in this volume).

identification of elites with office-holding is, of course, a much more general trend,²³ connected with the features of power and self-consciousness that the elite as a social category needs by definition to possess, and also with a more strict definition of the 'elites' not simply as such, but as 'governing' or 'power elites' (even though the latter term in particular does not restrict the elite to those holding formal authority and state offices).²⁴ Besides, in state capitals, and major cities, where often a group of powerful office-holders are the dominant factor, it is methodologically difficult to include other wealthy and/or reputable social actors in the elite, as those appear to be lacking in authority/power when compared with the office-holders.²⁵

An alternative way of defining the elite would be orientated more towards society. We would in this case consider as elite those with social power and influence, irrespective of whether they were involved in formal procedures or whether they were known to state agents; non-Muslims or dervishes and monks could then count as members of an Ottoman provincial elite. Obviously, sources of Ottoman history make it much easier to discern elites according to a state-centred rather than to a society-centred definition.

This is also reflected in the papers of this volume, as several among them refer to the issue of the relationship between the Ottoman state and provincial elites. Practically, what the two sides needed from each other and exchanged was legitimation (and, along with it, income). Provincial notables could facilitate the implementation of government policies and guarantee relative order in the provinces, while state acknowledgement or government appointment enhanced a local notable's prestige and authority. Thus, members of the provincial elites were appointed *sipahis* in the early centuries and *mütesellims* in later times (a few even became pashas),²⁶ or were involved in tax-farming and tax collection from a relatively early age.²⁷

If provincial elites really stood between the state and the mass of the local population, they need to somehow be differentiated from both for analytical purposes; however, dividing lines are not always clear. As far as differentiation from the state is concerned, provincial elites – especially when we identify them with the

23. See, for instance, Burke, *Venice and Amsterdam*, 16-32, and M. Bernard, 'Les élites politiques locales à la fin du XIX^e siècle : méthodes de recherche et premiers résultats', in Cébeillac-Gervasoni and Lamoine (eds), *Les élites et leurs facettes*, 277-87, where the problem of the inclusion in the political elite of those with an important informal political influence is also touched upon.

24. Scott, 'Introduction', x-xi.

25. See S. Faruqi's brief discussion of "who, in which period, formed part of the Ottoman elite" in her *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It* (London and New York 2004), 13.

26. See, for instance, the papers of Melek Delilbaşı and Yuzo Nagata in this volume.

27. See, for instance, the papers of Leslie Peirce, Eleni Gara, Yuzo Nagata, Michael Ursinus and Suraiya Faruqi in this volume.

ayan – are usually taken to have acquired their power independently from the state, even though they may occupy state posts or be involved in tax-farming. On the other hand, nothing in principle prevents a *kadı* or another state official who comes from the centre to become with time (sometimes, but not necessarily, following retirement or when out of active service) a provincial notable; and once again, it is to be borne in mind that scholars such as Marcus and Toledano associate the elite with office-holding.

If we now turn to the boundary which separates the elite from the mass of the people, status, wealth, and power (and/or influence), i.e., the defining characteristics of the elite according to Burke, form important dividing lines, but once again limits are not always clearly defined, as normally the elite and the population of a certain district share the same roots and actual social mobility is a factor to be taken into consideration. For instance, do guilds belong to the ‘people’, but guild officials to the ‘elite’? Or, are, on the other hand, major merchants really members of the elite? As has already been said, wealth is a defining characteristic of the elite, but is insufficient in its own right. For instance, wealthy merchants who are not involved in the running of local affairs or in public life in general, constitute members of the social elite in the everyday sense of the word,²⁸ but from a ‘social sciences point of view’ they are rather members of a wealthy ‘middle’ or ‘upper class’. On the other hand, it has already been noted that wealth very often brings by definition political power or influence along with it, and this is exemplified in the Ottoman case in non-Muslim merchants of the eighteenth century who were able to pay for foreign protection under the capitulatory regime and thus challenge the principle of communal responsibility in the payment of taxes,²⁹ or to question the political domination of the ‘traditional’ elite at the end of the same century,³⁰ and in major merchants, landowners and businessmen who occupied in the nineteenth century seats in the representative councils of the Tanzimat era.

We have now returned to a discussion of who belonged to the elite and who did not on the basis of restrictions set by the Ottoman administrative, moral and social system (or should I say systems in the plural for the last two?). To give a few more examples, do elites in the Ottoman Empire include members of both sexes? Women

28. See the definition of ‘social elite’ cited by Eleni Gara in n. 3 of her paper.

29. References to this may be found in K. Mertzios, *Μνημεία Μακεδονικής Ιστορίας* [Monuments of Macedonian History] (Thessaloniki 1947), 312, 322, 324, 326, 336-37, 359-60, 362-66.

30. P. Iliou, *Κοινωνικοί Αγώνες και Διαφωτισμός: Η Περίπτωση της Σμύρνης* [Social Struggles and Enlightenment: The Case of Smyrna (1819)] (Athens 1986 [2nd ed.]), 10-12. At a later stage, the guilds of Izmir challenged the merchants as leaders of the Christian community of the city.

did possess property, and wealth, and they not infrequently administered their affairs in courts and other public spaces themselves, but can they actually be included among the elite (as distinct from both the ‘upper class’ and ‘wives of elite men/women of elite families’) of a given town or region, in view of the restrictions set on women by Islamic law and society, and, especially, their exclusion from political power?³¹ In all likelihood, exceptions prove in this case the rule.³² What about non-Muslims, who could be wealthy and influential within a certain group of co-religionists (and sometimes beyond), but were unable to occupy government posts or be treated by the state on an equal footing with Muslim *ayan* as representatives of a district’s population? And what about dervish sheikhs or religious scholars, who had influence over a number of disciples and enjoyed respect, but did not necessarily possess political power in the strict sense of the term? Or what about villages and the rural area? Are elites an exclusively urban phenomenon (several elite members resided in towns, but had control over rural land and the village population),³³ or is it that only urban elites have left their marks on the available sources? Accident is by definition an important factor in studying the elites and past societies in general: we know of whom we know first and foremost because particular sources have survived and have channelled their names and aspects of their activities to us.

The subjects of the papers in this volume help us think about the issue of defining the boundaries of the notion of ‘provincial elites in the Ottoman Empire’. What is it that connects a fifteenth-century *sipahi* in Thessaly, in particular a Christian one, with a sixteenth-century Ayntab notable, such as Seydi Ahmed Boyacızaade, with major eighteenth-century *ayan*, such as the Karaosmanoğulları, with less important and powerful eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Balkan and Anatolian notables, such as the Tekelioğulları in Antalya and the even smaller-scale notables of Karaferye, with eighteenth-century erudite prelates, such as Antalyalı Serafim, Bishop of Ankara, and Chrysanthos Notaras, Patriarch of Jerusalem, with Jewish

31. Cf. the papers of Leslie Peirce, Suraiya Faroqhi, Eleni Gara, and Rossitsa Gradeva in this volume, and their depiction of and/or comments about women as members of the elite. See also H. Reindl-Kiel, ‘A Woman *Timar* Holder in Ankara Province During the Second Half of the 16th Century’, *JESHO*, 40/2 (1997), 207-38 and S. Faroqhi, ‘Two Women of Substance’, in her *Stories of Ottoman Men and Women* (Istanbul 2002), 151-66.
32. L. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire* (Oxford 1993); S. Faroqhi, ‘Crime, Women and Wealth in the Eighteenth-Century Anatolian Countryside’, in her *Stories*, 198-200.
33. See, for instance, the papers of Michael Ursinus and Émilie Thémopoulou in this volume. Rossitsa Gradeva mentions a rich Muslim Sofian who had moved out of the city to a village, while, in his paper, Nicolas Vatin refers to “l’élite du village” (n. 30). See also İnalçık, ‘Centralization and Decentralization’, n. 32 (p. 364).

entrepreneurs in Tanzimat Salonica, with a late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Damascene *amir al-hajj*, such as Abd al-Rahman Pasha al-Yusuf?

Obviously, all of them and many more were subjects of the Ottoman Empire at various historical moments, and this is a very important reason why we study them together. The political link is not negligible, but it is self-evident and thus of little practical value from a scholarly point of view.

Maybe an attempt to define 'provincial elites in the Ottoman Empire' could be facilitated by distinguishing between primary and secondary characteristics of provincial elites; primary characteristics would in this case be those considered necessary for someone to be treated as elite, while secondary ones would be those which would most likely but not always accompany the primary ones. Admittedly, such an approach does not solve all the problems with classifying individuals among the elite of a given place (as noted, what about intellectual elites with influence and status but no wealth, for instance?), but it does provide a basis for discussion.

In any case, the three basic characteristics pointed out by Burke, i.e., status, wealth, and power, could be primary. Even though a state appointment could and did secure someone precedence over his elite rivals, the elite as a group cannot be restricted to office-holders only, and, thus, power as one of its basic traits needs to be interpreted liberally: other than occupying a government post, it might take the form of being a factor in determining or influencing the local balance of power or of representing the region before state authorities or of being involved in tax collection or of being able to mobilise a number of people; significant economic power normally entailed an ability to influence the political balance, too. To these three basic characteristics, I would add identification with a particular locality or region; the provincial elites' power base and interests were geographically specific and in the provinces, even though they themselves did not necessarily need to be indigenous to the locality where they flourished.

What would then in random order be the secondary characteristics of Ottoman provincial elites? Lineage could be one; members of provincial elites often formed local dynasties and power was transferred from one generation to the next, or among family members of the same generation. Control of the land and its products as a basic source of income and power would be another, at least for the period before the Tanzimat, but to a large extent also after 1839; control of the land could take several forms: direct landownership or a tax farm or providing loans to villagers or discharging their tax obligations in exchange for a fee.

Another secondary characteristic of provincial elites would be what we can call 'networking'. Members of the elite were usually not isolated individuals, but belonged to either or both of two types of networks: family networks and patron-client networks. It was usually one member of the family who was the leading figure (the 'frontman' so to speak) surrounded by other family members who assumed

secondary roles and performed tasks which were necessary for maintaining and augmenting their family's power.

Patron-client relations were also important in securing one's position or that of a family.³⁴ Elites needed to form networks and alliances in order to defend their prominence in adverse times or to expand their power to regions beyond their original base when circumstances permitted. There were always intra-elite rivals who aspired to supersede or eliminate a powerful notable, while state intervention could lead to confiscation of an elite family's property and execution of its leading members;³⁵ the victims of such a policy could – and very often did – recover, fully or partly, their wealth and status, but this presupposed connections both locally and at the imperial centre, as well as an ability to negotiate one's position.

A particular – and popular – form of patronage intended for a larger audience was architectural patronage and the establishment of *vakıfs*.³⁶ Establishing a *vakıf* was a means of protecting the family's property from confiscation and bypassing the strict Islamic inheritance rules, but it also increased the family's prestige and popularity as a benefactor and provider of urban and rural services to the population of a certain region.

Yet another secondary characteristic of Ottoman provincial elites would be acquiring titles, which also enhanced their prestige. One category of such titles were religious ones, such as *seyyid* and *hacı*.³⁷ Another category were titles with political overtones; for instance, several eighteenth-century *ayan* possessed the title of imperial chief gatekeeper (*serbevvaban-ı âli* or *kapıcıbaşı*),³⁸ which at the symbolic level implied a special bond to the House of Osman.

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As is the usual academic practice, freedom was allowed to Symposium participants to choose their topics within the general framework of this theme. It is, therefore,

34. See in this volume the relationship between the Tekelioğulları of Antalya with the more powerful Karaosmanoğulları (Suraiya Faroqhi), as well as the relationship of Seydi Ahmed Boyacızade with his client Hacı Mehmed (Leslie Peirce). Compare with the marriage alliance between the Yusufs and the Shamdins (Martin Strohmeier).

35. See, for instance, the papers of Yuzo Nagata and Suraiya Faroqhi in this volume.

36. See, for instance, the papers of Leslie Peirce, Yuzo Nagata, Suraiya Faroqhi, and Filiz Yenışehirlioğlu in this volume.

37. For the importance of *seyyid*ship see the paper of Hülya Canbakal in this volume.

38. See, for instance, İnalçık, 'Centralization and Decentralization', 40, as well as the cases of the Karaosmanoğulları (Yuzo Nagata), and the Tekelioğulları (Suraiya Faroqhi) in this volume. Nagata, in fact, argues that the conferment of titles by the state suggests that *ayan* were treated as *kapıkulları*, whose estates were expected to revert to their master after death; in other words, confiscation of properties was more than an act of punishment for misbehaviour on the part of the *ayan*.

interesting to note that, as this volume, one hopes, demonstrates, despite their diversity in covering several aspects of the history of provincial elites in the Ottoman Empire, the papers do complement one another to a significant degree and in more ways than one.

György Hazai focuses on the degree of bilingualism and multilingualism observed among provincial elites in the Ottoman Empire. The author points out that the Ottoman state did not seek to impose the use of Turkish to its subjects who did not speak it as their mother tongue; linguistic developments were determined by the political, administrative, ethnic, religious and social conditions which prevailed in each particular region.

Nicolas Vatin proceeds to a study of the mobility of Muslim elites in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries on the basis of tombstone inscriptions, thus collecting evidence and drawing conclusions on networks, itineraries, and circumstances which connected various settlements of differing sizes with one another. Furthermore, the author discerns in the formulas used in tombstones a growing tendency among members of the elite towards taking particular pride in their places of origin and in belonging to a specific local aristocracy.

Jane Hathaway shifts our attention from elites as an exclusive group to elites as members of wide social alliances/groupings, by analysing the phenomenon of bilateral factionalism, which she defines as “a political culture dominated by two rival blocs with no third alternative”; as the author notes, factions were neither exclusive to, nor led by the elite. By applying a comparative approach, Hathaway demonstrates that bilateral factionalism constituted an ancient political tradition of the eastern Mediterranean and the Iranian plateau: she relates the emergence of such rivalries to conditions of political and demographic fluidity, and stresses the fact that the opposing factions were inclusive in terms of membership, as well as that public rituals, such as processions, were crucial for the strengthening of factional allegiance.

Hülya Canbakal chooses to study claims to descent from the Prophet Muhammad – which entailed fiscal and, with time, other privileges too – as an aspect of elite identity and of the relationship between provincial notables and the state, since the latter sought to control the conferment of the title of *seyyid/şerif* through the imperial and provincial *nakibüleşrafs*. The author discusses the limits of such surveillance policies, which reached their peak in the second half of the seventeenth century, and suggests that the spread of *seyyid*ship in the eighteenth century should be treated as yet another aspect of the integrationist policies of the state aimed at the provincial elites.

Aleksandar Fotić raises the issue of intellectual elites with particular reference to the Muslim and non-Muslim elites of Belgrade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Besides providing ample information about members of the intellectual elite of the town and their works, the author notes that communication between

different confessional groups on the intellectual level was scarce, and argues that even within a single denominational group the intellectual elite was not uniform. Even though religious institutions provided a strong focus of intellectual activity, not all intellectual production was of a religious nature.

Pinelopi Stathi argues that power and wealth should not be the only factors determining the inclusion of a given person in the elite, and moves on to discuss the case of Christian Orthodox bishops. After arguing that bishops did form part of Ottoman elite from an administrative, social, and intellectual point of view, she discusses the cases of various erudite prelates in order to disprove the view that all bishops of the Ottoman period were either uncultured or foes of knowledge and learning.

In her paper Melek Delilbaşı studies Christian *timar*-holders in fifteenth and sixteenth-century Thessaly. These constituted between one fifth and one seventh of the total number of *timar*-holders in the mid-fifteenth century, but, as proved by a comparative analysis of successive Ottoman registers, they had become practically extinct by the early sixteenth century because of a gradual Islamisation process. It is interesting to note in this respect that during the fifteenth century, members of old Byzantine families jointly held the family *timars* in Thessaly, even though some of them remained Christian while others had converted to Islam.

Leslie Peirce draws the portrait of a notable in sixteenth-century Ayntab, Seydi Ahmed Boyacı, whose story symbolises the successful adaptation of a distinguished local family to the advent of Ottoman rule in the region. Peirce explores the attributes of Ahmed's *ayan*ship, symbolic, economic, political and social (such as the claim to a prominent lineage and *seyyid*ship, rural and urban property ownership, performance of civic duties accruing from his social and ethical prestige, a town quarter and a mosque bearing the family name). Comparison with the activities of the other two major Ayntaban families of the time suggests that elite families of even the same locality did share common traits, but did not always adopt identical strategies in their quest for power and social prestige.

Eleni Gara investigates urban Muslim elites in the sixteenth and seventeenth-century Balkans and points to the difficulty in determining their composition and identity. Of particular interest is her discussion of political v. social elites in the early modern Balkans, as she argues that political power in this period was still largely beyond the reach of local notables, since the important posts in provincial administration were controlled by the central state. The author proposes the study of real estate transactions and loans, as well as of *sicil* entries where the *ayan ve eşraf* or individuals with honorific titles are mentioned, as a means of collecting information on the make-up and activities of a given provincial elite.

Rossitsa Gradeva draws a portrait of the 'rich' of Sofia in the 1670s on the basis of inventories of estates (*tereke defterleri*). These inventories allow us insights into not

only the material culture, but also the values, professions, investments, and family status of the elite, which is in this paper defined as an economic one (and appears as predominantly urban Muslim, given that most entries refer to this group). The author concludes that wealth was gender and religion-related in seventeenth-century Sofia, but points out that the inventories suggest an absence of strict spatial segregation among 'rich', 'middle class' and 'poor', even though the first group tended to live nearer the city centre. Finally, the author notes that among honorific titles, *ağa* was the one more closely associated with wealth in Sofia in the 1670s.

Svetlana Ivanova discusses the *varoş* institution as a fiscal and 'self-government' non-territorial corporation of the urban Orthodox Christian population. This institution emerged in the course of the seventeenth century in response to the requirements of the Ottoman fiscal system, and necessitated a redefinition of the role of traditional territorial units of self-organisation, such as the neighbourhood. On the other hand, eighteenth-century sources reveal an overlap in the membership of the *varoş* leadership and the metropolitan council, which, according to Ivanova, suggests that what was termed *varoş* by the Ottoman state may have simply been a 're-invention' of the pre-existing metropolitan councils. The author compares the emergence of the *varoş* and its Christian leadership with the emergence of the *ayan* as leaders of the Muslim community, and stresses the fluidity and informal character of the authority of the *reaya* leadership in the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Balkans with particular reference to the present-day Bulgarian territories.

Michael Ursinus focuses on the case of the *çiftlik* owners of the district of Manastır, and draws attention to *çiftlik* survey registers as an important source for studying the region's 'landed gentry' and power relations. Moreover, he argues that *çiftlik* owners based their economic and political power on a combination of direct landownership, fiscal 'mediation' for several 'free' peasant taxable households (they advanced their taxes in return for a considerable fee), and holding of local offices, such as the *ayanlık* and the *kaymakamlık*.

In my paper, I turn my attention to the difficulty of defining the provincial elite, which is usually identified with the political one, largely because of limitations of the source material – but obviously of approach, too. Furthermore, a literal reading of the sources may nurture a picture of strict division of the urban elite along confessional lines into two major groups (Muslims and non-Muslims). This picture, I argue, did not accurately reflect the social conditions in the eighteenth-century Balkans, but was to a certain extent fabricated in order to meet the precepts of the Islamic state and law. On the other hand, legal discrimination against non-Muslims was an integral part of state ideology, and as such it did affect society and the equilibrium between Muslim and non-Muslim elites.

Yuzo Nagata, our symposiarch, demonstrates the variety of resources on which an *ayan* family's wealth and power rested, more specifically focusing on tax farms, *çiftlik*s,

and *vakıfs*. The powerful Karaosmanoğlu *ayan* family of Manisa is his particular case-study, and the author argues that the variety of their economic undertakings explains why the waning of the political power of the family in the nineteenth century did not lead to the collapse of its social and economic influence. *Vakıfs*, in particular, allowed the family to maintain control over resources in the face of confiscation by the state upon a member's death, and also to create and maintain an extensive commercial infrastructure which facilitated the transport of agricultural produce from the hinterland to the urban centres, the Karaosmanoğlus not being indifferent at all to commerce, contrary to what is suggested by some of the sources on them.

Suraiya Faroqhi's paper focuses on the Tekelioğlu family of Antalya, and on their resources and investments (particularly in their landed property), as well as on the ways in which they sought to preserve and augment both their wealth and political power (for instance, by establishing *vakıfs*). As demand for grains was high in international markets at the turn of the nineteenth century, the Tekelioğulları invested in the cultivation of wheat and barley, which is, according to the author, an indication that much as political factors contributed to the formation of *çiftlik*s in the Ottoman Empire, the significance of market incentives should not be underestimated. The Tekelioğulları are an interesting case of medium-size *ayan*: even though they benefited from the distance which separated them from Istanbul in order to expand their power, their ambitions eventually made them overstep a certain limit and this led to their downfall through intervention of the central government.

Filiz Yenişehirlioğlu discusses Anatolian *ayan* as architectural patrons, focusing on the major *ayan* families of the Karaosmanoğulları, Cihanoğulları, Çapanoğulları, and Çıldıroğulları. The author points out that at the end of the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century architectural patronage in the provinces shifted from the Palace and state officials to local *ayan*, who thus contributed to the development of provincial variations of the new Ottoman baroque style. The buildings sponsored by the *ayan* were meant to reflect their power and concern for the needs of the local population; this is corroborated by the fact that the patronage pattern (types of buildings and geographical distribution) of each *ayan* family corresponded to its priorities, as well as to the particularities of its geographical, political, social, and economic environment.

Émilie Thémopoulou studies the composition and characteristics of the social and economic elite of a major commercial city, Salonica, in the wake of the reforms of the Tanzimat period and further incorporation of Ottoman economy into world economy. The author argues that at a time of general change the emergence of new fields of economic activity and the introduction of new institutions transformed the urban elite, which was no longer composed almost exclusively of people associated with the state in one capacity or another.

Finally, Martin Strohmeier examines the life of Abd al-Rahman Pasha al-Yusuf,

a scion of one of the major elite families of Ottoman Damascus. The al-Yusufs, a family of Kurdish stock, were relative newcomers to the city, as they most likely arrived in the late eighteenth century, and rose to notability through association and alliances with other powerful local figures and families, and government appointments. A post with which the al-Yusufs associated themselves, thus gaining prestige and power, was the position of *amir al-hajj*, which they held for most of the second half of the nineteenth and in the early years of the twentieth century. The case of Abd al-Rahman Pasha exemplifies the transition of an opponent of Arab nationalism from supporter of the Ottoman regime and subject of the sultan to politician in post-Ottoman Syria. Abd al-Rahman, who was seen as a defender of the interests of the 'traditional', established elite families, was assassinated in 1920.

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To recapitulate, what is there to gain from studying Ottoman provincial elites? Since the elites were social actors, they are a factor to be taken into consideration when studying Ottoman society, especially if we treat elites as communal leaders, the embodiments of values which hold a society together and role models for the rest of the community. If we furthermore accept that provincial elites served as mediators between the central state and its subjects, then another aspect of their important role during much of the Ottoman period is that they acted as agents who contributed to the cohesion of the Empire.³⁹ Finally, we should not neglect the fact that the elites' political power or influence was intrinsically linked to possession of economic and fiscal power;⁴⁰ in other words, provincial elites were not only an important political and social factor, but also an economic one.⁴¹

Of course, I do not claim that it suffices to study the elite to understand a given society, nor that elites are the determining factor in history. Elites are an influential social factor, but still one factor among several others, and it is as such that they should be approached;⁴² I by no means propose that we restrict ourselves to studying

39. See, for instance, A. Salzmann, 'An Ancien Régime Revisited: "Privatization" and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire', *Politics and Society*, 21 (1993), 393-423.

40. The example of the Manastır notables studied by Michael Ursinus in this volume is most telling: the local elite accumulated wealth through a combination of forming *çiftlik*s and performing *deruhdeci* duties, i.e., discharging the fiscal obligations of villages in exchange for a fee.

41. See, for instance, the involvement of the Tekelioğulları in *mubayaa* purchases of cereals in Suraiya Faroqhi's paper in this volume.

42. Cf. P. S. Khoury, 'The Urban Notables Paradigm Revisited', *RMMM*, 55-56 (1990), 225-26, and S. Asdrachas, «Προλεγόμενα» [Foreword] to Svoronos, *To Ελληνικό Έθνος*, 13.

the elite, and ignore other social strata or groups: the study of elites is meaningful only in the context of their interaction with these other groups within the wider social and state formation.⁴³ Besides, there was at all times social mobility, which means that no social group was immutable; some people's and groups' fortunes and influence waxed, while those of others waned, and this had an impact on their social standing.

From another point of view, the study of elites could be a fruitful field where theory meets empiricism. Micro-studies, such as most of those in this volume, contribute important information, interpretations, and points of view which can help us further elaborate on the role and characteristics of provincial elites in the Ottoman Empire;⁴⁴ not only this, but, as Yuzo Nagata suggests in his paper, Ottoman provincial elites can, for instance, be comparatively examined with their counterparts in China and Japan.⁴⁵ If we thus manage to amass a large number of empirical studies and combine them with a sound theoretical framework, the result will be a more profound knowledge of elites and society in the Ottoman context and beyond, and, at the same time, a test of the extent of the usefulness of the notion of the 'elite' in historical analysis.

43. 'Hegemony' might provide a useful additional tool of analysis of the relation of Ottoman provincial elites with both the state and other social groups, especially in view of the longevity of the Empire and its overall social stability; see, for instance, J. Haldon, 'The Ottoman State and the Question of State Autonomy: Comparative Perspectives', in H. Berktaş and S. Faroqi (eds), *New Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History* (London 1992), 34, and H. İslamoğlu-Inan, *State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire: Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century* (Leiden-New York-Cologne 1994) (I would like to thank Ms Marina Dimitriadou for providing these references). For a brief discussion of the term, see A. S. Sassoon, *The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought* (eds W. Outhwaite and T. Bottomore), s.v. 'Hegemony'; cf. J. C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven and London 1985), 304-50. The notions of 'negotiation/bargaining' and 'compromise' have been much more popular among Ottomanists in the last fifteen years or so; see, for instance, A. Singer, *Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials: Rural Administration Around Sixteenth-Century Jerusalem* (Cambridge 1994), and Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats* – the latter also refers to "the cultural context" and "cultural legitimation" (pp. 233, 239).

44. Cf. Burke's comment about Dahl's work in *Venice and Amsterdam*, 11.

45. See also S. Faroqi, 'Seeking Wisdom in China: An Attempt to Make Sense of the Celali Rebellions', in her *Coping with the State: Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman Empire 1550-1720* (Istanbul 1995), 99-121; eadem, *Approaching Ottoman History: An Introduction to the Sources* (Cambridge 1999), 215-20; Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats*, 15-16, 133-34, 236.

PART ONE

ASPECTS OF ELITE IDENTITY AND CULTURE

**LA LANGUE TURQUE DANS LES PROVINCES
DE L'EMPIRE OTTOMAN
ET L'ATTITUDE DES ÉLITES LOCALES ENVERS CELLE-CI :
LE CAS DE LA HONGRIE**

György HAZAI

Permettez-moi d'introduire ma modeste communication par quelques remarques. C'est la cinquième fois que j'ai l'occasion et l'honneur de participer au symposium fondé par Mme Elizabeth Zachariadou et M. Nikos Oikonomides en 1991 et qui porte le nom de « Halcyon Days ». Pendant cette brève période, comme le prouvent les volumes des actes parus régulièrement, ce symposium a acquis une grande réputation internationale. Parmi les facteurs qui ont contribué à ce développement le choix des sujets a joué, à mon avis, un rôle important. Les organisateurs ont toujours suggéré des thèmes fascinants, dont la discussion a permis d'arriver à une certaine synthèse possible. Pour moi, surtout en ma qualité de linguiste, c'est-à-dire tel un corbeau blanc parmi les historiens compétents, les sujets ont signifié un certain défi intellectuel, car je me suis senti obligé d'attirer l'attention de mes collègues sur certains aspects qu'offre ma discipline.

En me préparant à la communication d'aujourd'hui j'ai senti encore plus ce défi, car j'ai réalisé que j'entrais dans un domaine où les travaux préliminaires manquaient. Nous savons beaucoup de choses concernant l'élite locale ottomane dans les nombreuses provinces de l'Empire mais en ce qui concerne leur attitude linguistique, surtout en relation avec la population locale, nos connaissances me semblent être très dispersées.

Dans l'élaboration de ma communication, comme l'indique son titre, le cas de la Hongrie sous l'administration ottomane entre 1541 et 1686, comme celui de la Transylvanie dans la même période, étaient le point de départ. Il va de soi que le sujet a suggéré une certaine comparaison avec les autres provinces de l'Empire. Finalement on en est arrivé à cette question : quel était le rôle de la langue turque dans l'Empire ottoman en général, et dans les provinces originellement non-turques en particulier ? Un des aspects de ce sujet peut être formulé par la question suivante : est-ce que l'Empire a suivi une certaine politique de langue à travers les siècles ?¹

1. J'ai abordé ce problème à un colloque, dont seuls les résumés sont publiés : G. Hazai, « Osmanlı Döneminde bir İmparatorluk Dili Olarak Türkçe », in *Osmanlı Devleti'nin 700. Kuruluş Yıldönümü: International Congress on Learning & Education in the Ottoman World. Istanbul, 12-15 April 1999: Abstracts* (Istanbul 1999), 7.

Commençons l'analyse avec le cas de la Hongrie et de la Transylvanie dans la période mentionnée, c'est-à-dire aux XVI^e-XVII^e siècles.

Dans cette région qui, pour les Ottomans, était une importante forteresse dans leur confrontation militaire et politique avec les Habsbourgs, l'on observe que les adversaires, c'est-à-dire les Turcs et les Hongrois, ont consacré une grande attention à la question de la langue qui, pour eux, était un outil important dans les contacts quotidiens. Une série de documents importants prouve cet état de choses.² Les pachas de Buda (Budin) ont utilisé la langue hongroise dans leur correspondance soit avec l'administration des communautés locales des territoires occupés, soit avec les seigneurs hongrois des territoires soi-disant « royaux », c'est-à-dire non-occupés par les Turcs. Comme on le sait bien, de nombreux seigneurs hongrois ont gardé des relations avec leurs anciens sujets dans les territoires sous administration ottomane, souvent dans le but d'encaisser les tributs, dont ils étaient privés à cause de la nouvelle situation politique. Le double paiement des tributs de la population, c'est-à-dire d'une part aux Ottomans, d'autre part aux anciens seigneurs hongrois, a créé en lui-même une série de problèmes, qui, avec d'autres affaires, ont nécessité un contact permanent, et ainsi une correspondance fréquente entre les deux parties.³

En même temps nos sources historiques nous prouvent clairement que les Hongrois eux aussi ont dû attribuer une importance à l'usage de la langue turque dans ces contacts. Ainsi, nous savons bien que tous les deux côtés ont maintenu de petites chancelleries où l'on a rédigé la correspondance nécessaire. Dans ces chancelleries les secrétaires qui possédaient aussi la connaissance de la langue turque étaient bien sûr plus recherchés car ils pouvaient faire ce travail en deux langues.⁴

En Erdel, c'est-à-dire en Transylvanie, la situation était d'un certain point de vue différente. Le prince d'Erdel (*Erdel hükümdarı*) a maintenu des contacts directs avec la Porte, ce qui a rendu indispensable d'attribuer une attention plus particulière à la question de la langue. Les chancelleries des princes ont toujours disposé de secrétaires bilingues, possédant la langue turque.⁵ (Entre parenthèses je voudrais

2. S. Takáts, F. Eckhart et G. Szekfű (éds), *A budai basák magyar nyelvű levelezése. I. 1553-1589* [La correspondance des pachas de Buda en hongrois. I. 1553-1589] (Budapest 1915) ; G. Bayerle (éd.), *Ottoman Diplomacy in Hungary : Letters from the Pashas of Buda 1590-1593* (Bloomington, Ind. 1972). On doit mentionner aussi l'édition des archives de la collection d'Esterházy qui représente une riche documentation de la correspondance entre les deux parties : L. Fekete (éd.), *Türkische Schriften aus dem Archive des Palatins Nikolaus Esterházy 1606-1645* (Budapest 1932).
3. A ce sujet v. la monographie de F. Szakály, *Magyar adóztatás a török hódoltságban* [La taxation de la Hongrie sous la domination turque] (Budapest 1981).
4. S. Takáts, *Rajzok a török világból, 1-4* [Esquisses de la période de la domination turque, 1-4] (Budapest 1915-1922) (v. surtout les parties : 1: 1-104 ; 4: 37-56). Les chapitres mentionnés de l'ouvrage traitent en détail du rôle de ces petites chancelleries et des secrétaires qui y ont travaillé. L'édition abrégée du livre de Takáts en Turquie (*Macaristan Türk Âleminde Çizgiler* [Ankara 1958]) malheureusement ne contient pas ces chapitres.
5. A ce sujet v. l'introduction dans l'édition de l'ouvrage de G. Hazai, *Das Osmanisch-Türkische im XVII. Jahrhundert* (Budapest/La Haye-Paris 1973), 15-19.

mentionner que l'on possède aussi quelques documents en langue turque mais en transcription latine, qui viennent de la chancellerie de la cour de Transylvanie.⁶⁾ L'intérêt attribué à la langue turque est bien attesté par le fait que l'un des ambassadeurs de Transylvanie à Istanbul, qui en même temps y représentait aussi la cour de Brandenburg, a composé sous le titre *Colloquia Familiaria Turcico-Latina* (1672) un manuel pour apprendre la langue turque, qui y était illustré par une abondance de textes, conversations inventées par l'auteur, en transcription latine.⁷

Dans le « territoire royal », c'est-à-dire à l'ouest de la Hongrie aussi on connaît une initiative similaire. Nicolas Illésházy, aristocrate connu et politicien engagé de l'époque, a composé une introduction systématique de la grammaire et du vocabulaire de la langue turque.⁸

On doit se poser cette question à juste titre : d'où sont venus les hommes qui ont travaillé dans les chancelleries des Hongrois et des Turcs ? En d'autres termes : quel était l'arrière plan qui a fourni des éléments concernant la connaissance nécessaire de la langue turque ?

Il ne fait aucun doute que le bilinguisme créé dans la région par la domination ottomane, qui dans les Balkans avait ses antécédents depuis des siècles, était le facteur le plus important pour établir et renforcer le rôle et la position de la langue turque dans les chancelleries des Turcs et des Hongrois sur les territoires soit occupés, soit non-occupés par les Ottomans. Il ne faut pas oublier que dans ce cas une pratique bien connue, qui est née dans la première phase des relations de la Porte avec l'étranger à l'Ouest, était poursuivie. Il est bien connu que dans cette période les Grecs, les Italiens et les Serbes qui possédaient la langue turque ont joué un rôle clé dans la correspondance des Ottomans avec leurs voisins.⁹

En ce qui concerne le rôle de la langue turque dans les contacts quotidiens à l'époque de la domination turque en Hongrie, nous pouvons dessiner un tableau suffisamment clair. On sait bien que la présence turque s'est bornée aux territoires hongrois occupés par les Ottomans, aux garnisons militaires et aux éléments accompagnant cette couche relativement mince. Ils ont eu un contact quotidien avec la population hongroise, surtout avec les hommes dont la vie était liée aux villes ou à l'environ des forteresses. Ces relations ont dû établir un contact linguistique, comme cela est prouvé par les nombreux éléments turcs de la langue hongroise de l'époque.¹⁰ Cette couche de mots, très large à l'époque, mais qui plus tard a disparu

6. C'est M.-G. Bayerle qui a découvert un recueil des documents en turc écrits en caractères latins dans la Bibliothèque Nationale de Hongrie. Ils sont maintenant en cours de préparation pour leur publication.

7. Hazai, *Das Osmanisch-Türkische*.

8. Illésházy Nicolai *Dictionarium Turcico-Latinum* (Vienne 1668). L'ouvrage était édité par J. Németh, *Die türkische Sprache in Ungarn im siebzehnten Jahrhundert* (Budapest 1970).

9. G. Hazai, « Zur Rolle des Serbischen im Verkehr des Osmanischen Reiches mit Osteuropa im 15.-16. Jh. », *Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher*, 48 (1976), 82-88 (avec facs).

10. A la documentation et l'analyse de ces mots d'emprunt v. S. Kakuk, *Recherches sur l'histoire de la langue osmanlie des XVIe et XVIIe siècles. Les éléments osmanlis de la langue hongroise* (Budapest/La Haye-Paris 1973).

de la langue, prouve clairement que dans cette interférence linguistique les éléments balkaniques, surtout ceux qui sont venus de la zone occidentale de la péninsule, ont joué le rôle principal.

Voilà quelle était la situation linguistique, la cohabitation des langues dans une province lointaine de l'Empire ottoman.

Tournons-nous maintenant vers le cœur de l'Empire où un tableau complètement différent se présente.

L'immigration turque en Anatolie, plus tard la colonisation ottomane dans les Balkans, ont créé une cohabitation étroite entre les ethnies différentes à travers les siècles. Une conséquence naturelle de cette situation était un bi- ou multilinguisme. Les traces des contacts linguistiques à travers les siècles sont bien reflétées dans les langues de tous les protagonistes de ce processus historique. Au premier plan c'est le vocabulaire de ces langues qui, avec une abondance d'emprunts mutuels, présente un témoignage fidèle de ce processus. Mais souvent aussi les inventaires morphologiques ou les structures syntactiques portent les traces de cette symbiose linguistique. En ce qui concerne les emprunts turcs dans les langues balkaniques, ils ont formé la base d'un certain koinè turc pour la population indigène non-turque (plus tard, après l'émergence des états nationaux dans les Balkans, le nationalisme linguistique a détruit la base d'un tel koinè).

En même temps il ne faut pas oublier le développement sur le plan de la langue littéraire. Ici la langue turque a pu engendrer deux idiomes turcs satellites, notamment celui des Arméniens et des Karamanlis orthodoxes.¹¹ Ces deux langues, qui nous ont légué une documentation énormément riche en écriture arménienne et grecque, étaient en liaison étroite avec la langue turque-ottomane, mais en même temps ils ont formé et suivi une voie de développement particulière. Entre parenthèses il faut remarquer que nous n'en sommes qu'au début de l'étude de ces littératures, qui nous promet un grand enrichissement de nos connaissances.¹²

Voilà quelles étaient les circonstances linguistiques dans les provinces centrales de l'Empire ottoman, qui bien sûr ont déterminé à ce sujet la base de l'attitude de l'élite locale et mobile dont la vie était liée à ces provinces.

Quittons maintenant les provinces centrales de l'Empire ottoman, c'est-à-dire la région de l'Anatolie et de la Roumélie et tournons-nous vers les provinces arabes, où la présence turque avant la conquête ottomane n'était pas sans antécédents. Il suffit d'avoir présente en mémoire l'immigration lente mais permanente des troupes de mercenaires en direction de l'Asie Centrale au Proche- et Moyen-Orient à travers les siècles. L'établissement du pouvoir des mamelouks en Égypte, où auprès

11. Pour la documentation de ces deux idiomes v. les études suivantes : H. Berberian, « La littérature arméno-turque », in *Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta. Tomum Secundum* (Aquis Mattiacis 1965), 809-19 ; J. Eckman, « Die karamanische Literatur », in *ibid.*, 819-35. A ce sujet v. A. Tietze, « Ethnicity and Change in Ottoman Intellectual History », *Turcica*, 21-23 (1991), 385-95.

12. Ici on ne mentionnera que deux publications importantes : E. Misailidis, *Seyreyle Dünyayı (Temaşa-ı Dünya ve Cefakâr-u Cefakeş)*, éd. R. Anhegger et V. Günyol (Istanbul 1986) ; Vartan Paşa, *Akabi Hikayesi: İlk Türkçe Roman, 1851*, éd. A. Tietze (Istanbul 1991).

des éléments kiptchaques le rôle des éléments oghouz est bien attesté, c'était sans doute le point culminant de ce processus. Grâce aux recherches de T. Halasi-Kun et A. Zajackowski nous possédons une bonne connaissance de la présence de ces dialectes turcs dans cette région.¹³

Il est évident que la situation linguistique du point de vue de la base linguistique turque devait être très variée dans les différentes provinces arabes, où l'Égypte a représenté un cas spécial. Tout de même les conquérants ottomans à leur arrivée dans la région, surtout en Égypte, n'étaient pas confrontés à un milieu linguistique tout à fait étranger. D'une part, à cet égard il ne faut pas oublier la base même commune islamique qui a dû faciliter la communication entre Turcs et Arabes. Au niveau du contact culturel, pour simplifier appelons cela « niveau de *medrese* » : la connaissance de la langue arabe par les intellectuels turcs était un facteur important dans ce processus. D'autre part, à un niveau plus bas, disons « au niveau de la rue et du marché » le contact des garnisons turques et de leurs compagnons habituels (commerçants etc.) avec la population locale était bien facilité par la large couche des emprunts arabes dans la langue turque. Ainsi, il est bien sûr que dans ces provinces aussi un koinè turc est né pour la communication quotidienne entre Turcs et Arabes. En tout cas une large présence des éléments turcs dans les différents dialectes arabes bien documentée est une évidence indirecte pour l'existence d'un koinè turc qui a dû jouer un rôle intermédiaire dans ce processus linguistique.¹⁴

Au cours des dernières décennies on a consacré – heureusement – plus d'attention à l'étude des emprunts turcs dans les différents dialectes locaux de la langue arabe.¹⁵ Tout de même, du point de vue de l'étude des contacts linguistiques à travers les siècles nous sommes encore au commencement du travail qui attend les chercheurs.

Voilà nous voici arrivés à la fin de notre bref tour d'horizon à propos du rôle de la langue turque dans l'Empire ottoman. Il me semble utile de compléter ce tableau par une comparaison concernant l'Empire romain.

Comme il est bien connu, l'Empire romain au comble de son pouvoir s'est étendu sur toute la totalité du bassin méditerranéen. La conquête romaine était suivie

13. Pour les nombreuses études de T. Halasi-Kun et A. Zajackowski v. G. Hazai, « Bibliography of the Publications of Tibor Halasi-Kun », *ArchOtt*, 13 (1993-94), 45-53 ; [O. Pritsak], « Schriftenverzeichnis Ananiasz Zajackowski 1925-1963 », *Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher*, 36 (1965), 234-51.

14. Au sujet d'un koinè turc utilisé par la population locale dans les provinces de l'Empire ottoman dans les Balkans v. G. Hazai, « Remarques sur les rapports des langues slaves des Balkans avec le turc-osmanli », *Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 7 (1961), 97-138.

15. On trouve un bref aperçu des études consacrées à ce sujet dans les ouvrages suivants : G. Hazai, *Kurze Einführung in das Studium der türkischen Sprache* (Budapest/Wiesbaden 1978), 71-75 ; A. Tietze, « Der Einfluss des Türkischen auf andere Sprachen. (Die Veröffentlichungen seit etwa 1950) », in G. Hazai (éd.), *Handbuch der türkischen Sprache. Teil I* (Budapest 1990), 119-45.

partout dans les provinces par l'introduction, plus tard par le renforcement, de la culture et de la langue latine. En examinant cette évolution qui est bien connue sous le terme de « romanisation », surtout son résultat à ce plan historique, on peut résumer les faits comme suit.

Le résultat le plus important de la romanisation linguistique se présente dans l'émergence des langues néolatines à l'ouest de l'Empire romain et dans les Balkans. A l'est de Rome, la langue latine s'est trouvée longtemps en confrontation avec sa rivale, c'est-à-dire avec la langue grecque, dont l'histoire est bien décrite dans l'excellente monographie de Zilliacus.¹⁶ Finalement, le latin a perdu cette bataille : une romanisation linguistique similaire à celle de l'ouest et dans les Balkans n'a pas pu se réaliser. Pour différentes raisons historiques le rôle du latin en Afrique du Nord est resté temporairement limité.

En ce qui concerne le caractère même de la romanisation linguistique qui a radicalement changé la carte des langues en Europe, il faut souligner que ce grand changement qui était la conséquence de la conquête romaine n'était pas accompagné de grandes migrations ou par des mouvements de masses. Dans ce processus qui est bien documenté par les sources, et dont ainsi on peut dire qu'il s'est déroulé sur l'écran historique devant nos yeux, la force attractive de la civilisation romaine a joué le rôle le plus important.¹⁷

La conséquence linguistique de la conquête ottomane présente un tableau différent. C'est bien compréhensible car les circonstances historiques, la position des cultures, étroitement liées avec des religions qui sont nées entre le I^{er} et le VII^e siècles, et des langues de la vaste région qui était intégrée dans l'Empire ottoman étaient complètement différentes. Ainsi on ne peut pas constater un processus similaire à celui de la romanisation qui a conduit à la domination de la langue des conquérants dans une large région. On peut constater que la situation linguistique qui était connue avant la conquête ottomane est restée grosso modo la même. Par exemple la colonisation turque dans les Balkans et à Chypre y a introduit la langue turque en créant ainsi un bilinguisme, mais n'a jamais pu mettre en danger l'existence des langues locales.

Dans les provinces où il n'y avait que la présence militaire et administrative l'émergence d'un koinè spécial a assuré le contact linguistique.

La conséquence la plus importante de la conquête romaine était la naissance d'un groupe de nouvelles langues, c'est-à-dire de la famille des langues néoromanes. Le résultat de la conquête ottomane était différent de ce point de vue. La langue turque n'a pas aujourd'hui d'idiomes qui lui succèdent tels que le latin. Tout de même, grâce aux circonstances différentes, surtout à celles de la cohabitation et ainsi du bilinguisme, deux idiomes spéciaux, liés aux ethnies de l'Empire sont nés. Ce sont : le turc arménien et le turc karamanli, dont l'usage a conduit à la naissance d'une large littérature, dont l'écriture était basée sur l'alphabet arménien et grec.

16. H. Zilliacus, *Zum Kampf der Weltsprachen im oströmischen Reich* (Helsingfors 1935).

17. A ce sujet v. de préférence : J. Herman, *Le latin vulgaire* (=Que sais-je 1247) (Paris 1967), 19-26.

Finalement nous devons en revenir à la question posée au début de notre tour d'horizon : les Ottomans ont-ils eu une certaine politique de langue à adopter pour la population multiethnique et plurilinguistique de leur empire ?

Je voudrais souligner tout d'abord que le terme « politique de langue » est un terme récent dans la science des langues. Il traite surtout des faits qui sont devenus connus après la deuxième guerre mondiale quand la création d'une série de nouveaux États d'un caractère multiethnique était confrontée avec la tâche d'établir, disons, « la langue nationale », plus simplement d'un idiome commun pour la population.

Ainsi si l'on est strict, on peut dire que l'usage de ce terme pour les empires de l'antiquité et du moyen âge est à un certain degré anachronique. Tout de même, au lieu du terme « politique de langue » on pourrait parler peut-être d'une certaine volonté du pouvoir central à ce sujet.

Je pense que dans le cas des Ottomans on ne peut pas parler de l'existence d'une telle volonté concernant les langues de la population. Mais il y avait sûrement une attitude linguistique qui variait d'une région à l'autre, et qui était déterminée pratiquement par des différentes conditions ethniques, politiques etc.

Cette attitude linguistique était bien évidente pour la population dans la région donnée, qui a sûrement influencé, même déterminé, le comportement de l'élite locale à travers les siècles.

(Académie Hongroise des Sciences)

APERÇU SUR LA MOBILITÉ DES ÉLITES OTTOMANES MUSULMANES LOCALES D'APRÈS LES STÈLES FUNÉRAIRES*

Nicolas VATIN

L'importance des migrations, volontaires ou contraintes, pour l'évolution de la population de l'Empire ottoman est un fait bien connu. Ces phénomènes ont donné lieu à plus d'une étude, en particulier à propos des mouvements de réfugiés quittant à partir de la fin du XVIII^e siècle les provinces perdues.¹ On est moins bien renseigné concernant les déplacements spontanés au sein de l'Empire, même si l'on est en droit d'estimer que la société ottomane était au total assez mobile, et sur des distances parfois considérables.²

Mon intention n'est pas de présenter un tableau systématique du phénomène, mais d'en montrer le reflet sur une source particulière. En effet, les épitaphes ottomanes fournissent parfois des indications géographiques sur les morts ou leurs familles. Mon propos est d'étudier ces indications dans un certain nombre de collections d'inscriptions funéraires de la province ottomane. Moins complète que d'autres, cette documentation a en revanche l'intérêt de nous faire rencontrer des individus³ (dont

* Qu'il me soit permis de remercier Nathalie Clayer et Alexandre Popovic, qui m'ont aidé à repérer certaines localités bosniaques, et Elisabetta Borromeo, qui a dessiné les cartes qui illustrent cette communication.

1. Il ne me paraît pas utile de fournir ici une bibliographie, qui serait nécessairement incomplète. Qu'on me permette de renvoyer à D. Panzac, *La population de l'Empire ottoman. Cinquante ans (1941-1990) de publications et de recherches* (Aix-en-Provence 1993). La politique bien connue des déportations (*sürgün*) ne nous concerne pas ici, dans la mesure où dans la très grande majorité, les stèles funéraires sont de la fin du XVIII^e et surtout du XIX^e siècle. Sur les mouvements migratoires vers l'Empire ottoman aux XVIII^e-XIX^e siècles, cf. K. Karpas, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison 1985), 60-77 (qui reprend son article « Population Movements in the Ottoman State in the 19th Century: An Outline », in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont et P. Dumont (éds), *Contributions à l'histoire économique et sociale de l'Empire ottoman* [Louvain 1983], 385-428).
2. Cf. S. Faroqhi, *Towns and Townspeople of Ottoman Anatolia: Trade, Craft and Food Production in an Urban Setting* (Cambridge 1984), 267-87.
3. De ce point de vue, cette étude est plus proche de celle réalisée à partir des registres du cadastre d'Eyüp par S. Faroqhi, « Migration into Eighteenth Century 'Greater Istanbul' as Reflected in the Kadı Registers of Eyüp », *Turcica*, 30 (1998), 163-83. Mais cet article concerne une population de niveau plutôt inférieur et des phénomènes d'exode rural, alors que mon étude se consacre à des « élites » provinciales. Pour une réflexion sur les

beaucoup appartiennent à des catégories qui n'apparaissent pas ou peu dans d'autres documentations) et de leur donner la parole, dans la mesure où la présence d'un nom de lieu sur une inscription marque la volonté consciente d'afficher une origine.

Ce projet repose sur un postulat, confirmé par l'étude des cimetières ottomans que je mène depuis une vingtaine d'années avec MM. Bacqué-Grammont, Eldem, Laqueur, Yerasimos et quelques autres : dans leur état actuel, les cimetières ottomans, ne fût-ce qu'en raison du prix des stèles de marbre, sont le reflet de l'élite locale, de ce que j'ai appelé le dessus du panier d'une société.⁴ Aussi y a-t-il des cimetières de grands dignitaires comme de moindres personnages, mais ce sont les gens dont nous lisons aujourd'hui les épitaphes qui dominaient leur ville, leur quartier ou leur village.

Afin d'étudier l'importance, pour ces milieux, de l'origine géographique et d'éventuels déplacements, je me suis donc attaché à dépouiller un certain nombre de publications d'inscriptions funéraires dans différentes régions et localités de l'Empire, de manière à traiter de zones géographiques différentes, mais aussi d'agglomérations de diverses importances. En premier lieu, j'ai exploité les publications de Mehmed Mujezinović, où j'ai trouvé un grand nombre d'inscriptions funéraires de Bosnie, en particulier de Sarajevo, Mostar et Travnik, mais également de localités moins importantes.⁵ L'autre ville considérée, anatolienne celle-ci, est Sinope, dont J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont et moi-même avons naguère publié les stèles subsistantes.⁶ À côté de ces centres, outre des localités bosniaques secondaires déjà évoquées, j'ai pris en compte le cimetière du village de Karacaköy,⁷ en Thrace turque, et celui de Babakale,⁸ sur la côte anatolienne en face de Mytilène. Je me suis également référé au cimetière du *tekke* de Karadut,⁹ à Smyrne, et à des inscrip-

cimetières stambouliotes péri-urbains comme source démographique, cf. J.-F. Pérouse, « Les cimetières d'Istanbul : sources vivantes de l'étude des dynamiques démographiques actuelles », *Anatolia Moderna / Yeni Anadolu*, 9 (2000), 217-35.

4. Cf. N. Vatin, « Les cimetières musulmans ottomans, source d'histoire sociale », in D. Panzac (éd.), *Les villes dans l'Empire ottoman : activités et sociétés* (Paris 1991), I : 149-63 (155 sq.) ; N. Vatin et S. Yerasimos, *Les cimetières dans la ville. Statut, choix et organisation des lieux d'inhumation dans Istanbul intra muros* (Paris 2001), 73 sqq.
5. M. Mujezinović, *Islamska epigrafika u Bosni i Hercegovini* [Épigraphie Islamique en Bosnie-Herzégovine], 3 vols (Sarajevo 1974-82). J'y renvoie en mentionnant, après le n° du tome, la page et la place qu'y occupe la notice citée. Mujezinović n'édite pas toutes les stèles funéraires qu'il signale. J'ai donc dû me borner à exploiter celles dont il reproduit l'épitaphe.
6. J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont et N. Vatin, « *Stelae Turcicae VI*. Stèles funéraires de Sinope », *Anatolia Moderna / Yeni Anadolu*, 3 (1992), 105-207 (ST VI).
7. *Id.*, « *Stelae Turcicae IV*. Le cimetière de la bourgade thrace de Karacaköy », *Anatolia Moderna / Yeni Anadolu*, 2 (1991), 7-27.
8. Inédit. J'ai utilisé le relevé que mon ami Edhem Eldem a eu la gentillesse de me communiquer.
9. N. Ülker, « İzmir-Yağhanelerdeki Bektaşî Mezar Kitabeleri (XIX. ve XX. Yüzyıl) », in *IV. Araştırma Sonuçları Toplantısı* (Ankara 1987), 1-37 (Karadut).

tions funéraires relevées à Şile,¹⁰ sur la rive de la mer Noire non loin d'Istanbul, et à Diyarbakir.¹¹ Enfin des comparaisons ont été faites avec un corpus de stèles d'Istanbul et de sa région.¹²

Plusieurs précisions doivent encore être apportées. D'abord, il faut signaler qu'une même stèle peut fournir des indications d'origine sur plusieurs personnes différentes. Les défunts ne sont donc pas seuls concernés. De toute manière, et de façon plus générale, si le corpus a été établi de manière à être aussi équilibré que le permettait la documentation à ma disposition, il convient d'insister sur le fait que mon étude ne prétend pas avoir une valeur statistique, même quand des chiffres seront fournis à l'occasion, pour donner un ordre de grandeur. Il en va de même des datations, parfois précisées à titre d'information, quand il a paru possible d'en tirer un enseignement. En gros, les épitaphes se partagent inégalement entre le XVIII^e siècle et (principalement) le XIX^e siècle.

Il faut enfin distinguer différents types d'indications géographiques sur les stèles. J'ai trouvé mentionnée à 73 reprises la localité où un individu exerçait une fonction. Dans la très grande majorité des cas (63), il s'agit de l'endroit même où le cimetière est implanté ou de la circonscription. Il ne faut donc pas accorder – du point de vue de la présente étude – une importance excessive à cette indication. Certes, elle signale le caractère local du mort ou de ses proches, mais on peut aussi considérer qu'elle fait en quelque sorte partie du nom ou du moins de la désignation sociale du personnage, qu'il est normal de définir par sa fonction dans la société :¹³ il n'y a donc rien d'étonnant à ce qu'il soit précisé que tel ou tel est ou était cadi à Mostar ou ingénieur à Sinope...

Or ce qui nous intéresse ici est la mention explicite d'une origine. Je vais donc successivement tenter de voir quel espace géographique recouvrent ces informations ; quelles explications les inscriptions permettent de donner aux déplacements qu'elles signalent ; enfin, par l'analyse des formules employées, quelle signification revêtait pour ces élites provinciales ottomanes musulmanes des XVIII^e-XIX^e siècles la mention dans une épitaphe d'une origine géographique.¹⁴

10. J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont et N. Vatin, « *Stelae Turcicae III*. Le musée de plein air de Şile », in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont, B. Flemming, M. Gökberg et İ. Ortaylı (éds), *Türkische Miscellen. Robert Anhegger Festschrift-Armağanı-Mélanges* (Istanbul 1986), 45-61 (*ST III*).
11. M. İlhan, « Diyarbakır'ın Türbe, Yatır ve Mezarlıkları », in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont et A. Tibet (éds), *Cimetières et traditions funéraires dans le monde islamique* (Ankara 1996), 179-211.
12. J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont, H.-P. Laqueur et N. Vatin, « *Stelae Turcicae I*. Küçük Aya Sofya », *Istanbul Mitteilungen*, 34 (1984), 441-539 (*ST I*) ; *id.*, *Stelae Turcicae II*. *Cimetières de la mosquée de Sokollu Mehmed Paşa à Kadırga Limanı, de Bostancı Ali et du türbe de Sokollu Mehmed Paşa à Eyüb* (Tübingen 1990) (*ST II*) ; J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont et al., « Le tekke bektachi de Merdivenköy », *Anatolia Moderna / Yeni Anadolu*, 2 (1991), 29-135 (*ST V*).
13. Sur ces questions, cf. N. Vatin, « La notation du nom propre sur les stèles funéraires ottomanes », in A.-M. Christin (éd.), *L'écriture du nom propre* (Paris 1998), 135-48 (particulièrement 140-43).
14. Ici il pourra être fait usage de mentions d'origine locale et non plus seulement extérieure.

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Les villes d'une certaine importance, ou plus précisément celles qui jouaient un rôle de premier plan dans leur région,¹⁵ sont évidemment celles où l'on constate la plus grande proportion d'origines relativement lointaines : 36 sur 47 à Sinope, 20 sur 34 à Sarajevo, 10 sur 15 à Travnik.

A Sarajevo, on note la mention de localités bosniaques à 15 reprises, rouméliotes 6 fois – encore assez proches en général, puisqu'il s'agit (en dehors de Larissa et Andrinople) de villes ou villages de Macédoine, de Serbie ou du Montenegro,¹⁶ anatoliennes 7 fois, Istanbul apparaissant 5 fois et l'Égypte une fois. Les proportions sont comparables à Travnik, avec la mention de localités bosniaques 6 fois,¹⁷ rouméliotes 2 fois (Belgrade et Larissa), et anatoliennes 2 fois,¹⁸ Istanbul apparaissant 2 fois et, à une reprise, la Crète, la Syrie et le Maghreb. En revanche les origines bosniaques (en plus petit nombre) sont majoritaires dans les autres cimetières bosniaques pris en compte. De façon assez naturelle, les régions proches l'emportent donc de façon manifeste. On n'en soulignera pas moins une assez grande mobilité car, pour ne prendre que l'exemple de la Bosnie, c'est l'ensemble de la région qui est concerné et les lieux d'origine indiqués peuvent être distants de plusieurs dizaines de kilomètres : plus de cent entre Sarajevo et Mostar ou Novipazar, par exemple. C'est particulièrement net à Sarajevo où j'ai compté 13 différents noms de lieu.¹⁹ Sans doute faut-il lier ce fait à l'importance administrative et économique du chef-lieu de la province de Bosnie.

Sinope présente un équilibre un peu similaire entre localités proches ou plus éloignées. On recense 9 fois des localités proches, côtières (4) ou un peu à l'intérieur des terres (5),²⁰ à quoi on pourra ajouter 10 mentions de sites encore relativement peu éloignés, continentaux (3) ou côtiers (7).²¹ Soit un total de 19 sur 47. Pour le reste, l'Anatolie apparaît 4 fois,²² la Roumélie 4 fois²³ et Istanbul 5 fois. Mais ce qui paraît très remarquable et caractéristique de Sinope est le nombre élevé

15. Si Sarajevo était une relativement grande ville, Sinope ou Travnik n'étaient pas plus peuplées que Mostar ou Banjaluka. Mais la première était le centre le plus important de sa région et une base navale militaire ; la seconde abritait une garnison dont la mention apparaît fréquemment sur les stèles.

16. Kocani (*İlva* d'Üsküp/Skopje), Skopje (Üsküb), Kotor.

17. Outre l'épithète *bosnevi*, Sarajevo, Mostar, Prusac (Akhisar) et Livno (anciennement Hlivno : Ahlivne en ottoman).

18. Kastamonu et Kayseri.

19. Olovo, Bistrik, Foca, Modrica, Novi Pazar (Yenipazar), Ostrovica, Gorazde, Bihac, Mostar, Praca (Vrhprace), Banjaluka, Travnik.

20. Respectivement : Abana, Bafra, İnebolu, Kabalı ; et : Boyabad, Ezirgan, Kastamonu, Saфра Divanı.

21. Respectivement : Amasya, Çankırı, Taşköprü ; et : Keşab, Rize, Trabzon, Ünye.

22. Akşehir, Ardahan, Biga, Eğin.

23. Arta, Gallipoli, Kavala, Salonique.

de personnes présentées comme originaires des côtes pontiques non anatoliennes : elles sont 15 venant du Caucase (sans plus de précision), de Circassie (4 mentions), d'Abkhasie, et surtout de Crimée, d'Azov et des environs du détroit de Kerç (9 cas).²⁴ Je reviendrai plus loin sur ce dernier point.

Notre corpus comportant également des villages, nous pouvons constater que ceux-ci n'ignorent pas non plus une certaine mobilité. Dans celui de Karacaköy en Thrace sont mentionnés, en dehors du village d'Ormanlı, dans le même canton, des localités de la circonscription de Vize, à plusieurs dizaines de kilomètres,²⁵ et de celle d'Andrinople (soit 150 km environ), sans compter un grand personnage en poste à Istanbul et un Albanais. Le cimetière de Babakale, autre petit village, mais situé celui-ci sur la côte anatolienne en face de Mytilène et marqué par la présence d'une forteresse ottomane, fournit beaucoup plus de noms, mais présente une configuration un peu similaire : sur 17 indications de lieu, 4 renvoient aux environs ;²⁶ on peut ajouter Gallipoli, Kemer, Lapseki (2 fois) et, à deux reprises, Molova (Molivos) dans l'île voisine de Mytilène, soit un total de 10 mentions de localités proches (sur 17). Les autres endroits nommés, 5 fois en Anatolie (Smyrne, Foça et Aydın), 1 fois en Roumélie (Dimetoka/Didimotiho) et Istanbul (ou plus précisément Üsküdar) sont nettement plus éloignés, mais demeurent à des distances moyennes.²⁷

Ceci est d'autant plus vrai que Smyrne et Foça sont des villes côtières, ce qui diminue les difficultés de déplacement. Du reste, c'est 11 fois sur 17 que les lieux d'origine indiqués sont situés en bord de mer. La même constatation s'impose à Sinope, puisque sur 47 citations de lieux, 26 renvoient aux côtes de la mer Noire, soit sur les rivages anatoliens (11), soit, comme on l'a vu, sur ceux du Caucase et de la Crimée (15). L'importance de ces chiffres est plus frappante encore si on les compare à ceux des lieux proches ou relativement proches en Anatolie, qui ne

24. Anapa, Azov, Gözleve, Kefe, Kerç.

25. Evrenli, dans le canton même de Vize, à une cinquantaine de kilomètres de Karacaköy, et Sergen, à 70 km environ.

26. Babaderesi (?), Çaviş dans le *kaza* de Bayramiç, Çamköy, Kulalı dans le *kaza* d'Ayvacak.

27. Mentionnons également le cas du village d'Örcün, au fond du golfe d'Izmit (cf. A. N. Galitekin, *Osmanlı Dönemi Gölcük Mezar Taşları* [Gölcük s.d.], 168-216). Sur 327 épitaphes, seules 27 donnent une indication géographique plus ou moins précise : 7 désignent Örcün même ou le village voisin de Değirmendere ; Istanbul, Malatya, Trébizonde, Smyrne sont mentionnées une fois chacune. Ajoutons une Bosniaque, un personnage appelé Bozokoğlu Ahmed Ağa et un mystérieux Koko yalı (ou plutôt Kavkayalı ?) Süleymanoğlu Miftah. Ceci ne diffère guère de ce qu'on note dans d'autres villages. En revanche celui-ci se distingue par la présence dans ses cimetières de 13 Albanais, tous du sexe masculin, dont 10 plus précisément étaient originaires d'Elbistan. Ceci n'est pas pour surprendre : on sait qu'au milieu du XIX^e siècle les villageois musulmans de cette région avaient coutume de partir pour quelques années dans les environs de la capitale, où ils étaient employés comme jardiniers et travailleurs agricoles. Cf. J. G. von Hahn, *Albanesische Studien* (Iena 1854 [repr. Athènes 1981]), 82. Sur les migrations albanaises à l'époque ottomane, cf. Faroqi, « Migration », 173 sq.

sont que 8 fois mentionnés. C'est que la proximité ne se calcule pas seulement en distance. Bien qu'éloignée de plusieurs centaines de kilomètres, la lointaine Trébizonde (3 références) avait peut-être plus de relations avec Sinope que des villes dans l'intérieur des terres comme Kastamonu qui, à une cinquantaine de kilomètres, était le centre important le plus proche. Mais la géographie locale peut en partie expliquer ce phénomène : en effet, Sinope était coupée de l'arrière-pays anatolien par une chaîne de montagnes, et il fallait en 1890 trente six heures pour rejoindre Kastamonu.²⁸ Dans ces conditions, on conçoit que les relations maritimes aient été plus naturelles et il n'est pas étonnant que la ville se soit plutôt tournée vers la mer.²⁹ Bien que les obstacles continentaux n'aient pas été aussi dissuasifs pour la population de Babakale, des considérations similaires s'imposent évidemment dans son cas. Du reste la présence de la mer faisait des riverains, tout naturellement, des marins dont il n'est pas étonnant qu'ils aient eu des relations avec leurs collègues des autres ports de l'Égée ou de la mer Noire, selon le cas. On constate en effet leur présence notable dans la bonne société de Sinope ou de Şile.³⁰

Donc, pour résumer brièvement ce qu'on peut tirer de nos cartes, il apparaît que les quelques cas qui constituent notre corpus montrent, en Roumélie comme en Anatolie, sur les rives de l'Égée comme de la mer Noire, une société où l'on reste assurément entre soi, mais qui est néanmoins assez largement ouverte sur l'extérieur. Les contextes géographiques influent évidemment sur les modalités de cette ouverture, mais on trouve dans les grandes cités la mention aussi bien de l'Anatolie que de la Roumélie,³¹ Istanbul étant souvent présente.³² Istanbul con-

28. Cf. *Kastamoni vilâyet salnamesi* (Kastamonu 1306/1890-91), 474.

29. Sur tout ceci, cf. *ST VI*, 113.

30. Pour Sinope, cf. *ibid.*, 114 ; pour Şile, cf. *ST III*. Quant à Babakale, on ne mentionne sur les épitaphes de son cimetière que 3 *reis* et (peut-être) un *kapudan*. La garnison de la forteresse joua vraisemblablement un rôle prédominant dans l'élite du village, mais les marins ne peuvent pas en avoir été absents.

31. Sur ce point, la situation paraît donc assez différente de celle analysée par S. Faroqi à Eyüp (« Migration », 172-73). Ceci peut s'expliquer par la différence des milieux concernés : nous avons affaire ici à des gens différents de ceux rencontrés par S. Faroqi, qui pratiquaient surtout un exode rural impliquant des regroupements géographiques au sein même de la ville d'arrivée. A Eyüp, ces provinciaux venaient tous des mêmes localités rouméliotes. Dans les cimetières du quartier de Kadirga Limanı, nous avons rencontré des concentrations tout aussi remarquables de personnes originaires de quelques villes d'Anatolie, en particulier Kastamonu (cf. *ST II*, 24). Cf. également le cas du *tekke* bektachi de Kazlıçeşme, dans la banlieue européenne d'Istanbul : peut-être en partie en raison des origines albanaises du fondateur Perişan Baba, le *tekke* apparaît comme une antenne stambouliote du bektachisme rouméliote : cf. N. Vatin et T. Zarcone, « Le tekke bektachi de Kazlıçeşme I. Étude historique et épigraphique », *Anatolia Moderna / Yeni Anadolu*, 7 (1997), 77-109 (84-85).

32. Le cimetière du *tekke* de Şemsî Baba (dit aussi de Karadut), près de Smyrne, est un cas particulier sur lequel on reviendra. Les origines y sont à la fois diverses et lointaines : Istanbul, Brousse, Ereğli (vraisemblablement), la Crète, l'Eubée, Halkalı (près de Niş) et Belgrade.

stitue du reste un cas particulier. Son ampleur fait qu'on estime parfois nécessaire de préciser le quartier.³³ D'autre part, si le simple nom d'Istanbul est employé à 3 reprises, d'autres désignations rappellent (aussi bien à Sinope qu'à Sarajevo) qu'il s'agit de la capitale de l'Empire, dont la nature est exceptionnelle : c'est *İslambol* (1 cas), la « Porte de félicité » (*der-i saadet*, 2 cas) ou « le Seuil [sublime] » (*asitaneli*, *asitane-i âliyede*, 4 cas). Plus la ville est importante, plus large est l'espace géographique dessiné par les références apparaissant sur les stèles, mais même dans les petites localités de notre corpus, plusieurs dizaines de kilomètres peuvent les séparer des lieux mentionnés dans les épitaphes.

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Est-il possible d'aller plus loin, et de tenter de comprendre ces déplacements à partir des indications fournies par les inscriptions ? C'est souvent difficile, en particulier dans de petits cimetières aux épitaphes peu développées et donc avares de détails, comme ceux de Karacaköy, de Şile³⁴ ou de Babakale. D'autre part, on est nécessairement réduit à faire des hypothèses. Que dire, par exemple, de Aşcıoğlu Raşid Ağa, capitaine de la police montée (*süvari zabıtiye yüzbaşısı*) à Kastamonu, décédé en 1894, dont la stèle se trouve à Sinope :³⁵ était-il de passage ? Était-il revenu passer sa retraite au pays ou avait-il choisi Sinope pour son climat ou quelque autre raison personnelle ?³⁶ La même incertitude règne à propos de Hacı Ahmed Nuri Paşa, de Boyabad (à quelques kilomètres à l'intérieur des terres), dont l'épitaphe précise qu'il était retraité à Sinope³⁷ quand il y mourut en 1905.

On peut néanmoins dégager quelques catégories.

En premier lieu, la personne étrangère peut être décédée alors qu'elle n'était que de passage. On n'en trouvera pas d'exemple à Karacaköy, qui n'est qu'un village à l'écart des voies de communication. Mais à Babakale, deux marins (*reis*) originaires de Gallipoli et de Smyrne peuvent avoir été de passage, de même que Mehmed Çavuş, décédé « sur la route du pèlerinage » (*hac yolında*),³⁸ comme apparemment ce Ferhad Reis dont ignore l'origine, mort à Sinope en 1604-05.³⁹ De même, Receb

33. *Sakin-i asitane-i âliyede vefatı* (Sinope, SSB A 16) ; *İslambolî Eyyüb Ensari civarında Taşçı mahallesinden* (Sarajevo, t. I, 240c) ; *Üsküdar'da* (Babakale 7).

34. Du reste la collection de stèles étudiée à Şile se trouve non pas dans un cimetière, mais dans un petit musée de plein air. Il reste que ces stèles viennent de la ville même ou de localités proches...

35. *ST VI*, SSB C 82.

36. Un esprit mal tourné pourrait songer à l'existence de cet hôpital pour les pauvres et les syphilitiques qui était en construction lors de la rédaction du *salname* de Kastamonu de 1890-91 ! Précisons tout de suite pour la mémoire de Raşid Ağa et de Hacı Nuri Paşa que rien ne permet de soutenir cette hypothèse calomnieuse.

37. *Mütekaiden Sinob'da ikamet etmekte iken vefat eylemiş* : *ST VI*, SSB D 89.

38. Il était originaire d'un village voisin, Çaviş du *kaza* de Bayramiç, et on peut supposer qu'il était venu à Babakale pour s'embarquer...

39. *Misafir mücavir Ferhad Reis* : *ST VI*, SSB B 70.

Ağa de Bihac mourut en 1770-71 à Sarajevo alors qu'il se rendait à Istanbul ; Mustafa Ağa décéda en 1808 à Travnik, où il était venu porter officiellement la nouvelle de l'avènement de Mustafa IV ; enfin Seyfuddin Efendi, qui avait quitté Sarajevo sur l'ordre des médecins pour le bon air de Mostar, mourut en y arrivant en 1895-96.⁴⁰ Ce pourrait aussi être le cas, à Sinope, de certains marins ou d'un marchand originaire d'Anapa. C'est évidemment celui de Hasan Tahsin, commissaire de police stambouliote, exilé à Sinope où il mourut en 1914.⁴¹ On remarquera à ce propos que les particularités géographiques qui faisaient de Sinope un lieu de garnison isolé contribuent à expliquer ce lieu d'exil.

Manifestement plus nombreux sont les personnages ayant quitté leur patrie pour exercer des emplois officiels, dans le domaine administratif, religieux ou militaire. A Sinope, dont on a dit qu'elle était séparée de l'intérieur des terres par la montagne, c'est le cas de la quasi-totalité des individus originaires de Roumélie, d'Anatolie et d'Istanbul dont la fonction est connue :⁴² cadis et *naib* viennent de la ville voisine de Kastamonu, mais aussi de Gallipoli et d'Istanbul. Quant aux administrateurs ou militaires, on peut citer un *nazır* de Sinope, mort en 1761-62, qui était tcherkesse. Un officier d'artillerie décédé en 1893, quant à lui, était du Daghestan. L'Anatolie est représentée par Akşehir et Eğin, la Roumélie par Salonique et Arta. Un cas curieux est celui de el-Hac Muhammed Bey Efendi et de İzzet Mustafa Ağa, tous deux *alaybeyi*, le premier de Biga et Gallipoli, le second du *sancak* de Suğla (dont le chef-lieu était Smyrne), morts respectivement en 1789 et 1791 : étaient-ils de passage, chargés de l'approvisionnement en bois de leurs lieux de rattachement ou détachés pour participer à la défense de Sinope contre la flotte russe ?⁴³

La situation n'était guère différente en Bosnie. Les oulémas exerçant des fonctions officielles ou pédagogiques (cadis, *müfti*, *müderri*) sont évidemment mentionnés sur des stèles antérieures à 1878, date de la perte de la Bosnie par les Ottomans, hormis un *müfti* sans doute indigène à Sarajevo et un autre venu de Blagaj, non loin de Mostar, dont les fonctions n'avaient pas un caractère étatique. 4 cadis à Sarajevo morts entre 1724-25 et 1786 venaient d'assez loin : Istanbul, Andrinople, Üsküdar, mais aussi Brousse, ce qui n'aurait pas dû être possible.⁴⁴ Quoiqu'il en soit, le déplacement des cadis sur de longues distances au cours de leurs carrières n'était pas anormal. Du reste un autre cadi de Sarajevo, mort en 1842-43 était, lui, originaire d'une famille d'Herzégovine. En ce qui concerne les *müderri*, en dehors

40. Respectivement Mujezinović, I : 196a ; II : 343b ; III : 199b.

41. *ST VI*, SSB B 64.

42. Cf. *ibid.*, 116 : « Sur les 18 personnes originaires directement ou indirectement d'Anatolie (10), d'Istanbul (5) ou de Grèce (3), nous connaissons la situation sociale de 14. Or, à l'exception d'un serrurier originaire d'Amasya, toutes exerçaient des fonctions officielles ou étaient liées à des titulaires de telles fonctions ».

43. Cf. *ibid.*, 114.

44. Normalement un cadi faisait toute sa carrière soit en Roumélie, soit en Anatolie, selon le *kadıasker* dont il dépendait, mais des transferts pouvaient être exceptionnellement accordés : cf. H. İnalçık, « The *Rûznâmçe* Registers of the *Kadıasker* of Rumeli as Preserved in the Istanbul *Müftülük* Archives », *Turcica*, 20 (1988), 251-69 (265).

d'un Maghrébin mort à Travnik en 1884-85, on signale à Sarajevo deux personnes originaires de cités proches : Mostar (en 1792-93) et Dubnica (en 1812).

On recense nombre de fonctionnaires et militaires en poste en Bosnie. On peut supposer que plus d'un venait d'autres parties de l'Empire, ou y avait exercé des fonctions. Néanmoins on n'a le plus souvent aucun renseignement sur cette question. Ici encore, tous sont mentionnés avant 1878, en dehors d'un colonel originaire de Travnik et enterré dans sa patrie. De façon générale, ces personnages venaient de toutes les parties de l'Empire : Istanbul (5 cas), Anatolie (5 cas : Kütahya, Kayseri, Kastamonu⁴⁵), Crète (1 cas), Syrie (1 cas). La Roumélie est également représentée : 2 individus rencontrés à Mostar viennent de Shkodra en Albanie, un autre de Larissa. Enfin un personnage issu de Travnik apparaît à Sarajevo, le chef-lieu.

Il paraît clair que la garnison de Travnik, dont les membres apparaissent souvent sur les épitaphes, avait une place importante dans la société locale et que, souvent originaires d'autres régions de l'Empire, ces officiers contribuaient à ouvrir la ville sur l'extérieur. A un niveau différent, il en allait sans doute de même à Babakale. Ainsi que je l'ai dit, les nombreuses indications d'origines sur les stèles du cimetière ne s'accompagnent pas d'indications de métier, ou autres, permettant d'expliquer la mention du personnage concerné. Mais on peut supposer que beaucoup exercèrent des fonctions dans la forteresse, tels Hasan Bey de Molova (Molivos) et Derviş Ahmed d'Üsküdar, tous deux décédés en *şehid* en 1791-92 et 1827-28, tel Foçalı Mustafa Beşe ou encore Ahmed Efendi, du village sans doute voisin de Babaderesi, qui était employé à la quarantaine.

Ces fonctionnaires ne venaient pas seuls. On trouve naturellement parmi les morts des membres de leurs familles qui les avaient suivis à l'occasion de leurs nominations ici ou là. C'est clairement le cas de Mahmud Süreyya, venu avec son père stambouliote et juge à Sinope, ou encore de Şerife Emine et Ümm Gülsüm, qui l'une et l'autre avaient suivi leur gendre.⁴⁶ On sait que la première était d'Istanbul et que le gendre de la seconde était de Gallipoli. Enfin on peut citer le cas d'épouses accompagnant à Sinope leur mari militaire, gouverneur ou ingénieur. Même situation en Bosnie, où l'on remarque des enfants venus d'Andrinople, de Kütahya ou d'Istanbul, de même que des épouses de personnages en fonction sur place : ainsi cette « Anatolienne » mariée au *kaymakam* de Prusac (Akhisar) et enterrée (sans qu'on sache précisément pourquoi) à Gornji Vakuf (Tuzla-ı balâ), ou cette autre, originaire de Larissa et qui était la femme du *vali* de Bosnie, ce qui explique pourquoi elle a sa tombe à Sarajevo.⁴⁷ Citons pour finir l'imam Ahmed Efendi d'Evrenli, qui amena sa fille avec lui pour prendre ses fonctions à Karacaköy.⁴⁸

Parfois, nous rencontrons des femmes venues d'autres localités se marier avec un homme de la ville où elles sont enterrées : Zeliha Hanım, épouse de Tezkerecizade Hamid Bey Efendi (« d'une bonne famille de Travnik »), était elle-même

45. Respectivement 2, 2 et 1 cas.

46. Respectivement *ST VI* : SSB B 25, SSB B 69 et SSB B 48.

47. Respectivement Mujezinović, II : 320c ; I : 304.

48. *ST IV*, Kk A 32.

« d'une bonne famille d'Akhisar (Prusac) » ; de son côté, Hadice Hâfiza Hanım, « d'une bonne famille de Travnik », fut inhumée dans la ville de son mari, Simzade el-Hac Nafiz Ağa, « d'une bonne famille de Banjaluka ». ⁴⁹ On aura constaté que, dans ces deux derniers cas, les déplacements sont de faible ampleur. C'est entre familles bosniaques que se font ces mariages impliquant le déménagement de la fiancée. ⁵⁰ On retrouve ici l'opposition déjà notée entre un cercle régional et un cercle plus large qui est plutôt celui des officiels.

Une dernière cause de déplacement, typique des difficiles années que connut l'Empire ottoman à la fin du XVIII^e et au XIX^e siècle, est l'émigration de populations fuyant devant l'avance des ennemis du sultan obligé de céder des pans entiers de ses territoires. On a dit qu'on ne rencontrait plus d'indications d'origine étrangère à la région en Bosnie après 1878. En revanche, le nombre notable de personnes originaires de Crimée recensées à Sinope pourrait bien être lié à l'avance russe. ⁵¹ La Crimée apparaît sur des épitaphes en 1771-72, 1772-73, 1773, 1786-87, 1829-30, 1870-71 et 1921. Les quatre premières dates coïncident avec l'invasion russe de 1771 et l'annexion par Catherine II en 1783. Le mouvement dut se poursuivre durant les années suivantes. Du reste, la famille des Kavizade, qui domina la ville de Sinope au XIX^e siècle, était originaire de Crimée, d'où elle arriva dans les dernières années du XVIII^e siècle. ⁵²

Un autre exemple des émigrations entraînées par le déclin de l'Empire ottoman est fourni par le cimetière du *tekke* refondé en 1864-65 par Şemsî Baba à Smyrne. Que le *tekke* ait attiré des fidèles d'horizons lointains n'est pas en soi surprenant. Le monde des confréries est plus qu'un autre itinérant et, par ses réseaux, ouvert. Mais dans le cas du *tekke* de Şemsî Baba (dit aussi de Karadut), cette explication ne suffit pas. Certes, on recense dans son enclos funéraire des personnes issues d'Istanbul, de Brousse ou d'Ereğli, ⁵³ mais on note surtout la présence de 6 personnes originaires d'Eubée, de Halkalı (près de Niş⁵⁴), de Belgrade ou de Crète. Si

49. Respectivement Mujezinović, II : 379a et 217.

50. Ceci amène à s'interroger sur le cas d'une des femmes mariées à des hommes en fonction à Sinope dont il a été question au paragraphe précédent : dans la mesure où sa propre appartenance familiale est indiquée, a-t-on voulu marquer qu'elle était plus étrangère à Sinope que ne l'était son mari ? Ce n'est pas certain. Il s'agit de *Selânik eşrafından merhum Ali Rıza Efendi'nin kerimesi ve Sinob sancağı nafia mühendisi Feyzî Beğ'in halilesi Emine Mevhibe Hanım*, décédée en 1902 (ST VI, SSB C 78).

51. Je reprends ici des considérations développées en ST II, 116.

52. *Ibid.*, 117.

53. Plusieurs villes portent ce nom, mais il n'est pas possible de trancher entre celles-ci. D'autre part N. Ülker lit (« Bektaşî Mezar Kitabeleri », 18-19) *Erkrili* l'épithète de Kadriyendizade Şahin Ağa sur la stèle de son épouse Kâmile Hanım, ce qu'on est tenté d'interpréter *Ergirili*. Mais la photographie qu'il fournit (n° 21) est illisible. Or sur la stèle de son fils Hasan Rıza, le même Şahin Efendi (et non plus Ağa) porte une épithète que N. Ülker lit (*ibid.*, 22) *Eriklili* et l'on déchiffre en effet *Ereglili* sur la photo n° 27. Il me semble donc qu'il faut probablement comprendre qu'il s'agit en l'occurrence d'Ereğli.

54. « Bourg de la Turquie d'Europe, dans l'eyalet de Nisch, liva de Sofia, sur un affluent de la Lukova » (C. Mostras, *Dictionnaire géographique de l'Empire ottoman* [Saint-

Haydar, fils de Rıza Efendi de Halkalı décéda en 1876 avant la perte de cette ville, en revanche les autres régions concernées étaient perdues depuis plusieurs années à la date portée sur les stèles du *tekke*. Il s'agit très vraisemblablement de réfugiés. Ce n'est du reste sans doute pas un hasard si Yusuf Şemsüddin, le fondateur lui-même, originaire d'Eubée, est présenté dans son épitaphe comme « faisant partie des émigrés d'İstefe d'Eubée ».⁵⁵

Les inscriptions donnent évidemment moins d'informations sur les migrations au départ des localités où sont implantés nos cimetières. On peut cependant citer Salih Recâî, Bosniaque qui avait été cadî à Smyrne et avait eu des fonctions dans la capitale, mais fut enterré à Sarajevo en 1866-67 ; ou Bosnevî Abdullah Paşa, ancien *silâhdar*, qui finit sa carrière comme *vali* de Bosnie et fut enterré à Travnik en 1785.⁵⁶ De même, le *haseki* Adil Ağa, important personnage du Palais, fut inhumé en 1813 dans son village d'origine, Karacaköy,⁵⁷ tout comme Şeyh Hüseyin, dont l'épitaphe nous dit qu'il était bosniaque, fut enterré à Zivcici en 1799-1800 après être passé par Istanbul, Konya, Baghdad, Samarcande et Boukhara...⁵⁸ Ceci implique le maintien de liens sentimentaux et de rapports avec la patrie d'origine, sans doute plus nombreux que cette petite liste ne pourrait donner à penser.⁵⁹

Il est bien entendu difficile de savoir comment cohabitaient dans la vie quotidienne les gens que nous voyons aujourd'hui voisiner dans les cimetières. Il demeure que cette cohabitation même est un signe d'appartenance commune à une élite locale. Après tout c'est une famille de réfugiés de Crimée qui domina Sinope au XIX^e siècle.

*

L'analyse de la formulation même des origines géographiques dans les inscriptions peut-elle nous éclairer sur la signification qu'avait cette indication pour les intéressés ?

Le plus simple, et le moins encombrant sur la surface nécessairement réduite de la stèle, était évidemment d'accoler au nom une épithète. Aussi est-ce ce qu'on rencontre le plus souvent, à 113 reprises. Dans la majorité des cas (65), c'est la forme turque normale en *-li* qui est employée, mais on rencontre aussi (28 fois) la dérivée

Petersbourg 1873 (repr. Istanbul 1995)], 87).

55. *Ağrıboz İstefesi muhacirinden* (Ülker, « Bektâşi Mezar Kitabeleri », 11). Le cas d'Örcün, cité *supra* n. 27 est plus difficile à interpréter. La région de Gölcük, au fond du golfe d'Izmit, accueillit des réfugiés de Crimée et du Caucase. Mais comment arrivèrent dans ce village les 13 Albanais nommés sur les stèles ? Parmi eux, 10 étaient originaires de la région d'Elbasan, dont 9 entre 1843 et 1865. Faut-il mettre leur présence en rapport avec les troubles que connut l'Albanie au milieu du XIX^e siècle ? Ou bien s'agit-il d'émigration économique ?

56. Respectivement Mujezinović, I : 181a ; II : 331.

57. *ST IV*, Kk A 4.

58. Mujezinović, II.

59. On pourrait songer aussi à ces retraités à Sinope dont il a été question plus haut.

tion arabe en *-î*, parfois (en 7 occurrences) précédée de l'article arabe.⁶⁰ Encore que la forme arabe apparaisse à toute époque, elle est plus fréquente dans la partie « ancienne » du corpus : on dénombre en effet 2 cas du *xvi*^e siècle et 12 du *xviii*^e, soit un total de 14 sur 28, alors que pour la même période il n'y a que 17 formes en *-li* sur 65. On peut donc parler d'un certain archaïsme dans l'emploi de la forme arabe. Cependant le phénomène le plus frappant est géographique, puisque la majorité des références (18 sur 28) vient du corpus bosniaque. On pourrait être tenté de voir là une particularité provinciale où l'on décèlerait à la fois une tendance archaïsante (phénomène propre à toute région périphérique), mais aussi la marque d'une zone où le turc n'est pas réellement une langue indigène, ce qui aurait favorisé l'emploi de la forme arabe, peut-être considérée comme plus « chic ». Il faut néanmoins rester prudent, les épithètes de lieu en *-î* étant demeurées d'usage courant jusqu'à la fin de l'Empire ottoman, y compris dans les cimetières stambouliotes. A titre de comparaison, on soulignera cependant qu'alors qu'on dénombre dans notre corpus bosniaque 18 épithètes en *-î* pour 15 en *-li*, elles sont 6 pour 28 à Sinope et 19 pour 65 dans les quatre cimetières stambouliotes publiés dans le numéro II de la série *Stelae Turcicae*.⁶¹

On rencontre du reste d'autres façons d'exprimer une épithète de lieu, à commencer par des adjectifs courants mais n'utilisant pas ces deux suffixes : *arnabud* (« albanais »), *abaza* (« abkhaze ») ou *çerkez* (« tcherkesse », « circassien »). Mais on trouve également des inscriptions où le seul nom du lieu, sans suffixe, est accolé à un nom de personne, par exemple *Belizade Verhpraça el-Hac Derviş Osman* à Sarajevo en 1836-37, *Bafra Açıkoğlu Haydar* à Sinope en 1889-90 ou encore, dans la même ville, *İsmail Uzucuya Cifutan Kafkasya* en 1909-10.⁶² Cette curieuse façon de s'exprimer est à coup sûr maladroite et il n'est pas étonnant qu'elle soit rare. Cette rareté même nous interdit de risquer une interprétation, d'autant qu'on repère également des expressions similaires dans des cimetières stambouliotes.

Plus conforme aux règles grammaticales est l'emploi du nom de lieu à l'ablatif pour indiquer l'origine de la personne désignée : *Bursa karyesinden*, *Kayseri'den*, voire *an kasaba-ı Modriç*. J'en relève 9 cas dans mon corpus, à des dates et dans des lieux différents.

60. C'est du reste tout naturel dans le cas de l'épithète SKC 10, à Sinope, qui est entièrement rédigée en arabe.

61. Cimetières des mosquées de Küçük Ayasofya, Bostancı Ali et Sokollu Mehmed Paşa dans le quartier de Kadırga Limanı à Istanbul et du *türbe* de Sokollu Mehmed Paşa à Eyüp. On remarquera que, sans que ce soit systématique, la forme arabe semble particulièrement adaptée, en Bosnie, à des hommes de religion, puisqu'on relève un cheikh, 3 *müderriş* et 4 cadis.

62. Respectivement Mujezinović, I : 110c ; *ST VI*, SMZ 50 et 19. J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont et moi-même avons relevé à Karacaköy une formule que nous avons à tort interprétée de la même manière. On lit en effet *Otuz üç avcuların Ahmed Beşe* (Kk A 27) et *Otuz üç avcuların Mehmed Beşe* (Kk B 3). Cependant il ne s'agit pas, comme nous le supposions (p. 27), du village d'Evciler dans le canton de Pınarhisar, mais de l'affiliation de ces deux personnages (décédés en 1778-79 et 1791-92) au 33^e *bölük* des *sekbân*, celui des « chasseurs » (*avcı* : cf. İ.-H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtından : Kapukulu Ocakları* [Ankara 1943 (repr. 1984)], I : 163).

Une autre façon barbare de signifier l'appartenance géographique d'un individu, relevée à 6 reprises, consiste à employer le locatif : ainsi *Karacaköy'de Abdi Ağa*, ou *Babakalesinde Arif Baba*. En utilisant le locatif, on indique en quelque sorte en quel lieu on trouve (ou trouvait) la personne désignée. Les mots *sakin*, ou *olan* (« habitant à », « se trouvant à ») peuvent du reste se lire sur les inscriptions quand il s'agit de signaler l'appartenance de la personne à la localité où se trouve le cimetière. On n'insistera pas sur ce point, extérieur au sujet traité ici. En revanche on notera que trois de nos cas semblent fournir une piste sur une des origines possibles de l'emploi du locatif. Les noms de lieu s'y succèdent en effet selon un ordre hiérarchique administratif décroissant : ainsi *Terkoz nahiyesinde Karaca karyesinde*, ou même *Rumelinde Paşa sancağında Usturova nahiyesinde Üç ana karyesinde*.⁶³ Or c'est ainsi qu'on procède dans les documents administratifs, qui ont pu servir (peut-être inconsciemment) de modèle aux lapicides. Il y a là une double maladresse : littéraire, dans la mesure où il y aurait une erreur de registre ; grammaticale, puisque le dernier locatif n'est pas justifié. Tout se passe donc comme si, empruntée quasi mécaniquement, cette formulation n'était plus perçue comme ayant une fonction syntaxique dans une phrase. Quoi qu'il en soit, si l'on adopte l'hypothèse de l'origine administrative, on sent bien qu'il s'agirait alors moins de fournir une information anecdotique que de définir l'identité d'un individu. Dans notre corpus, la formule apparaît à Karacaköy et à Babakale, donc dans des régions différentes mais toujours dans de petites localités villageoises. On pourrait supposer en conséquence qu'il s'agit d'une façon populaire de s'exprimer, dans des élites locales ne participant que partiellement à la culture urbaine. Pourtant, on relève également cet emploi du locatif dans des cimetières stambouliotes.⁶⁴

Certaines formules affichent à la fois une origine et l'appartenance à une élite. Le terme le plus fréquemment utilisé est *hanedan*, qu'on pourra traduire par « famille », « dynastie », mais dont l'étymologie même souligne un enracinement local. La formulation consiste à donner le nom du lieu suivi de *hanedanından* : *Travnik hanedanından*, par exemple. J'ai relevé 7 cas et 3 variantes.⁶⁵ On pourra, de la même manière, dire qu'un individu fait partie des *eşraf* d'une localité (nom de lieu suivi de *eşrafından* : 4 cas et 2 variantes⁶⁶). Pluriel de *şerif*, le mot pourrait

63. Respectivement *ST IV*, Kk A 4 et A 25.

64. Cf. *ST II*, BA 29 ; SMK B 67, E 272 ; SME B 22. Le texte de la stèle SMK B 67, qui date de 1834-35, laisse du reste perplexe : *Nevşehir kasabasında Anar karyesinde sakın iken saray-ı hümayunda harem-i hümayun hoşabcısı*. Si le nommé Seyyid el-Hac Halil Efendi pouvait être employé au Palais et originaire de Nar, il ne pouvait certainement pas résider dans cette localité tout en exerçant ses fonctions dans la capitale (où il fut enterré). On voit bien ici comment l'emploi de formules toutes faites peut donner lieu à des absurdités, du reste sans graves conséquences : le personnage était défini par son nom, ses origines et sa fonction. Que la formulation fût un peu contestable n'était sans doute pas très important.

65. *Travnik hanedan-ı kadimi idi* ; *hanedan-ı Bosna'dan* ; *hanedan cedd be-cedd şehri Saray'ın bir güli* (respectivement Mujezinović, II : 347a ; I : 307b ; I : 103a).

66. *Bosna Saray eşraf-ı kiramdaramı* ; *Saray Bosna'nın eşraf ve ayanından* (respectivement Mujezinović, I : 337a, 209d).

désigner des descendants (réels ou supposés) du Prophète, mais il a sans doute plus généralement le sens neutre de « notable », comme le confirment les dictionnaires de Redhouse ou Sami Bey Fraşeri. Les deux termes sont donc à peu près synonymes et on les trouvera également réunis dans trois cas. Notons que *hanedan* seul n'apparaît, dans notre corpus, qu'en Bosnie (à Sarajevo, Mostar, Travnik et Banjaluka), tandis qu'on rencontre aussi *eşraf* à Karacaköy et à Sinope. En fait, il faut ici encore nuancer, dans la mesure où la Bosnie est largement majoritaire sur ce point dans notre corpus (30 cas sur 34), alors qu'on sait que l'expression était employée à Istanbul et dans sa banlieue.⁶⁷ En revanche la formule combinant un nom de lieu avec *ehalisinden*, recensée à 3 reprises à Travnik en 1865-67, et dont on relève une variante à Sarajevo,⁶⁸ pourrait jusqu'à preuve du contraire être locale. Citons enfin un synonyme employé une fois de la même manière à Sinope (*vücu*),⁶⁹ et une formule prétentieuse, hapax relevé à Sarajevo, qui, dans le contexte, a à peu près la même signification : *âbru-yı agavat-ı Behke* (« la crème des aghas de Bihac »).⁷⁰

Certaines formulations soulignent fortement l'importance de l'enracinement local déjà exprimé par *hanedan* : *hanedanı cedd be-cedd şehr-i Saray'ın bir gülü* (« sa maison était de père en fils une rose de la ville de Sarajevo ») ; *aslı ve nesli bosnevî* (« son origine et sa descendance sont bosniaques ») ; *Anadolî zadeğânlarından* (« d'une lignée anatolienne »).⁷¹

Tous les individus ainsi définis appartiennent clairement à l'élite locale, comme leurs épitaphes permettent souvent de le déterminer : il s'agit de fonctionnaires, de descendants de pachas, de militaires... L'importance qu'ils accordent à leurs racines mérite d'être remarquée, et d'autant plus qu'il s'agit parfois de personnes déplacées, en particulier de femmes se réclamant à la fois, comme on l'a vu, de la noble lignée de leur mari (sur place) et de celle de leur père (ailleurs). Dans 12 sur 31 formules en *hanedan* ou assimilables, une origine étrangère au lieu d'inhumation est indiquée.⁷² Un dernier trait caractéristique de ces indications est qu'elles apparaissent sur des inscriptions relativement récentes : sur 35 formules,

67. Le mot *hanedan* est utilisé, dans le cimetière stambouliote de Sokollu Mehmed Paşa (*ST II*), pour des personnes originaires de Kayseri (SMK C 136) ou Nevşehir (SMK B 49). On le trouve aussi employé, sur place, pour deux notables du village de Merdivenköy, dans la banlieue asiatique de la capitale (*ST V*, MB 4 ; Krk 8, 9, 10). On notera au passage qu'un de ces personnages est présenté tantôt comme *hanedanından*, tantôt comme *sakinlerinden* de la localité (MB 4 et 21), ce qui semble diminuer la valeur symbolique du mot *hanedan*. D'autre part on signalera que tant à Merdivenköy que dans les cimetières du quartier de Kadirga Limanı, du *türbe* de Sokollu Mehmed Paşa à Eyüp, ou du *tekke* de Kazlıçeşme, dans la banlieue européenne d'Istanbul, les différentes formules formées avec *hanedan* ou *eşraf* renvoient le plus souvent à des localités rouméliotes.

68. *Ehali-i mütehzan-ı Saraybosna*.

69. Cf. également à Istanbul : *Luleburguş eşraf ü vücuından olub* (*ST II*, SME A 43).

70. Mujezinović, I : 196a. Le personnage était *kapudan* dans sa ville d'origine, terme qui désigne ici une notabilité locale.

71. Respectivement *ibid.*, I : 103a ; II : ? (Ziveici) ; II : 320.

72. C'est également très largement le cas dans les cimetières stambouliotes consultés.

31 sont postérieures à 1800 et 25 à 1860.⁷³ Ce caractère tardif pourrait-il avoir un lien avec le développement de la circulation dans l'Empire, mais, surtout, avec un sentiment plus affirmé d'appartenance à une aristocratie locale fondée sur des « grandes maisons », qu'on voit d'ailleurs marier leurs enfants entre elles ?

Enfin certaines formules insistent sur le déracinement de l'individu et son installation loin de sa patrie d'origine. Cette mention implique un attachement à cette patrie : attachement social, puisqu'elle est gravée sur le marbre par les survivants, ce qui implique que le défunt était connu comme étant venu d'ailleurs ; mais aussi sans doute attachement sentimental. En effet, si certaines formules restent neutres,⁷⁴ d'autres soulignent le déplacement, plus ou moins volontaire, de l'intéressé : *geldi şehri-i İstanbul'dan bu monla Saraybosna'da kıldı ikamet* (« Il est venu d'Istanbul ce molla, et s'est installé à Sarajevo »).⁷⁵ On peut aussi citer cet enfant « amené » (*getürüb*) d'Andrinople à Istanbul, ou cet autre « venu d'Istanbul [à Sinope] avec ses parents » (*vâlideynimle Sitanbul'dan gelüb*).⁷⁶ Si l'on ignore pourquoi le marchand Mustafa Ağa, né à Sabac, vint s'installer (non loin de là) à Brezovo Polje, on se souvient que c'est la maladie qui avait contraint Seyfüddin Efendi à quitter pour Mostar Sarajevo où il était né (*mevled olan Bosna Saray*).⁷⁷ Cet autre encore, qui avait suivi son frère le *kethüda* du *vali* de Bosnie, proclame sur son épitaphe qu'« en fait ses racines étaient dans le *vilâyet* de Kayseri » (*fil'asl Anatolî vilâyet-i Kayseri'den olub*).⁷⁸ L'arrachement devait être particulièrement douloureux pour les « personnes déplacées » (*muhacir*) évoquées précédemment. Il est vrai que la mention de l'émigration et de l'exil n'est clairement formulée, dans notre corpus, que sur la stèle du fondateur du *tekke* de Karadut. Mais il n'est pas impossible de voir, dans la simple mention des origines sur les épitaphes de ces derviches rouméliotes installés à Smyrne, ou de ces Caucasiens et Criméens enterrés à Sinope, l'affirmation d'une identité et d'une nostalgie.

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Au moment de conclure, il faut rappeler les limites de mon étude. Le corpus utilisé ne prétend ni à l'exhaustivité (bien entendu), ni même à la représentativité. Il ne s'agit donc ici que d'exprimer les quelques impressions ressenties à l'occasion de ce petit travail.

73. Le même déséquilibre peut être constaté dans le corpus stambouliote consulté : on peut négliger comme tardifs les cimetières de banlieue, mais il en va de même dans ceux du quartier de Kadirga Limanı et dans l'enclos funéraire du *türbe* de Sokollu Mehmed Paşa à Eyüp : sur 7 cas, l'un est de 1812, 4 des années 1850-58, 2 de 1878-79.

74. Par exemple *Kastamonu sancağı ehalisinden Travnik'de ikamet etmekde iken*, ou *Yenişehir hanedanından iken şehri-i Saray meskeni oldu* (respectivement Mujezinović, II : 346a ; I : 34b).

75. *Ibid.*, I : 92a.

76. Respectivement *ibid.*, I : 38a et *ST VI*, SSB B 64.


77. Respectivement Mujezinović, II : 164 et III : 199b.

78. *Ibid.*, II : 393.

En premier lieu, à en juger par les seules inscriptions funéraires, les élites de province paraissent certes tournées d'abord sur elles-mêmes, mais aussi réellement ouvertes sur l'extérieur, même si une priorité est accordée à un premier cercle, dont la définition peut varier en fonction de particularités locales. L'appartenance à un empire commun, le déplacement des oulémas, administrateurs et militaires, l'arrivée des populations quittant des territoires perdus par les Ottomans, contribuent à ce phénomène, mais plus largement on constate que même dans de petites localités les gens bougent, et ont des rapports avec des régions relativement éloignées.

Parallèlement, l'analyse des formules, dont la relative homogénéité permet d'ailleurs de constater dans ce domaine une culture ottomane commune, montre l'attachement de ces élites à leurs racines, familiales et géographiques, l'une et l'autre étant intimement liées à leurs yeux.


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
Lieux cités sur les stèles relevées à SARAJEVO




Lieux cités sur les stèles relevées à BABAKALE



Lieux cités sur les stèles relevées à
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BILATERAL FACTIONALISM IN THE OTTOMAN PROVINCES

Jane HATHAWAY

This contribution concerns the political culture of Ottoman provincial elites, and specifically a phenomenon that I call bilateral factionalism, that is, a political culture dominated by two rival blocs with no third alternative. Examples of bilateral factionalism include the Blues and Greens of the Roman and Byzantine Empires, the Guelphs and Ghibellines of medieval Tuscany, and, in Ottoman Egypt, the Faqari and Qasimi factions. Membership of these factions is not exclusive to elites, nor are the factions equivalent to households led by elites; rather, they incorporate non-elites, notably soldiers and tribespeople.

Rivalries between two factions were strikingly prevalent in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Iranian plateau from antiquity through the Ottoman era. The political geography of the region may have been an underlying factor, specifically the East-West split that divided first the ancient Greek and Persian empires, later the Byzantines and Sasanians, Fatimids and Abbasids, Ottomans and Safavids. The dividing line ran roughly through the middle of present-day Iraq. The essential geographical bifurcation of the region was recognized by the late historian Bertold Spuler, who noted that throughout antiquity “the Mesopotamian region (as a rule united with Persia) and the Nile valley formed separate political entities”.¹ In addition, the region’s status as a crossroads meant that merchants, nomads, political and religious refugees, and invading armies passed through it with some degree of regularity, triggering political and demographic change in the lands to which they relocated. Although I would never venture a monocausal explanation for bilateral factionalism, I would submit that wrenching political and demographic change of the sort that crosses traditional boundaries – imperial, doctrinal, urban/rural, elite/‘common’ – contributes to the conditions that spawn bilateral factionalism.

I believe that bilateral factionalism, as a form of political culture, is fundamentally different from multi-factional or multi-party systems. Although it is impossible to make blanket generalizations, we can observe that the two factions tend to outlive any individual factional leader. In many cases, each individual faction tends to be assimilative rather than exclusive, incorporating members of different ethnicities, regions, and doctrinal tendencies. Factional identity is *not* all-pervasive; that is

1. B. Spuler, *The Muslim World: The Age of the Caliphs*, trans. F. R. C. Bagley, paperback reissue (Princeton, New Jersey 1995; originally published Leiden 1960), 72.

to say, one's factional allegiance does not permeate every feature of one's life, nor does factional rivalry permeate every feature of a society. Rather, there are certain occasions on which factional allegiance is especially meaningful and, therefore, visible: public processions, whether tied to religious observances, military victories, or political display, are a key example. Public ritual is essential to bilateral factionalism; sharp differences in the public appearances – colors, symbols, insignia – of two competing factions reinforce the binary opposition between the two.

In the pre-Islamic period, the territory of what would become the Ottoman Empire's Balkan and Arab provinces was riven by the conflict between the Byzantine circus factions known as Blues and Greens; these were charioteers and their fans who wore the colors just named and displayed banners and other partisan paraphernalia in races staged for the public's amusement.² In the early Islamic period, the Arab territories were the scene of the rivalry between so-called Northern and Southern, or Qaysi and Yemeni, Arabs. Indeed, the movement and stationing of armies composed of both Northern and Southern tribesmen throughout the expanding early Islamic empire arguably transformed the Qays-Yemen division into a serious political dichotomy.³ This rivalry continued into the Ottoman period in Lebanon and above all in Palestine, where Qays-Yemen tension was evident well into the twentieth century.⁴ More than one witness has recounted how, if a Yemeni wedding party passed through a Qaysi village in early twentieth-century Palestine, the bride would be obliged to change her white veil, which signified Yemeni allegiance, for one of Qaysi red.⁵ Although Qays and Yemen Bedouin groups are noted in Egypt as late as the ninth century of the Common Era, when they fought on opposite sides of the 'Brothers' War' (809-813) between the rival Abbasid caliphs al-Amin and al-Ma'mun (Qays for al-Ma'mun, Yemen for al-Amin),⁶ these two factions seem not to have been a factor in Ottoman Egypt. Bilateral factionalism *is* visible among Egypt's Bedouins in the late Mamluk era; chroniclers of the fifteenth century note the struggles between the Banu Haram and Banu Wa'il Bedouin blocs.⁷ By the sev-

2. A. Cameron, *Circus Factions: Blues and Greens at Rome and Byzantium* (Oxford 1976), 12, 41, 45-73, 191, 198-99, 201-13, 215-22, 231, 234-38, 244-48, 308, 314-17.
3. P. Crone, 'Were the Qays and Yemen of the Umayyad Period Political Parties?', *Der Islam*, 71/1 (1994), 1-57.
4. M. Hoexter, 'The Role of the Qays and Yaman Factions in Local Political Divisions: Jabal Nablus Compared with the Judean Hills in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century', *Asian and African Studies* (Haifa), 9 (1973), 249-311; S. Tamari, 'Factionalism and Class Formation in Recent Palestinian History', in R. Owen (ed.), *Studies in the Economic and Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London and Oxford 1982), 177-202; B. Kimmerling and J. S. Migdal, *Palestinians: The Making of a People* (New York 1993), 7, 40-41, 72.
5. G. Baer and M. Hoexter, *ET*², s.v. 'Kays 'Aylān: Kays and Yaman in the Ottoman Period', 835.
6. M. S. Gordon, *The Breaking of a Thousand Swords: A History of the Turkish Community of Samarra, 200-275 A.H./815-889 C.E.* (Albany, N.Y. 2001), 37-38, 185 n. 254.
7. Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Iyas (1488-c. 1524), *Histoire des Mamlouks circassiens*, trans. Gaston Wiet, 2 vols (Cairo 1945), 2: 65, 77, 78-79, 117, 402, 407, 415.

enteenth century, the Wa'il had been replaced in this pairing by the Banu Sa'd, and 'Sa'd-Haram' had become a byword for upheaval in the countryside.⁸

During this same century, the Sa'd-Haram factionalism crossed the boundary between rural and urban when it meshed with two new, primarily urban (though not exclusively Cairene), factions known as the Faqaris and Qasimis, who persisted until roughly 1730. As the four early eighteenth-century colloquial Arabic chronicles known as the Damurdashi (Demirdaşı) group note, echoed by the far better known and more syntactically orthodox early nineteenth-century historian Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti (1754-1825), the Faqaris and Qasimis were most clearly distinguishable in public processions, when they displayed their distinguishing colors and emblems: according to the chroniclers, the Faqaris carried a white flag and their standards bore a *rummana* (literally, 'pomegranate') while the Qasimis carried a red flag and their standards bore a *jalba*, which is how these chroniclers render the Persian word *chalap*, in this context a flat metal plate.⁹ As I have explained in detail in a recent book, I have deduced that the Faqaris' emblem was in fact an Ottoman *tuğ* while the Qasimis' emblem was probably a Mamluk *alem*; in addition, the Faqaris' white flag was probably emblazoned with the Ottoman version of Ali ibn Abi Talib's double-bladed sword Zülfikar, whence the name Faqari.¹⁰ The factions' colors, perhaps not coincidentally, are the same as those of Qays (Qasimi red) and Yemen (Faqari white).

The color dichotomy manifested by the Faqari and Qasimi factions, as well as the importance of public processions as a reinforcement of factional identity, are reminiscent of both Qays-Yemen and Blue-Green factionalism. Yet, as I have shown in my book, the Faqaris and Qasimis emerged during a period of demographic flux in the Ottoman Empire as a whole, and as armies dispatched primarily from Egypt were losing Yemen to the Zaydi Shiite imam.¹¹ As a consequence of the demographic movements triggered by these events, each faction assimilated men

8. Idem, *Journal d'un bourgeois du Caire*, trans. Gaston Wiet, 2 vols (Paris 1955), 2: 130, 188, 191, 202, 210-11, 229, 261-62, 362, 416; Süheylî Efendi, *Tevarih-i Mısır ül-kadim* [Chronicles of Ancient Egypt, c. 1630], Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library, MS Fatih 4229, folios 110v, 112r; Yusuf b. Muhammad b. Abd al-Jawad b. Khidr al-Shirbini (fl. late seventeenth century), *Hazz al-quhufî sharh qasid Abi Shaduf* [Racking the Brains: Commentary on the Ode of the Water-Drawer], ed. Shaykh M. Musa (Bulaq 1308 A.H.), 6.

9. Mustafa b. Ibrahim al-Maddah al-Qinali, *Majmu latif* [Pleasant Compendium], Vienna, Nationalbibliothek, MS Hist. Osm. 38, as reproduced in P. M. Holt, 'Al-Jabarti's Introduction to the History of Ottoman Egypt', *BSOAS*, 25/1 (1962), 42-43; anonymous, *Kitab al-durra al-musana fi waqai* [sic] *al-Kinana* [The Book of the Precious Pearl: Events in Egypt (Land of the Kinana Tribe)], University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bruce 43, as reproduced in Holt, 'Al-Jabarti's Introduction', 43-44; Ahmed Kâhya Azeban al-Damurdashi, *Al-Durra al-musana fi akhbar al-Kinana* [The Protected Pearl: History of Egypt (Land of the Kinana Tribe), c. 1755], British Museum, MS Or. 1073-74, 2.

10. J. Hathaway, *A Tale of Two Factions: Myth, Memory, and Identity in Ottoman Egypt and Yemen* (Albany, N.Y. 2003), chapter 6, esp. 117; 171-77.

11. Ibid., 4-6, 82-90.

and women of disparate ethnic and geographical backgrounds. At the same time, the advent of these factions is evidently colored by ethno-geographical antagonism between ‘westerners’ of Balkan and western Anatolian origin, on the one hand, and ‘easterners’ from the Arab provinces and the Caucasus, on the other. The Faqaris seem initially to have represented a ‘western’ identity, the Qasimis an ‘eastern’ one.¹² (The appearance within the Qasimi faction in the late seventeenth century of a Bosnian element has been remarked upon by P. M. Holt;¹³ I suspect this was no accident but resulted from the deliberate policies of the Köprülü grand viziers.)

Safavid Iran during this same period witnessed a strikingly similar episode of bilateral factionalism featuring two factions known as the Haydaris and Ni‘matis or Ni‘matullahis. Hossein Mirjafari argues that these factions emerged from two rival fourteenth-century Sufi orders: the followers of Sultan Mir Haydar Tunī (from the town of Tun in Khorasan, where he grew up), a Twelver Shiite based in Tabriz in northwestern Iran, and those of Shah Ni‘matullah Veli, a Sunni Shafii based in Kerman in northeastern Iran.¹⁴ Elements of generalized East-West, Sunni-Shiite antagonism are evident in the Sufi shaykhs’ historical circumstances. Indeed, the much-quoted French traveler Jean de Chardin (1643-1713) claims that one faction was Sunni and Turkish while the other was Shiite and Persian (although he is evidently confused as to which was which), an assertion that may reflect the continual antagonism between the Safavids and Ottomans.¹⁵ On the other hand, long before the Safavids spread Shiism throughout Iran, the region had been split in two by the struggle between Hanafis and Shafiis, often referred to simply as *fariqayn*, or ‘the two factions’, whose conflicts were so destructive that they occasionally laid waste entire cities.¹⁶ The Haydari-Ni‘mati factionalism could conceivably have drawn on a pre-existing climate of bilateral factionalism in Iran; in Egypt, by the same token, the Qays-Yemen rivalry of the classical Islamic period could have found an echo in the Faqari-Qasimi antagonism.

As in the case of the Faqaris and Qasimis, however, myths also accumulated to explain the Haydaris’ and Ni‘matis’ origins. Typically, these myths focus on two eponymous faction-founders: one identifies Haydar and Ni‘matullah as the overlords of two adjacent villages occupying the site of present-day Isfahan; another asserts that they were two rival Iranian princes.¹⁷ Similarly, the early eighteenth-century Egyptian chronicler Ahmed Çelebi relays a myth whereby the Faqari and

12. Ibid., 181-82; eadem, ‘A Re-Examination of the Terms *Evlad-i Arab* and *Rum Oğlanı* in Ottoman Egypt’, in H. C. Güzel (ed.), *The Turks* (Ankara 2002). Vol. 3: *Ottomans*, 531-36, esp. 532-33.

13. P. M. Holt, ‘The Beylicate in Ottoman Egypt during the Seventeenth Century’, *BSOAS*, 24/2 (1961), 224-25.

14. H. Mirjafari, ‘The Haydari-Ni‘mati Conflicts in Iran’, trans. and adapted by J. R. Perry, *Iranian Studies*, 12/3-4 (1979), 135-62, esp. 137-44.

15. J. de Chardin, quoted in Mirjafari, ‘The Haydari-Ni‘mati Conflicts in Iran’, 149.

16. R. P. Mottahedeh, *Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society* (Princeton 1980), 158-67.

17. Mirjafari, ‘The Haydari-Ni‘mati Conflicts in Iran’, 148-49.

Qasimi factions stem from two sons of a defeated Mamluk emir, Dhu'l-Faqar and Qasim, who quarreled while displaying their equestrian skills before the victorious Ottoman Sultan Selim I.¹⁸

In an even more striking parallel to their Egyptian counterparts, the Haydaris and Ni'matis were associated with two (genealogically related) Turcoman tribes: respectively, the Fuladlu and the Qojabiglu (Kocabeylu), both branches of the Shahiseven tribe.¹⁹ Their rivalry manifested itself above all in competitive processions commemorating the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali on A'shura, the tenth day of the Islamic month of Muharram. In addition, members of the two factions frequently engaged in ritualized battles with sticks and stones.²⁰ The Safavid Shah Abbas I (r. 1582-1629) is said to have encouraged such battles for his own entertainment; a later Polish historian, Krusinski, even claims that Shah Abbas deliberately instigated in every urban center of Iran a struggle between two blocs labeled simply "Felenk" and "Pelenk".²¹

Both the Faqari-Qasimi and Haydari-Ni'mati rivalries emerged at times of political uncertainty and demographic flux. The Ottoman Empire circa 1640 was still suffering the after-effects of the wave of inflation, exacerbated by currency debasement, that had swept the Empire at the end of the sixteenth century, to say nothing of those of the Long Wars with the Hapsburgs (c. 1593-1606), which spawned a population of peasant mercenaries who, once the fighting stopped, plundered the countryside, triggering mass flight to the cities.²² In 1636, after years of draining struggle, Yemen was abandoned to the Zaydis; a few years later, Sultan Ibrahim's (r. 1640-1648) initial inability to produce an heir called into question the continuation of the Ottoman dynasty itself. But perhaps the most wrenching event

18. Ahmed Çelebi b. Abd al-Ghani, *Awdah al-isharat fi man tawalla Misr al-Qahira min al-wuzara wa'l-bashat* [The Clearest Signs: The Viziers and Pashas Who Governed Cairo, c. 1737], ed. A. A. Abd al-Rahim (Cairo 1978), 283-84; see also Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti (1754-1825), *Aja'ib al-athar fi'l-tarajim wa'l-akhbar* [The Most Wondrous Remains: Biographies and Events], ed. H. M. Jawhar (Cairo 1959-67), 1: 71.

19. Mirjafari, 'The Haydari-Ni'mati Conflicts in Iran', 152.

20. Ibid. On *ta'ziyeh*, see further P. Chelkowski, 'Ta'ziyeh: Indigenous Avant-Garde Theatre of Iran', in idem (ed.), *Ta'ziyeh: Ritual and Drama in Iran* (New York 1979), 1-11; idem, 'When Time Is No Time and Space Is No Space: The Passion Plays of Husayn', in M. Cozart Riggio et alii (eds), *Ta'ziyeh: Ritual and Popular Belief in Iran: Essays Prepared for a Drama Festival and Conference Held at Trinity College, Hartford Seminary, April 30-May 2, 1988* (Hartford, Conn. 1988), 13-23.

21. Mirjafari, 'The Haydari-Ni'mati Conflicts in Iran', 147.

22. M. Akdağ, *Celali İsyanları (1550-1603)* (Ankara 1963); Ö. L. Barkan, 'The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East', *IJMES*, 6 (1975), 3-28; M. A. Cook, *Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 1450-1600* (New York and Oxford 1972); H. İnalcık, 'The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-Arms in the Middle East', in V. J. Parry and M. Yapp (eds), *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East* (London and New York 1975), 195-217; S. Faruqi, 'Crisis and Change, 1590-1699', in H. İnalcık with D. Quataert (eds), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge 1994), 413-636.

of these decades occurred in 1622, when the twenty-two-year-old Sultan Osman II was murdered by Palace soldiery threatened by his scheme of moving the capital to Anatolia or the Arab provinces and recruiting a new army of provincial mercenaries.²³ Indeed, the regicide highlighted the growing antagonism between the imperial *kullar* of Balkan and western Anatolian origin, and the mercenaries recruited from eastern Anatolia and the Arab provinces, and even among Safavid and Özbek deserters – to say nothing of the growing number of Mamluks from the Caucasus.²⁴ I would argue that the Faqari and Qasimi factions directly reflect this East-West antagonism; the earliest manifestation of their rivalry is the struggle in the 1640s between, on the one hand, Rıdvan Bey, the pilgrimage commander, and Ali Bey, the governor of the Upper Egyptian sub-province of Jirja, and, on the other hand, Qansuh and Memi Beys. Both pairs of beys recruited armies of mercenaries, but whereas Rıdvan's and Ali's forces consisted of *Rum oğlanı*, Qansuh's and Memi's were *evlâd-ı Arab*.²⁵ As I have attempted to demonstrate elsewhere, the expression *evlâd-ı Arab* in this context refers to 'easterners' from the Arab provinces and points east, whether they were ethnically Arab or not.²⁶

In the early seventeenth-century Safavid Empire, meanwhile, Shah Abbas triggered a parallel wave of demographic confusion when he attempted to replace the Turcoman *Kızılbaş* tribesmen, who had brought the Safavids to power and heretofore comprised the backbone of their armies, with Georgian *ghulams*.²⁷ (We have to assume, incidentally, that some dismissed *Kızılbaşes* sought service with Ottoman provincial and sub-provincial governors; this might partially explain why the *evlâd-ı Arab*, as described by the Turcophone chronicler of Egypt Mehmed b. Yusuf al-Hallaq, include "Acem", or "Persians".²⁸)

Arguably, other instances of factionalism in the Ottoman provinces should be regarded in the same light as the Faqaris and Qasimis, or as the Haydaris and Ni'matis: first of all, as consequences of socio-political, and particularly demographic, crises, if not necessarily of the seventeenth-century crisis; secondly, as bearing the distinctive marks of bilateral factionalism. The Qays-Yemen divisions that plagued Ottoman Lebanon and Palestine well into the twentieth century obviously lend themselves to this sort of treatment, but so might other examples of provincial factionalism, notably the eighteenth-century struggle between janissaries and

23. G. Piterberg, *An Ottoman Tragedy: History and Historiography at Play* (Berkeley, California 2003), chapter 1; B. Tezcan, 'The 1622 Military Rebellion in Istanbul: A Historiographical Journey', in J. Hathaway (ed.), *Mutiny and Rebellion in the Ottoman Empire* (Madison, Wisconsin 2002), 25-27.

24. İ. M. Kunt, 'Ethnic-Regional (*Cins*) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment', *IJMES*, 5 (1974), 233-39.

25. Mehmed ibn Yusuf al-Hallaq, *Tarih-i Mısır-ı Kahire* [History of Cairo, Egypt, to 1715], Istanbul University Library, T.Y. 628, folio 109 r-v.

26. Hathaway, 'A Re-Examination of the Terms *Evlâd-ı Arab* and *Rum oğlanı*', *passim*.

27. Iskandar Munshi (1560/61-1633), *The History of Shah Abbas the Great*, 3 vols, trans. R. M. Savory (Boulder, Colorado 1978).

28. Al-Hallaq, *Tarih-i Mısır-ı Kahire*, folio 109 r-v.

ashraf, or militarized purported descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, in Aleppo and Ayntab/Gaziantep²⁹ and that between locally-entrenched janissaries (*yerliyye*) and new arrivals from the imperial center (*kapıkulları*) in Damascus.³⁰ Here, the key demographic confrontation has shifted from East v. West to local v. 'metropolitan', although the later confrontation bears the marks of the earlier one inasmuch as local military forces are more likely to include 'eastern' elements, those imported from the capital 'western' ones. Indeed, the process of localization of disparate ethno-geographical elements is basic to the regularization of Ottoman society in the eighteenth century and, not incidentally, to the rise of *ayan*, many of whom were not members of the 'native Arab' population (itself a problematic concept) but localized descendants, literal or non-, of the old vizier and pasha households.³¹

A final observation is the influence of janissary culture on the manifestations of bilateral factionalism. My book demonstrates that the identifying color (white) and insignia (the Ottoman *tuğ* and the Zülfikar banner) of the Faqari faction drew directly on janissary prototypes.³² The faction itself contained large numbers of janissaries, localized and otherwise, and was even dominated by janissaries in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.³³ The Qasimis, for their part, were not immune to janissary influences simply by virtue of their opposition to the Faqaris. Likewise, the role of janissary customs and institutions in the factionalism of eighteenth-century Aleppo and Damascus is worthy of serious consideration. The fact that a regiment known as janissaries or *mustahfizan* might contain local elements and might even be 'Arabized' does not by any means signify that the regiment must necessarily have abandoned 'alien, Turkish' janissary culture. On the contrary, the physical space of the barracks, the physical reality of flags and *tuğs*, and the shared legacy of old janissary stories and songs may well have incubated janissary culture long after the regiment had come to be dominated by 'locals'. The invented traditions of bilateral factionalism typically long outlived its root causes;

29. H. L. Bodman, Jr., *Political Factions in Aleppo, 1760-1826* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina 1963), esp. 55-139; A. Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century* (New York 1989), 88-92; P. M. Holt, *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent: A Political History, 1516-1922* (Ithaca, N.Y. 1966), 103, 106-11, 132-33; H. Canbakal, 'XVII. Yüzyılda Teseyyüd ve Ayntab Sadatı', in Y. Küçükdağ (ed.), *Osmanlı Döneminde Gaziantep Sempozyumu* (Gaziantep 2000), 77-81.

30. A. K. Rafeq, *The Province of Damascus, 1723-1783* (Beirut 1966), 100-01, 109, 113, 137, 139-42, 145-46, 171-75, 187, 206, 209-12, 223-26, 240; K. K. Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708-1758* (Princeton 1980), 89-94.

31. E. Toledano, 'The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research', in I. Pappé and M. Ma'oz (eds), *Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from Within – Essays in Honour of Albert Hourani* (London and New York 1997), 145-62; R. A. Abou-El-Haj, 'The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households, 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report', *JAOS*, 94 (1974), 438-47.

32. Hathaway, *A Tale of Two Factions*, 99-103, 112-18, 167, 171-77.

33. Eadem, *The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt: The Rise of the Qazdağlıs* (Cambridge 1997), chapters 3-4.

hence the prevalence of garbled or vaguely remembered origin myths such as those transmitted by the Damurdashi chronicles and by al-Jabarti. It may be that these various forms of provincial factionalism had more in common than we have heretofore acknowledged. Where a comparison with Safavid Iran might lead, meanwhile, I must leave to other scholars.

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ON THE 'NOBILITY' OF PROVINCIAL NOTABLES

Hülya CANBAKAL

The claim to be a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (*teseyyüd*) was a widespread phenomenon that afflicted the Ottoman Empire from the sixteenth century onwards. Historians of the Arab lands were the first to observe the unnatural increase in the number of *sadat/ashraf*,¹ particularly in the eighteenth century. They also observed a high degree of correlation between wealth, notability and Muhammadan pedigree. It has been noted, for example, that in eighteenth-century Damascus, the average wealth of the *ashraf* was three times that of the commoners, and most of them “were members of otherwise prominent families”. In Aleppo, they constituted the elite of the civilian population with 58% of the notable families counted among their ranks according to one study. By the end of the eighteenth century, these families held more than 30% of the lifetime tax-farms.² Although there is reason to expect elective

1. **Note on transliteration:** I use Ottoman Turkish transliteration for words of Arabic origin, and switch to Arabic where regional distinctions are pertinent. Hence *sharif* and *ashraf* as opposed to *şerif* and *eşraf*, and *seyyid* as opposed to *sayyid*. In general the title *sayyid* referred to descendants of the Prophet's grandson Husayn and *sharif* to those of Hasan. But regional usage varied significantly throughout Islamic history. In Anatolia and the Balkans, the descendants of the Prophet came to associate themselves with Husayn and used the title *seyyid*. Although the title *sayyid* was used in Arabic-speaking territories too, I prefer the Turkish form, *seyyid*, for the sake of simplicity. For *sharif* I retain the Arabic form, as it was not used outside the Arab lands after the sixteenth century. For details of Ottoman usage, see H. Canbakal, ‘Status Usurpation in the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1700’, (forthcoming).
2. B. Masters, ‘Power and Society in Aleppo in the 18th and 19th Centuries’, *RMMM*, 62 (1991), 151-58; H. L. Bodman, *Political Factions in Aleppo, 1760-1826* (Chapel Hill 1963), 63-65, on involvement of *ashraf* in prestigious trades. M. L. Meriwether, ‘The Notable Families of Aleppo, 1770-1830: Networks and Social Structure’, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1981, 85. Also see M. Rozen, ‘The Naqib al-ashraf Rebellion in Jerusalem and its Repercussions on the City's Dhimmis’, *Asian and African Studies*, 18 (1984), 252; M. Winter, ‘The Ashraf and Niqabat al-ashraf in Egypt in Ottoman and Modern Times’, *Asian and African Studies*, 19 (1985), 25-27; D. Rizk Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834* (Cambridge 1997), 154-55; H. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton 1982), 9-12, 153-57; J.-P. Thieck, ‘Décentralisation ottomane et affirmation urbaine à Alep à la fin du XVIIIème siècle’, in M. Zakaria et alii (eds), *Mouvements communautaires et*

affinity between notability and Muhammadan charisma as will be seen below, we do not know for sure whether the notables had always been over-represented among the descendants of the Prophet. Likewise, although we know that *sadat/ashraf* had always been venerated for their pedigree, we do not know much about when and where the prestige they enjoyed translated into economic and political power. Nevertheless, that it did translate into economic and political power in at least some parts of the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries is evident. Winter's observations about the Egyptian *ashraf*, Parveva's observations about Rumelian towns point to an improvement in the "status, solidarity and economic conditions" of the *sadat/ashraf* starting in the seventeenth century.³ These observations lead me to the first premise of this paper, namely, the idea that there may be a link between the over-representation of the notables among the *sadat/ashraf* and the *sadat/ashraf*'s social and political ascendancy. There is, however, one more factor to be brought into the picture: the state.

A variety of social groups and individuals claimed descent from the Prophet's family at various conjunctures in Islamic history. Some of these were state-builders, some were magnates bidding for local or regional power, and others, as in the case of much of Ottoman *sadat/ashraf*, were prompted to forgery by the expansion of state power. In fact, usurpation of the noble title, or false ennoblement in the Ottoman Empire from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century embodied all three dynamics in varying combinations and intensity.

False claims to prophetic pedigree began to trouble the Ottoman government as a widespread phenomenon in the second half of the sixteenth century, if not before. They continued throughout the seventeenth century despite government efforts to control the process. Then, they reached a new height in the eighteenth century, when *ashraf* of all classes became an important factor in regional politics, available studies tell us, especially in Greater Syria and Egypt.⁴ No doubt the phenomenon had distinct dynamics in different regions and periods but the following probably applies to all.⁵ False ennoblement was a defensive response to the consolidation

espaces urbains au Machreq (Beirut 1985), 129. For examples from medieval Islamdom, *EI*², s.v. 'Sharif', IX: 337.

3. M. Winter, *Egyptian Society Under Ottoman Rule, 1517-1798* (London and New York 1992), 186, 191; S. Parveva, 'Representatives of the Muslim-Religious Institutions in the Town in Bulgarian Lands During the 17th Century' (in Bulgarian), in R. Gradeva and S. Ivanova (eds), *Myusyulmanskata kultura po bălgarskitezemi. Izsledvaniya* [Muslim Culture in Bulgarian Lands. Studies] (Sofia 1998), 167. I am grateful to Dr Rossitsa Gradeva for translating this text into English for me.
4. False ennoblement was equally common in some parts of Anatolia and the Balkans, but there are no studies on the politics of the *sadat* in these locations. The only area for which there is already evidence of *sadat* politics is the province of Maraş, which can be seen as an extension of the Syrian pattern. See H. Canbakal, 'Ayntab at the End of the Seventeenth Century: A Study of Notables and Urban Politics', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1999.
5. For an attempt at tracing the phenomenon in different regions and a discussion of regional factors, see Canbakal, 'Status Usurpation'.

of the Ottoman state and became a means for various subject groups to uphold their autonomy and/or to bid for local or regional power. This included ordinary subjects' urge to arm themselves against government exactions as well as notables' self-assertion up against and into the state apparatus.

As for the Ottoman state-builders, although they did not claim Muhammadan pedigree themselves, unlike their arch-enemy, the Safavids, or their lesser rivals in North Africa, they did promote the cult of Muhammadan nobility as part of their self-image. My findings suggest that at the same time, the Ottoman centre may have selectively accommodated false claims of Muhammadan pedigree as dictated by its scheme of status/title management as well as by its ideological programme, exigencies of territorial expansion and diplomatic claims. Consequently, it is quite possible that the phenomenon of *teseyyüd* was also one of *tesyid*: ennoblement by the Ottoman centre. At least, one could maintain, the improvement of the status of the *sadat/ashraf* had something to do with state policies, and I propose that the over-representation of the notables among the descendants of the Prophet was also linked with state policies and the relationship between the notables and the state.

To make such broad statements on a topic as little studied as this involves obvious methodological risks. Therefore, this paper should be read as an interpretative essay aspiring to no more than showing the legitimacy of these propositions rather than proving them. To this end, it examines the relationship between notables and Muhammadan nobility in two regards. First, it discusses the question of control over the distribution of the noble title, and then, proceeds with a discussion of the official significance of becoming a *seyyid/sharif*.

Policies of Surveillance and their Limits

Judging by the Registers of the Imperial *Nakibüleşraf*, the Ottoman policy towards the *sadat* went through 3 phases: roughly 1500-1650, 1650-1700 and 1700 onwards. The first phase was marked by the beginning of the government's systematic surveillance policy. The imperial *nakibüleşraf* kept track of their number and identity through copies of title deeds and summary registers organised alphabetically. Probably sometime in the second half of the sixteenth century, the government detected the phenomenon of false ennoblement, but it took no major action until the second half of the following century. Only then, more specifically, between 1659 and 1695, did it switch to a policy of militant surveillance that was reflected in a series of inspections meant to 'purge the noble lineage'. At the same time, the number of *seyyidship* claims authenticated in Istanbul dropped sharply. All these matched the centralist-restorative spirit of the Köprülü era, and they reflected the government's urge to restore the Ottoman socio-political order that had been upset by the two-way mobility between the *askerî* and *reaya*. In a parallel fashion, these inspections reflected the need to identify the resources of the realm at a time of mounting fiscal hardship. Consequently, a great many *sadat/ashraf* were demoted to *reaya* status and lost their green turbans.⁶

6. For example, of the 3,835 claimants inspected in Anatolia in 1659, 1,171 were deemed

Government vigilance against usurpation of titles came to an abrupt end in 1699, or slightly earlier, more or less simultaneously with the end of the Ottoman-Habsburg War. Inspections came to a halt, and even more significantly, regular registration of the rightful claimants also stopped, leaving us with no more than a handful of records dating from the eighteenth century. This is noteworthy because even though government policies towards the *sadat/ashraf* had always been partly motivated by ideological concerns and geared to the dynamics of the Safavid challenge, this new turn in the policy of control was effected two decades before the end of Safavid rule. Certainly, the imperial *nakibüleşraf* continued to dispatch warnings to the provinces instructing the local *nakibüleşrafs* to prevent usurpations. But the centre itself was no longer involved in the process of proof and certification, delegating this, evidently, to the local authorities. This switch conformed to the general pattern of the eighteenth-century administrative practices, but in fact, it may not have meant as radical a break as it may seem at first sight.

Irrespective of the changes in policies of surveillance, central control over the distribution of the noble title was limited in scope and effect, and where and when the Ottoman government had limited or no say in establishing the verity of the claims to noble pedigree, it was the local notables who were most likely to control the distribution of the title. Istanbul's control over the process of the certification of the *sadat* had always been limited in at least two ways. First, geographically. As far as the Arab lands were concerned, the capital limited itself to sending *nakibüleşrafs* to a few important cities, such as Cairo and Damascus. But after the sixteenth century, the office came to be monopolised by local notable families. Furthermore, the presence of a *nakibüleşraf* sent from the capital did not necessarily mean Istanbul was involved in the process of certification. For example in Cairo, even in the early decades of Ottoman rule, when Istanbul's direct appointees were in charge, the *ashraf* of the region were controlled locally. The *nakibüleşrafs* kept track of the genealogical tables and lists of allowances assigned for the *ashraf*, and authenticated or thwarted claims of Muhammadan pedigree using these lists. Evidently, they were not expected to send certificates of proof to Istanbul for final ratification.⁷ Ze'evi's description of the process of certification in seventeenth-century Jerusalem also points to the autonomy of the local *nakibüleşraf*, and probably applies to most places in the zone of indirect imperial control.⁸ The consequence of this for the

to be usurpers. Likewise, the two inspections held in the Province of Sivas in the 1680s revealed 1,089 usurpers from among 3,633 claimants. *Nakibüleşraf Defteri* (ND) ## 30, 27, 28.

7. Winter, *Egyptian Society*, 186, 193-96.

8. *Seyyidship* claims were proved by witnesses in the presence of the local *nakibüleşraf*. Then, the claimant went to the court with a communication signed by the *nakibüleşraf* and asked for it to be registered, probably also asking for a copy: D. Ze'evi, *An Ottoman Century: The District of Jerusalem in the 1600s* (Albany, N.Y. 1996), 73-74. For Aleppo and Nablus, see M. Salati, *Ascesa e Caduta di una Famiglia di Aşraf Sciiti di Aleppo: I Zuhrāwī o Zuhrā-zāda (1600-1700)* (Rome 1992), 27; also Bodman, *Political Factions in Aleppo*, 99.

modern historian is a sad one: the Registers of the Imperial *Nakibüleşraf* provide no information on Arab *sadat/ashraf*.⁹ Naturally, management of the *sadat/ashraf* had a longer history in Arab lands than other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, in view of the tradition of local self-management and the presence of historical/symbolic loci of authority over the *sadat/ashraf* (Mecca, Najaf, Karbala, and, later, the Safavid capitals), the exclusion of the Arab lands from imperial purview does not seem problematic. Nevertheless, eastern Anatolia and the western and north-western part of the Balkans too remained outside direct government supervision. In other words, it was neither history nor ethnic divisions that determined the contours of central control, at least, not they alone.

Istanbul's control over the process of certification was limited also within the zone of direct control, more specifically, the area between the Euphrates in the east and eastern Rumelia in the west. This was where *sadat* were certified by the imperial *nakibüleşraf* more or less consistently. Here too, the process of proving descent and getting it certified was never as smooth and orderly as Istanbul would have probably liked to see. The standard procedure of certification involved two elements: presentation of a title deed issued earlier and presentation of witnesses. It is likely that in conjunction with bureaucratisation, the use of documents for proof of descent increased over time, as in other kinds of judicial and notarial procedures. Be that as it may, there were many ways to get hold of a valid certificate. One could buy the title deed of a deceased *seyyid* or steal one.¹⁰ Title deeds could also be forged like any other document, and officials could be bribed.¹¹ Private individuals, scribes, even judges could be behind such forgery. Naturally, notables were in a better position than everyone else to bribe, manipulate or even coerce local and imperial officials in order to acquire impeccable genealogies or title deeds, or simply buy the services of the ablest document forgers. As the local *nakibüleşraf* himself was often from a notable family, his 'co-operation' within an actual or prospective network of clientage or factional alliance was highly likely.

Further, there are numerous sixteenth and seventeenth-century *hüccets* that make no reference to use of documents during the process of proof.¹² One of Ebussuûd Efendi's *fetvas*, too, tells us that testimony by reliable witnesses consti-

9. For information on the Registers of the Imperial *Nakibüleşraf*, see Canbakal, 'Status Usurpation', Appendix I.

10. R. Kılıç, 'Osmanlı Devleti'nde Seyyidler ve Şerifler (XIV-XVI. Yüzyıllar)', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Hacettepe University – Ankara, 2000, 63.

11. S. A. Kahraman and Y. Dağlı (eds), *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi* (Istanbul 1999), 3: 178-79; A.-K. Rafeq, 'Changes in the Relation between the Ottoman Central Administration and the Syrian Provinces from the 16th Century to the 18th Century', in T. Naff and R. Owen (eds), *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History* (Carbondale and Edwardsville – London and Amsterdam 1977), 65-66.

12. In one particular register among the Registers of the Imperial *Nakibüleşraf*, ND # 14, there is not a single reference to use of documents during the process of proof. Notably, this register belongs to Allâme Efendi (1630-34), one of the most active *nakibüleşrafs* in authenticating *seyyidship* claims.

tuted sufficient proof of Muhammadan pedigree.¹³ Likewise, Bottini observes that in Ottoman Homs for example, some families maintained their title on the basis of consensus or hearsay (*tawatur*) alone, and they could thus obtain even the post of the *nakib*.¹⁴ I suggest that it was this process of proving descent by recourse to social recognition that contributed to the proliferation of the *sadat* among the notables in particular. Oral testimony was a standard procedure used in all situations that required establishing a 'fact' in the sharia court. In cases of proving Muhammadan pedigree, testimony took a number of forms. The witness could testify on the basis of his personal knowledge, specifying the relatives whose genealogy had been proved earlier, or confirming kinship ties with such persons. Alternatively, the witness could testify to others' statements to the same effect referring to specific persons, hearsay, or the claimant's reputation in his/her community. In brief, testimony brought into the procedure of proof the opinion and will of the community: in this instance, the opinion of the community as to who could and should be a *seyyid*. Evidently, the *nakibüleşraf* could also forego individual witnesses altogether. According to a memo in one of the *Nakibüleşraf* Registers from the 1580s, the local *nakibüleşraf* could also determine the identity of a claimant by directly asking the community after the Friday prayer whether he was a *seyyid* or not. If the community said he was not, the *nakibüleşraf* was to remove the 'Green sign (of *seyyid*hood)'.¹⁵

Obviously, this practice was open to much abuse. That is why one of the imperial *nakibüleşrafs* of the early seventeenth century, Emir Ali Efendi, tried to institute a new rule requiring the presentation of 40 witnesses in order to prove descent, but this rule was soon disregarded.¹⁶ As noted earlier, the decades which followed actually saw the high point of government surveillance over the descendants of the Prophet. However, the liberalism we observe in surveillance policies in the eighteenth century may have its roots in this period.

Two texts from the inspection registers of the 1680s reveal a rather elaborate system of classification concerning claims of descent from the Prophet. The system is interesting in two regards. First, reputation, i.e., social recognition as *seyyid*, seems to have played a central role; second, even those claimants whose pedigree could not be proved with certainty were not automatically classified as impostors. Instead, they were placed on a scale of verity. '*El-ma'ruf bi's-seyyade*' (reputed as *seyyid*), '*el-kadimu's-seyyade*' (*seyyid* for a long period), '*el-kadimu'l-alâme ve'l-mechulu's-seyyade*' (bearing [the noble] sign for a long period and of uncertain

13. M. E. Düzdağ, *Şeyhülislam Ebussuûd Efendi Fetvaları* (Istanbul 1983), 82. Ebussuûd's *fetva* may be based on Hanafi jurists' view concerning the admissibility of reputation as evidence for one's identity; B. Haykel, 'Dissembling Descent, or How the Barber Lost his Turban in Eighteenth-Century Zaydi Yemen', *Islamic Law and Society*, 9 (2002), 194-225.

14. L. Bottini, 'Les descendants du Prophète à Homs: notes en marge', *Oriente Moderno* n.s., 18/2 (1999), 351-73.

15. ND # 5, 45b, cited in Kılıç, 'Osmanlı Devleti'nde Seyyidler ve Şerifler', 141.

16. M. Sarıçık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Nakibü'l-eşrâflık Müessesesi* (Ankara 2003), 138-40; Kılıç, 'Osmanlı Devleti'nde Seyyidler ve Şerifler', 65.

descent) were some of the grades of *seyyid*hood recognised by the investigators.¹⁷ Only those whose reputation was too recent were prohibited from claiming *seyyid*ship. Obviously, we cannot assume on the basis of these texts alone that such a system of classification was in common use. Still, it is significant because such elaborate emphasis on social recognition was novel (judging by the *Nakibüleşraf* Registers) and can be taken to herald the withdrawal of the capital from the process of certification.

Notables had something to gain from both. In fact, more instrumental in their usurpation of Muhammadan nobility was probably their social position and the popular perception of their identity. If we were to believe the testimony of d'Ohsson, a keen observer of the eighteenth-century Ottoman society, *sadat* living in destitution were regarded with suspicion, because the Prophet's blessing was supposed to have fallen upon his true descendants forever and protect them from all misfortune. In other words, the credibility of an impostor as a descendant of the Prophet was higher if he had a good social standing and was well off than would have been the case otherwise. Further, where prestige and credibility did not work, sheer power would have: it is unlikely that ordinary witnesses would have had the courage to challenge the claim of a notable family.¹⁸ At any rate, witnesses as well as those who supervised imperial inspections tended to be *sadat* of high standing.¹⁹

Finally, notables who wanted to marry into a family of *sadat* in order to secure 'nobility' for their descendants at least, again, stood a better chance than ordinary people. Judging by the Registers of the Imperial *Nakibüleşraf*, *sadat* exogamy was allowed in Anatolia and the Balkans. However, rules of compatible marriage, *kafaa*, required that even if the would-be spouse was not a *seyyid*, his distinction in other regards should make up for this deficiency.²⁰ Thus, naturally, notables had an edge in the pursuit of the hand of a *seyyide/sharifa*.

In brief, notables were more likely to become *sadat* because not only did they have at their disposal better means to elicit official recognition but also they bore the signs of high breeding and enjoyed social power.

Changes in the Status of the Nakibüleşrafs

In seeming contrast to the abeyance of central control over the provincial *sadat/ashraf* in the eighteenth century, the importance of the imperial *nakibüleşraf* in the Ottoman administrative hierarchy increased and his role in imperial ceremonies of legitimacy was enhanced. He became the primary figure in initiation ceremonies,

17. ND # 27, 2a; # 28, 10b.

18. We find a parallel to this situation in seventeenth-century France, where royal inspectors were having a hard time in finding witnesses who would testify against powerful families who claimed to be nobles (S. Clark, *State and Status: The Rise of the State and Aristocratic Power in Western Europe* [Montreal and Buffalo 1995], 179).

19. ND # 30, 34a; ND # 22, 5a.

20. *EP*, s.v. 'Sharif', IX: 335; J. E. Tucker, *In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine* (Berkeley 1998), 141-42.

only to be followed by the *şeyhülislam* in importance. He also assumed a crucial role both in old and newly instituted rituals associated with religious holidays.²¹ Significantly, one of these novel rituals instituted a graphic bond between Istanbul and the provinces: the *nakibüleşraf* would dip an edge of the mantle of the Prophet in water and send out the blessed water to dignitaries in the provinces. In return he received stately presents.²² The *nakibüleşraf*s also came to hold special privileges that were not accorded to any other dignitary within the bureaucracy. Starting from the last decades of the seventeenth century, they were appointed from among the highest ranking *ulema*, and in the eighteenth century, most of them also served as *şeyhülislams*.²³ In brief, although the House of the Prophet, and as the representative and overseer of its members, the *nakibüleşraf*s, had always been held in high esteem, it would appear that the cult of the Prophet and his House had never been so closely associated with the self-image of the Ottoman dynasty.

We find a parallel in the provinces to these changes taking place in the capital. The position of the *nakibüleşraf*s in the local political hierarchy was also enhanced in the course of the seventeenth century, which was later crowned by the increase in their authority over the local *sadat*.²⁴ According to Winter, as the office of the marshal was considered insignificant under the Mamluks in Egypt, appointments made by the new Ottoman regime did not evoke any local resistance in the sixteenth century. However, in the period which followed, he was transformed from a modest religious functionary to an important political figure. As he started attending the governor's *divan* like other notables, the local *ashraf* began to refuse the

21. He was the first to kiss the sultan's hand, only to be followed by the *şeyhülislam*. In the eighteenth century, he was given a leading role in girding the sultan with the Prophet's sword in Eyüp. He was also the primary guardian of the relics of the Prophet, and most importantly, the Holy Banner, which he took out for display on occasions of civil disorder, or to lead military campaigns. *Tarih-i Raşid*, II: 160 cited by C. Kafadar, 'Eyüp'te Kılıç Kuşanma Törenleri', in T. Artan (ed.), *Eyüp: Dün/Bugün* (Istanbul 1994), 58-59; Bodman, *Political Factions*, 94-95, based on European reports; İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilâtı* (Ankara 1988), 168-70.
22. I. Mouradjea d'Ohsson, *Tableau général de l'empire ottoman* (Paris 1791), 4/2: 264-65; Bodman, *Political Factions*, 95. Also, G. Necipoğlu-Kafadar, *Architecture, Ceremonial and Power: The Topkapı Palace in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries* (Cambridge, Mass. 1991), 151. Necipoğlu suggests that this may well be a pre-Ottoman practice although the earliest Ottoman reference is from the early seventeenth century.
23. Uzunçarşılı, *İlmiye Teşkilâtı*, 166-67. Once appointed, *nakibüleşraf*s could simultaneously hold other offices and follow the regular promotion track, unless they became *şeyhülislams*. Their revenue grant was never withdrawn (d'Ohsson, *Tableau général*, 4/2: 563-64).
24. A. M. Bakhit, *The Ottoman Province of Damascus in the Sixteenth Century* (Beirut 1982), 186; Rafeq, 'Changes', 66; Winter, *Egyptian Society*, 189, 191-95; Rozen, 'The Naqib al-ashraf Rebellion', 252. I would also like to thank Butrus Abu-Manneh for his comments on an earlier version of this paper concerning the power of the *nakibüleşraf*s in Damascus and Aleppo.

nakibüleşrafs sent by the government and drove them out, and the control of the post became gradually hereditary in Cairo and elsewhere.²⁵

Mundane realities of politics, such as the presence of a large number of notables among the *sadat/ashraf*, in addition to the fact that the *sadat/ashraf* as a whole constituted a sizeable social group, more importantly, one that could stage co-ordinated action in some places may account for their rise within the local community and local politics. But parallel policy changes effected in the imperial centre call for an account encompassing the relation and interaction between the capital and the provinces. Undoubtedly, such an account would have to have a cultural component. If we can indeed speak of a revival of interest in the cult of the Prophet and his House, it cannot be explained in instrumentalist terms attributing political designs to agents on either side: the centre or the provinces. In view of the debates about Akhbari reformism in seventeenth-century Iran and its possible connection with the social promotion of the *sadat*, and the more general phenomenon of fundamentalist reformism that affected the Ottoman lands, too, research into the cultural underpinnings of the fortunes of the *sadat/ashraf* appears a highly promising venue.²⁶ That, however, falls outside the scope of this paper. Thus, I shall continue with a narrowly defined political account.

Official Recognition of No(ta)bility

While *sayyid/sharif* status promised prestige and privilege throughout Islamic history, it was not very often that the drive to acquire Muhammadan nobility reached the proportions it did in Ottoman lands in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Like its precursors, the Ottoman state offered the *sadat* stipends and grants in considerable amounts, which no doubt constituted a positive incentive for usurpers.²⁷ Yet, such grants, administered directly or through religious foundations, targeted mainly the *sadat* of the Holy Lands and selected Arab cities of symbolic and political significance. As for the judicial privileges commonly associated with *sayyid/sharif* status, it seems highly likely that they emerged rather late, possibly in the eighteenth century, when the local *nakibüleşrafs* were given full control over the *sadat*.²⁸ In

25. Winter, *Egyptian Society*, 189, 191-95; H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West* (London and New York 1957), I/2: 101. For Ayntab, Ayntab Court Registers #106/271, Rebiyülevvel 1162/1749 in C. C. Güzelbey and H. Yetkin (eds), *Gaziantep Şer'i Mahkeme Sicillerinden Örnekler* (Gaziantep 1970), 4: 55; BOA, HAT 26846 (1235/1819-20).

26. A. Newman, 'The Role of the Sâdât in Safavid Iran: Confrontation or Accommodation?', *Oriente Moderno* n.s., 18/2 (1999), 577-95.

27. A. Temimi, 'Rôle des Sadat/Aşraf dans l'empire ottoman: quelques considérations', *Oriente Moderno* n.s., 18/2 (1999), 640, 646.

28. The earliest evidence for the *nakibüleşraf*'s judicial powers that I have been able to locate is from the 1730s: D. Cantemir, *The History of the Growth and Decay of the Othman Empire* (London 1734-35), 1: 94 n. 50, 2: 346. For a discussion, see Canbakal, 'Status Usurpation'.

other words, judicial privileges may have been a consequence, rather than a cause, of the phenomenon of false ennoblement.

What potentially affected everyone claiming to be a descendant of the Prophet was the tax privileges accorded to the title. Particularly after the regularisation of the household tax (*avarız*) in the seventeenth century, acquisition of tax exemptions by entering one of the politico-fiscal categories of *muaf* or *askerî* became especially important. Posing as a descendant of the Prophet was just one of the defensive tactics developed by the tax-paying population, and available evidence suggests that wherever there was a large body of *sadat*, the overall *askerî* population was also large. In some instances, the rates were fantastically high, a fact which deserves a separate inquiry on its own account. For example, in 1752, 31% of the households in the town of Alakenise in Niğbolu were *sadat*, and in the same town, the *askerî* as a whole constituted 77% of the population. The relevant figures for the town of Eski Cuma, also in Niğbolu, were 11% for the *sadat* and 75% for the *askerî*.²⁹ At the other end of the Turkish-speaking territories, Ayntab had a usurpation pattern closer to Damascus, with its *sadat* constituting about 12.5% of the population in 1697, and *askerî* 36%.³⁰

Nevertheless, while the desire to acquire exemptions cut across all segments of society, not every tactic used for that purpose was equally accessible or appealing to different social groups. Judging by the distribution of the *seyyid/sharif* title within the urban populace, it was *the* tactic favoured and controlled by the notables – which is not to suggest that only notables tried to forge their pedigree. Furthermore, Ze'evi's work on seventeenth-century Jerusalem indicates that no matter how one acquired Muhammadan nobility, socially and economically better-positioned *sadat* could successfully defend their privileges when challenged, while lesser members of the estate failed to do so. In other words, the claim to Muhammadan pedigree was a reasonable defence strategy against fiscal demands, but it promised greater and safer returns to those who were already closer to the upper echelons of society.

Further, while tax evasion may have been a source of temptation for the notables, too, like everyone else, the marginal value of the financial gain that exemptions provided was probably much more limited for them than for the lesser folk.³¹ On the other hand, the symbolic value of the move was likely to have been as important as tangible privileges associated with the title. Firstly, it added to the esteem and power the notables already enjoyed in various milieus in which they lived and func-

29. A. Şimşirgil, 'The Kazas (Townships) of Alakilise, Rahova, İvraca, İzladi and Eski Cuma – Subdivisions of the Sancak of Niğbolu in XVIII. Century', *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, 7 (2002), 239, 249, 252.

30. See Canbakal, 'Ayntab', 141–44.

31. There is very little research on the impact that changes in the taxation system had on different social groups. Therefore, any general statement on the matter is bound to be speculative. See B. McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land 1600–1800* (Cambridge and Paris 1981); L. T. Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560–1660* (Leiden 1996).

tioned: local, regional or imperial. And Meriwether's argument that acquiring *sharif* status in eighteenth-century Aleppo was not so much a means for social mobility as a means to set the seal on already existing power is probably generally valid.³² It can be surmised that particularly in places where unstable power balances within urban oligarchies and between such oligarchies and the central state bred factional politics, Muhammadan pedigree was an invaluable asset to capitalise on, all the more so if the prospect of gaining state backing in local struggles for supremacy was pretty high. And state backing it did provide, even if indirectly.

The Muhammadan title turned notability into nobility in a dual sense: nobility as hereditary distinction and nobility as legally recognised status, which naturally had a bearing on their relationship with the state. Irrespective of the process by which one's claim to the Muhammadan title was recognised, the title itself embodied a power independent of the state; therefore, it was a potential weapon that could be used against it. Ironically, the *sadat/ashraf* also constituted the only blood nobility apart from the ruling dynasty that the Ottoman state recognised, and this recognition was reinforced in a fundamental way when the *sadat/ashraf* were promoted from the category of *muaf* to *askerî* in the seventeenth century.³³ At this time, the *askerî* were a nobility, partly produced, partly impaired by the growing state as well as the divisive impact of market relations. It was comparable to the service nobility that all expanding states in history have tried to create and promote in spite of or over the old nobilities. The success of the early modern age in this regard was distinguished from all earlier cycles of centralisation by its long-term irreversibility, and the relative importance of the non-military element.

Accordingly, it is known that the real sensitivity of the Ottoman state was about military claims of the old nobilities in conquered lands, and even those encounters did not preclude concession and compromise. On a different front, in recognising status claims based on knowledge and religious charisma, the Ottoman state was more liberal within its ideological parameters, i.e., as the self-appointed leader of Sunnite Islam and Hanafism. Its patronage of the *sadat* parallel to the consolidation of Sunnite orthodoxy in the sixteenth century should be seen in this light. And once it managed to impose its terms as the sole dispenser of status and titles, i.e., once it made central certification the sole legitimate basis for claiming rights and privileges, usurpation of titles was a natural and common response provoked by its intrusions and increasing demands. In fact, Ottoman treatise writers of the seventeenth century, mourning the lost purity of the *askerî*, would have found kindred hearts in contemporary Europe, where statesmen had to spend much time in order to purge

32. Meriwether, 'The Notable Families of Aleppo', 86. Also Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, 153; M. el-Aziz Ben Achour, 'Les Šarifs à Tunis au temps des Deys et des Beys (XVII^e-XIX^e siècle)', *Oriente Moderno* n.s., 18/2 (1999), 346.

33. *Ferman/kanunname*, dated 1013/1605, in Ö. L. Barkan, 'Edirne Askeri Kassamına Ait Tereke Defterleri, 1545-1659', *Belgeler*, 3 (1966), 4-5; order dated Cemaziyevvel 1038/1628, in Uzunçarşılı, *İlmiye Teşkilâtı*, 125-26. Note also the explicit listing of all *sadat* among the *askerî* in a survey held in order to "differentiate (*tefrik*) [the *askerî*] from the *reaya*" (Ayntab Court Registers # 48A/167-61, Zilkade 1108/1697).

the nobility of usurpers, which points to the parallel dynamics of state-building in this era.³⁴

Certainly, both the *askerî* and the *sadat* were internally much differentiated in economic terms, especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but this alone does not disqualify them as a nobility. Wealth most often accompanied status in pre-modern societies as well, but they were not identical, and were even less so during this period. Ottoman nobilities were not immune to the post-Black Death upswing, political and economic, that swept across Eurasia.

What we observe in Ottoman lands during this period can be characterised as a contention between economic stratification and status stratification, the former rising to challenge the primacy of the latter. While the classic system of stratification was designed in a way to allow upward mobility through military might and command of (sacred) knowledge alone, economic and fiscal transformations of the post-classical era opened the way for mobility on the basis of wealth, thus bringing economic status and politically defined status closer to one another. It appears that once the *askerî-reaya* grid was stretched, the principle of descent (*neseb*), as opposed to merit, too, assumed a new and more celebrated function in the Ottoman socio-political constitution.³⁵ The way the *askerî* was originally defined did not mean descent ceased to function as a customary principle of status allocation. Amidst the transformations of the post-classical period, it surfaced back into the heart of the Ottoman official hierarchy, and combined with economic power, it helped burst open the *askerî-reaya* divide, or redefine it.

Several studies written in recent years have demonstrated that provincial notables were tied to the imperial centre within a framework of common interests through posts, entitlements to waqf stipends, tax-farms. The rapprochement that these studies reveal has allowed us to see decentralisation and state-making in a different light. I suggest that the spread of *seyyidship* in the eighteenth century be considered along the same lines, which would shed further light both on the phenomenon of rapprochement and title usurpation itself. This paper has pointed out the temporal overlap between a number of developments: the liberal attitude regarding title conferrals, the promotion of the *nakibüleşraf* and the cult of Muhammadan nobility in the capital, rise of the local *nakibüleşrafs*, and presence of a large body of *sadat/ashraf* among the notables, all at a time when the notables were in general on the rise. There is not enough evidence to postulate causality between them but there is enough evidence to justify further investigation.

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34. Clark, *State and Status*, 172-76.

35. A specific parallel to this can be observed in the increased importance of descent in the *ulema* hierarchy from the seventeenth century onwards: M. C. Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600-1800)* (Minneapolis 1988), 212-14. Compare Ben Achour, 'Les Šarifs à Tunis', 346, where the author associates title usurpation with periods of stability rather than periods of reconstitution of the elites.

BELGRADE: A MUSLIM AND NON-MUSLIM CULTURAL CENTRE (SIXTEENTH-SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES)

Aleksandar FOTIĆ

It is almost certain that no historian would deny the great strategic, military, economic and trading importance of Belgrade both in the Middle Ages and during the period of Ottoman rule. After the Ottoman invasion in 1521, Belgrade became part of a system of Islamic urban civilisation. Unlike the cities which already had a developed urban Islamic civilisation when the Ottomans incorporated them into their state, in the Balkan cities this type of civilisation took a specific Ottoman form from the outset. This was a result of the Ottoman concept of the role of the city within a state and it was primarily reflected in the city structure itself.

This study deals with the first period of Ottoman rule, which lasted more than a century and a half – from the end of August 1521 to early September 1688. Belgrade slowly became more oriental in appearance as Muslims enriched its urban structure with their endowments – a fact often commented upon by Western travellers. In that period Belgrade was steadily built, enriched and demographically enlarged at a rapid pace. This material progress was beyond doubt accompanied by corresponding cultural progress. The continuity of progress was occasionally hampered – most often by epidemics (plague in 1579 and 1628) or large-scale fires (1572, 1672) – but it was not interrupted by the scourges of war. It was only during the war with the Holy League (1683-99) that Belgrade sustained repeated heavy bombardment which damaged it to such an extent that it took decades to rebuild, almost from the ground up.

While the Semendire/Smederevo *sancak* was a military border zone, Belgrade with its high ramparts played a strategic role. Wars left their marks on the development of Belgrade even when the borders were moved far to the north and west. Belgrade was bound to become the largest military and food-manufacturing centre of the European part of the Empire owing to its geographical position and its indisputable advantage as a convenient transport hub where the most important road and river routes intersected. In addition to storing arms and military supplies, Belgrade also developed manufacture (cannon foundry and gunpowder and hard biscuit baking). Supplies, grain, cattle, arms and all military provisions flowed from all parts of the Empire into Belgrade to be distributed to the western frontier. It was also safe winter quarters for the army on military campaign. The presence of the army for months at a time promoted crafts and trade.

Economic expansion was at its peak around the middle of the seventeenth century, precisely at the time when Evliya Çelebi studied and described it. Enchanted by its appearance and by the wealth of its citizens, he called Belgrade the “Cairo of Rumeli”. Belgrade did not remain simply an internal trading station connecting Buda and Timișoara with Dubrovnik, Thessalonica, Istanbul and farther on with Bursa, Izmir, Damascus and Aleppo. The goods from the Arab and Persian lands flowed through Belgrade to the metropolises of Austria, the Czech lands, German states, Poland and Sweden, and in the opposite direction, manufactured products from Europe were transported to markets in the Levant. The founding of the Austrian Oriental Company (*Societas Mercatorum Orientalis*) in 1667 provided a special stimulus. At that time Belgrade was considered to be its first and most important station in the European part of the Ottoman Empire.¹

People of various races, nationalities and confessions lived in Belgrade. Along with the Muslims, there were Orthodox as well as Catholic Christians of diverse origins. The Orthodox Christians were mostly Serbs, then Bulgarians, Greeks and Armenians. The Catholic community was sharply divided into two groups: the colony of Dubrovnik merchants and the community of Catholics from Bosnia. Without much interest and often confusing national names, travellers seldom mention Croats, Dalmatians, Italians, or Hungarian Catholics, Calvinists and Lutherans. Apart from various Christian communities, there also were Jews and a considerable number of Gypsies (both Muslim and Christian). According to the imperial taxation registers, in fewer than forty years, from 247 households registered in 1536 (79 Muslim, 139 Christian and 29 Gypsy), Belgrade increased fourfold; in 1572 there already were 1,127 households registered (695 Muslim, 220 Christian, 192 Gypsy and 20 Jewish). An outside estimate for the second half of the sixteenth century is that Belgrade had a population of about 10,000 people, including the permanent garrison. The estimates for the seventeenth century, especially those made by travellers, are on the whole unreliable and imprecise, ranging from several tens of thousands to the most improbable 98,000 people (excluding garrison, notables and *ulema*), 21,000 of which, according to Evliya Çelebi, were liable to pay poll-tax! Evliya added that there were 17,000 Muslim houses. Nevertheless, one must bear in mind that some of the reports of the Catholic bishops and travellers are very close to Evliya's estimate [c. 2,000 households in 1620 (P. Mundy); 20,000 families in 1623/24 (Masarecho); 30,000 households in 1624 (L. Gédoyne); 8,000 households and 60,000 inhabitants in 1633 (Masarecho); 120,000 people in the first half of the

1. V. Čubrilović (ed.), *Историја Београда* [The History of Belgrade] (Belgrade 1974), I: 323-461 (chapters by H. Šabanović, R. Samardžić and R. Veselinović); R. Tričković, ‘Београд под турском влашћу 1521-1804. године’ [Belgrade Under Turkish Rule 1521-1804], in Z. Antonić (ed.), *Историја Београда* [The History of Belgrade] (Belgrade 1995), 89-142; H. Šabanović, ‘Урбани развитак Београда од 1521. до 1688. године’ [The Urban Development of Belgrade from 1521 to 1688], *Годишњак града Београда*, 17 (1970), 5-40; R. Samardžić, ‘Belgrade, centre économique de la Turquie du nord, au XVI^e siècle’, in N. Todorov (ed.), *La ville balkanique, XV^e-XIX^e ss. (Studia Balcanica 3)* (Sofia 1970), 33-44.

seventeenth century (De Georgii); fewer than 40,000 in 1681 (Donado); again in 1681, 50,000 (Benetti)]. Such summary estimates do not correspond to the figures in the *cizye* records for 1627/28, 1640/41 and 1642/43, which show respectively 378, 346 and 381 *cizye* households liable to pay taxes in Belgrade city districts (whatever the number of persons in a *cizye* household may have been).²

A researcher not familiar with the history of Belgrade would probably look up the entries in the second edition of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* and in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*. The first was published as far back as 1960, while the second (from 1992) absolutely inexcusably fails to include valuable new findings or an updated bibliography. Except for the number of mosques and *medreses*, taken from Evliya Çelebi, neither entry mentions the cultural life of Belgrade.³ The second publication does not include the findings of a significant project, *The History of Belgrade*, the result of which was a monumental three-volume book of several thousand pages published in 1974.⁴ That was a particularly fruitful period as regards research into the past of Belgrade under Ottoman rule.

2. *Историја Београда*, I: 385-88; Tričković, 'Београд под турском влашћу', 97-100; B. Hrabak, 'Католичко становништво Србије 1460-1700' [The Catholic Population in Serbia 1460-1700], *Наша прошлост*, 2 (1987), 104-22; O. Zirojević, 'Рајнолд Лубенау о Београду и Србији 1587. године' [Reinhold Lubenau on Belgrade and Serbia in 1587], *Годишњак града Београда*, 18 (1966), 54; K. Nehring, *Adam Freiherrn zu Herbersteins Gesandtschaftsreise nach Konstantinopel. Ein Beitrag zum Frieden von Zsitvatorok* (1606) (Munich 1983), 109; H. Šabanović, *Турски извори за историју Београда. I, 1: Катастарски пописи Београда и околине 1476-1566* [Turkish Sources for the History of Belgrade. I, 1: Cadastral Records of Belgrade and its Environs 1476-1566] (Belgrade 1964), 269-83; *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi* (Istanbul 1315), V: 376; M. Jačov, *Списи Конгрегације за пропаганду вере у Риму о Србима 1622-1644* [The Acta of the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide at Rome on the Serbs 1622-1644] (Belgrade 1986), 14 (Masarecho), 174, 191-92, 197 (Masarecho); R. Samardžić, *Београд и Србија у списима француских савременика XVI-XVII век* [The City of Belgrade and Serbia of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries in the Writings of Contemporaneous Frenchmen] (Belgrade 1961), 182-83 (L. Gédéon), 193-95; M. Jačov, *Списи Тајног ватиканског архива XVI-XVIII век* [Acta from the Secret Vatican Archive, Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries] (Belgrade 1983), 12 (De Georgii), 69-70; V. Kostić, *Културне везе између југословенских земаља и Енглеске до 1700. године* [Cultural Relations between Yugoslavia and England before 1700] (Belgrade 1972), 322 (Mundy); G. Stanojević, 'Два описа Београда из 1681. године' [Two Descriptions of Belgrade from 1681], *Историјски гласник*, 1-2 (1975), 136, 138 (Donado and Benetti); O. Zirojević, 'Попис цизје београдске области 1640/41. године' [The *Cizye* Records for the Belgrade Area for 1640/41], *Историјски часопис*, 44 (1997), 229, 233.
3. B. Djurdjev, *ET*², s.v. 'Belgrade'; D. Djurić-Zamolo, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, s.v. 'Belgrad', 407-09.
4. V. Ćubrilović (ed.), *Историја Београда*, 3 vols (Belgrade 1974). This project involved many years of research, including the study of Ottoman sources by H. Šabanović and R. Tričković. Unfortunately, this huge advantage was to a great extent rendered inoperative by the lack of the proper apparatus in the book.

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In this paper I intend to set up a methodological framework for researching the cultural life of Belgrade under Ottoman rule and provide basic information on the intellectual elite of the principal religious communities.

The definitions of the elite that take into account only its economic and political influence are not applicable to the intellectual elite. Their only common denominator may be their 'influence' on the social life of a community. The member of the intellectual elite could belong to the decision-making political or economic elite, but also could be a poor dervish or a simple monk. 'Influence', 'literacy' and 'creativity' are certainly the most important qualities of a sixteenth or seventeenth-century elite intellectual. But must all three requirements be fulfilled in order to consider a person an intellectual? Assuming that every literate person in the period under consideration is an intellectual, then every creative author, even a scribe, may be said to be a member of the intellectual elite in the broadest sense of the notion. If, however, elite membership is measured by 'influence' rather than by creativity, then even a 'reader' who left no work behind but did influence his environment, perhaps strongly, as some *müderrises* or Christian priests did, is a member of the elite. Furthermore, the question may be posed whether the intellectual elite also included illiterate but 'influential' persons who acquired their knowledge through listening, and, spreading it further by preaching, produced an enthusiastic public response (as in the case of a charismatic dervish). Conversely, an outstanding original author who did not influence the intellectual life of his environment in any way cannot, by this token, be considered a member of the elite of his epoch. And the fact that his work exerted a powerful influence on subsequent generations is not much help to him.

An intellectual could be recognised or contested by his contemporaries. Trouble began when the intellectual went beyond the accepted value system upheld by the authorities, if he was a Muslim subject, or by the church hierarchy, if he was a non-Muslim. At any rate, what made him an intellectual was not his adoption of officially recognised, mostly religious, values, but his influence on his contemporaries.

Sources give no hint of intellectual communication between Muslim and non-Muslim religious communities in the cultural life of the sixteenth and seventeenth-century Ottoman Balkan city. There was no institutional framework for such communication. On the contrary, the church hierarchy in the case of non-Muslims, and the *ulema*, military, administrative and judicial hierarchies in that of Muslims, did their best to discourage intellectual communication between the two communities in order to preserve the purity of their respective faiths. And it was the hierarchies who had the power of interpreting the law and tradition. "The religious communities should be separate", decided *şeyhülislam* Ebussuûd Efendi in one of his *fetvas*. Such views were based on religious affiliation as the crucial constituent of the identity of a community and were typical of a larger part of Ottoman rule both in the Balkans and in the Arab world, as shown by B. Masters. Then again, that does not mean that there were no contacts and exchange of opinions at all, only that they were sporadic and on individual initiative. The openness to intellectual communication of the *müfti* of Damascus Abdülgani el-Nabulusi (died 1731), and his

theological debate with the Patriarch of Antioch, even if resulting from his inclination to mysticism, is an extremely rare exception which proves the rule. Moreover, such contacts could have been a risky undertaking; if Muslim public opinion found them disturbing, both sides were liable to various punishments: conversion or death for non-Muslims, severe judgment and expulsion from the community for Muslims. On both sides ample literature and sermons were always there to remind one of the dangers of losing one's faith. R. Gradeva's analysis of folk epics, neo-martyrs' lives and other contemporary literary works related to the territory of present-day Bulgaria is fully applicable to the western Balkans, to the Serb-inhabited lands. The possible extent of influence exerted by neo-martyrs' biographies, especially by the Life of St George the 'New', whose martyrdom was consequent upon a falsely friendly conversation about the respective virtues of Christianity and Islam, is clearly shown by the rapid spread of his cult throughout the Balkans, and even beyond the Ottoman Empire. One of the very reliable sources, the detailed chronicle of Serres penned by Synadinos in the seventeenth century, also gives no hint of intellectual communication between different confessions.⁵

The restriction to their respective religious and cultural environments was not specific to the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. The relationship between the Catholics and Orthodox in the Ottoman Empire was burdened with the very same barriers, fears and intolerance. The lack of communication between Muslims and non-Muslims on the intellectual level, resulting from the fact that intellectual pursuits were mostly associated with religious matters, did not entail lack of communication and co-operation in everyday life. On the contrary, contacts on that level were common. Muslims and non-Muslims could be next-door neighbours, make friends, exchange gifts for major religious feasts, or work together in their guilds. The closest co-operation between the members of all communities, going as far as partnership, was realised in trade, even in those enterprises where the stakes were high and the scale international. But even this kind of co-operation was brought to a standstill in certain periods, as was characteristic of the Ragusan community in Belgrade. Institutionally, the statute of the *Society for Trade in the Levant* strictly forbade all co-operation, not just with Muslims, but also with Jews, or Christians from other communities, including Bosnian Catholics. Of course, the reasons were neither religious nor ideological, but solely the enfeebled Ragusan

5. B. Masters, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism* (Cambridge 2001), 26-39; R. Gradeva, 'Turks and Bulgarians, Fourteenth to Eighteenth Centuries', *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 5/2 (1995), 173-87; eadem, 'Apostasy in Rumeli in the Middle of the Sixteenth Century', *Arab Historical Review for Ottoman Studies*, 22 (2000), 29-73; D. Bogdanović, 'Житије Георгија Кратовца' [The Life of St George of Kratovo], *Зборник историје књижевности [САНУ]*, 10 (1976), 203-67; G. Subotić, 'Најстарије представе светог Георгија Кратовца' [The Earliest Representations of St George of Kratovo], *Зборник радова Византолошког института*, 32 (1993), 167-202; P. Odorico in collaboration with S. Asdrachas, T. Karanastassis, K. Kostis and S. Petmézas, *Conseils et mémoires de Synadinos, prêtre de Serrès en Macédoine (XVII^e siècle)* (Paris 1996).

community's economic interests. There is no simple way, then, to explain the relations between different religious communities. B. Masters' study of the life of non-Muslims in the Ottoman Arab world, and J. Strauss' analysis of the relations between the two communities in Synadinos' chronicle, come to similar conclusions. Masters infers that "while there were few rigid barriers separating individuals of different faiths from each other, there was concomitantly little to draw them together...". Speaking of the common people, of Muslims daily mingling with non-Muslims in the streets, of those, then, to whom a 'social exchange' came easily, he emphasises that there were no rules: the documents show "that their social acceptance of non-Muslims could vary almost as dramatically as could be found among the Muslim elites". J. Strauss remarks that "basic antagonism between 'Christians' ... and 'Turks' ... runs through the whole chronicle". The relations between the communities were described as "strained" and burdened "by mutual suspicion and aggressive outbursts". There is no doubt that the barriers of tradition and religion were coupled with a psychological one, without exception marked by latent intolerance and deep-seated collective memory of more or less frequent waves of uncontrolled violence. The experience of every single religious community corresponded exactly with Ebussuûd's stance cited above.⁶

The Muslim Intellectual Elite

The Muslim intellectual elite in Belgrade, as in other Ottoman cities, was not uniform; it was made up of individuals of different origin, education, economic and political power, in different ways included in the Ottoman political bodies and assembling in different places. As in other provincial towns in the Balkans, the elite in its most general sense was first of all made up of administrative and judicial authorities headed by a *kadi*, representatives of the *ulema*: a *müfti*, *müderreses* and their students, teachers at *mektebs*, military authorities headed by a *sancakbeyi* along with individual *sipahis*, then the Muslim 'clergy' and lesser 'clergy' in mosques, *şeyhs* of different dervish orders and their adherents, scribes of all kinds and all who were in some way connected with books (transcribers, calligraphers, artists and others). The system of rotation, applied in the Muslim military-administrative and judicial bodies and to a lesser extent to the members of the *ulema*, hampered, if not prevented, the sustained existence of a hard core of any established cultural circle. When eminent individuals left, regardless of whether they were military officers, famed *kadis* or inspired *şeyhs*, their subordinates and adherents left with them.⁷

6. R. Samardžić, 'Дубровчани у Београду' [Ragusans in Belgrade], *Годишњак Музеја града Београда*, 2 (1955), 72-73, 77; Masters, *Christians and Jews*, 37-38; J. Strauss, 'Ottoman Rule Experienced and Remembered: Remarks on Some Local Greek Chronicles of the *Tourkokratia*', in F. Adanır and S. Faroqi (eds), *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography* (Leiden-Boston-Cologne 2002), 205, 207.
7. Alexandre Popović has addressed the general methodological problems of researching the cultural life of Muslims in the Balkan cities. Other researchers have dealt with methodological issues, but only with those they came across in their work on certain

Given such a state system, the question is who constituted a local Muslim writer. Did all the writers with the *nisba* 'Belgradî' live and write in Belgrade? Obviously not. Many of them were simply born in Belgrade, attained fame in Istanbul, Cairo, Medina and elsewhere, and never returned to their birthplace. They should be studied as individuals who took part in shaping Ottoman civilisation, but they had no connection with the Belgrade intellectual elite. The local Muslim cultural circle was made up of those who lived and created in Belgrade, regardless of the place where they had been born, in the Balkans or in Anatolia or in the Arab provinces, and regardless of how long they stayed in Belgrade – a year or two or several decades. One of the paradoxes of Ottoman civilisation is precisely the fact that local Muslim cultural history was made, or influenced, by 'newcomers', people who were born elsewhere. The examples from Belgrade support this completely. Such people did not necessarily have to write a literary piece of work during their stay in Belgrade to be considered Belgrade intellectuals. They were part of the intellectual elite, or were very close to it, even when they wrote their books before or after their service in Belgrade.

The intellectual elite in Belgrade, first of all, gathered around educational institutions: *medreses*, *mektebs*, mosques, *darülkurras*, *tekkas*, as well as at the *sarays* of state officials (*beys*, *kadıs*), at the *mahkeme* (court), at the *müfti*'s, and in bazaars and coffee-houses.

It took time for such institutions to be established and consolidated in the recently conquered Belgrade. They mostly belonged to *vakıfs*, above all to large *vakıfs* which existed without interruption till the Austrian conquest of Belgrade in 1688. Leaving aside the sultans' endowments, the biggest *vakıfs* were founded by the Semendire *sancakbeyis* and viziers: in the sixteenth century – by the Grand Vizier Piri Mehmed Paşa (early 1520s), Yahyapaşaoğlu (Yahyalu) Mehmed Paşa (1540s, till 1548/49), Semendire *sancakbeyi* Bayram Bey (1557-68), Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Paşa (early 1570s), and in the seventeenth – by the *beylerbeyi* of Buda Musa Paşa (1632-43), and the Grand Vizier Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa (1661-67).⁸

The Belgrade intellectual elite, like those in other parts of the Empire, undoubtedly took an active part in gaining and spreading knowledge, doing it either as a job

aspects of cultural life. My work on the Muslim intellectual elite in Belgrade mostly follows Popović's methodological concepts (A. Popović, 'Un sujet méconnu: la vie culturelle des musulmans dans les villes balkaniques à l'époque ottomane (remarques méthodologiques)', in *La culture urbaine des Balkans (XV^e-XIX^e siècles)*. 3: *La ville dans les Balkans depuis la fin du Moyen âge jusqu'au début du XX^e siècle* [Belgrade and Paris 1991], 165-75; idem, 'La littérature ottomane des musulmans yougoslaves. Essai de bibliographie raisonnée', *Journal Asiatique*, 259/3-4 [1971], 326). I wish to express my gratitude to Prof. Popović not only for his advice, but also for the data he brought to my notice.

8. Šabanović, 'Урбани развитак'; *Историја Београда*, I: 376-421 (Šabanović); A. Fotić, 'Yahyapaşa-oğlu Mehmed Pasha's *Evkaf* in Belgrade', *ActaOrHung*, 54/4 (2001), 437-52.

or as an interest. The most important educational institutions, the 50-*akçe*-ranked Yahyalu Mehmed Paşa's and 25-*akçe*-ranked Bayram Bey's *medreses*, were built around the middle of the sixteenth century. This undoubtedly was a watershed in the cultural life of Belgrade. Cultural circles were formed around gifted professors who engaged in the study of various, mostly religious, topics, their interpretation, copying the works of eminent Muslim thinkers and in this way spreading the Muslim ideology. All this did not prevent their cultivating diverse literary genres.

Depending on the genre, as was usual at the time, they wrote in Arabic, Persian and more rarely in Turkish. A. Popović has already pointed out the problem of communication between such relatively closed circles and the vast majority of the illiterate public. The common people "could not even understand the language in which this culture and this civilisation manifested itself". Dervishes played an important role in conveying knowledge to the general public as they were in constant contact with the people; they spoke their language and were in the position to shape what is today called 'public opinion'. One of the most important tasks in the study of the dervish orders, both orthodox and heterodox, is undoubtedly ascertaining their role in the development of 'folk culture'.⁹

Yahyalu Mehmed Paşa's *medrese*, called also *İmaret medresesi*, was in some sixteenth-century sources referred to under the name of Mehmed's son Arslan Paşa. This should not throw us into any confusion. There was only one 50-*akçe*-ranked *medrese* in Belgrade, and it was Yahyapaşaoğlu Mehmed Paşa's *medrese*. It was attended by 40 students and 12-13 *danişmends* (higher level students). Its *müderises* were the second highest members of the Belgrade *ulema* after *kadis*. Their importance was still greater because usually they concurrently were the *müftis* of Belgrade. Reference to the following *müderises* has survived: Mevlâna Mehmed (1580-?); Mahmud Efendi (?-1584); Fazlullah Efendi (1604/05-?); İbrahim, the son of İskender, much better known under his pen-name Münirî Belgradî (?-c.1620/25?); Fazıl Müfettiş Süleyman (1648-52), a noted scholar who made a particular study of the rhetoric of the Koran; and Kapudanzade Timur Efendi (1656-60). To the appointment of Fazlullah Efendi, a *kadı* and poet Ahmed Çelebi of Tuzla dedicated a *tarih* (chronogram). To judge by a verse, the *medrese* had been closed "for quite some time" before this appointment.¹⁰

9. Popović, 'Un sujet méconnu', 167-68, 171.

10. Fotić, 'Yahyapaşa-oğlu Mehmed Pasha's *Evkaf*', 443; idem, 'Улога вакуфа у развоју оријенталног града: београдски вакуф Мехмед паше Јахјапашаића' [The Role of *Vakıf* in the Development of an Oriental City: The Yahyapaşaoğlu Mehmed Paşa's Belgrade *Vakıf*], in *Социјална структура српских градских насеља (XII-XVIII век)* [The Social Structure of Serbian Cities (Twelfth-Eighteenth Centuries)] (Smederevo and Belgrade 1992), 152-56; R. Tričković, 'Исламске школе у нашим земљама' [Islamic Schools in our Lands], in *Историја школа и образовања код Срба* [The History of Schools and Education with the Serbs] (Belgrade 1974), 253-54 (so far the best-documented presentation of this *medrese*, with clarifications concerning the use of the name Arslan Paşa); *Evliya Çelebi*, V: 377-78, 381; M. K. Özergin, 'Eski bir Rûznâme'ye göre İstanbul ve Rumeli Medreseleri', *TED*, 4-5 (1974), 268, 281; C. Baltacı, *XV-XVI. Asırlarda Osmanlı*

We know the names of three more Belgrade *müftis*: İbrahim, Mahmud and Ali Efendi el-İştibî, but it has not been ascertained when they lived or whether they were also *müderريس*. Ali Efendi wrote a book on the Islamic law on inheritance and glosses for Molla Hüsrev's works *Durar ve Gurar* and *es-Sireciyye*. It seems that he died in 1620 in Istanbul.¹¹

Münirî Belgradî was one of those well-known teachers and scholars who considerably influenced the cultural life of the Muslim population of Belgrade and all around it. Bearing in mind that he was a *müderريس*, his literary production and the length of his stay in Belgrade, he was probably the most important intellectual figure in Belgrade between 1521 and 1688. We know that he was born in 1551 or 1552 in a family of Bosnian origin and that he spent a great part of his youth in Mitrofçe/Sremska Mitrovica. He built his career as an *âlim* in Belgrade and its surroundings; he was a *vaiz*, a *müzekkir*, then a *müderريس* and a *müfti* till his death around 1620-25. He was also a *şeyh* of the Halvetis. He was a versatile man: in addition to his works of religious and moral character (*Tuhfat an-nasiha*, *Subul al-Huda*), there are many treatises (*risale*), scattered in numerous *mecmuas*, such as *Nisab al-intisab wa adab al-iktisab*, a study of the legal and moral framework of the activity of guild corporations, *Tetimme ül-kitab ül-Münirî el-merhum*, *Risale-i mühimme el-fazil el-Münirî*, as well as works on listening to music, on the imperfection of dance (*Naks-i raks*), and the works against the use of coffee, wine, opium and tobacco (*Nazm fi afat 'l-kahva wa 'l-hamr wa 'l-afiyun wa 'd-duhhan*). His *menakabname*, finished in 1603/04 and entitled *Silsilat al-mukarribin wa manakib al-muttakin*, contains more than 120 biographies, including a few dozen biographies of Balkan *şeyhs*, and constitutes an excellent source for studying the history of mystical brotherhoods in Rumeli in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Also, he was the author of a study on ancient geography finished c. 1581 (*Sab 'iyyat*). In his lively correspondence with eminent *şeyhs* of his times (Mahmud Hudayi, Hüseyin Lamekanî) he always defended the strict orthodox views of Sunni Islam. In addition to his original works, Münirî Belgradî copied several essays of the famous *şeyh* Ali Dede Sigetvarî Bosnevî (1615) as well as his *Muhadarat ul-awa 'il*

Medreseleri: Teşkilât-Tarih (Istanbul 1976), 155-56, 504, 581 (in BOA, K. Kepeci, Ruûs Kalemi 238, p. 163, it is called Arslan Paşa's *medrese*); A. Uğur, *The Ottoman 'Ulemâ in the Mid-17th Century: An Analysis of the Vakâ'i 'ül-Fuzalâ of Mehmed Şeyhî Ef.* (Berlin 1986), 315-16.

11. K. Dobrača, *Katalog arapskih, turskih i perzijskih rukopisa Gazi Husrev-begove biblioteke u Sarajevu* [Catalogue of Arabic, Turkish and Persian Manuscripts at Gazi-Husrev Bey Library in Sarajevo] (Sarajevo 1979), II: 143; H. Hasandedić, 'Djela i kraći literarni sastavi Muslimana Bosne i Hercegovine koji su napisani na orijentalnim jezicima i koji se nalaze u Arhivu Hercegovine u Mostaru' [The Works and Short Literary Pieces Written in the Oriental Languages by the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Archive of Herzegovina in Mostar], *Anali Gazi Husrev-begove biblioteke*, 4 (1976), 123; S. Trako, 'Duraru 'l-hukkâm sa marginalijama beogradskog muftije Ali-efendije' [*Duraru 'l-hukkâm* with the Marginalia by Ali Efendi, *Müfti* of Belgrade], *Anali Gazi Husrev-begove biblioteke*, 4 (1976), 131-32, 137-39.

wa musamarat ul-awahir, a kind of universal history, adding his own observations to the copy. According to Evliya Çelebi, his tomb became one of the respected and much frequented places in Belgrade.¹²

A few *müdrreses* from Bayram Bey's *medrese* are known: appointed *müdrres* and *müfti* of Belgrade in 1625/26, Budini Mustafa Efendi was transferred to Sarajevo to the post of *kadı* in 1627/28; a certain Ali Efendi was appointed a *müdrres* at the rank of 50 *akçes* in 1657; in 1679 Şeyh Ali Mısırlı was transferred from Bayram Bey's *medrese* to the post of professor at Fazıl Ahmed Paşa's *darülkurra*.¹³

Evliya Çelebi mentions six other *medreses* but does not give their names. As there is no corroboration of this information in other sources, this number may be explained by the fact that there were novice *müdrreses* who taught at some of the major mosques. In 1630, Hasan Halife and Mehmed Efendi earned their livelihood as officials of the imperial mosque, funded from the revenues of the Belgrade ferry. At Sultan Süleyman's mosque, the *müdrres* and *hoca* Salih was replaced in 1693 by Muharrem, the son of Ahmed, with the rank of *müdrres* of 20 *akçes*.¹⁴

Evliya Çelebi claims that there were eight schools for the study of *hadis* (*darülhadis*) in Belgrade; the beginnings of teaching this holy Islamic tradition are associated with the arrival of the dismissed *şeyhülislam* Abdürrahim (in Belgrade from 1651 to 1656). He observes that there was no special school for the study of the Islamic tradition and for the correct reciting of the Koran (*darülkurra*). Such a school was erected between 1661 and 1667 by the Grand Vizier Köprülüzade Fazıl Ahmed Paşa within his *vakıf*. The *müdrres* was assisted by three *halifes* and there were fourteen students. Except for Şeyh Ali Mısırlı, already mentioned, appointed in 1679, other professors are not known.¹⁵

The preface to a manuscript finished in 1642/43 mentions a *müdrres* Ali, but there is no further reference as to where he taught. The author of the manuscript

12. N. Clayer, 'Müniri Belgrâdi. Un représentant de la 'ilmiyye dans la région de Belgrade, fin XVI^e—début XVII^e siècle', in S. Praetor and C. K. Neumann (eds), *Frauen, Bilder und Gelehrte. Studien zu Gesellschaft und Künsten im Osmanischen Reich = Arts, Women and Scholars: Studies in Ottoman Society and Culture. Festschrift Hans Georg Majer* (Istanbul 2002), 549-68; eadem, 'Quand l'hagiographie se fait l'écho des dérèglements socio-politiques: le *menâkıbnâme* de Müniri Belgrâdi', in G. Veinstein (ed.), *Syncretismes et hérésies dans l'Orient seldjoukide et ottoman (XIV^e – XVIII^e siècles). Actes du Colloque du Collège de France, octobre 2001* (Paris 2005), 363-81; eadem, 'L'œil d'un savant de Belgrade sur les Melâmis-Bayrâmis à la fin du XVI^e—début du XVII^e siècle', in N. Clayer, A. Popovic and T. Zarcone (eds), *Melâmis-Bayrâmis. Études sur trois mouvements mystiques musulmans* (Istanbul 1998), 153-76; H. Šabanović, *Književnost Muslimana BiH na orijentalnim jezicima* [The Literature of the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Oriental Languages] (Sarajevo 1973), 193-201; I. Bušatlić, 'Muniri Bosnawî i njegova univerzalna geografija *Sab'ıyyât*' [Muniri Bosnawî and his Universal Geography *Sab'ıyyât*], *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju*, 47-48 (1997-98), 85-99.

13. Clayer, 'Müniri Belgrâdi', 558; Tričković, 'Исламске школе', 254-55, 257.

14. *Evliya Çelebi*, V: 378; Tričković, 'Исламске школе', 255.

15. *Evliya Çelebi*, V: 378; Tričković, 'Исламске школе', 256-57.

spared no space in praising “the eminent *müderriş* ... who can tell justice from injustice and diligence from laziness, who judges people by their actions and not by their clothes, because a man’s worth is in his manner of statement...”¹⁶

In addition to two *medreses*, Belgrade was covered with a network of religious primary schools, *mektebs*, beside the mosques to be found in almost every Muslim *mahalle*. There was another religious building important for Belgrade – a *musalla* (*namazgâh*), which belonged to Yahyalu Mehmed Paşa’s *vakıf*. By 1560 there were 16 mosques and *mescids* registered, in 1572 there were as many as 24 and at the end of the century, at least 29. In the seventeenth century, at least 29 mosques and 12 *mescids* were built, which would make about 70 mosques and *mescids* in all. Evliya Çelebi claims that there were 270 *mihrabs* (houses of worship) and as many *mektebs*, 33 mosques and 19 *mescids* included. The total number is undoubtedly exaggerated. According to H. Šabanović, in Evliya’s time (1660) or later there could not have been more than 80 mosques and *mescids*.¹⁷

The mysticism-orientated intellectual elite was connected with numerous derivate orders and the *şeyhs* who spread their tenets. There is no point in listing all orders, orthodox and heterodox, which existed in Belgrade as their number and influence varied from decade to decade. They gathered at *tekkes*; according to Evliya Çelebi, there were just 17 of them, but we should bear in mind that services could have been held in private houses. The biographies of some of the Belgrade *şeyhs* found their place in Müniri’s *menakıbnâme*: Nakşibendi *şeyh* Nasuh Belgradî (died 1573/74); Melami *şeyh* Musliheddin Dede, *halife* of Pir Abdülvehhab Elmalı; Halveti-Uşşaki *şeyh* Muhammed Edirnevî (died 1601/02), the founder of a *tekke*; Sinani *şeyhs* Ali Dede Belgradî and Muhammed Dede Belgradî; Sünbülü *şeyhs* Sinan Efendi (died 1601/02) and Bali Dede (died 1602/03). Evliya Çelebi mentions just two *şeyhs*, Mehmed Horasanî, head of Yahyapaşaoğlu Mehmed Paşa’s *tekke*, and Halveti *şeyh* Kurucızade, *halife* of Üsküdarî Mahmud Efendi.¹⁸

One of the greatest mystical poets in Belgrade in the seventeenth century was Habibi, a Mevlevi *şeyh*. He was born in Bosnia, educated in Istanbul and spent most of his life in Belgrade, where he died in 1640 or 1643. He wrote two literary pieces, both lost: *Divan* and *Küçük Mesnevi*. All his life in Belgrade he taught and interpreted Rumi’s *Mesnevi* at the Mevlevi *tekke*.¹⁹ Another *şeyh*, head of the Gülşeni

16. O. Mušić, ‘En-nemliyye fi izhârî-l-qawâ’idi-s-sarfiyye we-n-nahwiyye’, *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju i istoriju jugoslovenskih naroda pod turskom vladavinom*, 6-7 (1956-57), 39-55.

17. Šabanović, ‘Урбани развитак’, 26-29; *Историја Београда*, I: 417-20 (Šabanović); Tričković, ‘Исламске школе’, 245-46; *Evliya Çelebi*, V: 377-78.

18. *Evliya Çelebi*, V: 378, 380; Šabanović, ‘Урбани развитак’, 30-31; N. Clayer, *Mystiques, état et société. Les Halvetis dans l’aire balkanique de la fin du XV^e siècle à nos jours* (Leiden 1994), 174-75, 178, 426, 434, 436; eadem, ‘L’œil d’un savant de Belgrade’, 155; eadem, ‘Les miracles des cheikhs et leurs fonctions dans les espaces frontières de la Roumélie du XVI^e siècle’, in D. Aigle (ed.), *Miracle et karâma. Hagiographies médiévales comparées 2* (Turnhout 2000), 447, 453; eadem, ‘Müniri Belgradî’, 560-61.

19. S. Bašagić, *Bošnjaci i Hercegovci u islamskoj književnosti. Prilog kulturnoj historiji*

order in Belgrade, Ahmed Müsellim, wrote a *Divan* in the seventeenth century.²⁰

Besides all those who worked within *vakıf* institutions, there were *kadıs* and members of the *askerî* who left their imprint on the cultural life of Belgrade. *Nakibüleşraf* Abdürrahim Efendi, ex-*şeyhülislam*, should be singled out as the most influential among them. He was Belgrade *kadı* and *müfti* from 1651 until his death in 1656. He was buried in Belgrade.²¹ *Kadıasker* Muid Ahmed Efendi (1638-40), later a *şeyhülislam*, was also *kadı* of Belgrade, his appointment being a punitive measure.²² Another distinguished *kadı* was Molla Habil Efendi bin Receb, a writer and diplomat (a participant in concluding the peace at Zsitva Torok in 1606), who lived in Belgrade from 1607 to 1612 and from 1614 to 1622.²³ In the seventeenth century, other learned jurists were appointed as *kadıs* in Belgrade: Merhabazade Ahmed Efendi (1640-43), a poet with the *mahlâs* Şeyhi, also noted as calligrapher and musician; Haşimizade Seyyid Mehmed Efendi (1643/44), who wrote verses in Turkish under the *mahlâs* Yetimi; Sarı Muid Mustafa Efendi (1645/46), author of the treatise on *feraiz* in verse, and probably of *Hilye-i Nebeviyye* in verse; Acem Mehmed Efendi (1649/50), poet with the *mahlâs* Razi; another poet, İbrahim Efendi (1664/65) with the *mahlâs* Şükri; Şami Abdülatif Efendi (1667/68), who wrote *İstiarat*, a versification of the *Menar* with commentaries, and *kasides* in Arabic under the names el-Bali, el-Hanefi and Behai; Nisbeti Ali Efendi (1668/70), a poet.²⁴ About Mühterem Belgradî, *kadı* and poet, presumed to have lived in the seventeenth century, nothing is known except that he was born in Belgrade.²⁵

At least two of the Smederevo *sancakbeyis* had a proclivity for writing. One is Arslan Paşa Yahyapaşazade, head of the *sancak* from 1564 to 1565, later *beylerbeyi* of Buda. He wrote poems under the literary pseudonym Sinani. Partly brought up in Belgrade, where he lived with his father, he became *mütevelli* of his father's Belgrade endowment in 1548.²⁶ The other was the famous Feridun Bey, *sancakbeyi* from 1577 to 1579, well-known writer and historian, author of *Münşeat üs-selatin*, secretary to Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, and later a *nişancı*.²⁷

Bosne i Hercegovine [The Natives of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Islamic Literature. A Contribution to the Cultural History of Bosnia-Herzegovina] (Sarajevo 1986), 121-22.

20. *Историја Београда*, I: 417 (Šabanović).

21. M. Süreyya, *Sicill-i 'Osmani*, III: 330; *Evliya Çelebi*, V: 375, 378; *Naima Tarihi*, trans. Z. Danişman (Istanbul 1969), V: 2189; Uğur, *The Ottoman 'Ulemā*, 176-78.

22. *Naima Tarihi*, III: 1374-76, 1482, 1550; Uğur, *The Ottoman 'Ulemā*, 101.

23. *Историја Београда*, I: 411 (Šabanović); *Naima Tarihi*, I: 186, II: 734; L. Fekete (ed.), *Türkische Schriften aus dem Archive des Palatins Nikolaus Esterházy 1606-1645* (Budapest 1932), 18, 22, 27, 213, 225, 424.

24. Uğur, *The Ottoman 'Ulemā*, 204, 284, 302, 344, 358, 370, 475-76.

25. Šabanović, *Književnost Muslimana*, 669 [taken from J. von Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte der osmanischen Dichtkunst bis auf unsere Zeit* (Pest 1838), III: 495].

26. C. Römer, 'On Some Hass Estates Illegally Claimed by Arslan Pasha, Beglerbegi of Buda', in C. Heywood and C. Imber (eds), *Studies in Ottoman History in Honour of Professor V. L. Ménage* (Istanbul 1994), 297-98; Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte*, II: 239; Šabanović, *Književnost Muslimana*, 701.

27. F. Babinger, *Osmanlı Tarih Yazarları ve Eserleri*, trans. C. Üçok (Ankara 1982), 118-20.

There were also *sipahis* with broad interests. Hayreti, a poet, born in Yenice, lived beside the military border *beys* Yahyalis and at the court of Gazi Hüsrev Bey till his death in 1534. Belgrade was the subject of several of his poems, the best known being *Belgrad Şehr-engizi*.²⁸ The poet Cenani died young in 1591, while Belgradî Nagmi Çelebi, author of an original mid-seventeenth-century literary piece (*Şah u geda*), wrote about many events and interesting details concerning Belgrade.²⁹ First a *zaim* (1678) and then an *alaybeyi* of Semendire *sancak* till his death in 1688, Ali Bey Paşazade, known as Vusleti, wrote an epic poem about the Battle at Chehrin (*Gazaname-i Çehrin*) and dedicated it to Kara Mustafa Paşa. He also left a few smaller pieces (chronograms, *gazels*, etc.).³⁰ Another important state official, *defterdar* of the province of Temeşvar, Belgradî Mustafa, the son of Ahmed, continued the famous Peçevi's history for the period from 1635 to 1651.³¹

It should be mentioned that the famous historian, mathematician, calligrapher and painter Nasuh Matrakçı lived in Belgrade for a while.³² In the sixteenth century the poets Nuri Belgradî, Valihi Belgradî and Sadık Belgradî (died 1594) were born and perhaps wrote in Belgrade.³³ Around the middle of the century a certain Zeyni was famed for his chronograms dedicated to important city buildings.³⁴ We should also mention Ahmed Çelebi of Tuzla, a writer of chronograms active at the beginning of the seventeenth century,³⁵ and Emiri Belgradî, a much better-known lyricist of the same century.³⁶

Among those whose extended stay in Belgrade has not been ascertained is the poet Hüseyin Paşa el-Belgradî, previously a *kadı* in Medina and subsequently serving in Cairo, where he died (Belgrade 1551-Cairo 1614).³⁷ There is also an unknown poet Abdi Efendi Belgradî, whose poems were found among the poetry works of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries collected in one of the *mecmuas* preserved in Mostar.³⁸

28. M. Çavuşoğlu, 'Hayretî'nin Belgrad Şehr-engizi', *Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2-3 (1973-74), 325-56.

29. *Историја Београда*, I: 417 (Šabanović).

30. Babinger, *Osmanlı Tarih Yazarları*, 248; Šabanović, *Književnost Muslimana*, 373-74.

31. Babinger, *Osmanlı Tarih Yazarları*, 213; Šabanović, *Književnost Muslimana*, 311.

32. *Историја Београда*, I: 416-17 (Šabanović).

33. Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte*, II: 549, III: 86; *Историја Београда*, I: 417 (Šabanović); Šabanović, *Književnost Muslimana*, 697; Kınalızade Hasan Çelebi, *Tezkireti 'ş-Şuarâ*, ed. İ. Kutluk (Ankara 1978), I: 545-46, II: 1006-07; Latifi, *Teşkere-i şuarâ*, trans. O. Rescher (Tübingen 1950), 287, 291-92, 453, 457-58.

34. *Evliya Çelebi*, V: 377.

35. Šabanović, *Književnost Muslimana*, 110-11; M. Handžić, 'Kadi Ahmed Čelebi (Kādī Aḥmad Čalabī) iz Tuzle' [Kādī Ahmed Čelebi (Kādī Aḥmad Čalabī) from Tuzla], *Glasnik Islamske vjerske zajednice u Jugoslaviji*, 4 (1936), 194-200.

36. *Историја Београда*, I: 417 (Šabanović).

37. M. Handžić, 'Rad bosansko-hercegovačkih muslimana na književnom polju' [The Work of the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Field of Literature], *Glasnik Islamske vjerske zajednice u Jugoslaviji*, 2/1 (1934), 32.

38. Hasandedić, 'Djela i kraći sastavi', 122.

We should also bear in mind that books in private ownership used to travel around the Ottoman Empire with their owners, staying in Belgrade for as long as the owners served there as soldiers, judges, professors, etc. After the owner's death they could have been put on the market as part of his belongings intended for sale. For example, a copy of *Cawahir ul-fikh* of 1638 from the things left on the death of a certain Belgradî Mustafa Çelebi was sold in 1679 at the *suk-ı sultanî* of Belgrade in the presence of representatives of the sharia court.³⁹ Books stayed in Belgrade if they were donated to an institution, but even then they sometimes changed owners. Şeyh Süleyman Efendi, *vaiz* in Buda's Great Mosque, donated his *Tefsir*, but it somehow found its way into the hands of Belgradî Mehmed Efendi, *ağa* of the janissaries of the Sublime Porte at the time. In 1636 he gave the book as a gift to Ahmed Mısrızade, a librarian at Niš. After a while the book changed hands once again, and returned to Belgrade.⁴⁰

In addition to original works created in Belgrade, the most important undoubtedly being those written by Münirî Belgradî, old manuscripts circulated; they were sold, re-sold, bequeathed, copied to order or for personal pleasure. Of about twenty manuscripts ascertained to have been copied in Belgrade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, only four copies are noted as being made at Yahyalı Mehmed Paşa's *medrese*. It is reasonable to assume, however, that most of them stemmed from the cultural circle that formed round that most influential school. It cannot be said that religious works, including those on mysticism, predominate. Manuscripts in the fields of Islamic law, astronomy, general history, poetry, language, style and medicine were also copied. The scribes were mostly from the Balkans, above all from Bosnia: Hasan bin Mustafa Bosnevî (1591), Muhammed bin Kadı Hanefî (1601), Receb bin Kurd Ali Berkofçalı (1617), İbrahim bin Salih (1640), Muhammed bin Mustafa Çavuşzade from Yukarı Tuzla (1647), Kadı Muhammed (1654), Mesud bin Ahmed bin Hüseyin Kraguyevçalı (1656), Musa bin Muharrem (1657), Abdülvehhab bin Hacı Ramazan bin Hacı İbrahim (1664), Mustafa Budunî (1683), Hüseyin, Hasan bin Ahmed Banalukavî.⁴¹ We know about some ten scribes with the *nisba* Belgradî, but none of the books they copied contains information about the place where the copy was made.⁴²

The Non-Muslim Intellectual Elite

Non-Muslims, *zimmis*, were organised only within their religious and ethnic communities. The Christian intellectual elite was strictly divided into the members of the Orthodox Church and Catholics. On the one hand, their relations were bur-

39. Dobrača, *Katalog*, II: 375-76.

40. Ibid., I: 142.

41. M. Ždralović, *Bosansko-hercegovački prepisivači djela u arabičkim rukopisima* [Bosnian-Herzegovian Transcribers of Arabic Manuscripts] (Sarajevo 1988), II: 34, 41-42, 60, 72, 74-75, 79, 95, 333 (no date), and in Mehmed Paşa's *medrese*: 29, 39, 68, 334 (no date).

42. Ibid., 46, 52, 56, 58, 63, 68, 71, 74-75, 77, 341 (no date).

dened by the constant attempts of the Serbian higher clergy to impose taxes on Catholics, and, on the other, by the persistent missionary work of the Vatican (*Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide*). The Catholic community in Belgrade was rife with friction and intolerance between groups which were different from each other only in their territorial origins, along with adherence to particular monastic orders (Catholics from Dubrovnik versus Bosnian Catholics).

The intellectual life of non-Muslims was under the auspices of their respective churches. A certain religious and intellectual circle of individuals with a propensity for books formed round the churches, both Orthodox and Catholic. The books were read, copied down and bound there; some original literary work was also created. Naturally, schools were also founded round churches. Printed books mostly came from Italian centres, not only the Orthodox Serbian religious books in Cyrillic, printed to order, but also Catholic religious and language books. Catholic centres also produced special Cyrillic books for the missionary purposes of converting people to the Catholic confession and to the Unia; the contents were changed, and the books bore no dates or the names of their printers.

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The largest Christian community in Belgrade was that of the Serbian Orthodox. As for the sixteenth century, this fact is obvious from the names in the imperial taxation registers. Although Evliya Çelebi claims that the Serbs and Bulgarians lived in three *mahalles* (11 to 14 in the sixteenth century), the same number as the Greeks (*Rum*), a few pages below he states that all Belgrade *reaya ve beraya* are Serbs. There were several Orthodox churches in Belgrade, and some *mahalles* were named after them (*Papashane, Kilise, Orta Kilise*). They were under the care of the Metropolitan “of Belgrade and Srem”, as was his full title. As a shattering blow came the pulling down of three “Serbian churches” and one synagogue, shortly before 1567. According to the traveller Pigafetta, the order was given by Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Paşa with the view to providing the building material for a new *bezistan*. The Western sources testify to the poverty of the Orthodox clergy; Gerlach claims (1578) that a Belgrade priest had to work as a dyer to earn a living. The travellers also testify to the inadequate level of literacy of the clergy.⁴³

43. Šabanović, *Катастарски пописи*, 138-41, 271-83, 448-50; idem, ‘Урбани развитац’, 10-11, 16, 26; *Историја Београда*, I: 385-88, 408-09, 413 (Šabanović); A. Z. Hertz, ‘Muslims, Christians and Jews in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Belgrade’, in A. Ascher, T. Halasi-Kun and B. K. Király (eds), *The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds: The East European Pattern* (Brooklyn, N.Y. 1979), 150-59 [Relying on an unclear methodology and similarities of nomenclature, the author identifies the majority of Belgrade’s Christians registered in the taxation records of 1572 (according to him, 1570) as ethnic Vlachs, and also concludes that most Gypsies bear Vlach names. The names of Vlach origin are incontestable (though, again, not as frequent as he asserts), but that fact is by no means a proof of ethnic identity, especially not in the latter half of the sixteenth century]; P. Matković, ‘Putovanja po balkanskom poluotoku XVI veka. X:

Some of the *knezes*, who represented the Belgrade *reaya* before the Ottoman authorities, were literate, as well as some great merchants whose business dealings reached Vienna around the middle of the seventeenth century.

Knez Radiša Dimitrović, of Serbian origin, founded the first printing press in Belgrade in 1552. From a section added at the end of the first book it is obvious that *knez* Radiša had invested his own money and conceived the printing works as his donation to churches. Not that his possible profit from the enterprise is to be considered negligible, books being in demand in the Balkans at the time. He died while the first book, a *Tetraevangelion*, was being printed. A barber from the Dubrovnik colony, Catholic Trojan Gundulić, continued his work, obviously for business purposes. The printing process itself was taken care of by an Orthodox priest-monk, *Mardarije*, clearly a man with previous experience, who was to print another two books at the Monastery of Mrkšina Crkva in 1562 and 1566 respectively. The first of the two bears his note giving the information that he himself “cast the types of iron, copper and other”. The *Tetraevangelion* was the first book ever printed in Belgrade. Doubts as to whether this was the only book printed before the nineteenth century are raised by an inventory of Gundulić’s estate (he died a little later, in 1554 or in 1555), which apart from several dozen *Tetraevangelions* lists several copies of various other books.⁴⁴

Trading in religious books, printed in Cyrillic and intended for the Orthodox must have been very lucrative. There is also some evidence for the importation

Putopis Marka Antuna Pigafette ili drugo putovanje Antuna Vrančića u Carigrad 1567. g.’ [Travels in the Balkan Peninsula in the Sixteenth Century. X: The Travel Accounts of Marco Antonio Pigafetta or the Second Journey of Antun Vrančić to Constantinople in 1567], *Rad JAZU*, 100 (1890), 183; R. Tričković, ‘Српска црква средином XVII века’ [The Serbian Church in the Mid-Seventeenth Century], *Глас, CCCXX, Одељење историјских наука [CAHY]*, 2 (1980), 125-27; *Evliya Çelebi*, V: 376, 380, 382.

44. *Историја Београда*, I: 457-60 (R. Samardžić); Samardžić, ‘Дубровчани у Београду’, 87-92; D. Medaković, *Графика српских штампаних књига XV-XVII века* [The Graphic Aspect of Serbian Printed Books of the Fifteenth-Seventeenth Centuries] (Belgrade 1958), 53-56, 164-69; F. Kesterčanek, ‘Inventar prvog beogradskog tiskara Trojana Gundulića’ [The Inventory of Belgrade’s First Printer Trojan Gundulić], *Anali Historijskog instituta u Dubrovniku*, 1/1 (1952), 197-205. From the property and a large sum of money Gundulić left behind, it is obvious that being a barber was not his only occupation, and that he probably was also engaged in trading. The founding of a printing press in Belgrade was not an isolated case. The same period saw the founding of several Serbian printing works in the territory of the Ottoman Empire, all of them short-lived (1-4 years) and with a poor output of two or three books each (Goražde 1519-23; Rujan Monastery at Užice 1529; Gračanica Monastery at Priština 1539; Mileševa Monastery at Prijepolje 1546, 1557; Mrkšina Crkva Monastery, near Montenegro 1562, 1566; Scutari/Shkodër 1563). By far the most productive was the printing works of Božidar Vuković in Venice (1519-46), active even after the founder’s death until 1597. Yet another printing press publishing Cyrillic books was started in Venice by Jerolim Zagurović from Kotor (1569-71). Taken over by the Italian Marco Ginami, it worked until 1638 (for an overview with the catalogue of Serbian printed books: Medaković, *Графика српских штампаних књига*).

of books from Italy. In 1554 a merchant from Dubrovnik and citizen of Belgrade, Luka Dimitrović, ordered from his business associate in Ancona 200 liturgical books bound in leather “*stampatos cum litteris et lingua serviana*” to be delivered in two months. The notary of Dubrovnik certified in 1560 a document stating that the Italian Ambrosio Corsi, through the agency of a Stjepan Peranović, forwarded to Belgrade two chests of books in “the Serbian language” to be sold in Serbia (“*ad partes Servie*”). And from a civil case tried in Dubrovnik in 1563 we learn that 75 *Triodions*, 100 *Missals* and 200 *Psalters*, all printed on the Serbian press of the Vuković family in Venice, had been sold in Belgrade, Vidin and Nikopol.⁴⁵

Belgrade’s spiritual life was closely connected with major monastic centres throughout the Metropolis of Belgrade and Srem: above all with the Srem monasteries of Krušedol and Hopovo, where the metropolitan frequently resided, and with Šišatovac. Under Ottoman rule these and other Srem monasteries played an exceptionally important part in the spiritual life of the Serbs, and decisively contributed to the cultivation of literacy and Belgrade’s cultural life. It is not possible, however, to dwell on the subject on this occasion. The nearby monasteries of Rakovica and Slance, south-east of Belgrade (today within city limits), should also be mentioned. Books copied at the monasteries were in circulation throughout the Metropolis. To the Belgrade *protopop* (the first of the city priests) Jeftimije, the abbot and brotherhood of Šišatovac Monastery (Srem) gave (or lent?) a manuscript in 1636, and the brotherhood of Hopovo another one in 1639.⁴⁶

The inscriptions which scribes left in some of the books testify to the fact that books were copied in Belgrade, especially in the seventeenth century, usually to order by the donors, mostly Belgrade Metropolitans and other members of the higher clergy. The Metropolitan Hadji Ilarion (c. 1644-62) donated funds not only for several icons, many crosses, chalices and other religious objects, but also for copying and binding several books. Another distinguished metropolitan, Hadji Simeon (1680-90), also possessed many books and was a well-known *ktetor* (in the Monastery of Hilandar, Mount Athos, he had the Pyrgos of St Sava renovated and the small church of St John the Baptist built). The said metropolitans of Belgrade were not the only ones to have made a pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre; some of Belgrade priests did the same: monk Vasilije from the Monastery of Slance (1666), hadji *protopop* kyr Nikola (who withdrew to Mount Athos in 1690), and even ordinary people.⁴⁷

45. J. Tadić, *Дубровачка архивскађ грађа о Београду I, 1521-1571* [Documents on Belgrade from the Archives of Dubrovnik I, 1521-1571] (Belgrade 1950), 66-67, 100-01; Samardžić, ‘Дубровчани у Београду’, 87; Medaković, *Графика српских штампаних књига*, 34-37.

46. L. Stojanović, *Стари српски записи и натписи*, I [Ancient Serbian Notes and Inscriptions] (Belgrade 1902 [reprint: 1982]): No. 1,283; VI (Sr. Karlovci [reprint: Belgrade 1988]): No. 10,093.

47. *Ibid.*, I: 1,532, 1,533, 1,571, 1,584, 1,620, 1,727, 1,184; III (Belgrade 1905 [reprint: 1984]): 4,990; VI: 10,197.

There are no data about schools and teachers (*daskal*), but examples of contemporary towns give grounds to assume they did exist within parishes.

The Serbian merchant class, as well as the Armenian and Greek, gained considerably in strength owing to the advancement of international trade after the Treaty of Vasvar (1664) and a *ferman* allowing free trade (1665) with Habsburg lands. A telling illustration is the fact that 45 merchants travelled 82 times from Belgrade to Vienna between 1663 and 1668.⁴⁸ This financial elite must also have contributed to intellectual advancement. Rich citizens were also donors; they gave religious books as gifts to Belgrade churches and nearby monasteries, mostly for the repose of their dead relatives' souls. The old inscriptions mention Kruna, Hadji Jani's wife from Belgrade, who donated gold for frescoing the narthex of the monastery church at Hopovo in 1654, or Marija, who in 1684 donated a book to the monastery at Rakovica on the initiative of kyr Jovan, a Belgrade *protopop*.⁴⁹

It is of some interest that in 1668, in Belgrade, ten merchants and tradesmen (goldsmiths, furriers, and tailors), Serbs from Sarajevo, had a Gospel bound with the intention of giving it as a gift to a church in Sarajevo.⁵⁰

This is the time at which Evliya remarks that "the Serbs are the people into whose language the Gospel has been translated and about whose ancient kings trustworthy historical books give evidence". Many data confirm a literary production by the Serbs that was not strictly religious. The most interesting to us, as they were to Evliya or some of his contemporaries, both friendly and hostile, are historiographical works.⁵¹ Genealogies and annals prevailed, of which *vitae* (the most important being the lives of the Serbian sovereigns) and chronicles were to evolve. Also noteworthy is orally transmitted folk poetry, characteristic of most of the Balkans; particularly popular and widely known were the epic cycles relating the events from the medieval or more recent past. Oral folk chronicles were essential

48. C. von Peec, 'Alte serbische Handelsbeziehungen zu Wien', *Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, 36/3 (1915), 500-09; R. Veselinović, 'Продирање аустријске трговине у Београд у другој половини XVII века' [The Penetration of Austrian Trade into Belgrade in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century], in *Ослобођење градова у Србији од Турака 1862-1867. год.* [The Liberation of Towns in Serbia from the Turks 1862-1867] (Belgrade 1970), 163-70; idem, 'Развитак занатлијско-трговачког слоја српског друштва под страном влашћу у XVII и XVIII веку' [The Development of a Stratum of Craftsmen and Merchants in Serbian Society under Foreign Rule in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries], in *Градска култура на Балкану (XV-XIX век)* [Urban Culture in the Balkans (Fifteenth-Nineteenth Centuries)] (Belgrade 1984), 116.

49. Stojanović, *Стари српски записи*, I: 1,837; III: 4,990.

50. Ibid., I: 1,640.

51. *Evliya Çelebi*, V: 382; M. Jačov, *Le missioni cattoliche nei Balcani durante la guerra di Candia (1649-1669)* (Vatican City 1992), II: 391-92; Andrea Bogdani, Archbishop of Skopje, emphasises in his *relatione* of 1663 the importance that the Serbs, otherwise "nostri capitalissimi nemici", attach to their historical books: "libri storici che molto in chiaro metono le antichità di questo Paese [Regno di Servia] che loro tengono come cosse pretiose ...".

for the development of historical thought and for sustaining the people's awareness of their own past.⁵²

There is no information on Bulgarians and Greeks, probably because of the fact that they fitted easily into the Orthodox Serbian community. Documents from Dubrovnik, and later those from Vienna too, mention a Greek name or two, but such references are insufficient to draw inferences about their community in Belgrade. It should be borne in mind that the contemporary travellers and Catholic bishops in their reports often mistook Serbs for Greeks because of their common confession, a fact which may cause difficulties for the modern researcher.⁵³

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The Catholic community in Belgrade began to grow in the 1530s. Their nucleus was an organised colony of merchants from Dubrovnik. They did not have a city district to themselves; their houses and shops were grouped in the commercial centre of the city, in Ferhad Paša *mahalle*, making it the so-called *Latinler çarşusu*. Almost all sources, including the Ottoman, refer to them as *Latins*. Although never very numerous – they constituted only one seventh or one eighth of the overall Catholic population in Belgrade – they were very influential because of their financial strength. All Catholics other than Ragusans are referred to exclusively as “*Christiani Bosnesi*” (and not as Croats) in the reports by Catholic bishops and other higher clergy. Some travellers, for example Lubenau (1587), or Prandsteter (1608), mention Croats and Dalmatians instead of Bosnians. In the Ottoman sources, the Catholics in general are referred to as “*Latinler*”, but also as “*Frenk keferesi*”, with many variations. If it was necessary to differentiate between Ragusans and Bosnians, as in Belgrade, the Ottoman authorities used the term “*Latin*” for a Ragusan, and the terms “*Şokça ve Boşnak*” or simply “*Boşnak*” for a Bosnian. Among other Catholics, only Hungarians are mentioned in few sources.⁵⁴

52. N. Radojčić, ‘Облик првих модерних српских историја’ [The Form of the First Modern Serbian Histories], *Зборник Матице српске, серија друштвених наука*, 2 (1951), 5-56; R. Samardžić, *Усмена народна хроника* [Oral Folk Chronicles] (Novi Sad 1978); *Историја српског народа* [The History of the Serbian People] (Belgrade 1993), III-2: 105-327 (part 7: ‘Културна историја’ [Cultural History], chapters by P. Ivić and M. Pantić).

53. *Evliya Çelebi*, V: 380. Although Evliya speaks of both a Greek and a Bulgarian church, it is certain that neither the Patriarchate of Constantinople nor the Archbishopric of Ohrid had churches or priests in Belgrade. It is more likely that Evliya gave a share of churches to each of the ethnic communities who, according to what he heard, lived in Belgrade.

54. *Историја Београда*, I: 425-60 (Samardžić); Samardžić, ‘Дубровчани у Београду’, 47-94; idem, *Београд и Србија*, 193 (Quiclet, 1658); Jačov, *Списи Конгрегације за пропаганду вере*, 14, 197; T. Popović, *Дубровачка архивска грађа о Београду III, 1593-1606* [Documents on Belgrade from the Archives of Dubrovnik III, 1593-1606] (Belgrade 1986), 42, 261, 313, 414, 417, 424; Zirojević, ‘Рајнолд Лубенау’, 54; Nehring, *Adam Freiherrn zu Herbersteins Gesandtschaftsreise*, 109; D. Bojanić, ‘Султанска акта издата на захтев Дубровачке републике (1627-1647)’ [Sultan’s Orders Issued at the

An anonymous traveller escorting the French ambassador Des Hayes speaks of some 800 Catholics in Belgrade in 1621. According to a report for 1632/33, there were 30 Ragusan shops and 200 people in all, families and servants included. At the same time there were 130 families of Bosnian Catholics – about 1,500 people. A little later, in 1651, 31 Ragusan households, and 135 households of both Bosnians and Catholics “*di altra Nazione*” (166 Catholic households in all) were recorded in the Belgrade bishop’s papers. There were 90 Ragusans, 750 Bosnians, and about 100 “other” Catholics, 940 souls in all.⁵⁵

Formally, Belgrade belonged to the Bishopric of Smederevo, and it became a see only in the first half of the seventeenth century. Rivalries in the ranks of the Catholic higher clergy were additionally nourished by the agile Franciscans, intent on including Belgrade in their Bosnian diocese. Far fewer, but richer, the Ragusans, later in alliance with the Jesuits, were in a bitter conflict with the Bosnians, headed by the Franciscans, for control over the Belgrade church building (built by Ragusans) and appointing clergy, as well as over the community’s religious life. In one moment (1629) there were three chapels in Belgrade: a regular church run by the Ragusans, and the Franciscan and Jesuit chapels. The scale of the conflict is clearly evidenced by the fact that the Franciscan chapel was closed down as a result of Ragusan legal action with the Ottoman authorities and related evidence that it had been established without permission and without legal grounds (1632). On the other hand, the Franciscans had the Jesuit chapel closed down on the same grounds. This conflict serves here to show that a seemingly close-knit and firmly-structured religious community was not immune from discord. By the way, it should be emphasised that it was those who often strictly forbade their flock such contacts who used to turn to the Ottoman authorities, taking advantage of the Ottoman legal system. The conflict left its mark on the larger part of the seventeenth century, hampering to a large extent the development of the intellectual life and education of the Catholic population in Belgrade. The church which was the cause of all the conflict was destroyed by fire in 1672; it had not been rebuilt by the time of the fall of Belgrade in 1688, although the *ferman* for its restoration was issued in 1674.⁵⁶

Unlike the Bosnian Catholics, most Ragusan merchants, being of noble descent, not only were literate but often quite well-educated. Inventories of the community members’ estates often record a book or two, and the contracts drawn up in Belgrade bore personal signatures. Dubrovnik merchants had always supported a chaplain, who along with his religious tasks performed all notary work – from business correspondence and maintaining the accounts of the colony to wills and private letters.

Request of the City-Republic of Dubrovnik (1627-1647)], *Miscellanea/Мешовита грађа*, 10 (1982), 41, 52, 54, 70, 74, 79, 139, 141.

55. Samardžić, *Београд и Србија*, 165; Jačov, *Списи Конгрегације за пропаганду вере*, 197; idem, *Le missioni cattoliche*, I: 621.

56. Hrabak, ‘Католичко становништво’, 88-90, 104-22; Војанић, ‘Султанска акта’, 79; М. Vanino, ‘Isusovci u Beogradu u XVII. i XVIII. Stoljeću’ [Jesuits in Belgrade in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries], *Vrela i Prinosi*, 4 (1934), 1-20.

In some periods he was also entrusted with teaching their children to read and write (1675: “*fu la scuola alla gioventù*”).⁵⁷

Significant steps forward in education were the arrival of the Jesuits in Belgrade and the founding of a secondary school in 1613. It had about thirty students but was closed down before 1623. Nevertheless, the Jesuits were providing a sort of primary education for the children of merchants at their ‘School of Christian Sciences’ until the intrigues of the jealous Franciscans got them banished from Belgrade in 1632. In 1614, several grammars by a Portuguese Emmanuel Alvares were ordered for the school, along with the works of Cicero, Ovid and Virgil.⁵⁸

In the sixteenth century, Dubrovnik merchants wrote most of their official papers, sometimes even testaments, in Cyrillic, and in Serbian when they wrote them personally (“*in carattere serviano*”, “*nella lingua nostra serviana*”). Only the letters written by chaplains were in the Roman alphabet and in Italian. It was only around the middle of the seventeenth century that the Dubrovnik people started writing their private letters in the Roman alphabet. An interesting Cyrillic copy of a prayer book, *Ortus Animae*, was made in Belgrade in 1567. A merchant, Mato Djora Božidarević, had an original which was in Slavic, being a Croatian version in Ča-dialect and Kaj-dialect (Chakavski and Kaikavski) and in the Roman alphabet, translated into Što-dialect (Shtokavski) and in Cyrillic, which he understood better. It was the popular language and script which the people of Dubrovnik still understood best.⁵⁹ On his visitation tour of the Balkans, Bartol Kašić, a learned Jesuit and grammarian, spent the years 1612/13 and 1618 in, as he put it, “*srbskom Biogradu*” (Serbian Belgrade), where he translated from Italian into Slavic (*lingua illyrica*) the book *Perivoy od dievstva illi životi od devica* (*Garden of maidenhood or the lives of maidens*, published 1628). Kašić was the author of several works of lasting value such as the translations into Slavic of *Rituale Romanum Urbani VIII* (1640) and the New Testament (which, however, was not printed because, although a vernacular version, it was in Latin script and therefore thought impossible to sell in the Orthodox Balkans accustomed to Cyrillic script).⁶⁰

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Jews made their appearance in Belgrade at the same period as the Ragusans, in the 1530s, when conditions for the city’s economic advancement and the development

57. Samardžić, ‘Дубровчани у Београду’, 53, 58-59, 63-65, 79-82.

58. Vanino, ‘Isusovci u Beogradu’, 6-19; Samardžić, ‘Дубровчани у Београду’, 84.

59. Tadić, *Дубровачка архивска грађа*, 132, 145; Popović, *Дубровачка архивска грађа*, 401; Samardžić, ‘Дубровчани у Београду’, 74, 80-81, 86; F. Fancev, ‘Vatikanski hrvatski molitvenik i dubrovački psaltir’ [The Vatican Croatian Prayer Book and the Dubrovnik Psalter], *Djela JAZU*, 31 (1934), lxxxix-xciii.

60. M. Stojković, ‘Bartuo Kašić D. I. Pažanin’ [Bartol Kašić D. I. from Pag], *Rad JAZU*, 220 (1919), 185, 187, 192-93, 229; M. Vanino, *Autobiografija Bartola Kašića* [The Autobiography of Bartol Kašić] (Zagreb 1940); J. Radonić, *Штампарије и школе римске курије у Италији и јужнословенским земљама у XVII веку* [Print Shops and Schools of the Roman Curia in Italy and South-Slav Lands in the Seventeenth Century] (Belgrade 1949), 39-52, 55-57, 63.

of international trade allowed. From the middle of the sixteenth century, the Jewish merchants of Belgrade figure in all the significant travellers' accounts, and are often compared to the Ragusans. The Belgrade Jews are mentioned in the context of all major trade centres in the Balkans, but also in the West (mostly Venice and Ancona). Their presence is recorded in the imperial taxation registers after 1560 (1560: 5 households and 2 singles; 1572: 20 households; 1582: 22 households). Later the number increased: the Englishman P. Mundy mentions 60 to 70 households in 1620, and Baron Ottendorff as many as 800 souls in 1663. Although Evliya Çelebi makes no mention of a *mahalle* of their own, it is registered in the *cizye defters* of 1627/28-1642/43 and in a receipt of 1687. At any rate, in the seventeenth century most of the Jews were grouped in one street. Many of them lived communally in one large building. The community was not completely homogeneous, there being strong Ashkenazim and Sephardim groups. The former provided the rabbi of Belgrade up to the beginning of the seventeenth century, and the latter in the course of that century.⁶¹

The first mention of a synagogue in the sources dates from 1547. There may have been more in the seventeenth century. Pigafetta wrote in 1567 that Sokollu Mehmed Paşa had a synagogue pulled down to provide the stone for his *bezistan*. Under the guidance of educated rabbis, the Jewish community had an intensive cultural life. They promoted literacy and founded several schools. The German traveller Gerlach mentioned only one school in 1574. Among the most prominent rabbis are those who exerted a powerful influence on Jewish culture. Undoubtedly the best known are: Meir Angel, who published a work on ethics, poetics and the written word *Keshet Nehushali* (*Bow of Bronze*) in 1593 in Istanbul, *Masoret ha-Berit* (*Tradition of the Covenant*) in Krakow in 1619, and in Mantua in 1622, *Masoret ha-Berit ha-Gadoel*, commentaries on tradition and grammatical inaccuracies in the Bible; Judah Lerma – author of *Peletat Bet Yehudah*, printed in Venice in 1647 – the majority of his manuscripts were lost for ever in the fire of 1640; Simhah ben Gershon Kohen (c. 1622-69), who published in Venice (1657) his *Sefer Shemot*, a work on the orthography of Hebrew personal names as well as of the names of places and rivers in Asia and Europe; and Joseph ben Isaac Almosnino (1649-89), the halachic (Jewish law) authority and cabbalist. Almosnino's library and part of his writings were destroyed in a fire, probably that of 1672. His *Responsa*, preserved by chance and later rediscovered, was published by his sons in Istanbul in 1711 and 1713. All these educated rabbis conducted intensive correspondence with

61. B. Hrabak, 'Јевреји у Београду до краја XVII века' [Jews in Belgrade Until the End of the Seventeenth Century], *Годишњак града Београда*, 18 (1971), 21-51; Šabanović, *Катастарски пописи*, 460; idem, 'Урбани развитак', 17, 22; Kostić, *Културне везе*, 322-23; Evliya Çelebi, V: 376; Zirojević, 'Попис цизје', 233; Biblioteca Universitaria di Bologna, MS 3574, 205; Samardžić, *Београд и Србија*, 193 (Quiclet, 1658), 203-05 (Poullet, 1658); H. Egyed (ed.), *Budáról Belgrádba 1663-ban. Ottendorff Henrik képes útleírása* [From Buda to Belgrade in 1663: An Illustrated Travel Account by Henrik Ottendorff] (Tolna 1943), 99.

the greatest minds of Istanbul, Jerusalem and Thessalonica. Many came to Belgrade to solicit their opinions; Almosnino came to Belgrade to extend his knowledge and stayed for the rest of his life. Many prominent rabbis passed through Belgrade, or made a short stay there, often on their alms collection mission; for example, Eliezer ben Samuel Treves, a Polish scholar and author, passed through the city in 1648, when he gave a copy of his treatise on divorce to the Belgrade rabbi; Joseph Nazir ha-Levi in 1679, rabbi of Hebron and Cairo; and the same year, Zebi Ashkenazi, rabbi of Alt Ofen, Sarajevo, and Berlin. In this list of the learned inhabitants of Belgrade we should certainly include the Hebraist and Talmudist Joseph ibn Danon, who was born to an old Belgrade Sephardim family in 1620 and died in London towards the end of the same century. He was Rabbi Almosnino's personal secretary, wrote commentaries on other authors' works, but was himself the author of an original treatise *Sheloshah Sarigim (Three Branches)* on the basic principles of the world (Law, Faith and Charity).⁶²

Nor was Belgrade passed over by the Karaites (a non-rabbinical Jewish sect which rejected the Talmud). It was in Belgrade in the first half of the sixteenth century that the scholar and liturgical poet Judah ben Elijah Tishbi copied and completed the exegetical work of his grandfather Abraham ben Judah, and wrote many poems, several of which were included in the Karaite prayer-book (*Siddur ha-Keraim*).⁶³

The Jewish community was exiled from Belgrade after the Habsburg occupation of the city in 1688, but it started to grow again after the 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz.

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There is no adequate evidence about the intellectual life of certain communities in Belgrade, regardless of their size.

Although quite small until 1688, the Armenian community gained economic strength by the mid-seventeenth century, being engaged mostly in trade. The first mention of their church in 1632 was occasioned by the fact that the infuriated *kaymakam* of Buda's vizier had it levelled. It obviously was rebuilt, as several references to it have survived: by the Bishop of Belgrade Fra Mattheus Benlich in 1651, by Evliya Çelebi in 1660, by Henrik Ottendorff in 1663, as well as by an English traveller, Dr Browne, staying in a rich Armenian household in Belgrade in 1669. Evliya Çelebi also mentions one Armenian *mahalle*. Another piece of information

62. Hrabak, 'Јевреји у Београду', 44; Matković, 'Pigafetta', 183; *Evliya Çelebi*, V: 380; *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, s.v. 'Almosnino, Joseph ben Isaac' and 'Belgrade'; *The Jewish Encyclopaedia* (1901-06), s.v. 'Angel, Meir ben Abraham', 'Simhah (Freudemann) Ephraim ben Gershon ben Simeon ben Isaiah ha-Kohen', 'Treves, Eliezer ben Samuel', 'Joseph Nazir ben Hayyim Moses ha-Levi', 'Ashkenazi, Zebi Hirsch (Hakam Zebi) b. Jacob', and 'Danon, Joseph ben Jacob ben Moses ibn'.

63. *The Jewish Encyclopaedia*, s.v. 'Judah ben Elijah Tishbi'.

claims that they were doing nothing against the Catholics.⁶⁴ The church suggests the presence of priests. It may also be assumed that most Armenian merchants were literate. Unfortunately, other than that, there are no data about the life of the Armenian community in Belgrade before 1688; the sources are much more generous with information about the next century.

The community of Gypsies is also among the less known. They were present in Belgrade from the very beginning of Ottoman rule. They were both Muslims and Christians, and the latter, bearing Serbian names, almost certainly were for the most part Orthodox. Most contemporaries judged their religious feeling as quite superficial, which, in addition to racial differences, sufficed to prevent them from being fully admitted to the existing religious communities. The Ottoman imperial taxation registers always record them separately from others. They were divided into two groups (*cemaat*), according to their confession, and the majority lived in two, later three, *mahalles*, which is the state of affairs that continued into the seventeenth century. The privileged among them worked in smithies at the docks. According to the *tahrir defters*, there were: in 1536: 20 Christian and 9 Muslim households and 2 singles; in 1560: 33 Christian and 22 Muslim households; in 1572: 97 Christian and 95 Muslim households; and in 1582: 22 Christian and 100 Muslim households.⁶⁵

The data about the Protestant community are still fewer. The first mention of “*Ungari Eretici*” occurs as late as 1623. They had a church of their own for a while, and it was pulled down in 1632, just like that of the Armenians. Their exceptionally small number must have been the reason for a report of 1632 to the Holy See to comment that they “do not harass papal envoys as much as the Bosnian Franciscans”.⁶⁶

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There is no doubt that there was a cultural life in Belgrade in the first period of Ottoman rule (1521-1688), and that its course was set by the intellectual elites of each religious/ethnic community. The necessary prerequisite for a more accurate assessment of its intensity and importance, and consequently of the place of Belgrade in the cultural life of the Empire, is a full insight into the cultural life of most cities, at least of those in the Empire’s European part.

The main characteristic of the cultural life in Belgrade is the lack of intellectual communication between different religious communities. The cultural life of members of a community was limited exclusively to that community. But divisions

64. Samardžić, ‘Дубровчани у Београду’, 73; Veselinović, ‘Продирање аустријске трговине’, 173, 176-77; Јаčov, *Списи Конгрегације за пропаганду вере*, 174; idem, *Списи Тајног ватиканског архива*, 69-70; idem, *Le missioni cattoliche*, I: 621; Kostić, *Културне везе*, 335 (Browne); *Evliya Çelebi*, V: 376, 380; Egyed (ed.), *Budáról Belgrádba*, 99; Samardžić, *Београд и Србија*, 193 (Quiclet, 1658), 203-07 (Pouillet, 1658).

65. Šabanović, *Катастарски пописи*, 275, 458-59; idem, ‘Урбани развитак’, 13, 17, 22; Hertz, ‘Muslims, Christians and Jews’, 154-55; *Evliya Çelebi*, V: 376, 380.

66. Јаčov, *Списи Конгрегације за пропаганду вере*, 14, 174, 183-84.

within a single religious community were not uncommon. In the Catholic one, for example, there was a harsh and unbridgeable divide between two groups based on their different territories of origin and their sympathies for different, and competing, religious orders. Except to some extent for the shared participation of all communities in a city's general economic vigour, nothing, not even such a civilisation-shaping invention as the printing press, effected a change towards their joint cultural advance. Their cultural lives followed their own separate courses.

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**PROVINCIAL BISHOPS OF THE ORTHODOX CHURCH
AS MEMBERS OF THE OTTOMAN ELITE
(EIGHTEENTH-NINETEENTH CENTURIES)**

Pinelopi STATHI

How can we define the elite? Do we point to a group of wealthy people or do we talk about people of knowledge and intellect, or both, or is it power that is the characteristic attribute of the elite? Since the notions of leadership and dominance are included in the meaning of the word, it seems that we are referring to a select group which imposes attitudes and ideas in a broader frame of social being.

Given that the Ottoman Empire was multilingual and multicultural and the Greek Orthodox community was a part of this mosaic, I consider that a part of the higher Orthodox clergy, and, more specifically, the metropolitans who were subjects of the sultan, should be considered members of the Ottoman elite.

The Greek Orthodox community within the borders of the Ottoman Empire had recognised the patriarchs as *milletbaşıs*. The primus was (and still is) the Patriarch of Istanbul, who has even now the distinctive title of *Ecumenical* (universal); this practically means that his spiritual jurisdiction extended over the whole Orthodox world, including lands which did not belong to the Ottoman Empire.¹ The Patriarch of Jerusalem and the Patriarch of Antioch are the other two religious leaders who represented the Greek Orthodox believers living in the Ottoman territories.

Let us observe more closely the structure of the clergy in the Patriarchate. Of structural importance within the framework of the institutions was the Holy Synod, which was composed of the metropolitans representing the Orthodox Christians of the different parts of the Ottoman territories. The metropolitans favoured by the geographical position of their dioceses were able to have easy access to the capital, or even to reside permanently in it, so it is evident that they could avail themselves of their synodal right to a greater extent than others who lived in remote dioceses.² This was the case, for instance, with the Metropolitans of Nicomedia, Adrianople, Dercoi, etc., who, in the course of time, came to acquire a considerable influence as factors determining the policy of the Church in many aspects. It is needless to say that besides the metropolitans of the Holy Synod there were numerous metropolitans without the special authority of the member of that body.

1. H. İnalcık, 'The Status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch under the Ottomans', *Turcica*, 21-23 (1991), 407-09.
2. S. Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity* (Cambridge 1968), 386-87.

In the *Notitiae Episcopatum* of different times we count nearly 137 metropolitan sees within the geographical jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.³

The metropolitans were elected by the members of the Holy Synod and the Patriarch, although in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the elections one can also note the presence of the chiefs of the guilds and other dignitaries.

In the early years of the eighteenth century we can observe in patriarchal letters the signatures of metropolitans, who were members of the Holy Synod and always put the place they represented before their names: so we can see, for instance, the Metropolitans of Ereğli, Izmit, Iznik, Kadıköy, Selânik, Edirne, Bursa, and Karaferiye. Most of them had started their careers in some provincial monastery, but as they climbed up the hierarchy, they had to be administrators and stand for their flocks and sees, that is, they had to live in the province they represented and not be absent. In the patriarchal registers we can find synodical decisions concerning metropolitans who left for the capital and did not return to their provinces for three years. This was, for instance, the reason for the deposition of the Metropolitan of Kayseri Zacharias in 1648.⁴

At the local level, metropolitans were proportionately equal to the Patriarch: they had the same jurisdiction and rights, and also had the responsibility of organising the Greek Orthodox communities. They were the officials who stood not only for the religious but also for the political representation of the Orthodox Christians who lived in the provinces of the Empire. They signed, certified and sanctioned religious acts as well as divorces, dowry contracts, wills, statutes of the guilds and all kinds of juridical documents, having at the same time the authority to judge cases of civil law.⁵

It is interesting to follow the increase of power of the metropolitans in the mid-eighteenth century. In the year 1741, Gerasimos, Metropolitan of Heracleia, one of the resident members of the Holy Synod, applied for the issue of a *hatt-ı şerif* subordinating the election of the Patriarch to the recommendation of five metropolitans, those of Heracleia, Kyzikos, Nicomedia, Nicaea and Chalcedon. He paid 35 purses to the chief physician of the Sultan, Hayatîzade, for having his demand considered, and, even though he did not succeed in obtaining a *hatt-ı şerif*, he secured a *ferman* regulating the election of the Patriarch in the manner suggested in his demand, which was that “no candidate would obtain the patriarchal throne without the consent of the five metropolitans”. This was called the system of the Elders, and the above-mentioned five metropolitans became the chief factor in determining the election of the Patriarch, and at the same time they assumed the most important part in the administration of the Church.⁶

3. T. Papadopoulos, *The History of the Greek Church and People Under Turkish Domination* (Brussels 1952), 103-21.

4. D. Apostolopoulos and P. D. Michaelares, *Η Νομική Συναγωγή του Δοσιθέου: Μια Πηγή κι ένα Τεκμήριο* [The *Nomiki Synagogi* of Dositheos: A Source and a Piece of Evidence] (Athens 1987), 201.

5. L. S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453* (New York 1958), 104.

6. A. Komnenos Hypselantes, *Εκκλησιαστικών και Πολιτικών των εις Δώδεκα, Βιβλίων*

In 1752, during his second patriarchate, Cyril founded a 'Committee of the Public' into which were admitted the representatives of the Greek Orthodox professional guilds of Istanbul, and which was entrusted with the administration of the material affairs of the Church, notably the financial affairs which were in exceptionally bad state. The metropolitans mounted a strenuous resistance to this measure, which meant that they were to lose their powers of a temporal character. Cyril succeeded in securing an order by virtue of which every metropolitan was bound to reside in his diocese and not in Istanbul. It actually seems that the problem of absence from the provinces was rather disturbing, since in 1765 the Grand Vizier inquired as to the reasons for the constant presence of a great number of metropolitans in the Ottoman capital. He was wondering whether they were neglecting their spiritual duties as a consequence of their long absence from their dioceses. The Patriarch Samuel tried to justify their presence in the capital on the grounds that such presence was necessitated by the conduct of ecclesiastical affairs. The Grand Vizier observed in reply that the presence of five or six of them was sufficient for this purpose.⁷

Western travellers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were horrified at the low standards of the Greek clergy, but in their accounts they did not forget to praise the hospitality they found in various places and the outstanding personality of some metropolitans they met: there were still a few establishments where the old traditions were maintained and there were still provincial bishops who could discuss theology with erudition.

The fact that a great number of teachers and literary men were clergymen was very seldom acknowledged or favourably commented on. If anyone referred to this, he also hastened to add that the clergymen might be the most literate but not the most enlightened of the Greeks.

The metropolitans were very often disliked and denounced because of their identification with the interests of the Ottoman authorities and the *kocabaşıs*. From the documents and the narratives of travellers it emerges that a common sentiment among the Greek people was that their prelates were largely responsible for their degraded state and they did not, in general, have any esteem for them. Part of Greek literature is vividly marked by this anti-clerical spirit, but to what extent the average Greek shared this opinion is a matter for discussion.

Decadence must not be exaggerated. The metropolitans were often learned clergymen with qualities not only of a theological but also of an administrative nature, since they were ruling their flocks in the provinces. By the eighteenth century it was a matter of pride for them to be versed in Western philosophy and the rationalism fashionable at the time.⁸ The improvement in educational facilities provided

H', Θ' και Ι', ήτοι τα Μετά την Αλωσιν (1453-1789) [Ecclesiastical and Political History after the Fall of Constantinople (1453-1789)] (Istanbul 1870), 350.

7. Papadopoulos, *History*, 52-53.

8. An outstanding example for this kind of erudition is Neophytos, Metropolitan of Philippopolis, who went to England with his retinue in 1701 and was awarded the honorary degree of Doctor of Divinity at a special ceremony at Oxford (Runciman, *Great Church*, 304).

by the schools and academies that they patronised meant a corresponding decline in religious education. The British traveller Leake acknowledged at the beginning of the nineteenth century the contribution of certain metropolitans to the revival of learning either as teachers and founders of schools, or as authors, scholars, and protectors of education. Although at the time of the French Revolution the Church had tried to suppress “the Gallic doctrines of liberty, then widely epidemic among the Greeks”, Leake believed that some of the most sincere supporters of learning were prelates. In his statement the traveller did not take into account the fact that the Church officially had adopted an increasingly reactionary, though not very effective, attitude towards the Enlightenment, dating from the end of the eighteenth century. Leake is the only traveller who realised that both education and literature in modern Greece to a great extent depended on, and were represented by, the Greek Orthodox Church and its clergy.⁹

I will try now to produce some evidence concerning the erudition of some metropolitans. Apart from the many official documents that they wrote for administrative purposes and their private correspondence from which the degree of their education can be traced, the following cases have something to do with their standing as members of Ottoman society.

In 1780, the Metropolitan of Ankara was Serapheim from Antalya, Attalialu Serapheim (Ατταλιαλού Σεραφεΐμ), as he described himself. This remarkable prelate devoted his life to the translation from Greek to Turkish of a number of religious books in order to ameliorate the spiritual life of his fellow-countrymen.¹⁰ The religious education of the Turkish-speaking Orthodox people of Ankara, Kayseri and the surrounding areas was his ultimate concern, as can be traced in the prefaces of the books that he translated and edited. In the foreword of the book *Semavi Bahçe Donanması*, published in 1783,¹¹ he accused the priests of not educating the people and exclaimed: “Lâkin vah Anatol memleketine, vah, vah ne aman çıplak, garip kaldı Anatol, ne aman üryan kaldın sen? Ah bir vakit kıymeti yok cevahir taş idin, pahası bulunmaz inciydın, mühürlü kimya zapt etmiş hazneydin, ilimlik sende idi, kâmillik sende idi, ekâbirlik sende idi...”; after that, he continued to enumerate the glories of the past by contrast with his own day’s deplorable state.

9. W. M. Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. 4 (London 1835), 282; H. Angelomatis-Tsougarakis, *The Eve of the Greek Revival: British Travellers’ Perceptions of Early Nineteenth-Century Greece* (London 1990), 84-85.

10. P. Stathi, «Τα Τουρκογραφικά Βιβλία και ο Σεραφεΐμ Ατταλειάτης» [Turkish-Greek Books and Serapheim of Antalya], in *Το Έντυπο Ελληνικό Βιβλίο, 15ος-19ος Αιώνας* [Printed Greek Books, Fifteenth-Nineteenth Centuries] (Athens 2004), 329-39.

11. *Σημαβή Παχτζέ Ττοναυμασσή, Γιάνια, Σετζηλμής μπέρ γερά Τζέμ ολμούς, γιαζηλμής τουρ πάζι Μετίν ολάν Αζιζλερίν Μάρτυρος λουκλαρί, σσεχίτ ολμαλαρί κάν ακιτικλαρί, Χριστός Εφέντι Ιτζήν ... Τουρλλού Ιγβάϊ κιταπλартάν, τεφσίρ ολουνμούστουρ, Ρώμτζα τιλληντέν τούρκ λισανηγά, Χριστιανλιγίν κιφασετληγί ιτζήν. Σάπηκα Αγκαρα Μητροπολουτού, Ατάλιαλου Σεραφεΐμ Ροχπάν Ρακιπτέν...* [Illumination of the Heavenly Garden] (Venice 1783), 501-13.

Serapheim travelled to Venice, collaborated with the important printing houses of Bortoli and Glykys, and worked very hard as a translator, proof-reader and very often as a writer. In the *Bibliography* of Salaville and Dallegio for the *Karamanli* books we notice that in thirty years, from 1753 to 1783, eleven books are registered and ascribed to “Séraphin d’Adalia”, Metropolitan of Ankara.¹²

Ankara was a diocese which was of importance for the Patriarchate, although the Orthodox population was rather small in number. In order to reach their flock the officials from Istanbul did not hesitate to address them in Turkish. In 1720 a patriarchal letter in Turkish gave a good reference for the newly elected Metropolitan of Ankara.¹³ From the episcopal catalogues we assume that the person of whom the Patriarch wrote: “Tanrının nazarı üzerinizde olmasıyla size bir aziz, ikramlı, Allahtan korkar, Allah muhabbetlisi bir arhierea vermiştir, ihsanına şükür etmelisiniz, kendim vukuf olalı sevinçliyim”, was Neophytos, who remained on the metropolitan throne of Ankara from 1720 to 1740.

In Manuscript 66 of the Old Greek Parliament Building (now the Hellenic Society for History and Ethnology), dating from the eighteenth century,¹⁴ among other texts there is a copy of the Greek translation of the report of Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed Efendi after his visit to Paris in 1721. It is the well-known *sefaretname* which was translated into French by Julien Galland in 1757, entitled *Relation de l’ambassade de Mehémet Effendi à la cour de France en 1721, écrite par lui-même et traduite du Turc*.¹⁵ After examining the text, I assume that the Greek translation was made directly from the Turkish text and before the French translation.¹⁶ As for the text in the manuscript, it was written by the metropolitan of the island of Tzia, and, as he testifies, he copied it in 1760. It is very interesting to speculate about the need which prompted him to copy this rather amusing and peculiar text. It is neither a theological nor an ethical/philosophical text which would normally attract the attention of a metropolitan!

Metropolitans were not only writers, editors, and translators, but also composers of church music, which can be found in manuscripts of Byzantine music. Numerous church melodies that are still sung today are the work of metropolitans such as

12. S. Salaville and E. Dallegio, *Karamanlidika: bibliographie analytique d’ouvrages en langue turque imprimés en caractères grecs*, Vol. 1: 1584-1850 (Athens 1958), 13-81.
13. P. Stathi, «Δύο Εγκύκλια Πατριαρχικά Γράμματα στα Καραμανλίδικα» [Two Patriarchal Letters in *Karamanli* Turkish], *Deltion tou Kentrou Mikrasiatikon Spoudon*, 5 (1984-85), 103-32.
14. S. Lampros, «Κατάλογος των Κωδίκων των εν Αθήναις Βιβλιοθηκών πλην της Εθνικής. Α΄. Κώδικες της Βιβλιοθήκης της Βουλής» [Catalogue of Codices in the Library of the Greek Parliament in Athens], *Neos Hellenomnemon*, 3 (1906), 463.
15. G. Veinstein (ed.), *Mehmed efendi – Le paradis des infidèles : relation de Yirmisekiz Çelebi Mehmed efendi, ambassadeur ottoman en France sous la Régence. Traduit de l’ottoman par Julien-Claude Galland* (Paris 1981).
16. P. Stathi, «Ένας Οθωμανός Πρέσβης στη Γαλλία το 18ο Αιώνα» [An Ottoman Ambassador in France in the Eighteenth Century], *He Kath’Hemas Anatole*, 5 (2000), 135-77.

Ierotheos from Ioannina, Cyril from the island of Tinos, Gerasimos from Heracleia, Raphael from Konya and others.

Something which still remains to be investigated is the kind of relations which existed between the Orthodox metropolitans and the local people and particularly the Muslims in the provinces where they lived. Reading the private correspondence of the prelates and the documents included in the patriarchal codices, at first sight we gather that these relations were only financial: in a way, we are faced with a constant *alışveriş*. Being officials of the Greek Orthodox community and subjects of the sultan, provincial bishops had to pay taxes both to the Ottoman state and the Patriarchate.

On their ascent to the throne of a diocese, metropolitans had to pay the *piskeş* to the sultan in order to obtain a *berat*, and at the same time to disburse a yearly amount to the Patriarchate;¹⁷ this was the reason why they often received loans from various laymen. In ecclesiastical documents of the eighteenth century we find the names of Muslim moneylenders to whom money was owed. In the nineteenth century the communities had the obligation to pay to the metropolitan a yearly sum of money which was predetermined by the Patriarchate.

Rich dioceses were in great demand, but this, in the long run, resulted in making their acquisition too expensive. All the sees were burdened with enormous debts, to which were added the debts that every metropolitan contracted to secure his preferment. The situation, finally, reached a point where a lucrative diocese could be considered unprofitable, as Ioannina was said to be.

Besides, it is very well known that the metropolitans used bribery in order to obtain *fermans* for all kinds of matters, and very often they circumvented patriarchal law with a sultan's *ferman*; such activities were also costly for metropolitans.

Still, it is in the chronicles of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries where we find some relations which were not merely financial: at the beginning of the eighteenth century in Bursa the local metropolitan Kallinikos had very friendly relations with Şeyh Mısıri Efendi, who liked Christians and had even composed some verses concerning the birth of Christ. The Ottomans were very suspicious of him and thought that he secretly professed Christianity.¹⁸

The relations of the metropolitans with non-Orthodox Islam have been dealt with in many different works, so we can add here the patriarchal letters to all the metropolitans (*apantachouses*) in favour of certain persons, so that "they can travel around in the provinces and be helped in every way because they are pious and learned men".¹⁹

And perhaps the most interesting example of an intellectual relation between a Greek Orthodox prelate and an erudite Ottoman Muslim is the case of Chrysanthos

17. E. Zachariadou, *Δέκα Τουρκικά Εγγράφα για την Μεγάλη Εκκλησία (1453-1576)* [Ten Turkish Documents on the Great Church (1453-1576)] (Athens 1996), 87-89.

18. Hypselantes, *Εκκλησιαστικών*, 215.

19. A similar letter was given even to Evliya Çelebi in order to facilitate his travels in Greek territories.

Notaras, Patriarch of Jerusalem from 1707 to 1730, and Yanyalı Esad Efendi, *müderris* in the *medrese* of Eyüp and later *kadı* in Galata.²⁰ The two men exchanged a number of letters and expressed their friendship and their interest in astronomy.²¹ We possess 21 letters of Esad Efendi in Greek, from the years 1713-17, that show the kind of communication that two members of the Ottoman elite who belonged to different religions could have.

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The principal aim of this short paper was not only to include Greek Orthodox senior clergy in the Ottoman elite, but also to try to find those few cases in which representatives of the Orthodox *reaya* tried to come closer to the Ottomans, either by knowledge or by curiosity. It is hard to accept that the only factor which formed the elite group was money.

(Centre of Medieval and Modern Hellenism at the Academy of Athens)

20. K. Sarıkavak, *XVIII. Yüzyılda bir Osmanlı Düşünürü Yanyalı Es'ad Efendi* (Ankara 1998).

21. P. Stathi, «Ο σοφώτατος Εσάτ Εφέντης, Φίλος και Αλληλογράφος του Χρυσάνθου Νοταρά» [The Most Learned Esad Efendi, Chrysanthos Notaras' Friend and Correspondent], *Ho Eranistes*, 18 (1986), 57-84.

PART TWO

PROVINCIAL ELITES IN THE FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH CENTURIES

CHRISTIAN *SİPAHİS* IN THE TIRHALA TAXATION REGISTERS (FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH CENTURIES)

Melek DELİLBAŞI*

*To Prof. Elizabeth Zachariadou
in appreciation*

That the Ottomans in the period of their empire's foundation left the former Albanian, Serbian and Greek elite and military classes in place and added them to the ranks of *timar* holders, and that these Christian *sipahis* preserved their religion for two or three generations is a matter to which attention has been drawn in the works of historians, such as H. İnalcık,¹ Ö. L. Barkan² and N. Beldiceanu.³

In this paper, in addition to providing information on the *dirliks*, revenue and military obligations of Christian *sipahis* based on two *mufassal* and one *icmal defteri* for the Tırhala (Trikala) district in Thessaly, the family trees of the large families like the Mikras and Kravars who gave their names to the districts they inhabited will be described by concentrating on their *timars*.

The region of Thessaly, a wide plain surrounded by mountains in central Greece, became, like Epirus, an important resistance centre and the central government was forced to deal with the opposition of the large landowners over a long period. At the same time, the region had suffered Catalan, Venetian, Serbian and Turkish invasions.⁴

While Turkish troops reached the edges of Epirus as part of the extensive Balkan campaign organised by Sultan Murad in 1385, Çitros and Yenişehir (Larissa) were captured by Hayreddin Paşa and Evrenos Bey. After 1385, in addition to Yenişehir, Çayhisar (Damas) also came under Ottoman authority. The entry in *Tırhala Mufassal Tahrir Defteri* (MM 10) dated 1454-55 recording that İlyas and Yusuf Beys, coming with their grandfather Evrenos Bey, held a *timar* in Fenar (Phanarion) shows that the Ottoman policy of conquest and settlement reached a peak at that date.

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1. H. İnalcık, *Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar* (Ankara 1954), 137-84.
2. Ö. L. Barkan, *İA*, s.v. 'Timar', 298-302.
3. N. Beldiceanu, 'Timariotes chrétiens en Thessalie (1454/55)', *SF*, 44 (1985), 45-81.
4. For Byzantine Thessaly, see A. Avramea, *H Βυζαντινή Θεσσαλία μέχρι του 1204* [Byzantine Thessaly up to 1204] (Athens 1974); J. Koder and F. Hild, *Hellas und Thessalia. Tabula Imperii Byzantini* (Vienna 1976); P. Magdalino, 'The History of Thessaly 1266-1393', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oxford, 1976.

After Bayezid I came to the throne, it is clear from the text in the Lavra Monastery of an agreement made between the ruler of Thessaly, Alexios Angelos, and Bayezid that this region was considered *darülahd*.⁵ After Trikala, Domokos, Pharsala, Hypati (Badracık) and Zetouni were also taken by Bayezid. Chalkokondyles records that these regions were taken without the opening of hostilities. From both Chalkokondyles and a letter written in February 1394 by the Duke of Athens, Acciajuoli, to his brother Donato it can be inferred that central Greece had been conquered before February 1394.⁶

Turkish colonisation in Thessaly began during the time of Murad II and the *yörüks* (nomads) who came with Turhan Bey were extensively settled in the region.

The oldest existing *Tırhala Mufasssal Tahrir Defteri* is listed in the Istanbul Prime Ministerial Archive (*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi*) with the number MM 10 and consists of 455 folios (*varak*). In 2001 the entire text was published by myself and M. Arıkan at the Turkish Historical Society (Türk Tarih Kurumu – TTK) and the information was computerised.⁷ H. İnalçık in his book titled *Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar* discussed this register for the first time; N. Beldiceanu and P. Nasturel evaluated the information in the register in an article in the journal *Byzantion*.⁸

The second register that we examined was *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi* MM 66 *icmal defteri*, dated 1466-67; it is composed of 196 folios. The third register was TT 36, dated 1506. It consists of 1,326 folios.

A fourth register, *Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi* TT 105, dated 1521, has not yet been examined.

According to the register, in 1454-55, the *sancak* of Tırhala consisted of three *vilâyets*:

1- TIRHALA VİLÂYETİ

- a) Nefs-i Tırhala
- b) Nefs-i Yenişehir
- c) Kale-i Damas

2- FENAR VİLÂYETİ

- a) Nefs-i Fenar
- b) Nahiye-i Rodoviz

3- AĞRAFA VİLÂYETİ

- a) Nefs-i Ağrafa

5. M. Delilbaşı and M. Arıkan, *Hicrî 859 Tarihli Süret-i Defter-i Sancak-ı Tırhala* (Ankara 2001), XXI.

6. R. J. Loenertz, *Byzantina et Franco-Graeca* (Rome 1970), 246.

7. Delilbaşı and Arıkan, *Süret-i Defter-i Sancak-ı Tırhala*.

8. İnalçık, *Tetkikler ve Vesikalar*, 145-48; N. Beldiceanu and P. S. Nasturel, 'La Thessalie entre 1454/55 et 1506', *Byzantion*, 53 (1983), 108-18.

The *dirlik* distribution in the *sancak* of Tırhala recorded during the period Turhan Bey's son Ömer Bey was the *sancakbeyi* was as follows:

In the *vilâyet* of Tırhala, 1 *mirliva hassı*, 88 *eşküncü timars* and 24 *mustahfızan timars* for a total of 112 *timars* and 1 *hassı*; in the *vilâyet* of Fenar 1 *subaşı hassı*, 63 *eşküncü*, and 10 *mustahfızan timars*, totalling 73 *timars* and 1 *hassı*; in Ağrafa there was 1 *subaşı hassı* and 7 *eşküncü timars*. Thus in the entire *sancak* there was a total of 3 *hasses* and 192 *timars*.

Ömer Bey, who had the use of the *mirliva hassı*, had a total revenue of 317,065 *akçes*. His obligations were 62 *cebelüs*, 6 *geçims*, 2 *günlüks*, 1 *sokak* and *abrız*, 1 *hazine çadırı*, 1 *kiler*, 1 *matbah*, and 1 *serraçhane*. Among the allotted resources were 2 cities, 70 villages and 9 *mezraas*. In these units, 3,105 Christian households, 321 unmarried and 371 widowed Christians, 797 Muslim households and 36 Muslim widows were recorded.

Turhan Bey's son, Mehmed Bey, the *subaşı* of Fenar (p. 280b-309a), had a total revenue of 115,518 *akçes*; the 33 villages of the city which he held (Fenar) contained 1,525 Christian households, 81 single and 227 widowed Christians, as well as 175 Muslim households and 5 widows. As for Mehmed Bey's obligations, they were *kendü bürüme*, 29 *cebelüs*, 4 *geçims*, 1 *günlük*, 4 *çadırs* and 4 *tenktürs*. The third *hass* in the district belonged to the *subaşı* of the *vilâyet* of Ağrafa, Hacı Bey. Hacı Bey's annual income was 122,629 *akçes*; in the 38 villages he held there were 2,968 Christian households, 37 unmarried and 87 widowed Christians. As for Hacı Bey's obligations, they were 30 *cebelüs*, 45 *geçims*, 4 *çadırs*, 4 *tenktürs*, 1 *günlük*.

Doubtless, the above-mentioned *beys* were the elite's most prominent administrators; however, this is a subject which requires separate, more detailed treatment. The subject at hand here is Christian *sipahi timar* holders. Of the 112 *timars* in the *vilâyet* of Tırhala, 89 were held by Muslims, 20 by Christians and 3 belonged to joint Muslim-Christian *dirlik* owners.

Of 73 *dirliks* in the *vilâyet* of Fenar, 61 were held by Muslims and 12 by Christian *sipahis*. In Ağrafa there were 6 Muslim and 1 Christian *dirlik* owners.

In the *sancak* of Tırhala out of 192 *timars*, 156 belonged to Muslims, 33 to Christians and 3 belonged to joint Muslim-Christian owners. In addition there was one *mevkuf timar*.⁹

The first scholar to mention the Christian *sipahis* in MM 10, dated 1454-55, as stated above, was Professor Halil İnalçık. In his outstanding book cited above he discussed the *tahrir defterleri* related to this subject and gave various examples from the Balkans.¹⁰ Of those working on the *tahrir defterleri* from the Balkans, the number of researchers interested in this subject is limited. One of the first historians to take up this subject was Branislav Đurđev. Đurđev examined the registers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries from the *sancak* of Smederevo and recorded that most of the Christian *sipahis* in the region in 1516 had previously been *baştına*

9. Delilbaşı and Arıkan, *Sûret-i Defter-i Sancak-ı Tırhala*, XLI.

10. İnalçık, *Tetkikler ve Vesikalar*, 137-84.

holders. According to the writer, the surrender of Smederevo before the beginning of hostilities in 1459 and the granting by the Turks of extensive privileges to local authorities in the border districts explained the large number of Christian *sipahis* to be found in the region.¹¹

The Bosnian historian Hamid Hadžibegić identified 25 *timars* in the hands of Christians out of 177 *timars* in the *defter-i vilâyet-i Vlk* (the district of Branković).¹²

Hazim Šabanović showed that among the 229 *timars* from the *icmal tahrir defteri* of 1455 entitled *Suret-i Defter-i Mücmel-i Yeleç ve İzveçan ve Hodidede ve Senica ve Ras ve Üsküb ve Kalkandelen maa tevabihi* and the *hass* and *timar* of the *uc beği* İshakoğlu İsa Bey, 45 belonged to Christians.¹³

Nicoara Beldiceanu in his important article on Christian *timars* in the district of Tırhala published in 1985 in *Südost-Forschungen*, after giving an account of the *timars*, revenue and obligations of the Christian *sipahis* in register MM 10, provided examples of Slavs and Albanians among them.¹⁴

In the present study, after listing the Christian *sipahi timar* owners to be found in the *mufassal tahrir defteri* MM 10, we will discuss the large *timar*-holding families by making use of the *icmal defteri* MM 66, dated 1466-67 (871 A.H.). In addition, we will provide information on the small number of *timar*-holding *sipahis* mentioned in the *mufassal tahrir defteri* TT 36, dated 1506 (912 A.H.). In the *mufassal tahrir defteri* MM 10 presented in Table 1, there were 33 Christian *sipahi timar* holders and 3 *timars* belonging to joint Muslim-Christian owners.

The first record, on page 93a in the register, is *Timar-ı Boga ve Pilgrin evlâd-ı Bogoslav* (the *timar* of Boga and Pilgrin, sons of Bogoslav). They went on joint campaigns and held a *tezkere*, a certificate of confirmation; the *timar* produced a revenue of 1,689 *akçes* and their military obligation in time of war was two *cebelüs*.

Apart from the Kravar and Mikra families, whom we will discuss below, Miho, son of Klaznos, and Aranid, son of Vradinos (f. 130a), had the largest incomes; they held *karye-i Kiryoniro* and *karye-i Aspropetia* as *timar*. In these villages there were 132 households, 23 single men and 15 widows; they were required to participate in military campaigns with 2 *cebelüs*. The total revenue was 6,903 *akçes*.

In MM 10 there are 8 Christian *timar* owners with a revenue greater than 3,000 *akçes* (Table I).¹⁵

11. B. Đurđev, 'Hrišćani spahije u severnoj Srbiji u XV veku' [The Christian Feudal Lords in North Serbia in the Fifteenth Century], *Godišnjak IDBiH*, 4 (1952), 165-69. I would like to thank Research Assistant Hatice Oruç for the translation of the Bosnian and Serbian texts.

12. H. Hadžibegić, A. Handžić and E. Kovačević, *Oblast Brankovića. Opširni katastarski popis iz 1455. godine* [District of Branković. Detailed Taxation Register of 1455] (Sarajevo 1972), 12.

13. H. Šabanović (ed.), *Krajište Isa-Bega Ishakovića: Zbirni katastarski popis iz 1455. godine* [Border District of İsa Beg, Son of İshak: Summary Register of 1455] (Sarajevo 1964).

14. Beldiceanu, 'Timariotes chrétiens', 45-81.

15. I would like to thank my assistants Aysegül Çalı, Mustafa Uyar and Richard Dietrich for computerising the data in the tables.

The Kravar Family


On page 239b of MM 10 is the following entry: *timar-ı Musa ve Karaca ve Mikropetra ve Karlo[s] evlâd-ı Kravar; müşterek yiyüb dördü bile eşerler* (the *timar* of Musa, Karaca, Mikropetra and Karlo[s], descendants of Kravar; shared revenue, the four of them together go to war).

On the same page, which contains the information on the jointly-held *timar* of the descendants of Kravar, the share (*hisse*) of Karlos, son of Morik, is also cited. From the entry on page 20a of MM 66 (dated 1466-67) on *nahiye-i Kiravaldi timar-ı Karaca Kurt, an tahvil-i Süleyman veled-i Morik bin Kiravaldi* (district of Kiravaldi, *timar* of Karaca Kurt, from the assignment of Süleyman, son of Morik, son of Kiravaldi), it is clear that Morik is Kiravaldi's son and Süleyman is Kiravaldi's grandson. Karlos is the other grandson of Kiravaldi (in MM 66 Kravar is registered as Kiravaldi, and the Kravar family as the Kiravaldi family).

In addition, on page 19a of the *icmal defteri* MM 66, the villages held by Kiravaldi's descendant Halil are listed. There is a record for Kiravaldi's descendant Musa on page 16b of MM 66 (*timar-ı Yunus bin Paşa Yiğid, an tahvil-i Musa bin Kiravaldi*).

Karaca's name is cited in MM 66, page 19b, which also provides further evidence as to the descent of Halil from Kiravaldi: *timar-ı Ahmed bin Papas an zevayid-i timar-ı Halil bin Kiravaldi* (*timar* of Ahmed son of Papas, from the revenue of the *timar* of Halil, descendant of Kiravaldi). We were unable to discover any records concerning Mikropetra in MM 66.

KRAVAR FAMILY



DESCENDANTS

Mikropetra (MM 10, 239b)	Musa (MM 10, 239b, MM 66, 16b)	Halil (MM 66, 19a-19b)	Karaca (MM 10, 239 b, MM 66, 19b)
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The total income of the descendants of Kravar listed on pages 239-255a of MM 10 was 25,572 *akçes*, or 639.3 ducats, since at the beginning of Mehmed II's reign one gold coin was equal to 40 *akçes* (Table II).

Kravar's descendants Karlos, Karaca, Musa and Mikropetra held their *timar* in shares.

In Karlos' share there were 14 villages, 192 households, 29 unmarried men and 10 widows, with a revenue of 9,241 *akçes*. His military obligations were *kendü bürüme*, 1 *cebelü*, 1 *oğlan* and 1 *tenktür*.

In Karaca's share there were 13 villages, 90 households, 14 unmarried men and 4 widows producing an annual revenue of 4,645 *akçes*. His obligations were *kendü bürüme*, 2 *cebelüs*, 1 *oğlan* and 1 *çadır*.

In Musa's share there were 16 villages, 149 households, 15 widows and 34 single men. His income was 7,759 *akçes* and his obligations were *kendü bürüme*, 1 *cebelü* and 1 *tenktür*.

In Mikropetra's share there were 9 villages, 5 *mezraas*, 69 households, 16 single men and 1 widow, providing a total revenue of 3,927 *akçes*.

Kravar's grandson Karlos held the largest share. As an example, we will provide some information on the sources of revenue of the town Rahova, which had the largest population and sources of revenue.

Rahova was held by Karlos, Karaca and Musa as *an karye*.

The distribution of revenue was 1,201 *akçes* to Karlos, 644 to Karaca, and 914 to Musa. In these three shares there was a population of 48 households, 4 single men and 7 widows, totalling approximately 251 people. The sources of revenue were wheat, barley, walnuts, a tax on barrels (*resm-i fiçu*), a tax on pigs (*resm-i hınzır*), legal and marriage fees (*niyabet ve arusî*), and an annual 25-*akçe* poll tax.

In register MM 66, the district of Kiravaldi (*nahiye-i Kiravaldi*) is listed as Tura Bey's *zeamet* (f. 16b). While 50 villages and 5 *mezraas* were listed in 1454-55, in the *icmal defteri* of 1466-67, 38 villages are registered.

In the district of Kiravaldi the revenue of Paşa Yiğid's son Yunus (see next section), who took possession from Kiravaldi's descendant Musa, was 4,874 *akçes*; İsa son of Mehmed, son of Mikra (see next section) made 4,525 *akçes*; Papas' son Mahmud earned 4,036 *akçes*; Lumaş's sons Mustafa and İsmail had a revenue of 4,498 *akçes*; Kiravaldi's descendant Halil made 4,813 *akçes*; the revenue of Karaca Kurt, who took possession from Süleyman, son of Morik, was 5,956 *akçes*; and Hoşkadem's revenue was 14,356 *akçes*. Tura Bey's total revenue was 46,124 *akçes* (see Table III). In 1454-55, the Kravar family's income was 25,572 *akçes*.

The *timar* of the Kravar family was a single geographical unit. On a map prepared by a British imperial geographer in 1827 the region is named *Kravari*. Kravari, who gave his name to the region, was one of the prominent feudal leaders in the Byzantine period, and after the region was annexed by the Ottomans, his family became holders of a large *timar*.

The Mikra Family


Like the Kravars, the Mikras were former large landowners who gave their name to a region. We are able to obtain detailed information about Mikra and his descendants from registers MM 10, dated 1454-55, MM 66, dated 1466-67, and TT 36, dated 1506.

The descendants of Mikra are to be found in MM 10 between pages 224a and 236b (Table IV). On page 224a we find the entry *timar-ı Ağlava veled-i Mikra ve Muhammedî veled-i Paşa Yiğid, müsterek yiyüb nevbetçe eşerler* (*timar* of Ağlava/ Iglava son of Mikra and Muhammedî, son of Paşa Yiğid; shared revenue, military service in turns). In this entry Ağlava is recorded as Mikra's son and Muhammedî is listed as Paşa Yiğid's son, which makes him the grandson of Mikra. On page 232a we see the record for a *timar* (*timar-ı Ağlava ve Dominiko ve Mizrak evlâd-ı Mikra*) belonging to three descendants of Mikra; on the same folio it is clarified that Ağlava is the son of Paşa Yiğid and not of Mikra. On page 234b we find the *timar* of Mustafa and Petros, who are cited as sons of Mikra, going on campaign in turns. From the entry on page 236b, *timar-ı Pavlo mezkûr Mikra'nın oğluymuş kardaşı Paşa Yiğid gözün çıkarmış, yılda bir eşkinci verürmüş* (*timar* of Pavlo, son of the aforementioned Mikra; his brother Paşa Yiğid put out his eye; he provided one *eşkinci* yearly), we understand that Pavlo, whose eye was put out by his brother Paşa Yiğid, was Mikra's son.

In register MM 66 there is an entry *timar-ı İskender nev-müslüman an tahvil-i Pavlo-yı âmâ veled-i Mikra* (*timar* of İskender the new Muslim, from the assignment of Pavlo the blind, son of Mikra) on page 14a, and on page 14b Mustafa, the son of Mikra, is mentioned again. On page 17a an İsa is recorded as a son of Mehmed, son of Mikra.

In addition, in the same register Oğul Paşa is listed as the brother of Mizrak (Mikra's son) on page 14a.

The total revenue for the descendants of Mikra as given in MM 10 was 22,412 *akçes* (Table IV). There were 16 villages held jointly by Ağlava and Muhammedî and in these villages there were 422 households and 23 widows. Their annual revenue was 15,539 *akçes*. Their military obligations were *kendü bürüme*, 5 *cebelüs* and 1 *çadır* (f. 224a-231b). Ağlava, Dominika and Mizrak jointly held 4 villages with 61 households, with a revenue of 3,170 *akçes*; they alternated in their military service. Their obligations were *kendü cebelü* and 1 *oğlan* (f. 232a-233b). Mustafa and Petros alternated in participating in military campaigns and held 73 households and 2 widows in 4 villages. Their income was 3,261 *akçes* and their obligations were *kendü bürüme*, 1 *cebelü* and 1 *tenktür* (f. 234b-236a).



Pavlo provided one *eşküncü* annually and held one village of 10 households; his income was 422 *akçes* (f. 236b).

In MM 66 the province of Mikri is listed as *nahiye-i Mikri ili, tabi-i serasker-i Badra* (the district of the province of Mikri, subject to the commander-in-chief of Badra) (f. 12b-16a).

Below is a list of the *timar* holders, sources of revenue, population and the *timars*' military obligations for İzdin, linked with the village of Karpiniş in the district of the province of Mikri (Table V).

It can be established that some *timars* in the province of Mikri were taken over from the Mikra family. On page 14a, Hızır Topçu's son Bayezid took over a *timar* from Oğul Paşa and his brother Mizrak. On the same page, İskender became a Muslim and took over a *timar* from Mikra's son Pavlo the blind. There is a possibility that İskender could be the son of Pavlo. Finally, on page 15b the *timar* holder Hızır Silâhdar was assigned a *timar* from Mikra's son Mustafa. Most probably they were Muslim descendants of Mikra.

In the summary register (*icmal defteri*) MM 66, certain connections between the Kravar and Mikra families of the second generation appear. On page 16b, Paşa Yiğid's son Yunus took possession of his *timar* from Kiravaldi's descendant Musa. Thus the region included the villages of Kilipa, Sinista, Tirnova, Zilista, İstromiyani, Likorane, Şinişte, and Palolonkova, which were taken from the Kiravaldi family and handed over to the Mikra family. Also, on page 17a, a *timar* connection between Mikra's grandsons is to be observed. Finally, on page 20a, the *timar* of Karaca, the son of Kravar's grandson, was transferred from his father Süleyman.

In register MM 66, other than the descendants of Kravar and Mikra, we find on page 121a in the district of Tırhala Mirko, Pavlos, Todor, Berayko, son of Lika, Petro Todor and Muzak, who jointly held the village of Toskis, consisting of 9 households and providing a revenue of 666 *akçes*; they alternated in their military service obligations.

On page 44a, we find Kosta, Kostandin, Nikola, Migarcı, Banyan, Gin, another Gin, Kortis, Kartas and Yorkis, who were settled outside the village of Bobunyani and alternated in their military service. Out of the 418 *timars* included in the summary register, 405 were held by Muslims, and 13 by Christians. In addition, 14 new

Muslims were recorded in this *icmal defteri*.¹⁶ They were given allotments from 15 Christian *sipahis*. The second *mufasssal tahrir defteri* belonging to the Tırhala district, Istanbul Prime Ministerial Archives (BOA) TT 36, is from the year 1506. The last three Christian *sipahis* in the district are recorded in this register. In the entire *sancak*, a total number of 492 *timars*, 51 *zeamets*, 3 *hasses* is recorded; only three Christian *sipahis* are mentioned. On page 860 they are Üveys, Umur and Enes, called *kâfir* (*Enes nam kâfir*), who held the village of Kortis in Fenar and participated in military campaigns. The village's revenue was 3,545 *akçes*. On page 893 is the entry *timar-ı Hüseyin kethüda-i Fenar sabıkan ve Duka birader-i o, mutasarrıf olup eşerler* (*timar* of Hüseyin, formerly kethüda of Fenar, and Duka, his brother; holders and participants in campaigns). After Duka's brother became a Muslim, we can see that he became the *kethüda* of Fenar. It also becomes apparent from the *tahrir defteri* TT 36 that Hüseyin's brother Duka maintained his Christian faith.

Among the brothers who held the village of Koliza in Fenar as a *timar*, Hüseyin's share was 4,000 and Duka's share was 3,850 *akçes*. On page 1081 we see a *timar* for Voyda, son of Mizrak (possibly Mikra's son). Voyda obtained a revenue of 3,880 *akçes* from the village of Şeyhler/Şihlar which was subject to Çatalca (Pharsala).¹⁷

Here Voyda is the last Christian *sipahi* whom we find in the registers for Tırhala. In addition, on pages 776, 1140 and 1252, in the villages of the districts Alasonya, Domeke and Suvalak, we find new Muslims.

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In this study, three generations of these two great families have been described. As far as religion is concerned, we see, for instance, that Morik's sons, Karlos and Süleyman did not share a common faith: one was a Muslim while the other kept his Christian faith. In the next generation, with the possible exception of Mikropetra, all family members had become Muslims.

It can also be seen in this study that nobles like the Kravars and Mikras who in the Byzantine period owned large tracts of land and who gave their names to districts, in the Ottoman period became members of the large *timar*-holding elite class. Numerous such examples have been found for the Balkans. From the examples that we examined from Tırhala it is clear that this class served in the Ottoman army until the beginning of the sixteenth century.

(Ankara University)

16. MM 66 İcmal Defteri (summary register): 5a-b; 11a; 121a-121b; 14a; 67a; 75a (2); 78b; 127a (2); 132a; 156b; 157a; 180b; 184a.

17. TT 36 Mufasssal Tahrir Defteri (detailed register): 306b; 354a-354b.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Pronunciation: Consonants in Turkish are pronounced as in English with the following exceptions:

<i>Turkish</i>	<i>English</i>
c	j
ç	ch
ğ	not pronounced; lengthens preceding vowel
j	like <i>s</i> in 'pleasure'
ş	sh

Vowels are pronounced as follows:

a	like <i>a</i> in 'father'
e	like <i>e</i> in 'bed'
ı	not found in English; between the <i>i</i> in 'sit' and the <i>u</i> in 'cut'
i	like <i>ee</i> in 'meet'
o	like <i>o</i> in 'cold'
ö	like German <i>ö</i>
u	like <i>oo</i> in 'moon'
ü	like German <i>ü</i>

abriz – small, easily cleaned, partitioned tent

akçe – Ottoman silver coin

an karye – a share of a village as a source of revenue

asıyab – mill

bağ – vineyard

baştina – pre-Ottoman hereditary peasant family farm in the Balkans

bive – widow

bive-i gebr – Christian widow

bive-i müslim – Muslim widow

bürüme – a type of armour more important than *cebe*

cebe – armour

cebelü – fully armed retainer of a *timar* or *hass* holder

cevz – walnut

çadır – tent

defter – register

dirlik – fief

dut – mulberry

emrud – pear

eşcar-ı fevakiḥ hassa – private fruit trees

eşküncü/eşkinici – campaigner; *timar* holder assigned to take part in military expeditions

gebr – non-Muslim, Christian

geçim [or *keçim*] – coat of mail

günlük – a large tent or awning used as a shade

- hane* – family; household as a tax unit
hane-i gebr – Christian household
hane-i müslim – Muslim household
hasıl – revenue
hass – crown lands, also lands assigned to high dignitaries
hassa – private
hassa bağ – private garden
hazine (çadırı) – a tent used as a treasury on campaigns
hisse-i timar – share of a *timar*
icmal defteri – summary register
kendü bürüme/cebelü – “bringing his own *bürüme/cebe*”
kethüda – headman in a village/town quarter/religious community
kiler – a mess tent on campaigns
kiras – cherry
kura – village
matbah – a tent used as a kitchen on campaigns
mevkuf timar – a *timar* without an owner and being held until a new one is assigned
mezraa – deserted site, arable land
mirliva – commander of a brigade
mufassal tahrir defteri – detailed tax register
mustahfız – soldier of a fort
mücerred – unmarried, single
mücerred-i gebr – unmarried Christian
mücerred-i müslim – unmarried Muslim
nahiye – lowest administrative unit in the Ottoman Empire, sub-division of a *kaza*
oğlan – servant
resm – tax
serraçhane – a tent used as a leather shop on campaigns
sipahi – holder of a *timar*
sokak – a tent with partitions for a commander’s use on campaigns
subaşı – a commander above a *sipahi* and below a *sancakbeyi*
şehr – city, town
tahrir defteri – tax register
tenktür – a kind of tent
timar – military fief
toplam hasıl – total revenue
varak (v.) – folio
zeamet – middle-sized military fief

THE VILLAGES OF MİKRA AND KRAVAR FAMILIES




Table I: FIEF HOLDERS IN THE SANCAK OF TIRHALA, THEIR OBLIGATIONS AND SOURCES OF REVENUE – MM 10 (859/1454-55)

NUMBER (SIRA)	FOLIO (VARAK)	OWNER (SAHİBİ)	TYPE (TÜRÜ)	VİLÂYETİ	RELİGİON (DİNİ)	OBLIGATIONS (YÜKÜMLÜLÜK)							SOURCES OF REVENUE (TAHİS EDİLEN KAYNAKLAR)						TOTAL REVENUE (TOPLAM HASIL)						
						KENDÜ BÜRME	CEBELÜ	OĞLAN	GEÇİM	ÇADIR	GÜNLÜK	TENKÜTÜR	ŞEHİR	KURA	AN KARAYE	MEZRAA	HANE-İ GEBR	MÜCERRED-İ GEBR		BİYE-İ GEBR	HANE-İ MÜSLİM	BİYE-İ MÜSLİM			
1	93-a	TİMAR-İ BOGA VE PİLGRİN EVLÂD-İ BOĞOSLAV, EZ TAHVİL-İ PEDEREŞ, MÜŞTEREK YİYÜB NEVBETÇE ESERLER, ELLERİNDE TEZKİRE VAR.	TİMAR	TİRHALA	GEBR	2									2			37	6	3					1689
2	101-b	TİMAR-İ MORİK VE GİN, KADİMİLERDİR, MÜŞTEREK YİYÜB NEVBETÇE ESERLER.	TİMAR	TİRHALA	GEBR	1									1			39		2					1447
3	124-b	TİMAR-İ KRAVAR VE LİBKORİŞ, MÜŞTEREK YİYÜB İKİSİ BİLE ESERLER.	TİMAR	TİRHALA	GEBR	1	1								3			41		4					2630
4	126-a	TİMAR-İ TODORİS VE DİMİTRİ, MÜŞTEREK YİYÜB İKİSİ BİLE ESERLER, MEZKÜR DİMİTRİ VOYNÜK İMİŞ, MEZKÜR KÖYLER DAĞILMIŞ CEMİNE VE HARACINA MÜLTEZİM OLDUĞU İÇİN MEZKÜR TODORİSE MÜŞTEREK KİLÜB VERİLMİŞ.	TİMAR	TİRHALA	GEBR	1	1							1	3			52		10					2353
5	130-a	TİMAR-İ MIHO VELED-İ KLAZNOS VE ARANİD VELED-İ VRADINOS, EZ TAHVİL-İ TATAR HAMZA, MÜŞTEREK YİYÜB İKİSİ BİLE ESERLER.	TİMAR	TİRHALA	GEBR	2	2			1					2			132	23	15					6903
6	135-b	TİMAR-İ MANOLİS FİLÜ ASRİPANOS, EZ TAHVİL-İ SOLAK AHMED	TİMAR	TİRHALA	GEBR	1	1		1						1			39		2					1912
7	143-b	TİMAR-İ DİMO VE YORGHİ VE KİZE DUKA VE MAZARAK EVLÂD-İ DİMO, MÜŞTEREK YİYÜB NEVBETÇE ESERLER.	TİMAR	TİRHALA	GEBR	1	1								3			63	7	3					3034

[illegible]

25	315-a	TİMAR-1 YORGİS VELED-İ GOROZİ, KADİMİ SİPAHİ OĞLUDUR.	TİMAR	FENAR	GEBR	1							1			33	3			1088	
26	317-a	TİMAR-1 TODORİS VELED-İ MUZAK VE BERAYKO VELED-İ TODORİS, MÜŞTEREK YİYÜB İKİSİ BİLE EŞLER.	TİMAR	FENAR	GEBR	1	1						1			66	3			2651	
27	318-a	TİMAR-1 GÜPŞA VE SERAKİN, MÜŞTEREK YİYÜB NEVBETÇE EŞLER.	TİMAR	FENAR	GEBR	1							2			11	2			597	
28	327-b	TİMAR-1 PETROS KAZNİŞ VE İSTİ KAZNİŞ VE KOSTA KAZNİŞ VE FİLYE KAZNİŞ VE YORGİS KAZNİŞ, MEZKÜRLARIN YILDA BİRİSİ EŞER. BİRADER-İ MEZKÜRAN YORGİS VELED-İ İSRİ.	TİMAR	FENAR	GEBR										1					120	
29	333-a	TİMAR-1 TODORİS VE KALANİŞ VE DOMINYAKAS VE ORTOS VE İSTİNAS. BU MEZKÜRLAR BERATLARINDA KALAZBARİ ADLI MEZRAYA YILDA BİRİSİ EŞERLER DEYÜ KAYD OLUNMUŞ, ŞİMDİKİ HALDE OĞULLARINDAN SEKİZ KİŞİ ZIYADE BULLUNDU VE KENDÜLERİLE OTURUK ONSERİZ KÄHR ÜÇ DUL BULLUNDUGU İÇİN YILDA İKİSİ EŞMEYE MÜTEZİM OLDUKLARI İÇİN ÜZERLERİNE KAYD OLUNDU.	TİMAR	FENAR	GEBR								1			19	3			793	
30	341-a	TİMAR-1 GÜNNAYVROMAT, EZ TAHVİL-İ TODOR.	TİMAR	FENAR	GEBR	1								1		28	1			1014	
31	341-b	TİMAR-1 GİN MAZARAK VE KARDAŞI TODOR, MÜŞTEREK YİYİP NEVBETÇE EŞLER.	TİMAR	FENAR	GEBR										1	13				789	
32	342-a	TİMAR-1 MANOS VELED-İ MANÇO, KADİMİ SİPAHİDİR.	TİMAR	FENAR	GEBR	1							2		1	42	3			1789	
33	348-a	TİMAR-1 MİKRAŞ VE KOKARAS VE LİKOREŞ, MÜŞTEREK YİYİP NEVBETÇE EŞLER. KENDÜ CEBELÜ.	TİMAR	FENAR	GEBR	1							1			13	5			1105	
34	348-b	TİMAR-1 GİN LİKOREŞ VE LAZAR LİKOREŞ, ARNAVUDLARDIR. MÜŞTEREK YİYİP NEVBETÇE EŞLER.	TİMAR	FENAR	GEBR								1			9	3			723	
36	450-a	TİMAR-1 BARİD VE TODORİS EVLÄD-İ GÜN, MÜŞTEREK YİYÜB NEVBETÇE EŞLER.	TİMAR	AGRAFA	GEBR	1	1									26	8	2	3	2	1352

TABLE II: CHRISTIAN SİPAHİS IN THE SANCAK OF TIRHALA (KRAVAR FAMILY) – MM 10 (859 [1454-55])

NUMBER (SIRA NO)	FOLIO (VARAK)	F I E F (DİRLİK)				OBLIGATIONS (YÜKÜMLÜLÜK)					SOURCES OF REVENUE (TAHİS EDİLEN KAYNAKLAR)						TOTAL REVENUE (TOPLAM HASIL)		
		OWNER (SAHİNİ)	TYPE (TÜRÜ)	VİLAİYET (VİLAİYETİ)	RELİGİON (DİNİ)	KENDÜ BÜRÜME	CEBELÜ	ÇADIR	OĞLAN	TENKTÜR	YERLEŞİM TÜRÜ	MEZRAA	ADI	KURA	HANE	MÜCERRED		BİVE	
		Musa ve Karaca ve Mikropetra ve Karlo, evlâd-ı Kravar, müsterek yiyülb dördü bile eserler	Timar	Tırhala	Gebr	1	3	1					Rahova		23		6	1201	25572
1	239b	Karlos veled-i Morik	Hisse, haric ez-defter	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Kotliste		13	2	1	591	
2	240a		Hisse, haric ez-defter	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Nihori		16	2		770	
3	240b		Hisse, haric ez-defter	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Şinati		6	1		270	
4	240b		Hisse, haric ez-defter	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Pira Lobotina		24	3	1	1064	
5	241a		Hisse, haric ez-defter	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Lobotina		11	1		494	
6	240b		Hisse, haric ez-defter	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Voyoca		14	2	1	756	
7	241a		Hisse, haric ez-defter	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Kidonya		7			358	
8	241a		Hisse, haric ez-defter	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Linniste		13	2		636	
9	241b		Hisse, haric ez-defter	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Nizovari		11	2	1	527	
10	241b		Hisse, haric ez-defter	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Hırsova		5	1		230	
11	242a		Hisse, haric ez-defter	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye								

[illegible]

TABLE II (continued)

	F I E F (DİRLİK)	OBLIGATIONS (YÜKÜMLÜLÜK)					SOURCES OF REVENUE (TAHİS EDİLEN KAYNAKLAR)						TOTAL REVENUE (TOPLAM HASIL)					
							SETTLEMENT UNITS (YERLEŞİM BİRİMLERİ)			POPULATION (NÜFUS)								
		OWNER (SAHİBİ)	TYPE (TÜRÜ)	VİLÂYET (VİLÂYETİ)	RELIGION (DİNİ)	KENDÜ BÜRÜME	CEBELÜ	ÇADIR	OĞLAN	TENKTÜR	YERLEŞİM TÜRÜ	MEZRAA		ADI	KURA	HANE	MÜCERRED	BİVE
NUMBER (SIRA NO)	FOLIO (VARAK)																	
32	248a		Hisse, haric ez- defer	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Avorani		9	3		433
33	248b		Hisse, haric ez- defer	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Kato Avorani		6	2		318
34	249a		Hisse, haric ez- defer	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Briste		11	3	4	609
35	249a		Hisse, haric ez- defer	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Pirlikos		5	1		335
36	249b		Hisse, haric ez- defer	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Artotiva		12	1	1	480
37	249b		Hisse, haric ez- defer	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Pilatanos		8	1		386
38	250a		Hisse, haric ez- defer	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Tirnoviç		11	4	1	549
39	250b		Hisse, haric ez- defer	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Vonortiya		11	1	1	599
40	250b		Hisse, haric ez- defer	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		İstiranoma		6	1	1	328
41	251a		Hisse, haric ez- defer	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Haykali		8	4	2	502
42	251b		Hisse, haric ez- defer	Tırhala	Gebr						Karye		Simo		6	3	1	340

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

ENTREPRENEURIAL SUCCESS IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY AYNTAB: THE CASE OF SEYDİ AHMED BOYACI, LOCAL NOTABLE

Leslie PEIRCE

A minor provincial capital, the city of Ayntab in the sixteenth century boasted a modest array of notable families and successful entrepreneurs. The sources of their status and the scope of their influence were local, thus none was a player in the politics of the imperial Ottoman center. But because the dynastic regime was dependent on recruitment of local partners in administration, the Ottomans can be said to have practiced a domesticated imperialism that created provincial zones of opportunity. At least this was the situation in the city and province of Ayntab in the period examined here, a generation after the Ottoman conquest in 1516.¹ What follows is a sketch of one member of the Ayntab elite, Seydi Ahmed Boyacı, scion of a notable Ayntab family, who appears to have been adroit at exploiting the new presence of the Ottoman regime in his ancestral locale. Seydi Ahmed's work was perhaps a critical link in the stability of a notable family that survived into the twentieth century.

The family name 'Boyacı', meaning dyer, suggests that Seydi Ahmed's ancestors made their mark in the textile industry that flourished in Ayntab. The Turkish (rather than Arabic) family name also suggests that, like the majority in this multi-lingual and multi-ethnic province, the Boyacıs were of Turkish – or more properly Turkmen – origin. From the eleventh century on, Turkmen nomadic tribes invaded or migrated from Khorasan and Central Asia into Anatolia, northern Syria, and northern Iraq. The tribal bonds of many were gradually eroded by the process of sedentarization, which substituted a local civic identity for that of Turkmen. On the other hand, on-going immigration meant that tribal practices and allegiances remained part of the cultural mix in much of the greater Ayntab region.² The promi-

1. For general treatments of Ayntab, see H. Özdeğer, *Onaltıncı Asırda Ayıntâb Livâsı* (Istanbul 1988); B. Darkot and H. T. Dağlıoğlu, *İA*, s.v. 'Ayıntab'; H. Özdeğer, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, s.v. 'Gaziantep'; N. Çam, *ibid.*, s.v. 'Gaziantep, Mimari'. See also my *Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab* (Berkeley 2003).
2. A classic work on Turkmens in Anatolia is F. Sumer, *Oğuzlar (Türkmenler): Tarihleri, Boy Teşkilâtı, Destanları* (Istanbul 1980). For an excellent short account of Turkmens in the greater Ayntab region, see B. Kellner-Heinkele, 'The Turkomans and *Bilâd aş-Şam* in the Mamluk Period', in T. Khalidi (ed.), *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in*

nence of Seydi Ahmed is in part the story of the gradual displacement in Ayntab of an Arab elite class, shaped during the Ayyubid and Mamluk periods, by a Turkish elite. The growth of this elite was no doubt accelerated during the long interlude of regional rule by the Dulkadir Turkmen dynasty, who held Ayntab off and on during the fifteenth century and then continuously from 1481 until the Ottoman conquest. Yet Ayntab always maintained dense economic and cultural ties to the sophisticated metropolis of Aleppo, and several Aleppan notables had rural estates in Ayntab province and probably business in Ayntab city.

There are no family memoirs penned by a Boyacı, nor is there a biographical treatment of Seydi Ahmed or any of his forebears by a descendant or an admiring retainer. But there are sufficient sources – oral legends as well as documentary records – to piece together a sketch of the man, his ancestral lineage, and his historical environment. In one kind of documentary source, the records of the Ayntab court, Seydi Ahmed appears in his capacity as entrepreneur – contracting loans, giving title to land, and collecting rural tax revenues.³ He also appears in court in various civic-service capacities such as witness to court proceedings and mediator in communal disputes. In another kind of source, local cadastral surveys and inventories of trusts (*vakıf*, Arabic *waqf*) established by local citizens, the Boyacı family is literally rooted in two locations in the provincial landscape: the flourishing urban quarter that bore their name (*Boyacı mahallesi*), and the large village of Arıl that was their private property (*mülk*).⁴ The portrait of Seydi Ahmed that follows is drawn from the court records for 1540–41, a thorough cadastral survey of Ayntab in 1543, and a 1557 inventory of trust and privately-owned properties in the province. Lastly, in the oral history of Ayntab captured by local twentieth-century historians, the Boyacı family is linked through a colorful legend to one of the oldest mosques in the city, which came to be popularly known as ‘the Boyacı mosque’.⁵

The sketch that is drawn here of Seydi Ahmed’s career in the early 1540s is not a picture of unalloyed success. Like several other local notables, Seydi Ahmed felt the pinch of the Ottoman regime – its policy of circumscribing privately-held

the Middle East (Beirut 1984), 169–80. On the modern political economy of Turkmen nomads in this region, see D. Bates, *Nomads and Farmers: A Study of the Yörük of South-eastern Turkey* (Ann Arbor 1971).

3. The court records (*sicils*) of Gaziantep (Ayntab’s modern name) are housed in the National Library in Ankara. This essay draws on the second (no. 161) and the third (no. 2) of the many Gaziantep registers; in citations below, these registers are abbreviated to AS (*Ayntab Sicili*) followed by the register number, folio number, and case number (a, b, c, etc.) on that folio (e.g., AS 2: 239c). AS 161 covers the period from September 1540 to May 1541, and AS 2 from May 1541 to October 1541. For a catalogue of the Ayntab court records, see A. Akgündüz, *Şer’iye Sicilleri: Mahiyeti, Toplu Kataloğu ve Seçme Hükümler*, vol. 1 (İstanbul 1988), 190–91.
4. In citations below, the cadastral and trust inventory registers (*tapu tahrir defterleri*) will be abbreviated TTD, followed by the register number and folio cited. Information from several of the Ayntab registers is summarized in Özdeğer, *Ayntâb Livâsı*.
5. C. C. Güzelbey, *Gaziantep Camileri Tarihi* (Gaziantep 1992), 60–67.

rural estates, and its attempts to force local tax-farmers to pay up arrears owed to the state. On the other hand, Seydi Ahmed was able to profit from the recent incorporation of Ayntab into a strong empire, one that brought political stability and economic prosperity to the northern Syrian region in which the city was located.

Locating the Ancestral Family

How does a notable family acquire its notability? When does a lineage become a lineage worthy of public recognition? Despite the absence of anything resembling a Boyacı biography, various bits of information combine to give us an outline of Seydi Ahmed's ancestral lineage. Even in a time and place that is poorly documented, such as early sixteenth-century Ayntab, the Ottoman habit of compiling and archiving registers of information on the Empire's legal, fiscal, military, and bureaucratic life enables us to sketch some beginnings for the Boyacı family.

In the cadastral survey register of 1543, which details the revenues of the Boyacı estate in Arıl, the village is identified as "the private property of Seydi Ahmed ibn (son of) Alaüddin ibn Mehmed ibn İbrahim ibn Hüseyin Boyacı".⁶ This notation does not necessarily mean that Arıl had been in the possession of the Boyacı family for five generations (it could have been a recent purchase). What it does mean is that scribes and the authorities whom they served in the 1540s recognized and inscribed the family as a distinguished local lineage.

The records of Seydi Ahmed's appearances at court frequently hail him as *fahriülayan*, 'pride of the notables'.⁷ The term *ayan*, commonly used over the centuries to refer to provincial notables, is employed in sixteenth-century records for Ayntab to mean leading figures in the economic and civic life of the city. When the Ottoman regime required it, the *ayan* acted collectively as witnesses of local customary practice: for instance, as the court record informs us, "the *ayan* of Ayntab gathered and came to the court" in June 1540 to testify to the customary seasonal price of lamb and goat meat; the official market price (*narh*) was then issued on the basis of their testimony. Villages too had their *ayan*: when a black freedman from Kızılhisar village was wrongly accused as an accomplice in a theft, two witnesses who were "from among the *ayan* of Kızılhisar" testified to his innocence.⁸

As we see, the *ayan* functioned as a trusted source of local knowledge about individual persons as well as economic practices. They also testified collectively regarding claims of property ownership. In this capacity they show up repeatedly in an imperial register compiled in 1557 that inventoried trust property and private property in Ayntab province. For example, when Ahmed ibn Demirci, whom we will meet below, asserted his claim to the village of Bahaüddinburc (half of whose revenues were held in a family trust and half in trust for a large charitable hospice), the register informs us that "the *ayan* of the province testified that he had managed

6. Özdeğer, *Ayıntâb Livâstı*, 440.

7. AS 161: 170f; AS 2: 178b, 186a, 299c.

8. AS 2: 19a, 289b.

[the trusts] according to the trust-deed from before and after the [Ottoman] conquest until the present”.⁹

To sum up, in their capacity as a strategic source of local knowledge, the *ayan* of Ayntab simultaneously served the state and protected local interests. Local interests were, of course, interests that protected the *ayan*’s own advantages of status, wealth, and access to opportunity, but in protecting themselves and the sources of their wealth, they ensured a degree of autonomy for the province in the management of its resources. But while the *ayan* were familiar players on the local scene, documentary sources rarely go so far as to distinguish an individual as ‘pride of the notables’ or list five generations of a lineage. Even in their imperial decrees and diplomatic missives, the sultans typically cited only three generations of the Ottoman house.

Why, then, was Seydi Ahmed singled out for this honor and not the scions of other notable families of Ayntab – the Sikkak family for instance, with an urban quarter named after it, or the Demirci family, with the hospice (*zaviye-i İbn Demirci*), which attracted endowments by Mamluk and then Ottoman sultans. These three families of Ayntab – the Boyacıs, Sikkaks, and Demircis – shared the distinction of a lineage name. Such names were rendered interchangeably in Arabic (for example, İbn Sikkak), Turkish (Sikkakoğlu), or Persian (Sikkakzade), all of which are translated literally as ‘son of Sikkak’ but also mean more generally ‘of the house/lineage of Sikkak’.

Length of family pedigree cannot entirely explain the scribal honors paid to Seydi Ahmed, for the Boyacıs were not the oldest lineage in Ayntab. Although far from conclusive, the sources suggest that the Sikkaks out-ranked them in this regard. We can roughly estimate that Hüseyin Boyacı was a player on the local scene by 1430 or so (assuming, for the sake of argument, that Hüseyin Boyacı was the first Boyacı of note, that fatherhood occurred at age 25, and that Seydi Ahmed was 40 in 1540). Only two generations of Sikkaks are regularly recorded in cadastral surveys, suggesting (by this measure) that their lineage was less venerable (four are cited for the Demircis).¹⁰ However, if we turn to another, probably more reliable, means of estimating lineage age – the establishment, common in Ayntab, of a family trust (*vakf-ı zürriyet*) – the Sikkaks, who formed two trusts in 848/1444-45, appear to be a ‘house’ of substance by this date. That their prominence had emerged even earlier is suggested by an item in the list of trust income – “a dwelling in the Sikkak quarter” – demonstrating that the quarter had already taken on the name of its distinguished resident. In contrast, the earliest documentary evidence of the Boyacı presence in Ayntab is the family trust that was formed in 928/1521-22.¹¹ In

9. TTD 301: 22.

10. See Özdeğer, *Ayntâb Livâsı*, *passim*, for these two lineages: the Sikkak lineage “Nasrî Mehmed ibn Hüsâmî el-ma’ruf be İbn-i Sikkak”, and the Demirci lineage “Ahmed ibn Hâce Kasım ibn Hacı Mehmed ibn Ahi Mümin eş-şehir be İbn-i Demirci”.

11. For the Sikkak and Boyacı trusts, see TTD 301: 26, 28, 29.

other words, the Sikkaks can be counted as *ayan* by the early fifteenth century (at least), while the Boyacıs may have emerged more recently as a notable family, sufficiently imposing, however, to assert a respectably seasoned lineage.

Another clue to Seydi Ahmed's stature may be that he was a *seyyid*, that is, he claimed descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad. His father, Seydi Ali, had also claimed the honor and the honorific title (*Seydi* was a common variant of *seyyid* used with proper names). Toward the end of the seventeenth century, as the social value of this claim to religious status increased, the numbers of *seyyids* in Ayntab, as in Aleppo, would explode, by means of fabricated genealogies.¹² In 1540, there were fewer but still significant numbers of *seyyids* who appeared in the records of the Ayntab court, mostly as witnesses with no identifying information except personal name. Among the more prominent of *seyyids* was a father and son pair, Seyyid İsmail (called "pride of the *seyyids*") and Seyyid Şemseddin, who were the spiritual heads as well as managers of two of the largest charitable hospices in Ayntab. *Seyyids* are thought to have been exempt from some property taxes, but whether this was actually the case in Ayntab in 1540 is unclear. *Seyyids* could also expect to exact a modicum of deference from others.

Lastly, the Boyacıs were a family inscribed in local historical lore, namely, in the foundation legend of the mosque that came to bear their family name. It is worth asking if the longevity of the Boyacı house, and the Demirci house as well – both of whose family narratives tell of extraordinary beginnings – had something to do with the power of local lore to shore up reputation. Both families remained prominent into modern times (when Ayntab became Gaziantep), branching along the way into several successor lineages. In contrast, the Sikkaks, with no apparent lore attached to their name, would dissipate by the end of the seventeenth century, or so the lapse of their name as marker of an urban quarter would suggest.¹³ As an older, possibly Mamluk-era *ayan* lineage, the Sikkaks perhaps stood outside the culture of legend-making that so imbued the Turkmen sense of cultural identity.

Although there are variations on the legend about the Boyacı mosque, the basic narrative recounts the relationship between a reformed bandit who became learned in the Islamic sciences (Kadı – 'Judge' – Kemaleddin) and a local man, Boyacı Yusuf, who saved the judge in his bandit days by cutting him from down from a hanging tree. Even during his life of crime, Kemaleddin's good character had been signalled by the fact that the young girl he and his band abducted (the crime for which the authorities sentenced him to hanging) forgave him his transgression. Years later, the successful judge sent money to the dyer, instructing him to build a mosque on the site of the hanging tree. In a variant of the story, Kemaleddin (now a

12. For Ayntab, see H. Canbakal, 'XVII. Yüzyılda Teseyyüd ve Ayntab Sadatı', in Y. Küçükdağ (ed.), *Osmanlı Döneminde Gaziantep Sempozyumu* (Gaziantep 2000), 77-81; for Aleppo, and on lineage claims in general, see A. Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century* (New York 1989), 61ff.

13. C. C. Güzelbey, 'Gaziantep Şer'i Sicillerinden Örnekler', *Gaziantep Kültürü*, 10 (1967), 276.

successful general rather than judge) returned to Ayntab to deliver a bag of gold to the pious dyer, who was preparing himself for prayer when Kemaleddin knocked at the door.¹⁴ An inescapable point of this story is that the rescuer has not only compassion and courage but also moral insight (in one version, the hand of the abducted woman miraculously inserted itself between the bandit's neck and the rope, thus sustaining him until Boyacı Yusuf's arrival).

Whether the legend had coalesced by Seydi Ahmed's lifetime is unclear. The mosque was one of Ayntab's oldest, with an inscription on its pulpit dated 759/1357. In the sixteenth century, the mosque was officially known (in cadastral registers) as Kadı Kemaleddin and its urban quarter *Kadı mahallesi*, but by the mid-seventeenth century it was routinely referred to as the Boyacı Mosque.¹⁵ There is nothing in the legend that specifically links Seydi Ahmed's lineage to Boyacı Yusuf. Ayntab undoubtedly had many textile dyers over the centuries and many men known as 'Boyacı So-and-so'. Moreover, records of the 1540s reveal a mosque known popularly as 'the Boyacıade mosque' (its official name was Hacı Musa), located in or near the Boyacı quarter of the city.¹⁶ But somehow and at some point both the story and the mosque of Kadı Kemaleddin got attached to Seydi Ahmed's lineage. This shift was certainly helped by the fluid naming habits of the region. Mosques, shrines, urban neighborhoods, and villages were sometimes known popularly by names other than their official ones, and official records contain frequent 'also known as....' notations. As migration and internal relocation shifted the character of neighborhoods, and as some buildings fell into disrepair while others, remodelled or newly built by new patrons, arose in their place, renaming was bound to follow.

The 'Boyacıade mosque' would not be the only instance of legend trumping fact, of the migration of a story about one individual to the memory of another of the same name. The Demirci lineage appears to be a striking example of this process, for its twentieth-century descendants claimed a sixteenth-century ancestry that is at odds with the evidential record. Rather than the distinctly establishment 'house' portrayed in court and cadastral records, it is a charismatic miracle-worker with anti-establishment proclivities – a real individual whose descendants are traceable in cadastral sources – who is claimed as the first family ancestor to settle in the region. To be noteworthy, it seems, was to require a moralistic fable, preferably with miraculous overtones, about one's origins. This is not to say that the twentieth-

14. I have arbitrarily combined two versions of this story, one related to me in 1999 by Ahmet Söylemez, imam of the Boyacı mosque, and the other recounted by Güzelbey (*Gaziantep Camileri Tarihi*, 65-67), neither of which fully establishes the relationship between Kadı Kemaleddin and Boyacı Yusuf. In Söylemez's version, it is the abducted girl who cuts down the bandit; moreover, it is not the bandit himself who abducts her, but rather his accomplices. In Güzelbey's version, the reformed bandit, who is not named, becomes a valiant soldier (but not a judge) and amasses riches.

15. For the sixteenth century, see TTD 301: 3; Özdeğer, *Ayntâb Livâsı*, 148; for the seventeenth, see Güzelbey, *Gaziantep Camileri Tarihi*, 62.

16. AS 2: 267d; TTD 301: 1, 3.

eth-century genealogy is falsified, but rather that remembered genealogies are not always accurate recitations of family origins.

Whenever the segue from the actual to the remembered Demirci ancestor occurred, it was surely facilitated by characteristics shared by the two lineages. One was the name, Ahmed, of the two families' mid sixteenth-century scions; both Ahmeds, moreover, were known by the honorific *Çelebi*.¹⁷ A second shared characteristic was the two families' early affiliation with charismatic spirituality, indicated by the honorific title of the first-cited ancestor (Şeyh Evliya the miracle-worker, Ahi Mümin). As an *ahi*, the 'real' Demirci ancestor perhaps established the hospice that came to attract royal patronage, for *ahis* typically flourished as urban brotherhoods that welcomed wayfarers.¹⁸ Shared geography may also have facilitated the commingling of the family histories: the trust incomes of the two Ahmed Çelebis included neighboring villages (Caberun and Gerceyin).¹⁹

The point in all this is that legends found plausible subjects over time, shifting to figures, families, and monuments more likely to perpetuate them. These artifacts of oral history suggest a significant dynamic that is incalculable by – indeed, invisible to – official records. The Boyacı and Demirci stories are microcosms of a much larger dynamic, namely, how 'canonical' histories are forged expeditiously from 'false' elements. As a story of a hardy provincial lineage, the Demirci genealogy is perhaps also a microcosmic instance of the flexible practices by which tribal confederations assimilated or shed member lineages. The features of these stories tempt comparison with origin legends of the Ottoman dynasty: Boyacı Yusuf resembles Osman Gazi, alleged founder of the Ottoman lineage, who is represented in legendary histories as a pious but naive recipient of the mandate of temporal sovereignty, while Şeyh Evliya recalls Şeyh Edebali, father-in-law to Osman and a charismatic dervish with ties to a massive rebellion against the Seljuk state. These shared strategies of lineage narration were doubtless linked to the environment of on-going Turkmen migration into Anatolia, and from eastern Anatolia westward. For new élites, imperial and provincial alike, notability and legitimacy depended on the invention of local tradition. The more threads that could be woven together in a story of origins, the stronger its appeal.

To sum up, then, although we cannot be certain when the Boyacı emerged as *ayan*, they appear to be established at the very latest around the time of the Ottoman conquest and perhaps as much as a century earlier. The confirmable attributes of Seydi Ahmed's *ayan* status, which no doubt account for the deference demonstrated in official records, included his large rural estate, his *seyyid*ship, and his family's

17. The Ahmeds were the third generation in the spuriously-claimed lineage and fourth generation in the authentic Demirci lineage. As recorded in the cadastral register of 1543, the 'spurious' lineage was "Ahmed Çelebi ibn Şeyh Osman ibn Şeyh Evliya" (Özdeğer, *Ayıntâb Livâsı*, 241).

18. On the *ahis* of Anatolia, see the fourteenth-century Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta, in H.A.R. Gibb (ed. and trans.), *The Travels of Ibn Battuta*, vol. 2 (Cambridge 1962), *passim*.

19. Özdeğer, *Ayıntâb Livâsı*, 241, 243.

prominence in Ayntab city, with a quarter and a mosque bearing its name. Lineage honor was reinforced at different points in time with the acquired attributes of descent from the Prophet and fabled family origins.

Seydi Ahmed the Rural Magnate

One of Seydi Ahmed's multiple personas was that of the rural magnate. How long the Boyacıs had possessed the village of Arıl is not clear, however. The trust deed of 1521-22 is ambiguous in this regard. It could suggest protection of a recent purchase, in which case we might imagine that Seydi Ahmed or more probably his father capitalized on rural depopulation and depressed land prices during the conquest years. On the other hand, the incorporation of Arıl as *vakıf* could just as easily have been an act protective of an older rural property inspired by expectations of a land grab by the new Ottoman regime.²⁰ If the village was a long-held possession of the Boyacıs, it may have been in Arıl that the family came to prominence as textile dyers, since dyehouses were not uncommon in the larger villages of Ayntab province.

There is no sign, however, that Seydi Ahmed, the current scion, was still involved in a hands-on way with textile dyeing. In a property suit brought by his younger cousin (discussed below), the family's inherited wealth was stated to consist of the revenues from Arıl and the rental income on five shops in the city.²¹ Annual revenue accruing to the Boyacıs as tax on Arıl's agricultural products – wheat, barley, “summer crops”, “grapevines and fruit trees” – was estimated in 1543 at 10,400 *akçes* (the *akçe* was the standard Ottoman silver currency).²² Income from shop rentals was considerably smaller: for example, two shops that belonged to the ‘Boyacızade mosque’ trust yielded a total rent of 300 *akçes* in 1541.²³

This was a comfortable, if not exceptional, income. It was presumably supplemented by other earnings, for example, from the two mills that belonged to the family trust (mills might earn a profit of as little as 500 or as much as 6,000 *akçes* a year). Moreover, as landed gentry, the Boyacıs no doubt profited from the economic prosperity that Ayntab was enjoying under the *pax ottomanica*. Trade was picking up, and people were returning to rural settlements abandoned during the turbulent years before and after the conquest. Arıl was a large village that was strategically located on the road from Ayntab across the Euphrates River and on to the east, a route that is still today called ‘the old silk route’. It is no coincidence that this main artery eastward left the city perimeter in or near the Boyacı quarter, one of the most

20. The sources are conflicting on the status of Arıl: according to the 1557 *evkaf-emlâk* survey (TTD 301), Arıl was *vakıf* (in trust) as of 1521; in the cadastral survey of 1543, Arıl was *mülk* (private property). Property typically moved from *mülk* to *vakıf* status, but perhaps the Boyacıs shifted the legal status of their rural estate according to political and economic winds.

21. AS 2: 314a.

22. Özdeğer, *Ayıntâb Livâsı*, 440.

23. AS 2: 267d.

rapidly-expanding parts of the city. The city's two other fast-growing quarters were also located on major routes into and out of the city.

There were signs of prosperity in Arıl in 1540-41. One of them was expansion of land being farmed. That fallow land was going into production at a rather rapid pace is evidenced by the numerous grants of usufruct rights to agricultural land (*tapu*) registered at the Ayntab court. The vast majority of *tapu* rights were granted by imperial agents, since by far the greatest part of agricultural land was claimed by the sultanate. But as the legal owner (*sahib*) of Arıl, Seydi Ahmed was entitled to grant *tapu* rights to land in and around Arıl. In late September 1540, he renewed the grant of a specified parcel to two individuals who had previously worked it, and in mid-October he gave title to another man to a vineyard plot gone fallow.²⁴ Petitioners paid fees for *tapu* rights, ranging from 60 *akçes* for a modest vineyard, orchard, or vegetable plot to 200 *akçes* for a mill site.²⁵ Seydi Ahmed as rural magnate was thus enriched in a small way by these and perhaps other such *tapu* grants. However, the prestige in bestowing land may have been more valuable than the fee itself, for the elaborate ritual language employed by court scribes in recording *tapu* grants reflects the status and honor derived from land ownership: for example, when the timariot Ahmed Ağa ibn Abdullah gave *tapu* rights to five village partners, the scribe had him speak as follows: "I gave right to the land in accordance with imperial law and received the *tapu* tax, so that from this day forth they may farm the aforementioned parcel of land and no man shall prevent them and [the land] shall be in their hands".²⁶

Did Seydi Ahmed also profit from clientage affiliations with individuals who had acquired *tapu* rights from him, or with other residents of Arıl? Let us first consider the status of a village's residents in relation to the owner of the village land in the period under study. Ottoman usage rarely refers to landed rural magnates as 'lords' in a European feudal sense. The loosely corresponding terms 'agha' or 'sheikh' do connote, in a rural context, control over people as well as land, such as a tribal chieftain could claim. It was the tribal chief, not the individual tribesman, who was answerable to the state for taxes or tribute. In contrast to the tribesman, the individual villager paid his taxes himself, and was therefore beholden to whatever authority or authorities claimed legitimate rights to them. One might expect that Arıl villagers owed all their taxes to Seydi Ahmed, but that was not the case. In Ayntab (and elsewhere), the Ottoman regime arrogated to itself certain among the various taxes levied on villages.²⁷ In Arıl in 1543, tax revenues claimed by the state consisted of poll taxes on married male householders and bachelors; taxes on beehives and an oil press; the tax on watchmen who guarded village lands against theft and depredation by stray animals (*destbanî*); and 'windfall taxes' (*bad-ı hava*) whose biggest items were the marriage tax and criminal fines. The sum total of

24. AS 161: 92b, 101a.

25. AS 161: 44b, 111b, 132a.

26. AS 161: 138b.

27. See my *Morality Tales*, Chapter Six, on this practice, familiar in the region for several centuries.

these taxes was estimated at 3,183 *akçes* (in comparison with Seydi Ahmed's estimated income of 10,400 *akçes*).²⁸

Seydi Ahmed's entitlements in Arıl can be defined as contained in the land, his *mülk*: a tax share of its agricultural produce and the right to tax the grant of productive access to uncultivated parcels. The state's entitlements, on the other hand, were to taxes on persons and non-agricultural labor. In theory, these taxes enabled the state to insert itself into every rural community, including estates owned by local gentry; windfall taxes in particular could thrust the regime's agents into the personal lives of villagers – their marriages and their misdemeanors.²⁹ But it would seem that in the case of Arıl, unusual in Ayntab, Seydi Ahmed himself acted as tax-collector on behalf of the state. In late December 1540, he notified the court that the village had paid *to him* all taxes owed to the imperial treasury for the years 941 to 946 (July 1534 to May 1540). The record of his statement illustrates the stages by which tax revenues made their way upward from peasant hands, or to put it another way, the stages by which the right to collect taxes was delegated downward from the sultan to village leaders:

The pride of notables Seydi Ahmed ibn Seydi Ali, known as Boyacızade, came to the court, and in the presence of Hacı Ömer ibn Şeyh Musliheddin, legal proxy of the residents of the village of Arıl, he stated: "Formerly, I received from the people of the village the taxes on farming and non-farming householders and on bachelors and other taxes belonging to the state (gayri miriye aid olan rüsum) for the years 941, 942, and 943 when Mustafa Çelebi ibn Hamza was the state's agent; secondly, I received three years' taxes plus the sheep tax when Mehmed ibn Tapıncık was the agent [from 944 through 946]. Neither a single akçe nor a single grain [i.e., nothing by way of cash or kind] remained due in the tax-payers' register".

In addition to this role as tax-collector for himself as well as for the state, Seydi Ahmed was surely a significant presence in the lives of Arıl's residents in other ways. In the pre-modern Ottoman Empire, the ubiquitous and pervasive pattern of patron-client relationships ordered much of social and economic life. Seydi Ahmed's multiple personas – city notable, rural magnate, man of large reputation – surely enhanced his attractiveness as patron. Although there is no specific evidence in the sources, we can imagine villagers seeking various kinds of aid from Seydi Ahmed: interceding with local and state authorities, advancing loans, facilitating business in the city, and perhaps offering employment opportunities there. Particularly during the decades preceding the Ottoman conquest, when the region was contested among Mamluks, Dulkadir chieftains, Ottomans, and Safavids, local

28. Özdeğer, *Ayıntâb Livâsı*, 440.

29. This phrase is borrowed from A. Singer, 'Marriages and Misdemeanors: A Record of *resm-i 'arûs ve bâd-i havâ'*, *Princeton Papers: Interdisciplinary Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 4 (1996), 113-51.

magnates like Seydi Ahmed no doubt played an even more critical role in protecting their rural estates and the peasants who worked them, perhaps sheltering them temporarily in the city. Moreover, instability and the dependence it engendered persisted during the two decades following the conquest, before Ottoman authorities were able to introduce order and security to non-strategic provinces.

Let us look at a court case that suggests an affiliation between Seydi Ahmed and a man rather like himself, an urban dweller with rural estates. In November 1540, Hacı Mehmed, a resident of the Boyacı neighborhood of the city, appeared in court to register the sale of “real estate and livestock” (*emlâk ve davar*) to the two sons of his daughter Ayşe, for a sum of 4,000 *akçes*. The sale consisted of sizeable property in Arıl: a house, a vegetable garden, a pomegranate orchard, and the right to rent a pond and a well there. The sale also included two large vineyards not in Arıl and 50 head of sheep.³⁰ What makes this case of interest is the coincidence of Hacı Mehmed’s urban and rural residences with the Boyacı’s two power bases. Hacı Mehmed was a smaller-scale version of Seydi Ahmed, each officially registered as a city-dweller but in practice also a rural entrepreneur. It is not difficult to imagine a patron-client relationship between Seydi Ahmed and Hacı Mehmed, one that perhaps went back one or more generations, and possibly even some sort of joint enterprise. In turn, Hacı Mehmed probably had his own patron-client relations with the villagers, who might be hired to work his land, process his grape harvest, and watch over his properties in his absence; likewise with local pastoralists – his sheep were in the care of two men from the Turkmen tribe of Begdili. This case illustrates the variety and complexity of relations between urban and rural economies and human networks. It also enables us to imagine the multiple ways in which Seydi Ahmed interacted with his own rural dependents.

Seydi Ahmed the Family Man

The only Boyacı family member beside Seydi Ahmed to make an appearance in the records of the early 1540s was his younger cousin, Hamza ibn Sıdkı. Hamza’s appearance in court was adversarial: he claimed that Seydi Ahmed was preventing him from assuming control of property he (Hamza) inherited from his father.³¹ In Hamza’s words, “My father Sıdkı and my uncle [here a term of respect for the elder cousin] Ahmed exercised, as partners, joint control over the village named Arıl and five shops as their private property. My father died, and the shares that he controlled of the village and the shops passed to me by way of inheritance. My uncle prevents me [from taking control of my legal shares]”. The gravity of this legal suit was signalled by Hamza’s journey to Istanbul and his petition to the sultan’s court. From the latter he obtained an imperial decree ordering the highest local executive and judicial officials – the regional governor-general (*beylerbeyi*) in Maraş and the

30. AS 161: 96a.

31. AS 2: 314a. In my *Morality Tales*, I erroneously identified Hamza as Seydi Ahmed’s nephew.

judge of Ayntab – to investigate the matter. Hence the hearing in the Ayntab court, whose record allows us to witness this family dispute.

Hamza's suit raises a mystery, namely, whether his father Sıdkı was dead or alive. In response to Hamza's accusation, Seydi Ahmed alleged that "this Hamza's father is presently alive, let him prove his death". Unfortunately, the court records lapse shortly after the case was recorded, only to resume three years later, leaving the mystery about Sıdkı unresolved. But it is hard to imagine how the death or even the whereabouts of a prominent individual such as a Boyacı elder could remain uncertain in a society that had equipped itself with an efficient region-wide network for turning up missing animals.³² In any event, Hamza's suit appears to have failed, for in the cadastral survey of 1574, the next to follow that of 1543, the status of Arıl was recorded as "the family trust of the descendants of Seydi Ahmed ibn Boyacızade".³³ Hamza and his offspring may have gotten something, but they lost out on the biggest revenue-producing item in the Boyacı inheritance.

Seydi Ahmed may or may not have been the abusive patriarch that Hamza depicted. The elder cousin could be expected to defend his uncle's estate under the legal doctrine of missing persons, which in Hanafi law assumed a natural lifespan of ninety years, during which time the missing person was assumed to be alive unless proven dead.³⁴ In other words, Seydi Ahmed may have been defending the estate against his cousin's attempt to usurp it prematurely. Nevertheless, the bizarre facts of the case inevitably conjure up a scenario in which Seydi Ahmed may have acted less than ethically. Once again, it is tempting to hazard a comparison between this local lineage and its sovereign overlords, who by 1540 had for several generations avoided division of the imperial patrimony among brothers through the practice of royal fratricide. The overarching goal of the Ottoman lineage was to maintain the patrimony intact through the critical years of (e)state-building. In posing this comparison, my intention is less to portray Seydi Ahmed as a shady character (the bare facts of the case provoke a greater suspicion of Hamza's intent) than to raise the interesting question of how local elites avoided the splintering effect of Islamic inheritance law that could undermine the patrimony of a preeminent lineage.

Like Seydi Ahmed, the Demirci scion Ahmed Çelebi was the only adult male in his family who was recognized in records of the early 1540s. In contrast, three Sikkak brothers appear in the court records – Ali Çelebi, Hamza Çelebi, and Kara Bey – all active as tax-farmers and/or businessmen. However, the cadastral survey of 1543 repeatedly identified their father, "Nasrî Mehmed ibn Hüsâmî, known as İbn Sikkak", as owner of the Sikkaks' several rural land holdings. The fact that, unlike Seydi Ahmed and Ahmed ibn Demirci, Nasrî Mehmed performed no recorded civic duties suggests that he had retired from public life, leaving management of family business and maintenance of an *ayan* profile in his sons' hands. (These hands may have been less than fully mature: in the summer of 1541, Ali Çelebi and a former

32. On this network, see my *Morality Tales*, Chapter Two.

33. Özdeğer, *Ayıntâb Livâsı*, 440.

34. N. J. Coulson, *Succession in the Muslim Family* (Cambridge 1971), 195ff.

tax-farming partner were subject to a lengthy investigation at court by an imperial agent dispatched to collect tax arrears that the two owed to the state). What I want to point to by comparing the three families is an apparent practice of devolving family power whereby only one generation was publicly active. This has relevance to the Boyacı cousins' dispute: elders were elders, and if Hamza was considerably younger than Seydi Ahmed, he was bucking a venerable cultural assumption about age and power.

As for the females of Seydi Ahmed's family, they are not to be found among the many women who conducted business at the Ayntab court. The public invisibility of elite women was typical of Ayntab and elsewhere in the sixteenth century. This does not mean that elite females had no business: indeed, the Ayntab court's records present ample, if indirect, evidence of elite women's ownership of revenue-producing property, mostly inherited (shops, shares in mills, vineyards), as well as their investment in long-distance trading ventures. Elite women also acted as financial backers (*kefil bi'l-mal*) of prominent tax-farmers, presumably earning some return on their investment.³⁵ As to the identity of Seydi Ahmed's wife, we must resort to speculation. She was no doubt from a prominent family. Since first-cousin marriage was a common, although not exclusive, pattern of alliance (the preference for a male being his father's brother's daughter), it may be that Seydi Ahmed was married to an elder sister of Hamza, or Hamza to a younger sister of Seydi Ahmed. But we shall never know for certain about the Boyacı females, since official records respected protocols of honor by rendering them neither visible nor audible.

Seydi Ahmed the Urban Entrepreneur

Managing Arıl no doubt took up much of Seydi Ahmed's time, especially as he was also its tax-collector for the state. But Seydi Ahmed was clearly an urban magnate as well, and given the entrepreneurial multi-tasking so characteristic of the *ayan*, it is highly likely that he engaged in other forms of business. There is, however, little documentary evidence of Seydi Ahmed's activities in the city other than his appearances at the Ayntab court. Elite males of Ayntab tended to avoid the court – our only record for daily life in Ayntab – except for matters that demonstrated their status, such as serving as witness or managing some aspect of the imperial treasury's local business. Luckily, Ayntabans did have the habit of registering credit transactions at the court. In the absence of banks, credit throughout the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire was extended largely by individuals, and courts acted as registries of loans contracted and debts paid; thus we learn what people were buying, selling, and investing in. What follows are educated guesses at endeavors that may have occupied Seydi Ahmed's time and attention: tax-collecting and trading in textiles.

Can Seydi Ahmed be considered a tax-farmer? The frequent bidding contests for tax-farms issuing from state agencies demonstrate the popularity of this investment opportunity in Ayntab in 1540-1541. If the essence of a tax-farm is a contract

35. AS 2: 5a-b, 93b.

between the legal owner of certain taxes (the Ottoman regime, in this case) and an individual who pays the owner a fixed sum in exchange for the right to collect and keep the taxes, then Seydi Ahmed was not a tax-farmer. Beyond acting as tax-collector for Arıl, there is no evidence that he occupied himself with this apparently lucrative form of investment. The Sikkak family, by contrast, was actively engaged in tax-farming: Ali Çelebi had been secretary to the royal domain (the *hass*, that is, state-owned lands and taxable enterprises in Ayntab) from 944 to 946 (June 1537 to May 1540).³⁶ The Sikkaks may in fact have had a long-standing association with tax-farming and in particular with the royal domain: in February 1540, Kara Bey appeared in court to remit the tax revenues of eight *hass* villages – the large sum of 36,295 *akçes* – to Mustafa Çelebi, current trustee of the royal domain (*hass emini*), who had also held the position from July 1534 to June 1537.³⁷

While Seydi Ahmed cannot be considered an entrepreneurial tax-farmer in the manner of Ali Çelebi or Mustafa Çelebi, there was still room for financial gain in collecting and remitting the state's taxes in Arıl. Court records indicate that Seydi Ahmed was accountable to the state treasury for an annual 20 gold florins (a florin equalled 80 *akçes*; taxes were often registered in florins rather than *akçes*). But in the 1543 cadastral survey, state taxes in Arıl were estimated at 39 florins, nearly double what Seydi Ahmed had been remitting in recent years. Where we have data from the cadastral surveys of both 1536 and 1543 (for the third of the province in which Ayntab city was located), we see that the earlier survey vastly underestimated Ayntab's productive capacity several years hence. In other words, the marked economic upswing in Ayntab in the late 1530s and early 1540s allowed tax-farmers and tax-collectors to keep large profits in their own pockets. For Seydi Ahmed, the gain was not huge; for Kara Bey, it was considerable. The gap between estimated and real return was most dramatically demonstrated in the market inspectorship (*ihতি-sab*), an urban tax-farm: its annual tax yield was estimated at 500 florins in 1536, but bidding in 1541 went as high as three times that amount; the cadastral survey of 1543 corrected the gap, estimating revenues of 1,700 florins.³⁸

Strange, then, that so many tax-farmers in Ayntab were delinquent in their payments. Seydi Ahmed too had a "debt to the state" (*miriye bore*), although only 28 florins. Throughout the year studied here, notable tax-farmers were summoned to court to account for their arrears. The first was the trustee, Mustafa Çelebi, who drew on his wife Aynışah's considerable wealth to pay his debt of 250 florins.³⁹ Pressure on tax-farmers increased in the summer of 1541 when Ayntab experienced a significant upgrading of its status within the Empire and a concomitant degree of imperial control: a new and more powerful judge arrived on June 23, a new pro-

36. The language conveying Ali Çelebi's office and that of his colleague Mehmed ibn Tapıncık, trustee of the royal domain (*hass emini*), unmistakably indicates a tax-farm: *bundan akdem Ayntab hasslarına ber vech-i iltizam* [in some records, *ber vech-i timar*] *emin ve kâtip olanlar Mehmed b. Tapıncık ve Ali b. Sikkak nam amellerun...* (AS 2: 13b).

37. AS 161: 7a-d, 8a-d.

38. Özdeğer, *Ayntâb Livâsı*, 128.

39. AS 161: 67d.

vincial governor of higher rank than his predecessor arrived on July 13, and a new regional governor-general arrived in Maraş on July 23. They were preceded by a royal agent who held sway at the Ayntab court for a month beginning May 27; his assignment clearly was to signal that the sultanate would no longer countenance delinquency in the matter of tax-farming. What was happening in Ayntab was classic Ottoman practice: a policy of benign neglect accompanied by lowered tax rates immediately following conquest, which allowed local economies to recover from the depredations of war, to be succeeded by a policy of imperialization and raised taxes.

The first notable to be summoned by the royal agent was Seyyid İsmail, sheikh of the Hacı Baba hospice, who owed 48 florins for the tax-farm to Mervana, a large *hass* village. Four days later, the market inspector made arrangements to pay his debt of 162 florins (three individuals, including two women, pledged surety).⁴⁰ And Ali Çelebi, former *hass* secretary, and his colleague Mehmed ibn Tapıncık, former *hass* trustee, were relentlessly exposed over the month as the agent presided over the piece-by-piece liquidation of their estates to cover arrears of 138 florins incurred during their three-year tenure. Since the amount garnered hardly seemed worth the effort, it is probable that the regime and its agent intended to make a conspicuous example of this key tax-farm.

Seydi Ahmed's arrears amounted to 28 florins – 20 for the year 946 and an additional unspecified eight florins. But Seydi Ahmed was not summoned to court to account for his delinquency as other prominent Ayntabans had been. Rather, his “man” (*ademi*) Sinan ibn Hacı Resul remitted the sums due directly to the Maraş garrison commander (the garrison was the main recipient of taxes collected from the royal domain, which went to pay the wages – also in arrears – of garrison soldiers).⁴¹ Seydi Ahmed's exemption from court arraignment and from payment of debt in person suggests deference to his status: he was subordinated neither to the royal agent nor to his fellow Ayntaban, the trustee Mustafa Çelebi, who typically received and then forwarded tax revenues to garrisons in the region. Then again, it may have been Seydi Ahmed's relatively small debt and his ‘natural’ role as collector of Arıl's state taxes that exempted him from the public disciplining of ‘real’ tax-farmers.

What were all these tax-farmers who lagged in enriching the state doing with their profits? Some at least were investing in textiles. Given the Boyacı family background as textile dyers, the textile trade seems a likely draw for Seydi Ahmed as well. A central element in Ayntab's economy, the manufacture and marketing of textiles created a network that encompassed a range of social groups, from the nomad whose sheep provided wool to the long-distance trader. Indeed, it is hard to overestimate the degree to which Ayntabans were busy with textiles, not the least their consumption.

40. AS 2: 3b, 5a-b.

41. AS 2: 144b, 178b, 238b, 247b-c. The court scribe tended to confuse Sinan and his brother Yusuf ibn Hacı Resul.

The sums of money that changed hands in relation to textiles were large, and purchase on credit was frequent.⁴² When the cloth merchant Hoca Yusuf died, five investors in his long-distance trading operation (including the woman Rahime) claimed a total of 654 florins against his estate. The prominent Jewish financier (*sarraf*) Ma'tuk ibn Sadullah – also a major urban tax-farmer – had heavily invested in textiles: his transactions included purchase of 23 yards of purple broadcloth for 45 florins, purchase of less than a pound of *laciverd*, lapis-blue dye, for 108 florins (for which he put up a house in the Kadı district as collateral), and a debt of 75 florins for broadcloth and linen shirts. The compulsive textile merchant Ali ibn Yusuf, who required his customers to put up collateral, sold 20 lengths of plain cotton and four of Damascene linen to the headman of Telbaşer village for 2,100 *akçes*, and four days later, 65 lengths of plain cotton and 130 of Egyptian cotton to the son of the trustee Mustafa Çelebi for 10,000 *akçes*. (For purposes of monetary comparison, Seydi Ahmed's estimated income from Arıl in 1543 was 130 florins, or 10,400 *akçes*.)

Admittedly, there is no concrete evidence that Seydi Ahmed engaged in the active and ubiquitous trade in textiles. As one of the most distinguished men of Ayntab, he probably kept his business dealings outside the court intentionally. We can only speculate, imagining that the five shops he rented out were occupied by textile dealers, or that the 80 florins he borrowed in July 1541 from the provincial governor (and paid back ten days later) and the 75 florins he borrowed from Ali Çelebi ibn Sikkak in September were for investments in textiles.⁴³

Seydi Ahmed the Civic Patron

Like other prominent figures, Seydi Ahmed performed the civic duty of witnessing legal proceedings. It was customary for nearly every case heard at court to be signed off on by three or four 'case witnesses' (*şühudülhal*); their function was to act as a check on the correctness of legal procedure followed in the case as whole, and as repository of communal memory of the incident at issue. Some cases, because of their serious or problematic nature, called for pillars of the community – government officials, local *ayan*, or prominent religious figures – to act as witness. Seydi Ahmed performed the function of witness for some six cases over the course of the year, half of which were weighty cases and half of which probably garnered his signature because he was in town and already at or around the court for other purposes. To illustrate the latter: two days before Hamza's suit was aired at court, Seydi Ahmed witnessed a case involving a brawl between a villager and a tribesman that erupted while they were racing their horses; one day before the cousins met as adversaries, they both witnessed the routine sale of a modest-sized vineyard. At least twice, Seydi Ahmed was accompanied at court by his 'man' Yusuf ibn Hacı

42. The cases cited below are: AS 2: 30a, 30c, 31a, 43a, 48c (Hoca Yusuf); AS 161: 75b, and AS 2: 142b and d, 321d (Ma'tuk ibn Sadullah); 46a, 52c (Ali ibn Yusuf).

43. AS 2: 144b, 304b.

Resul, brother of Sinan, who acted as witness alongside his employer.⁴⁴

We can imagine that the relative infrequency of Seydi Ahmed's performance as witness created a ripple of excitement among the throng assembled in the judge's courtyard when he did appear. But rather than nuance our portrait of this local notable, the cases that Seydi Ahmed witnessed – as well as a remarkably similar constellation of cases witnessed by Ahmed ibn Demirci – confirm the qualities that made the *ayan* valuable civic actors: business expertise and ethical authority.⁴⁵ In company with the sheikh (guild head) of the bakers, Seydi Ahmed witnessed the confession of a (gum?) seller who had failed to observe the set market price; his participation in the case lent authority to the push in the summer of 1541 to bring market regulation under the oversight of the judge's court. In a case where his combined urban and rural experience was pertinent, Seydi Ahmed witnessed a complex purchase by six city men in partnership whose goal was consolidation of three contiguous rural properties each owned by a different individual; here it was probably the status (*mukataa*) of the aggrandized land parcel that called for expert witnesses. In another case, it is the assemblage of 'heavyweight' witnesses – the two *ayan* Seydi Ahmed and Ali ibn Sikkak, the deputy judge, and the scribe of the court, in addition to several ordinary citizen witnesses – that suggests a problem underlying the court record's rather sterile account of a land sale. In this double sale, the *hass* trustee Mustafa Çelebi purchased a share of an agricultural property near the large village of Rumevlek from one Mehmed for 5,000 *akçes*, and then sold it to Mehmed's brother. Behind this intervention of the trustee, we can imagine a dispute between the two brothers, for siblings often fought over property, especially shares of inheritance. In this scenario, it may have taken a team of prominent Ayntabans to settle the matter and keep peace in the village.

In an unusual affair that created a nexus among an overextended tax-farmer, a village headman, an Armenian resident of Ayntab, the latter's Muslim underwriter, a *sipahi* soldier, the governor-general, and the sultan, Seydi Ahmed's prestige was lent to an act of mediation rather than witness.⁴⁶ The narrative that can be extracted from five linked court cases suggests that the affair began when the trustee Mustafa Çelebi pressed one Feyzi, the tax-farmer, to pay up his debt to the state. In turn, Feyzi called in two debts owed to him, one for 2,000 *akçes* from the sale of a horse to the village headman, and the other an unspecified debt of 5,600 *akçes* (70 florins) owed by the Armenian. Each debt recovery entailed obstacles, and we will follow only the story of the Armenian's debt, since it was this that involved Seydi Ahmed. The affair as a whole provides a window onto the intricate connections among various elements of the Ayntab population and the latter's encounters with the state's administrative apparatus.

44. The court cases discussed above are: AS 161: 137b; AS 2: 126b, 130a, 186a, 299b, 309b.

45. The cases cited in this paragraph are: AS 161: 137b; AS 2: 126b, 186a; for Ahmed Demirci, see AS 161: 23d, 71a; AS 2: 91b, 183c, 285b, 292a, 293a, 294c.

46. This affair is recounted in AS 161: 156a-c, 158d, 159a.

Able to come up with only 400 *akçes*, the Armenian turned to his financial backer (*kefil bi'l-mal*) Cuma. Cuma was consequently forced to liquidate his own property in order to cover the Armenian's debt to Feyzi. Here Cuma ran into an obstacle: the house he planned to sell was illegally occupied by a *sipahi* cavalryman who refused to leave. Cuma then proceeded to obtain an imperial *ferman* (presumably by making the long trip to Istanbul and petitioning the sultan's *divan*); the *ferman* ordered that the matter be locally investigated and the *sipahi* evicted should Cuma's allegation prove correct. Here is where Seydi Ahmed came into the story: he was appointed to act as Cuma's proxy (*vekil*) in the sale of the house, which also meant evicting the *sipahi*. Seydi Ahmed was presumably successful in his assignment, since the house was sold for 2,400 *akçes* and Cuma made up the remaining portion of the debt to Feyzi in wheat.

Who chose Seydi Ahmed for this role as facilitator? We can hypothesize that it was the governor-general and/or the judge. We must also hypothesize as to *why* Seydi Ahmed was chosen. Perhaps Cuma's house was located in the Boyacı quarter. Or perhaps Cuma was a business associate or client of Seydi Ahmed, the more powerful partner already counselling the other on the need to summon imperial authority to discipline the recalcitrant *sipahi*. On the other hand, perhaps Seydi Ahmed's appointment was the result simply of his trusted and influential position in Ayntab's civic life.

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PART THREE

THE CONSOLIDATION AND HEYDAY OF OTTOMAN PROVINCIAL ELITES

MONEYLENDERS AND LANDOWNERS: IN SEARCH OF URBAN MUSLIM ELITES IN THE EARLY MODERN BALKANS

Eleni GARA

The study of provincial elites in the Ottoman Balkans has focused on the eighteenth century, while elites of earlier times remain virtually unknown. This is hardly surprising, for it is during the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries that an urban political power group, the *ayan*, emerged in the provinces. Of course, pre-eighteenth-century Balkan towns possessed local elites of their own; yet it is not clear either whom these early elites consisted of or what the extent of their political influence was, if any at all. This paper will explore the possibilities and limits of research into sixteenth and seventeenth-century urban Muslim elites in the Balkans, and present some preliminary conclusions about the make-up and activities of one such elite, that of the town of Veria (Βέροια, Karaferye) in present-day Northern Greece.

Putting Balkan Muslim Elites in Perspective

The study of Ottoman provincial elites is a rather young field; by way of contrast, the Empire's ruling class is far better known. As a result, there is a tendency to identify Muslim elites in the provinces with the prominent members of the military, administrative and religio-judicial apparatus, and to ignore lesser office-holders and dignitaries, not to mention other urban groups. But once focus has shifted to provincial localities and their elites, it is hardly adequate to confine research to members of the Ottoman ruling establishment residing in the provinces: if not for any other reason than because to construe *a priori* that particular group of people as local elite would presuppose a high degree of integration between military-administrative and local elites in the Balkans, a premise which is not at all given but remains to be established.¹

1. In the Arab provinces integration between these two elites occurred through a slow dual interactive process of localisation and Ottomanisation which began in the seventeenth century and resulted in the emergence of 'Ottoman-local elites' in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; see E. Toledano, 'The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research', in I. Pappé and M. Ma'oz (eds), *Middle*

There is also another reason: an approach which focuses exclusively on office-holders and political elites is not really fruitful for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The emergence and consolidation of local political elites in Ottoman towns is an aspect of the general relationship between the central state and the provinces, and is inextricably linked to two issues: participation of provincial elites in the ruling establishment, and the importance of local elites to the central state in controlling the provinces. The composition and recruitment of the Ottoman ruling elite changed considerably over time; it seems, however, that up to the mid seventeenth century the divide between central and provincial elites was very pronounced. Until the rise of the *ayan*, the upper stratum of provincial office-holders belonged to an Empire-wide elite, whose point of reference was Istanbul. Thus, local persons and families of status and wealth, as long as they neither had access to high offices nor a well-defined role in provincial administration, can hardly be regarded as constituting a political elite, though they may have exercised considerable influence in local politics.

In the case of the Balkans, however, there is a peculiarity which blurs the line between local and imperial elites, at least before the mid sixteenth century. Unlike Anatolia and the Middle East, where Muslims constituted the overwhelming majority of the population, the emergence of Muslim communities in the Balkans was a by-product of the Ottoman conquest, and went hand in hand with the consolidation of the sultan's rule. In the Balkan mainland, which formed an integral part of the Ottoman core-lands from the late fourteenth to the early nineteenth centuries, urban Muslim communities grew around a nucleus of soldiers and administrators who were sent to establish Ottoman control over the region.

These early communities consisted for the most part of immigrants of Turkish origin from Anatolia. Very soon, however, Balkan towns became the theatre of widespread conversion to Islam among Christian inhabitants, both local townspeople and recent immigrants from the surrounding countryside or other regions. This wave of Islamisation, which swelled between 1520 and 1580, resulted in the creation of large urban Muslim communities and transformed many Balkan towns into Muslim ones.² It is against this background that urban Muslim elites emerged in the Balkans. The absence of indigenous Muslim elites, together with the fact that

Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from Within (London and New York 1997), 145-63. Tal Shuval recently argued that no such process took place in Algeria: T. Shuval, 'The Ottoman Algerian Elite and its Ideology', *IJMES*, 32/3 (2000), 323-44.

2. The relative contribution of immigration and conversion in the creation of Balkan Muslim communities has been a matter of a long-standing debate with political implications. See A. Zhelyazkova, 'Islamization in the Balkans as an Historiographical Problem: The Southeast-European Perspective', in F. Adanır and S. Faroqhi (eds), *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography* (Leiden 2002), 223-66. Recent research leads rather to the conclusion that both processes were equally important but for different periods of time; compare G. Boykov, 'Demographic Features of Ottoman Upper Thrace: A Case Study on Filibe, Tatar Pazarcık and İstanımaka (1472-1614)', unpublished M.A. thesis, Bilkent University, 2004.

those who eventually emerged belonged to communities formed by immigrants and converts, makes Balkan urban Muslim elites a case apart. Only comparative research can show whether the emergence and consolidation of provincial elites in the Balkans (including eighteenth-century *ayan*) proceeded in ways similar to – or different from – the all-Muslim parts of the Empire.

In short, insofar as research is concerned with local elites before the emergence of the *ayan*, it is neither obligatory nor necessarily the best strategy to focus on political elites. In addition, research on Balkan Muslim elites should distinguish between a phase of formation, characterised by rapid change due to the process of immigration *cum* Islamisation described above, and a phase of stabilisation (roughly from the mid sixteenth to the mid seventeenth century). Research on the formation of urban elites during the latter phase should not automatically include – least of all restrict itself to – the upper echelons of the military-administrative elites, but should rather explore the relationship of officials to local societies, as well as look into social elites, which include but are not restricted to persons with leading positions in politics and administration.³

The answers to the following questions can be very useful in this respect: Who from among the top-ranking *askerî* and *ulema* originated from provincial towns? Who from among them resided in provincial towns and in what capacity? Are members of the imperial ruling elite to be found in every town or only in major administrative centres? Should the *ümera*⁴ and the *kadıs* be considered as part of the respective local elites? Were lower or middle-ranking office-holders and dignitaries dwelling in provincial towns of local origin? What was the status of wealthy merchants or master craftsmen compared to that of *askerî* and *ulema* in a local setting? Who had social intercourse with whom and at what venue? And, above all, between which groups were marital alliances forged and according to what patterns?

Studies of European towns can provide inspiration to a certain extent.⁵ At first, only political urban elites received attention but in recent decades Early Modernists have turned to the study of social elites. Despite the considerable regional variety in their structure and composition, early modern urban elites are distinguished by certain common features: high social status, access to and/or control of offices, participation in the decision-making process and, more often than not, disproportionate control of resources. Members of the elite are further distinguished by their sense of being different from other townspeople, which finds expression in choices concerning whom to associate with in their various activities and, most of all, in marital

3. "The social élite may be defined as a cohesive social group with leading positions in a broad range of activities: politics, wealth, culture, ideas and the practice of highly regarded professional occupations, such as the law, education or administration" (A. Cowan, *Urban Europe 1500-1700* [London 1998], 52-53).
4. The term refers to the upper stratum of provincial administration, i.e., *sancakbeyis* and *beylerbeyis*.
5. The most important work is P. Burke, *Venice and Amsterdam: A Study of Seventeenth-Century Elites* (Cambridge 1994 [2nd ed.]). Also very useful are Cowan, *Urban Europe*, and C. R. Friedrichs, *Urban Politics in Early Modern Europe* (London 2000).

alliances. Lastly, those who belong to the elite are perceived as a separate group by other townspeople, who are fully aware of their own inferior status.

In historical practice, research into early modern urban elites has proceeded on an empirical basis, focusing on particular groups of people. Depending on the demographic composition and socio-economic make-up of each town, these may include persons holding high offices, members of the nobility or the ruling class, as well as wealthy individuals. Similar groups of people should be suitable research subjects in the Ottoman case as well. These would include the various office-holders and dignitaries, the persons referred to in the sources as notables (*ayan ve eşraf*), as well as conspicuously wealthy individuals. Although the elite of a particular town may not necessarily be identical to any one of these groups, families whose members fall into all or most of these categories should be undoubtedly considered as elite. Consequently, research into the affiliations, activities and resources of these families should lead us to conclusions about elite formation, activity and reproduction in Ottoman cities and towns.

Whom Do Elites in Ottoman Towns Consist of?

The first group to focus on in our quest for urban Muslim elites is that of the various office-holders. Ottoman provincial administration, as is well known, was structured along two separate lines, a military and a legal-administrative one. In the Balkans, where the *timar* system was fully implemented, provincial capitals were the seats of *sancakbeyis*, who had not only military but also administrative duties, and functioned as governors; however, large areas of administrative responsibilities rested with *kadis*, who resided in all cities and major towns and were also entrusted with the rendering of justice. On the level of town administration, it was the *sancakbeyi*'s lieutenant, the *subaşı*, who effectively acted as governor in provincial capitals.⁶ In other towns, the official fulfilling that function was called the *voyvoda* and was appointed by the beneficiary of the town's taxation income. Therefore, the *voyvoda* was not answerable to the *sancakbeyi*, even if he had a military background. In the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, more often than not the *voyvoda* entered upon office through *iltizam*, i.e., by farming the town's income. Alongside these persons, there were numerous other senior and junior officials appointed to various offices of the military and financial administration.⁷

Ottoman provincial administration as outlined above did not allow much for the involvement of local elites on Western European patterns; there existed neither city councils nor mayors, and there were no major offices reserved for or at the disposal

6. İ. M. Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650* (New York 1983), 13.

7. The best survey of offices in seventeenth-century provincial administration is to be found in the pages of Evliya Çelebi's *Seyahatname*. Concerning urban administration in the early Ottoman centuries, see N. Beldiceanu, *Recherche sur la ville ottomane au XV^e siècle: Étude et actes* (Paris 1973).

of local magnates. Provincial administration was controlled by the central state and the most coveted positions were reserved for senior members of the ruling elite.⁸ High-ranking office-holders in the provinces were closely attached to the imperial centre, on which they directly or indirectly depended for appointments. One consequence was that the overwhelming majority of highly placed provincial officials had close ties not to the provinces but to the imperial capital and the households of top-ranking Ottoman military and administrative office-holders.

The gradual rise in consequence of patron-client networks for appointments and career advancement after the mid sixteenth century made the link to the capital even more pronounced. Furthermore, close ties to Istanbul became all the more important because officials did not remain long in their posts; frequent rotation was the rule. The latter had been adopted as a measure for relieving competition among the aspirants for a position in high offices, especially among *kadis* and *sancakbeyis*. But even in lower offices, frequent rotation must have been the rule, not the exception, given the fact that most positions were either at the disposal of senior members of the ruling elite or accessible through tax-farming.⁹ This meant that sixteenth and seventeenth-century Ottoman officials were unlikely either to obtain an appointment in their native towns for any considerable length of time or build networks linking them to local elites during their tenure of office in any one place.

Thus, given the fact that frequent rotation rate was the rule among high and lucrative positions, the more senior an official, the more improbable it is that he had a local affiliation prior to his appointment. This holds true even for town *voyvodas*, who in theory could more easily have been local people.¹⁰ Admittedly, that at least some of the provincial office-holders in high positions did not belong to local families cannot be ruled out. The truth is that, in the case of the overwhelming majority of these officials, we simply do not know anything about their places of origin (actually, in most cases we do not even know their names). Only extensive prosopographical research could lead to conclusions; but, given the state of the available documentation, the feasibility of such a project is highly questionable.

8. Military and administrative office-holders were mostly recruited from among the *kuls*, the sultan's servants, and usually had *devşirme* background. See especially Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants*. The elite of the religio-judicial establishment (*ulema*) was likewise recruited from groups in or closely attached to the imperial capital. See especially M. C. Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulema in the Postclassical Age (1600-1800)* (Minneapolis 1988).
9. On tax-farming see especially L. Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire 1560-1660* (Leiden 1996).
10. Extensive research in the sharia court archives of Veria from the first half of the seventeenth century revealed a very frequent rotation rate among *voyvodas* and only one person who could arguably have been a native. See E. Gara, 'Kara Ferye 1500-1650: Menschen, Lokalgesellschaft und Verwaltung in einer osmanischen Provinz', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Vienna, 2000, 54-55, 58-62.

In short, there is not much we can determine about the background and activities of office-holders in the provinces beyond their tenure of office. The frequent rotation rate renders questionable whether they were able to build local networks and, if non-natives, to be incorporated into the local elite. Therefore, though there can hardly be any doubt that *kadis*, *sancakbeyis* (and their *subaşı*s), *voyvodas*, as well as all other senior officials residing in provincial capitals, belonged to the elites of the respective urban centres, I would consider them as a marginal, rather than a core element of these elites.

On the other hand, lower office-holders in urban administration, such as the *subaşı*, who acted as the deputy of the *voyvoda* in small towns, and the *muhtesibs*, the officials supervising the regular functioning of the market, were local people. If the case of the town of Veria is to guide us in the matter, the *muhtesibs*, who, it must be noted, entered upon office by farming the respective part of the town's income from the *voyvoda*, belonged without any doubt to the local urban elite; not only by virtue of their office but also because they fall into some of the other categories of elite candidates. They almost always bore honorific titles and belonged by default to the wealthier segments of the local population, since they could afford to participate in tax-farming, albeit on a small scale.¹¹ This was not necessarily the case with the town *subaşı*. On the contrary, it seems that this official, who was appointed and paid by the *voyvoda* and must not be confused with the senior military officer of the same title (a *sancakbeyi*'s lieutenant) mentioned above, did not enjoy a high status. The *subaşı* was most probably regarded just as an executive organ, the *voyvoda*'s man charged with policing the town, hardly any better than the low-level janissary, which he often was.¹²

As concerns members of the religio-judicial establishment, appointment in one's native town must have been a rare occurrence for *kadis*, although they were not attached to Istanbul as closely as military and administrative officials (many *kadis* came from *ulema* families rooted in the provinces and had received at least partial training there). This seems to be especially true of small-town *kadis*; for how many among them could possibly have had local affiliation? But it must also be valid for *kadis* originating from big towns and cities, though the latter could presumably succeed in getting appointments in their native towns at some point in the course of their careers. The same goes for *müftis* or jurisconsults, senior figures in the *ulema* hierarchy and with very prestigious positions.¹³ On the other hand, imams, *hatibs* and other officials comprising the *ulema* sub-hierarchy in Ottoman towns were definitely local people.

11. On the *muhtesibs* of Veria, one of whom was almost always a Christian, see *ibid.*, 56-58, 60-62.

12. A lot can be learnt from the case of a *subaşı*'s murder by his *voyvoda*'s slave in June 1620; see E. Gara, «Δολοφόντοι και Δικαστές στην Οθωμανική Βέροια» [Murderers and Judges in Ottoman Veria], *Imeros*, 1 (2001), 113-30.

13. Apart from the great *müfti* of Istanbul, who held the office of the *şeyhülislam*, there were *müftis* appointed in all provincial capitals, as well as in many small towns.

Once we leave the group of office-holders and turn to that of town notables, the *ayan ve eşraf* of the Ottoman sources, we find ourselves on safer ground. The members of that group belonged to the local urban elite *par excellence*; one could very well argue that these were in fact the elite. Things, however, are once more not as straightforward as one would wish. The *ayan ve eşraf* of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are a very elusive set of people: we know that they existed but do not know who they really were.

The *ayan ve eşraf* appear acting in a body where matters of major local importance were at stake, as well as when the taxation burden of the town or the *kaza* underwent negotiation in order to be re-estimated and distributed. The latter was still infrequent in the early seventeenth century but became a yearly occurrence in Balkan towns from the mid-1640s onwards. Yet the presence – or rather documentation on the presence – of notables in important cases is not as frequent as one would expect; in the sharia court records of Veria there are hardly a couple of relevant documents from each year.¹⁴ As a consequence, the group of the *ayan ve eşraf* has very low visibility in the archival sources, although it can be demonstrated that they played an important role in local decision-making.¹⁵ This state of affairs could be a result of imperfect recording; but it most probably implies that sixteenth and seventeenth-century town notables were not in the habit of appearing in court or consulting in a body.

Scant documentation in relation to the collective action of the *ayan ve eşraf* would not be such a problem if we were in a position to know whom that group was composed of. According to the sixteenth-century administrator and historian Mustafa Ali, the *ayan-ı memleket* constituted the ‘middle class’, occupying a position between high-ranking officials and administrators on the one hand, and craftsmen and merchants on the other.¹⁶ Mustafa Ali, however, was concerned with the social status of the various segments of urban population, not the composition of local elites; therefore, his remarks cannot be taken as a guideline in the issue. As for information from archival sources, it is once again inconclusive. Registration of names in Ottoman documents, as is so often the case, is very unsystematic and

14. Compare E. Gara, ‘In Search of Communities in Seventeenth Century Ottoman Sources: The Case of the Kara Ferye District’, *Turcica*, 30 (1998), 156–58.

15. Compare L. Peirce, *Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab* (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 2003); B. Ergene, *Local Court, Provincial Society and Justice in the Ottoman Empire: Legal Practice and Dispute Resolution in Çankırı and Kastamonu (1652-1744)* (Leiden and Boston 2003); E. Gara, ‘Çuha for the Janissaries – Velençe for the Poor: Competition for Raw Material and Workforce between Salonica and Veria, 1600-1650’, in S. Faroqhi and R. Deguilhem (eds), *Crafts and Craftsmen of the Middle East: Fashioning the Individual in the Muslim Mediterranean* (London 2005), 121–52.

16. A. Tietze, ‘Mustafa Ali on Luxury and the Status Symbols of Ottoman Gentlemen’, in *Studia Turcologica Memoriae Alexii Bombaci Dicata* (Naples 1982), 577–90. Mustafa Ali regarded the *ayan* as on a footing with *sipahis* and *zaims*, but remarked that outstanding *sipahis* were higher in status than the ‘middle class’ (ibid., 580–81).

incomplete. In the sharia court records of Veria, the names of town notables recorded in cases in which they took collective action can be anything from four to eight, followed by the formula “and the other *ayan* and *eşraf* of the town”. Furthermore, the same names are hardly ever registered twice, even in cases only a couple of months apart. There is no visible pattern as to why these particular persons (and not others) were active in a particular case. The picture emerging from the sources is completely random.

I have tried to get results by following a different path, namely by checking the names of the persons who acted as witnesses (*şühudülhal*) to cases of major local importance, even when the *ayan ve eşraf* do not appear to have taken any part in the proceedings in a body. Research brought me again at a dead end. Although witnesses to such cases were almost exclusively people of high status, there was no visible pattern which could explain the presence or absence of particular persons, nor was it possible to distinguish between local notables and military or administrative officials temporarily residing in town.¹⁷ In short, apart from the very few persons who are explicitly defined in the documents as *ayan ve eşraf*, there is not much chance of finding out either who exactly belonged to that group or whether there was a hierarchy of higher and lesser notables among them.¹⁸

Since we cannot hope to locate the members of a town's elite by focusing on the cases where the *ayan ve eşraf* acted in a body, we should turn to two other groups of people who appear as likely candidates: persons of high social status, as indicated by the honorific titles they bear, and conspicuously wealthy individuals. In the first group are the various *efendis*, *ağas*, *bey*s, *çavuş*es and *celebis* of the Ottoman sources. The question is: were all such persons equally regarded as elite? The answer should be an unreserved yes, with one important exception: the group of *celebis*, which requires scrutiny because of the great numbers of people bearing that particular honorific. (Since at least the mid sixteenth century the honorific

17. To give an example: On the first decade of Zilhicce 1627 (13-22 August) a case of apostasy which ended in the conviction of the accused was recorded (IKB [=Ἱεροδικαστικός Κώδικας Βεροίας (Karaferiye kadı sicili)] 11, f. 40r [p. 78], no. 5). The witnesses to the case were as follows: Musli Efendi el-kadı, Hüsam Efendi el-kadı, Alaybeyzade Mehmed Bey, Mahmud Çavuş der-ali, Mehmed Çelebi bin Hüsam Efendi, Miski Beşe er-racil, Mehmed Beşe er-racil, İbrahim Beşe ibn-i Nasuh er-racil, Kurt Beşe [bin] Mustafa er-racil, Siyamizade Mehmed Çelebi, Şaban Beşe, Abdünnebi Bey nalband. (The presence of so many janissaries is presumably due to the fact that the accused was a janissary.) During exactly the same ten days the court of Veria heard another case of enormous local interest, regarding the estate of a ten-year-old Christian boy who had allegedly converted to Islam before his death (IKB 11, f. 89r [p. 176], no. 2). This time a completely different set of persons acted as witnesses to the case: Kurt Bey er-racil, Hüseyin Çelebi ibn Abdi, nalband Abdullah, Savurdı Hasan Bey, Ali Çelebi bin Abdi Bey, Hasan tabi-i Ali Efendi, kalaycı Hasan, Yusuf Bey tabi-i Hüseyin Ağa, Yusuf tabi-i Ali Efendi, İbrahim bin Mustafa el-muhzır.

18. To continue the example given in the previous footnote: in early 1628 the *ayan* of Veria included Mahmud Çavuş, Ali Çavuş, Ahmed Bey, Mahmud Çelebi and Mehmed Bey (IKB 11, f. 77v [p. 153], no. 1; dated 7-16 March).

çelebi was given to literate persons in general, including junior administrative officials, secretaries, merchants, etc.¹⁹) Regarding the other titles mentioned above, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries they were evidently reserved for senior members of the religio-judicial (*efendi*) and military establishments (*ağa*, *bey* and *çavuş*). Hence, they can be useful for locating a town's elite, though they are hardly of use in discovering internal hierarchies.

As concerns people of above-average wealth, it is unfortunately very hard to locate them. For all its severe limitations, the one source suitable for such a task is probate inventories.²⁰ Such inventories do occur from time to time among sharia court records but, as far as I can tell, they are extremely few until the mid seventeenth century, at least in archival material from the Balkans.²¹ There is, however, an oblique way to pinpoint likely candidates for that group of people: namely by examining documentation on property sales and leases, as well as loans, the only economic activities which were systematically recorded in the sharia court archives. The results, however, can hardly be conclusive on their own. On the one hand, we cannot rationally expect to locate all wealthy individuals in that way; on the other, there is no certainty that all wealthy persons belonged to the elite. On the contrary, it is very probable that in Ottoman towns, as in other parts of the world, wealth was only of secondary importance as concerns membership of the elite.

Where does this survey leave us? On the one hand, one can hardly expect to come to conclusions as to the provincial urban elite's composition and recruitment beyond a crude level. On the other, it may very well be possible to assess, at least partially, the elite's political, economic and social activities. This can be done either on the basis of individual case-studies or through examination of the groups of 'likely candidates' as outlined above. The ideal research project should, of course, combine both approaches.

Unfortunately, such a project would require very elaborate and extensive prosopographical research of a scale hardly to be managed by a single person in a reasonable period of time. The reason is not just the large numbers of documents that must be processed but also the registration practices of the time, which hinder this kind of research. As is well known to scholars of the Ottoman Balkans, in sixteenth and seventeenth-century documents there were hardly ever any family names recorded, and most people had very common personal names to boot. Thus, one ends up with endless numbers of, say, Mehmed Beys, sons of Mustafas, who may have been the same person or not.²² And the most frustrating of all, when one's subject is the elite,

19. L. Fekete, *Das Heim eines türkischen Herrn in der Provinz im XVI. Jahrhundert* (Budapest 1960), 3.

20. See especially C. Establet and J.-P. Pascual, *Familles et fortunes à Damas: 450 foyers damascains en 1700* (Damascus 1994).

21. The reasons are unknown. It is possible that probate inventories were separately recorded and did not survive; but it is rather more probable that such documents started being systematically registered in the court records only at a later time. In the sharia court archive of Veria systematic recording of probate inventories seems to have started in the 1660s.

22. Compare the effort of Lajos Fekete to identify Ali Çelebi of Budin, the hero of his story,

is that even when individual persons can be identified, hardly any families can be reconstructed. But studies of early modern elites rely on a fundamental concept: that the basic unit of research is not the individual but the family or the household. Only through research on the webs of networks and activities of these families and their members can one gain insight into the composition, recruitment, identity and scope of activities of the elite.

Moneylenders and Landowners

The situation, however, is not hopeless. Some questions can still be answered. And this brings us to the “moneylenders and landowners” of this paper’s title. Examination of sales, leases, and loans, combined with the – unfortunately scant – results of research on the group of the *ayan ve eşraf*, can lead to some conclusions. My conclusions, based on research in the sharia court archives of Veria, are only preliminary and not necessarily valid for all over the Balkans; but, on the other hand, there is no reason at all to regard the picture emerging from the material of Veria as unparalleled and unique.

Research on property transactions shows that by the early seventeenth century several members of the elite, especially from among the *ulema*, had acquired landed property in the countryside, which included farms (*çiftlik*), as well as meadows (*çayır*). The size of the farms, which usually consisted of a farmhouse with outbuildings and the adjoining land, seems to have been too modest for commercial exploitation. As to meadows (actually a rare item of property), it is not clear whether the owners used them for cattle-breeding of their own or simply rented them to cattle-breeders. Purchase of rural property by townspeople took place according to the stipulations of the law, i.e., with the consent of the ‘master of the land’ (*sahibülarz*), and – as far as I could find out – was never contested by villagers. The trend for the elite to invest in real estate in the country continued undiminished throughout the seventeenth century. The economic – presumably also demographic – crisis that hit the *kaza* in the late 1640s and the 1650s²³ resulted in more intensive penetration of the urban Muslim elite into the hinterland of Veria, a process which eventually led to the creation of large *çiflik*s.²⁴

The urban elites of Veria appear also to have owned extensive urban dwellings, though not necessarily a lot of them. Elite families seem to have bought or built large houses as a symbol of status,²⁵ and not to have invested in houses which could be rented to other townspeople and generate income. The need for housing and workshops created by the town’s developing textile manufacture, especially the manufacture of *velençes* in the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries,

with various Ali Çelebis known from contemporary documents (Fekete, *Das Heim*, 3-5).

23. See Gara, ‘Kara Ferye’, 103-09.

24. The *kaza* of Karaferye was among the districts with a larger share of *çiflik*s in the eighteenth century; see B. McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600-1800* (Cambridge and Paris 1981), 75.

25. Compare Mustafa Ali’s views in Tietze, ‘Mustafa Ali’.

was met by pre-existing or new imperial foundations. On the other hand, the elite of Veria, especially scions of *ulema* families, responded to the many opportunities created by the rising economy of the town by building and acquiring wheat, sesame and fulling mills. It is conceivable that at least some of these persons took a more active interest in investment opportunities in the textile manufacture and the marketing of agricultural production, but there is no evidence; archival sources are silent on such matters.

Data on loans, granted both to townspeople and villagers, show even more clearly the degree of the religio-judicial elite's involvement in the local economy. In loans registered between 1600 and 1650, male moneylenders who were either *ulema* or of *ulema* associations appear in 41% of the cases (in 33% of the cases moneylenders belonged to the military elite); in 54% of these cases the moneylender is defined as a *kadı*. It is true that more persons of military – and fewer of *ulema* – background were involved in money-lending activities.²⁶ But, on the whole, given the fact that the military elite consisted of far larger numbers of people, the *ulema* elite of Veria seem to have been much wealthier and a lot more involved in money-lending activities.

This kind of difference between the military and the religio-judicial segment of the elite may seem startling at first sight but is actually to be expected. In a middle-sized town like Veria, the military elite tended to be composed mainly of *sipahis* with a rather modest income. These individuals had to meet great expenses in order to fulfil their military duties and faced a very high mortality rate. Only the lucky few would return unscathed and with enough booty to use for investments of any kind. In fact, there is some evidence, albeit inconclusive, that those from among the military who launched a successful career as landowners and moneylenders were entrusted with administrative duties in the service of the Porte or of their highly placed patrons, rather than joining the army in its yearly expeditions.

Kadis, on the other hand, could reasonably hope for a long life and received handsome pay in cash. Although they had to meet the expense of setting up a new establishment every time they received a new appointment, they could more easily accumulate capital and invest in real estate or money-lending (or bequeath it to their descendants). Of course, only a few of the *kadis* mentioned as landowners and moneylenders in the archival material of Veria had active posts at the time, and just a tiny minority served as *kadis* of the town itself. As far as we can tell, most of these persons were either retired or between appointments. Still, the picture emerging from the sharia court records is revealing as to the superior opportunities offered to members of the elite through a career in the religio-judicial establishment, in comparison to the military, despite the frequent rotation rate of *kadis*.

Thus, the religio-judicial elite of Veria is found to have invested heavily in real estate (mostly farms and mills), as well as in money-lending. One should also

26. In the sample there appear 44 male and 17 female moneylenders with military associations, as opposed to 33 male and 10 female ones with *ulema* affiliation. On money-lending in the *kaza* of Karaferye, see Gara, 'Kara Ferye', 114-74.

not forget that, in addition, the *ulema* profited to a large extent from the income generated by the town's numerous pious foundations. We cannot help wondering whether members of the *ulema* elite did not also involve themselves in trade or other entrepreneurial activities. Unfortunately, the available sources do not permit any speculations as to the matter. It should not come as a surprise, however, if they were found to have depended for their income exclusively on salaries and rents. This impression is reinforced by the fact that the creation of pious foundations was also extremely popular, especially that of cash *vakıfs*, the capital of which was turned over to money-lending.²⁷ After all, the establishment of rentier elites in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the trend all over Europe and affected even the most prominent merchant cities.²⁸ It may not even be far-fetched to see in the prominent position that *ulema* families seem to have enjoyed in Ottoman towns a trend parallel to the rise of the legal profession in European towns during the same period.²⁹

Conclusions

Research into urban Muslim elites in the sixteenth and seventeenth-century Balkans can be of only limited scope because of the inadequacy of the existing archival material. It is possible to follow individual careers and economic activities only in the most conspicuous cases, while reconstruction of families and examination of their activities and networks can only very rarely take place. Most promising is an empirical approach that combines research into different groups of people who can be regarded as belonging to the elite. These include office-holders, the group of the *ayan ve eşraf*, persons bearing honorific titles, as well as major landowners and moneylenders.

Research into the sharia court records of Veria from the seventeenth century reveals an open elite, the upper stratum of which consisted of senior members of the religio-judicial and military establishments. The former appear to have enjoyed higher social status and to have been more active as landowners and moneylenders. This can be partly explained by the *ulema*'s having more opportunities to accumulate capital and consolidate real estate. Investment in real property, both in the town and the country, was very popular among elite members, alongside money-lending. Evidence suggests, however, that elite owners of real estate primarily aspired to rents and not to the commercial exploitation of their properties. The acquisition of *çiftlik*s, even those of modest size, seems to have been considered an especially attractive investment; and the mid seventeenth-century crisis gave urban Muslim elites the opportunity to acquire agricultural land in the town's hinterland cheaply and by thoroughly legal means.

27. In the first half of the seventeenth century there were over a hundred cash *vakıfs* active in Veria. Almost a third of the founders were women of the elite.

28. Cowan, *Urban Europe*, 60-62.

29. Compare *ibid.*, 63.

In the middle decades of the seventeenth century, a disastrous combination of high taxation demands and economic crisis resulted in an acute need to manage local affairs, which gave a boost to elite influence in on-the-spot decision-making. A milestone in this process was the institutionalisation of *ayan* participation in the negotiation and redistribution of the *kaza*'s tax burden from the 1640s onwards. Research into the *ayan ve eşraf* group has shown further that seventeenth-century urban notables could initiate and direct collective action, if need be, assume local leadership, and take decisions on matters of local importance, albeit on an informal basis. In addition, cases of major local interest, which were bitterly fought both in the town's sharia court and before the central judicial authorities, lead to the conclusion that, by the early seventeenth century, the importance and influence of town notables in local decision-making was large. It exceeded by far what one would have expected, in view of the low visibility of the *ayan ve eşraf* group in the documentation, thus foreshadowing the developments of the eighteenth century.

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TOWARDS A PORTRAIT OF 'THE RICH' IN OTTOMAN PROVINCIAL SOCIETY: SOFIA IN THE 1670s

Rossitsa GRADEVA

The *tereke* or *muhallefat defters* and the inventories of estates in general, and the possibilities they offer for the study of various aspects of social life in Ottoman society, attracted the attention of scholars as early as the late 1960s.¹ Since then, research based on them has gone in several directions. Some scholars publish single documents with a view to the study of important personalities or simply high officials,² while others publish collections of estates of specific social groups, or address only geographically defined groups.³ It is impossible even to list all the themes which have been researched with the help of the mass of material contained in these inventories. Some analyse them as a historical source, their structure, limitations, but also the variety of issues which can be studied in the light of them, including the legal procedures, and the functionaries involved in the process.⁴ Usually after the description of some general features of their sources,

1. L. Fekete, 'XVI. Yüzyılda Taşralı Bir Türk Efendisinin Evi', *Belleten*, 29/116 (1965), 615-38; Ö. Barkan, 'Edirne Askeri Kassamına ait Tereke Defterleri', *Belgeler*, 3/5-6 (1968), 1-479.
2. J. Hathaway, 'The Wealth and Influence of an Exiled Ottoman Eunuch in Egypt: The Waqf Inventory of Abbas Agha', *JESHO*, 37/4 (1994), 293-317; S. Savaş, 'Sivas Valisi Dagistani Ali Paşa'nın Muhallefatı. XVIII. Asrın Sonunda Osmanlı Sosyal Hayatına Dair Önemli Bir Bölge', *Belgeler*, 15/19 (1993), 249-91; Y. Cezar, 'Bir Ayanın Muhallefatı. Havza ve Köprü Kazaları Ayanı Kör İsmail-Oğlu Hüseyin (Musadere Olayı ve Terekenin İncelenmesi)', *Belleten*, 12/161-64 (1977), 41-78; G. Veinstein, 'Le patrimoine foncier de Panayote Bénakis, *kocabaşı* de Kalamata', *JTS*, 11 (1987), 211-33.
3. N. Todorov and M. Kalitsin (eds), *Turski izvori za bălgarskata istoriya* [Turkish Sources for Bulgarian History], vol. 6 (Sofia 1977), 23-223; Y. Nagata, *Some Documents on the Big Farms (Çiftlik) of the Notables in Western Anatolia* (Tokyo 1976); idem, *Materials on the Bosnian Notables* (Tokyo 1979); H. Özdeğer, *1463-1640 Yılları Bursa Şehri Tereke Defterleri* (İstanbul 1988); S. Öztürk, *Askeri Kassama ait Onyedinci Asır İstanbul Tereke Defterleri (Sosyo-Ekonomik Tahlil)* (İstanbul 1995).
4. G. Veinstein and Y. Triantafyllidou-Baladié, 'Les inventaires après-décès ottomans de Crète', in A. van der Woude and A. Schuurman (eds), *Probate Inventories: A New Source for the Historical Study of Wealth, Material Culture and Agricultural Development* (Wageningen 1980), 191-204; J.-P. Pascual, 'Les inventaires après-décès. Une source

these studies concentrate on specific aspects of social, legal, or cultural history. Even a simple enumeration of topics shows what an invaluable source the inventories are: for instance, studies have focused on problems of the social structure of Ottoman society,⁵ or aspects of modernisation in later times,⁶ on details of everyday life and material culture, sometimes combining data from the *tereke defters* with archaeological finds.⁷ The *tereke* documents have also proved very important with a view to the study of intellectual life in the provinces,⁸ demographic problems

- pour l'histoire économique et sociale de Damas au XVII^e siècle', in D. Panzac, *Les villes dans l'Empire ottoman: activités et sociétés*, vol. 1 (Paris 1991), 41-65; C. Establet and J.-P. Pascual, 'Damascene Probate Inventories of the 17th and 18th Centuries: Some Preliminary Approaches', *IJMES*, 24/3 (1992), 373-93; A.-K. Rafeq, 'Registers of Succession (*Mukhallafat*) and their Importance for Socio-Economic History: Two Samples from Damascus and Aleppo, 1277/1861', in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont, İ. Ortaylı and E. van Donzel (eds), *CIEPO. VII. Sempozyumu Bildirileri: Peç: 7-11 Eylül, 1986* (Ankara 1994), 479-91; C. Establet, J.-P. Pascual and A. Raymond, 'La mesure de l'inégalité dans la société ottomane: utilisation de l'indice de Gini pour le Caire et Damas vers 1700', *JESHO*, 37/2 (1994), 171-82; C. Establet and J.-P. Pascual, 'Les inventaires après décès, sources froides d'un monde vivant', *Turcica*, 32 (2000), 113-43.
5. H. İnalçık, 'Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire', in idem, *The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy* (London 1978), XII (97-140); N. Todorov, *The Balkan City, 1400-1900* (Seattle and London 1983), based largely though not singly on inventories of estates.
 6. M. Anastassiadou, 'Les inventaires après-décès de Salonique à la fin du XIX^e siècle: source pour l'étude d'une société au seuil de la modernisation', *Turcica*, 25 (1993), 97-135.
 7. I. Gerelyes, 'Inventories of Turkish Estates in Hungary in the Second Half of the 16th Century', *ActOrHung*, 39/2-3 (1985), 275-338; T. Artan, 'Terekeler Işığında 18. Yüzyıl Ortasında Eyüp'te Yaşam Tarzı ve Standartlarına Bir Bakış', in T. Artan (ed.), *18. Yüzyıl Kadı Sicilleri Işığında Eyüp'te Sosyal Yaşam* (Istanbul 1998), 49-64; J.-P. Pascual, 'Meubles et objets domestiques quotidiens des intérieurs damascains du XVII^e siècle', *RMMM*, 55-56/1-2 (1990), 197-207; M. Kalicin, 'L'habillement en tant qu'indice de la différenciation de la population urbaine', in N. Todorov (ed.), *La ville balkanique, XV^e-XIX^e ss. (Studia Balcanica 3)* (Sofia 1970), 169-72; S. Faroqhi, 'Female Costumes in Late Fifteenth-Century Bursa', and C. Neumann, 'How Did a Vizier Dress in the Eighteenth Century?', both in S. Faroqhi and C. Neumann (eds), *Ottoman Costumes: From Textile to Identity* (Istanbul 2004), 81-91 and 181-217.
 8. M. Stajnova, 'Ottoman Libraries in Vidin', *ÉB*, 1979/2, 54-69; M. Anastassiadou, 'Livres et "bibliothèques" dans les inventaires après décès de Salonique au XIX^e siècle', *RMMM*, 87-88 (1999), 111-41; eadem, 'Des defunts hors du commun: les possesseurs de livres dans les inventaires après décès musulmans de Salonique', *Turcica*, 32 (2000), 197-252; C. Establet and J.-P. Pascual, 'Les livres de gens à Damas vers 1700', *RMMM*, 87-88 (1999), 143-75; H. Sahillioğlu, 'Ottoman Book Legacies', in idem, *Studies on Ottoman Economic and Social History* (Istanbul 1999), 189-91; O. Sabev, 'Knigata v ezhdnevito na myusulmanite v Ruse (1695-1786)' [The Book in the Everyday Life of Muslims in Ruse (1695-1786)], in *Almanah za istoriyata na Ruse* [Almanac for the History of the Town of Ruse], vol. 4 (Ruse 2002), 380-94; idem, 'Private Book Collections in Ottoman Sofia, 1671-1833 (Preliminary Notes)', *ÉB*, 2003/1, 34-51.

and women in particular,⁹ even the religious beliefs and practices of Muslim society.¹⁰ The broad possibilities offered by inventories of estates make them a preferred source in the study of a growing number of aspects of the social structure and spiritual life in a variety of Ottoman settlements which is impossible even to list here.

In this essay I shall try to present on the basis of a similar source from Sofia¹¹ several cross sections of Sofian society in the second half of the seventeenth century with an accent on the 'rich' in the town as they emerge from the pages of this register. Bearing in mind the limitations these sources set for scholars which I shall discuss below, I hope that it will add some strokes to the portrait of the provincial 'rich', men and women, citizens and villagers, Muslims and non-Muslims. I shall try to bring to light some aspects of their private and social life, their family status, professional profile, economic activities, mentality, in short, another insight into Balkan Ottoman society of the seventeenth century, and certainly a point of departure for comparison with other parts of the Empire.

It is probably important to remind the reader that during most of the period after the Ottoman conquest, Sofia was the centre of Rumeli, which at that time ranked highest among the Ottoman provinces. It was the seat of the governor but also an important trade hub in the Balkans and a station on the *Via Militaris/Orta Kol*, a fact that had an effect on the social, ethnic and religious structure of its population. As a result of the accumulation and overlapping of factors of administrative, geographical, economical, and historical nature during the seventeenth century, Sofian citizenship was a composite one. In terms of religion, it consisted of Muslims, Orthodox, Armenian, and Catholic Christians, and Jews, each of these groups comprising a variety of ethnicities and languages.¹² Many people resided in the city

9. C. Estabiet and J.-P. Pascual, 'Famille et démographie à Damas autour de 1700: quelques données nouvelles', in D. Panzac, *Histoire économique et sociale de l'Empire ottoman et de la Turquie (1326-1960). Actes du sixième congrès international tenu à Aix-en-Provence du 1er au 4 juillet 1992* (Paris 1995), 427-45; O. Todorova, 'Zhenite v Sofiya prez 70-te godini na XVII vek (po dannii ot edin registăr s nasledstveni opisi)' [Sofia Women in the 1670s (According to Data from a Register of Inheritance Inventories)], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 1996/3, 3-40; C. Estabiet and J.-P. Pascual, 'Women in Damascene Families around 1700', *JESHO*, 45/3 (2002), 301-19; A. Aktan, 'Tereke Kayıtlarına Göre Kayseri'de Ailenin Sosyo-Ekonomik Durumu (1738-1749)', in M. Köhbach, G. Procházka-Eisl and C. Römer (eds), *Acta Viennensia Ottomanica: Akten des 13. CIEPO-Symposiums vom 21. bis 25. September 1998 in Wien* (Vienna 1999), 13-19.
10. G. Veinstein, 'Les pèlerins de la Mecque à travers quelques actes du qadi de Sarajevo (1557-1558)', *Turcica*, 21-23 (1991), 473-94.
11. Attention was first drawn to this register in a study dedicated to the judicial competences of the *kadı* courts: R. Gradeva, 'Za pravorazdavatelnite kompetentsii na kadiyskiya sąd prez XVII vek' [On the Judicial Competences of the *Kadı* Court in the Seventeenth Century], *Istoricheski Pregled*, 1993/3, 109.
12. See for more details R. Gradeva, 'The Ottoman Balkans – a Zone of Fractures or a Zone of Contacts?', in A. Bues (ed.), *Zones of Fracture in Modern Europe: The Baltic Countries, the Balkans, and Northern Italy / Zone di frattura in epoca moderna: il Baltico, i Balcani e l'Italia settentrionale* (Wiesbaden 2005), 61-75.

for short terms, as part of the administration, as members of the janissary garrison, for trade, as craftsmen or offering a variety of services in response to the existing demand. My natural focus will be the local elite but some details about the 'visitors' will, too, be used in drawing the image of the Sofian 'rich'.

The Source and its Limitations

The *tereke defter* on which this paper is based had remained unknown to Bulgarian scholars until the 1990s and was not used in the comprehensive study by N. Todorov of the Balkan city which otherwise attributes due attention to inheritance lists as a major source for urban social structure in the Balkan cities under Ottoman rule.¹³ Some of the data from it have been used in studies on women,¹⁴ private book collections in Sofia,¹⁵ and charity.¹⁶

The register opens with the beginning of the incumbency of Parsa Mehmed Efendi as *kadı* of Sofia,¹⁷ but has no ending. 286 inventories are recorded on its 149 pages. No fewer than three are entered twice¹⁸ and one represents a list of the moveable and immoveable property handed to the wife and mother of the under-age children of the richest inhabitant of Sofia whose estate was divided in the court.¹⁹ This leaves us with 282 inventories. Of these, one is unfinished²⁰ and one contains

13. Todorov, *The Balkan City*, 127-84 in particular.

14. Todorova, 'Zhenite v Sofiya', is largely based on data from this register.

15. Sabev, 'Private Book Collections', *passim*; R. Gradeva, 'Reading, Literacy and Magic in Sofia in the 1670s', unpublished paper read at the 13th Congress of CIEPO, Warsaw, June 2004.

16. S. Ivanova, 'Hristiyanska i myusyulmanska blagotvoritelnost po bălgarskite zemi, XVI-XVIII vek (dokumenti, uchastnitsi i institutsii)' [Christian and Muslim Charity in Bulgarian Lands, Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries (Documents, Participants and Institutions)], in P. Mitev (ed.), *Daritelstvo i vzaimopomosht v bălgarskoto obshtestvo (XVI-nachaloto na XX vek)* [Donation and Mutual Aid in Bulgarian Society (Sixteenth-Beginning of Twentieth Century)] (Sofia 2003), 7-110 (*passim*).

17. R. Gradeva, 'On Kadis of Sofia, 16th-17th Centuries', in eadem, *Rumeli under the Ottomans, 15th-18th Centuries: Communities and Institutions* (Istanbul 2004), 85-86.

18. Oriental Department of the 'Sts Cyril and Methodius' National Library of Sofia (hereafter the collection will be omitted unless different from this one), S 12, p. 110, doc. VI (incomplete), and p. 112, doc. II, of Hadice bt Abdullah; p. 125, doc. II, and p. 140, doc. I, of Gŭlzar bt Abdullah (in the former document the name of the deceased is Gŭlfetar bt Abdullah but all other details, including the names of the husband and the neighbourhood, and the list of the belongings coincide fully); p. 137, doc. I, and p. 145, doc. I, of Debbag Hasan b. Abdullah, all from the *mahalle* of Hacı İsmail. It is difficult to interpret these double records; it is unclear whether they may be attributed to some specific characteristic of the neighbourhood.

19. S 12, p. 29, doc. I, and p. 149, doc. I, of İsmail Ağa b. Sefer, *zaim*, from the *mahalle* of Yazıcıoğlu.

20. It belongs to Abdŭlaziz b. Yusuf, from the *mahalle* of Kuru Çeşme; it bears no date but is recorded with dates from 1088. His sole heirs were his wife and a cousin on the paternal side. The list of the assets in the estate seems full or almost full as it ends with money loans

only part of the valuation.²¹ The estates of the majority of the deceased high officials, some military men and other visitors, belonging to the group of temporary residents of Sofia, were inventoried but not valued. Probably their possessions, rather than their monetary value, were taken elsewhere. The register also contains a number of 'accompanying' documents related to the appointment of guardians and allowances of under-age orphans, settlement of debts after the death of a debtor, property transactions with inherited property, gifts (*hibe*), disputes about inherited property, and even a marriage contract.²²

The register was kept during the tenures of several *kadis*, covering the period between 1082 and 1089 A.H. (October 1671-February 1678),²³ but this had only a minor effect on the way the inventories were compiled. Chronologically the documents are distributed rather unevenly. In fact, they range between ten for 1085 A.H. and sixty-two for 1087 A.H., with only one from 1089. One wonders about the principles of registration of the inventories as we find ones from 1084 among those from 1085 and 1086. The same is also true of the other years. In fact, an inventory from 1083 is written immediately after the opening formula of the *sicil*, followed by a body of documents from 1082, as if the scribe was looking for some blank space to record it. Within the same year documents are sometimes also registered a bit chaotically.²⁴ Thus for 1083 the chronological order of the first inventories is from the months of Şaban, Muharrem, Safer, Zilkade, Rebiyülevvel, Cemaziyelevvel, etc. Some inventories were recorded much later than the actual death. Probably specific but revealing is the case of the undated inventory of Ahmed Ağa b. Yakub Çavuş, who perished in the town of Anabolu during the Cretan campaign, that is, before 1669, "[blank] years before this entry in the register", registered among

(but we do not know if these were all) he had made, which usually occupy a place at the end of an inventory. The other two parts, however, are missing – the taxes, dues, possible debts, the *mehr*, as well as the shares of the heirs. Perhaps the reason was that some of the items, including the house, were not valued. While we may take it into account for some of the basic statistics – it clearly belongs to a 'middle-class' man from Sofia – it should be dropped from the number that we shall process for our main purpose in this essay.

21. Unfortunately this is one of the most interesting estates of Sofian women, Ayşe bt Hafız Mehmed from the *mahalle* of Yazıcıoğlu, 27 Zilhicce 1087. Her heirs were her husband and two under-age grandchildren. The first part of the inventory was properly drawn up and divided among the heirs. Then follows a second list, explicitly saying that these were "hidden objects" which were valued and the money was directly handed to the children's guardian, different from Ayşe's current husband. Then comes a third one more or less lumped with the second, of objects (several books and other belongings), which, however, lack valuation and were, too, handed directly to the guardian.

22. S 12, p. 111, doc. III.

23. Gradeva, 'On Kadis of Sofia', *passim*. I shall discuss details of the legal procedures and of the structure of the inventories elsewhere.

24. Here my observations are in line with those of Pascual, 'Les inventaires – Damas', 45, but the records in this register do not allow me to speculate on the reasons for the lack of strict chronology.

documents from 20 Şevval 1082 and 1 Zilkade 1082 (1672), but preceded and followed by documents from 1083 (1672-73).²⁵ Its registration, most probably re-registration, might have been caused by problems following the death of Ahmed Ağa's brother, who had expended all of Ahmed's estate.²⁶

The issue of the 'speed' in inventorying the estates, or rather, of the period elapsing between the actual death and its 'processing' by the *kadı* court official emerges, for example, in one of the estates recorded twice in the register. The unfinished list of the property left by Hasan b. Abdullah, a tanner from the *mahalle* of Hacı İsmail who had no known heirs and for that reason his estate was owed to the *beytülmal*, was first recorded on 6 Zilkade 1088. It includes an unvalued house as well as very modest clothes and bedding (worth altogether 596 *akçes*), but it is not clear if that was all. The second one, more or less identical with the former in its first part describing the deceased, bears the date of 4 Muharrem 1089, that is nearly two months later. Its second part, however, contains only an integral sum – 3,730 *akçes*, followed by the deducted dues and taxes, and the amount that was handed to the *emin* of the Treasury. What caused this delay is unclear. Probably this time was needed for the sale of the house.²⁷ In any case, it leaves us with certain questions about the procedures. Sometimes one has the impression that the court official was registering the inventories by neighbourhoods,²⁸ or during a round tour in the nearby villages,²⁹ but neither of these can be considered to have been the rule. Occasionally we observe something which I would call 'integrated' family estates. These include a sequence of inventories belonging to members of one family, often pointing to the fact that the death of an heir had occurred during or shortly after the inventorying, probably between the inventorying and entering it in the *sicil*,³⁰

25. S 12, p. 27, doc. II.

26. I shall discuss the case of the two brothers below.

27. S 12, p. 137, doc. I, and p. 145, doc. I. The other cases of second registration of the same entry show some variations: with Gülzar bt Abdullah (p. 125, doc. II; p. 140, doc. I), the two entries are absolutely identical in terms of content and date; with Hadice bt Abdullah (p. 110, doc. VI; p. 112, doc. II), the dates are identical, but the first entry includes an unvalued house, and has a couple of items fewer than the second. It is not clear whether the sale of the house was the reason for the second entry.

28. See for example S 12, p. 70, doc. I (26 Şevval 1084), and p. 70, doc. II (16 Safer 1086), respectively of Ahmed b. Abdullah and Lâlezar bt Abdullah, both inhabitants of the *mahalle* of Kara Danişmend; p. 78, doc. I (6 Muharrem 1086), and p. 78, doc. II (7 Muharrem 1086) of Mustafa b. [missing] and Saliha bt Abdullah, both from the *mahalle* of Kurşunlu, etc.

29. See, for example, S 12, the inventories entered on p. 5, docs II and III (from the village of Golyam Lozen); p. 6, doc. I (the village of Verdekálna); p. 6, doc. II (the village of Chelopezch); all of them of Orthodox Christians.

30. See, for example, S 12, p. 2, doc. I (shortly after the death of Kenan Bey, his wife Ayşe bt Abdullah also died, leaving only their under-age son, 11-20 Cemaziyelâhır 1082); p. 8, doc. II (the estate of Bekir b. Ömer: more or less at the same time as the division of the estate his father died, and his share from Bekir's estate was given for safe-keeping, 15 Receb 1082); p. 40, doc. I, and p. 41, doc. I (of el-Hac Mehmed and his son Ahmed, from

but not necessarily – sometimes they are recorded in succession but with different dates.³¹

The limitations of these registers as a source for more general conclusions have been pointed out by all the scholars who have used them.³² Here I shall go into details which concern only the peculiarities of the Sofian register. In his major capacity of protector of the 'weak', the sharia judge was at least in theory involved when, irrespective of their religious affiliation, there were under-age heirs, a pregnant wife, or any of the heirs was missing. These are actually the vast majority of the estates in this register. The *kadı*'s involvement was also needed when the debts of the deceased exceeded the value of the estate. These cases also constitute a significant number of the available estates of people belonging to all layers of Sofian society. The *kadı* court also had to be approached for the valuation of the estates of people who had died without heirs, or where the existing heirs were to receive only part of the shares of an estate according to the Islamic inheritance law, such as when just one spouse was the single heir. In both cases the agent of the Treasury was there to collect the state's due, or the whole estate. This would very often be the case also with janissaries when their local *kethüda* served also as the agent of the treasury of the corps. The fear of inter-regional and international traders who were in an alien milieu that the Treasury could lay hands on their properties may be the main reason why some of them summoned representatives of the *kadı* court at their deathbeds and named their direct heirs, or made a bequest.³³ Soldiers, too, appointed other people as executors (*vasi-i muhtar*) of their 'wills', but it is not clear what their role was in the case when there were no legal heirs.³⁴ The *kadı* court was invited to

the *mahalle* of Saat, Sofia, 9 Ramazan and 5 Şevval 1083); p. 59, doc. I (the estates of a Christian family – İstano bt Jovan and Mihno v. Petre, in the *mahalle* of el-Hac Bayram, Sofia, registered in succession but as one document, 27 Zilkade 1083); p. 117, doc. I (of Ebu Bekir b. Nasuh, and his under-age son Mustafa, from the *mahalle* of Cami-i Atik, Sofia, 1 Şevval 1087) and many others.

31. See, for example, S 12, p. 5, docs II and III (the estates of Boshko v. Todori and of his sister-in-law Milka, which mention the recent death of the brother of Boshko and husband of Milka – Kalin, all from the village of Golyam Lozen, resp. 11-20 and 1-10 Receb 1082).
32. Cf. Veinstein and Triantafyllidou-Baladié, 'Les inventaires – Crète', 195-96; Pascual, 'Les inventaires – Damas', 47; Rafeq, 'Registers of Succession', 480-81.
33. See S 12, p. 99, doc. II, of 1 Zilhice 1086, which contains an inventory of the property of an Armenian called İrakli, inhabitant of the village of Şurutli, in the *nahiye* of Nahiçevan, in *diyar-ı Acem*, compiled at his request and in the presence of his son, whom he named as his sole heir.
34. I encounter the term *vasi-i muhtar* usually in estates of janissaries and high military officers. Sometimes the documents explicitly mention that the deceased had under-age heirs, or just heirs, in which case the person in question was expected to hand them the inheritance or its monetary value. See, for example, S 149, f. 5v, doc. V, of 1684: the *zaim* Mehmed Bey declared in the sharia court in Sofia that Kapıcı Mehmed Ağa from a *kasaba* in the *sancak* of Ankara had died in the house of Abdurrahman Efendi in Sofia. Before that, he had appointed him as his *vasi-i muhtar* with the obligation to pay his

value an estate also when a person was reported missing. The property or its monetary equivalent was then given for safe-keeping. Though not very frequently, the judge's intervention was called for in the event of discord among the lawful adult heirs concerning the division. Several inheritance inventories in the Sofian register seem to have been drafted because of disagreement among the heirs. A typical case concerns a Christian family, the heirs of Spas v. Pavle, from the *mahalle* of Kara Danişmend, that is, his wife Elka, his sister Sveto, and his brother's son, Stojan v. Marko, all of age. Six days after the division of a modest estate, amounting to 6,330 *akçes*, Elka and Sveto returned to the sharia court. This time it was clearly a conflict about the inherited property, a house that the deceased had presented as a gift to his wife but which his sister was trying to occupy. Elka's cause was supported by the testimony of two Muslims and the house remained in her hands.³⁵

The register gives very little information about the members of non-Muslim communities. Of these we may actually speak only of Christians – 36 estates, of which three belonged to Armenians who were temporarily based in Sofia *hans*; one was identified as a *zimmi* from Niš with the name of Da(v)id,³⁶ one is clearly an immigrant from Christian lands, a *zimmi*, but his religious affiliation is not clear,³⁷ two more temporary inhabitants of the town were also identified as *zimmis*, clearly Christians, but again the denomination remains unknown.³⁸ Ten of the estates of Christians belong to villagers, both men and women. This leaves us with only 19 estates of local Orthodox urbanites, both men and women. No estates of Jews, settled Armenians, or Ragusans reached the sharia court during the period in question.³⁹ Members of these groups appear only as partners, moneylenders, neighbours, etc. in the register; Jews in particular were moneylenders, more rarely

debts and hand the rest to his heirs in the Anatolian town. Mehmed Bey started a lawsuit against the *emin* of the *beytülmal*, who wanted to lay hands on the estate, claiming that the deceased had no known heirs. In other cases, however, the appointment of such an agent may probably be regarded as an instrument used to avoid the seizure of the property by the Treasury in favour of a 'preferred legatee'. Thus, the *vasi-i muhtar* of Ali Ağa, *kethüda* of the Rumeli *vali*, who had perished on the battlefield at Vienna (1683), disputed the right of the *emin* of the *beytülmal* to seize the property which had been left to him. No other heirs are mentioned. See S 149, f. 1r, doc. II, of 1684; also, *ibid.*, f. 4v, doc. II.

35. S 12, p. 42, doc. III, of 4 Şevval 1083, and p. 43, doc. I, of 10 Şevval 1083; see also, for example, p. 106, doc. II of Hadice bt İbrahim, whose heirs were her husband and adult brother.

36. The name leads me to think that the person was either a Jew or an Armenian.

37. This is one of the interesting personages who appear in the pages of the register – under the name of *Koçiyaş*, the current Serbian and Bulgarian word for *koçucu*, that is, a coachman. We learn only that he was a *zimmi*, but *fil'asl ... keferesinden olub*. Unfortunately we can only guess about his place of origin, probably Hungary or Austria (S 12, p. 84, doc. II).

38. Marko v. Krsto and Zoto (S 12, p. 109, docs II and III).

39. Cf. Veinstein and Triantafyllidou-Baladié, 'Les inventaires – Crète', 197; Pascual, 'Les inventaires – Damas', 46.

debtors. However fragmentary this information, it still allows some clues to be traced about financially strong Jews.

There are no precise data about the size of the religious communities during the seventeenth century. One of the latest extant *mufassal* registers of Sofia, dating from 1595, reveals the following correlation between the religious groups in the town: 920 Muslim households and unmarried men, including eight Gypsies, a number which does not take into account the *askerî* residing in the town; 499 Christians, including 32 Gypsies, but not the higher clergy including the Metropolitan and his entourage with his see in Sofia; 126 Jews.⁴⁰ From a *cizye defter* of 1666-67 we learn that there were 327 'infidel' taxpayer households in the town of Sofia⁴¹ without internal confessional division. I actually wonder if this number of non-Muslims includes Jews at all, as they seem to have paid the *cizye* and other taxes as a separate community and in a lump sum (*maktu*), and to have figured as such even in the *icmal defters*, their taxes being collected by special collectors.⁴² Such a serious drop, even if the number is for Christians only, can be explained either by an advanced level of the Islamisation process among non-Muslims,⁴³ by an outbreak of plague,⁴⁴ or, most likely, both. This, however, does not explain the lack of estates

40. N. Genç, *XVI. Yüzyıl Sofya Mufassal Tahrir Defteri'nde Sofya Kazası* (Eskişehir 1988), 31-32, 119-48.

41. S. Andreev and S. Dimitrov (eds), *Turski izvori za bālgarskata istoriya* [Turkish Sources for Bulgarian History] (Sofia 2001), 358. This number does not look fully reliable to me as about twenty years earlier, in 1640-46, another *cizye* register gives exactly the same figures for Sofia (ibid., 174). Cf. E. Grozdanova, *Bālgarskata narodnost prez XVII vek. Demografsko izsledvane* [The Bulgarian Nationality During the Seventeenth Century: A Demographic Study] (Sofia 1989), 113.

42. See the receipts for the Jewish *cizye* in S. Andreev (ed.), *Ottoman Documents on Balkan Jews, XVIth-XVIIth Centuries* (Sofia 1990), 22 (for Silistre, 1622, Filibe [Plovdiv], 1635, Selānik, 1677-78), 23 (for the *ispence* paid by Jews in Sofia, 1638), 37 (for the *ispence* to be collected from the Jews in the *kaza* of Sofia, 1681-82). In all those cases Jews paid separately from the other non-Muslim communities. There were special collectors for their taxes, estimated as *maktu*, without specifying the number of the *hanes*.

43. I could not find relevant data about the number of the Muslims, and it is impossible to judge whether there was a general drop of the number of Sofians, or whether this only applied to non-Muslims in general or even only to Christians, but the very high number of people bearing Abdullah as a patronym and other details suggest widespread conversion to Islam among the Christians in Sofia at the time of the compilation of the *tereke defter*, a fact that I shall discuss elsewhere. For the sake of correctness, however, I should mention that once or twice in this register Abdullah appears as a given name.

44. The plague as a possible factor is also supported by the above-mentioned 'integrated' family estates. I was unable to find direct evidence about it at the time of the compilation of the register in Bulgarian local sources and in the contemporaneous accounts of Austrian and German diplomats who had crossed the city on their way to or back from the Ottoman capital, although they usually contain shorter or more detailed descriptions of the town. On the other hand, English accounts, though not from Sofia, speak of plague in various parts of the Balkans in 1669 and 1675. In the first case, it is about Belgrade where it had dwindled, and in Priština where the travellers encountered one Muslim who

of Jews and the very low number of those of Christians. It is highly unlikely that for six or seven years not a single Jew would fall into the categories in which the intervention of the court was compulsory. Rather, I am inclined to think that one should see in this fact the active role of the community structures. In the case of Jews throughout the Ottoman period, these structures were very strong in Sofia and their role can be traced in all aspects of the relations between them and the Ottoman authorities.⁴⁵

It seems that by the seventeenth century the Orthodox Church was, too, beginning to recover from the blow inflicted on its prestige and network by the Ottoman conquest. This found an expression in a more active policy, though less successful than that of the rabbis, aimed at prevention of contacts between its flock and the Ottoman institutions, the *kadı* court in particular.⁴⁶ I tend to believe that the number of the Christian Sofians' estates is an indirect indication that this policy was more successful in the field of inheritance law, but failed in the prevention of conversions. The number of the local Christian Sofians' inventories of men and women (19) for a period of more than seven full years, compared to their 327 *hanes*, makes them a rather weak source basis for the study of social divisions within this confession.

Further limitations on the use of the *tereke defters* – actually for any purposes and not just for this paper, emerge from another cross-section of the estates related to the correlation between 'urban' and 'rural' estates. The *defter* contains only 18 'rural' estates – of 14 peasants (nine Christians and five Muslims), two employees in a *çiftlik* (one Muslim and one Christian), and two Muslims who belong to the *askerî* group: a *bey* (who was until shortly before his death also a citizen of Sofia) and a *sipahi*. The *cizye defter* of 1666 records 2,202 *hanes* for the whole Sofia district, that is, 1,878 Christian *hanes* for the villages. There is no positive information about the number of the Muslim ones, the impression being that they were by far fewer than those of the non-Muslims in the hinterland of the city. Although the *cizye hane* seems to have been very much a financial institution and not necessarily directly related to the actual number of non-Muslims, this still means that the 'rural' estates recorded in the *sicil* are far from representative for the villagers, both Christians and Muslims.

was sick (Edward Browne); in July 1675 the plague attacked Edirne causing, according to John Covel, the death of nearly half of the city's population. I have used Bulgarian translations of these travel accounts. Cf. M. Todorova (ed.), *Anglijski pātepsi za Balkanite (kraya na XVI-30te godini na XIX vek)* [English Travel Accounts about the Balkans (End of Sixteenth Century–1830s)] (Sofia 1987), 174, 181, 237 ff. Unfortunately I cannot tell for sure what happened between these two years and between these two parts of the peninsula, but I am inclined to think that the plague might have raged there all that time.

45. R. Gradeva, 'Jews and the Ottoman Authority in the Balkans: The Cases of Sofia, Vidin and Rusçuk, 15th-17th Centuries', in eadem, *Rumeli under the Ottomans*, 280-85.

46. Eadem, 'Turks and Bulgarians, Fourteenth to Eighteenth Centuries' and 'Orthodox Christians in the Kadi Courts: The Practice of the Sofia Sheriat Court, Seventeenth Century', in *ibid.*, 195-216, 193-94.

Indeed, Christian city-dwellers are better represented in the *tereke defter* than the villagers, and here we should take into account distance as an important factor, making the villages less accessible to Ottoman officials.⁴⁷ This allowed the peasants to avoid the intervention of the Ottoman institutions and to resort to customary law rather than to the Sharia or canon law. In the villages the authority of the local communal self-rule institutions was much stronger and in only one case is there no 'visible' reason for the court's intervention – that is, all heirs were of age and present, and we may suspect disagreement in the family, who were seeking an independent and impartial institution.

A gender cross-section shows that inventories of women constitute around 36% of all estates, a number comparable with all other parts of the Empire. This percentage, however, is a direct result of the much higher mobility among men, as all estates of visitors belong to men – Muslim and Christian. Of the 246 Muslim estates, 22 belong to 'outsiders', all men – officials, janissaries, traders and craftsmen, temporary settlers, just visitors of unknown purpose, people on their way to and back from the hajj, which leaves us with 224 estates of locals, eight being of people residing in villages. Of the locals, 126 are men and 98 women, the latter being about 44% (or 45% if we consider city-dwellers only), which may be regarded as a more or less normal ratio. Only one of the estates of Muslim residents in villages belongs to a woman. The situation with the Christians is different. Of all the 36 Christian estates, only 29 belong to people living in the city or in the villages of the *kaza*, the rest being of visitors. While women's estates are slightly fewer than 28% of all Christians', of the 19 estates of Christian Sofians nine belong to women, that is, slightly fewer than 50%. Only one of the ten estates of Christian villagers belongs to a woman. One wonders if that striking similarity with the situation with Muslim women does not reflect the relation of peasant women to property.

The vast majority of estates belong to adults. Only seven are described as belonging to minors – three to Christians and four to Muslims.⁴⁸ Sometimes I wonder, however, how adult some of the adults were, as some indirect evidence makes

47. Rafeq reports a similar situation in the case of Damascus and Aleppo in 1861. He mentions also that this might have been the result of a special policy and that only larger estates reached the court in the city, while the minor ones were dealt with by *kassams* in minor places (Rafeq, 'Registers of Succession', 481). This explanation, however, is inapplicable in our case, as there were hardly any other judicial authorities around Sofia. Cf. also Veinstein and Triantafyllidou-Baladié, 'Les inventaires – Crète', 197.

48. S 12, p. 10, doc. IV, and p. 11, doc. I: of Nikolcho and Kaliche, the son and daughter of an unnamed Christian; p. 28: of Hadice bt Ahmed Ağa; p. 41, doc. I: of Ahmed b. el-Hac Mehmed; p. 88, doc. II: of Marcho bt Gyorgo; p. 120, doc. I: of Ümmühanı bt el-Hac Nasuh; p. 120, doc. III: of Havva bt el-Hac Mehmed b. Abdullah. Some of these rank among the wealthiest citizens of Sofia with only their shares from their parents' estates, others are more of the 'middle-class' group.

me believe that they were not very much past childhood. A few among them seem to have been very young people.⁴⁹

In perusing the inventories, one wonders what actually reached the *kadı* – not only in terms of percentage of the whole population of a town or a district, but also what part of the estate itself. In the first place, the inventories do not include landed possessions which were subject to the *miri* regime, but only vineyards and gardens. Occasionally there would be a *çiftlik* but what we find valued are mainly various implements, grain, cattle, but no cultivable plots as explicitly indicated items, the *çiftlik* as an integral compound sometimes explicitly including the sown fields, in which case it was the seeds and the sowing that were taken into account.⁵⁰

Besides, one should bear in mind the fact that the estates of the ‘outsiders’ – be they janissaries, officials, merchants, or just visitors – in most cases constitute only part of the possessions of the deceased, but we do not know what part. One of the most highly valued among them, three chests of belongings including books of Mehmed Mecdi Efendi, *defter emini* and inhabitant of Istanbul, are clearly just a portion of his entire property. They were sent to Sofia by his son in order to meet the debt of the deceased to a Sofian Jew, amounting to 1,060 *guruş*.⁵¹ The estates of higher officials would often lack valuation; just an inventory would be drawn up. This issue should be also considered in the cases of those who had died away from home – in the Cretan campaign, the Polish campaign,⁵² in a battle with bandits (*haydud eşkıyası*), on the way to or back from the hajj. The case of the above-mentioned Ahmed Ağa, where a variety of factors cross, leads me to believe that what we have is sometimes less than the entire bulk of the estate. It is explicitly stated in his inventory that in the capacity of *kassam-ı askerî* and guardian of his under-age nephews, the brother of the deceased, Mustafa Ağa, had laid hands on the inheritance and spent it all. The list in this register was compiled years later with a view to protecting the interests of the grandmother and the two under-age sons of Ahmed Ağa, and is probably far from the gross value of the estate of the deceased. The inventory includes a list of 25 “books of the estate of the deceased Ahmed Ağa

49. The age of adulthood is a rather slippery issue. While girls at the age of nine are treated as ‘marriageable’, and boys at seven as leaving childhood, twelve is generally regarded as the time when both sexes enter adulthood; however, the actual age for each person depended on their physical qualities and especially on their ‘reason’ (*akıl*), which could postpone adulthood until they reached seventeen or eighteen years of age. See O. Todorova, *Zhenite ot Tsentralnite Balkani prez osmanskata epoha (XV-XVII vek)* [Women in the Central Balkans in Ottoman Times, Fifteenth-Seventeenth Centuries] (Sofia 2004), 201-03, and the bibliography cited there.

50. See, for example, S 12, p. 18.

51. S 12, p. 125, doc. II, n.d., probably end of 1087/beginning of 1088: the difference over and above the debt, after deducting court expenses, was handed to the son. In this case, it is not even a death in Sofia but part of an estate of a person who had probably spent some time in Sofia incurring a considerable debt.

52. S 12, p. 28, doc. II, of 21-29 Safer 1083: a sale of a house inherited from a person who had perished in that war.

which were discovered", but we do not know how close this list is to his original book collection, especially bearing in mind that his brother was also a book-lover, with a private collection which is very impressive by contemporaneous Sofia standards. There are also objects given to the mother of two of his children, but we do not know if the mother of his third child was still alive, a widow or divorced at the time of Ahmed Ağa's death, that is, whether she had received any share from his estate. Some of the property had been handed to the heirs. The question, however, remains whether the over 642,170-*akçe* estate is actually all that was left by him.⁵³ In another case (of a man who perished in an attack by the *hayduds*), the text explicitly says that his belongings had been plundered by the bandits. There is no evidence what their value was but another note indicates expenses for the transporting of his property from the site of his death to Sofia.⁵⁴

Other cases also seem to show convincingly that legators and legatees tried to avoid the intervention of the judicial officials, and if possible reduce the estate subject to court expenses. It is in this context that one should probably view the frequent intra-family gifts and transactions declared on the deathbed and bequests within the family.⁵⁵ Clearly heirs also tried to conceal at least part of the estate. Among the possible reasons for these practices must have been the afore-mentioned

53. S 12, p. 27, doc. I, n.d.

54. S 12, p. 29, doc. I, of 10 Safer 1083.

55. See, for example, S 85, p. 31, doc. III, of 1680: el-Hac Hızır b. Kuli donated his house in the *mahalle* of Mansur Hoca to his under-age daughter Meryem. From the delineation of the borders of the property we learn that his son was living 'next door'; S 149, f. 6v, doc. II, of 1684: in the presence of court officials, Margaruna bt Kostadin declared as her only heir the youth Panayot, the son of her brother Kostadin; *ibid.* f. 8v, doc. I, of 1684: through a proxy, Fatma bt Ali declared at the sharia court that a year and a half earlier she had presented a house in her full ownership as a gift to her husband Şeyh Ahmed b. Abdullah; *ibid.*, f. 6v, doc. I, of 1684: Hüseyin b. Arslan, a youth from the *mahalle* of Kız Kasım, declared that he had received as a gift (*hibe*) from his father a saddler's shop, half of which with half of its cellar (*mağaza*) he sold to Mustafa Çelebi b. Eyüb; S 12, p. 63, doc. II, of 1 Muharrem 1084: a dispute between Ayşe bt Abdullah, a step-daughter (*rebibe*) and freed slave (*mutaka*) of the deceased İftab bt Abdullah, and the proxy of Musa Çavuş b. Mehmed Ağa, former master of İftab. The bone of contention was a gift (clothes, household articles, furniture, bed sheets, pillows etc., and a pair of gold earrings) made by the deceased to Ayşe, which was claimed by Musa Çavuş. These objects were not valued as they were recognised as the donated property of Ayşe, while the former master received the rest of the estate at the amount of 11,892 *akçes* (before deducting court expenses); *ibid.*, p. 82, doc. I, of 14 Rebiyülevvel 1086: the property of Şaban b. Muharrem, one of the wealthiest persons in Sofia if we trust the register, with an estate at the amount of 516,943 *akçes*, was divided between his wife and under-age son. It transpires from the expenditure, however, that before his death he had made several donations to certain individuals, to the *avarız vakıf* of the *mahalle* of Kara Şahin, and to his wife – from the price of a slave at the amount of 10,000 *akçes*, etc.

court expenses, which could represent a rather high percentage of the estate.⁵⁶ A series of three documents all recorded on the same date, introduce us to a family tragedy but also to a possible attempt to hide some of the family property. According to the first entry, an unnamed Christian, an inhabitant of the *mahalle* of Kalojan, left to his widow, one son and three daughters a rather strange inheritance consisting of several large casks, including one with *cibre*,⁵⁷ one made of metal, and three for pickled cabbage, as well as of one horse, the crops of a vineyard and seeds, all amounting to 28,231 *akçes* (21,600 came from the grapes alone). We see that considerable expenditure was due for *hizmetkârs* and processing the grapes, still leaving a sum of 11,580 *akçes* which would put the deceased among the largest group of 'middle-class' legators according to the register. But the interesting part comes in the next two entries – related to the estates of two of his children, who died shortly after one another. It then emerges that this is actually an additional division, probably of property that had not been declared on the first occasion. Then, the under-age son Nikolcho alone had received 75,990 *akçes*, making the total of his share more than 80,000 altogether, and one of the under-age daughters 37,995 *akçes*,⁵⁸ a fact which puts the father among the wealthiest Sofians.

Estates left by single persons, especially those residing in a *han*, were certainly more liable to encroachment by neighbours, colleagues, partners, acquaintances, or others. The rather modest property of an Osman Beşe, a janissary who died at the Banabaşı Han in Sofia, was received by the town's *serdar* of the janissaries, who also acted as the *emin* of the janissary *beytülmal* in the town; the *serdar* immediately took to court another janissary accusing him of having misappropriated 100 *esedi gurus* and other smaller and larger items of the property of the deceased.⁵⁹

In the end, a major issue when we discuss the *muhallefat* registers is the reliability of the values of the objects, that is, whether they corresponded to real market prices, or were either above or below them. While it is true that the sharia court officials might have been interested in artificially inflating them, I would agree with the conclusion of J.-P. Pascual that this might have been very difficult in the presence of local people, especially since very often the possessions were sold at

56. The amount of the expenses as well as the details of the court procedure as it emerges from the Sofian inventories will be dealt with elsewhere within the context of the *kadı* court procedures. See for the situation in Crete and Damascus, respectively, Veinstein and Triantafyllidou-Baladié, 'Les inventaires – Crète', 196, and Pascual, 'Les inventaires – Damas', 54.

57. Residue of pressed grapes, which is used for the production of *rakı*.

58. S 12, p. 10, docs III and IV, and p. 11, doc. I, 1-10 Şaban 1082. Unfortunately neither the name nor the real property of the man in question have reached us. Yet this case clearly shows that non-Muslims did not occupy only the lowest steps of the social ladder. See for a similar case of hiding of property, p. 123, doc. I, the estate of Ayşe bt Hafız Mehmed (n. 21).

59. S 12, p. 42, doc. I, 21-30 Ramazan 1083: including a horse, a saddle, a cheap sword, some clothes, of a value of 3,013 *akçes* (p. 42, doc. II).

auction. In any case, our sources never refer to the current prices in the town.⁶⁰ However, we do not know the exact procedures, and hence the way in which the values were calculated, especially in the cases when the lawful heirs actually bought up the items in the estate without attending publicly. Besides, houses are not described in the inventories from Sofia, and we cannot compare them with the prices of those in ordinary transactions.⁶¹ Two cases show that practices varied. In the first, the valuation of the court official was confirmed by a subsequent sale of a house.⁶² The second shows a significant difference between the transaction price and the court valuation. This, however, might be attributed not only to a conscious attempt on the part of the court official to collect a higher fee as expenses, but also to a deliberately reduced price in a sale between close relatives, probably with the purpose of paying lower taxes.⁶³

To conclude, it is clear that this *tereke defter*, like all others, is far from being a panacea and confronts us with serious drawbacks. The estates belong to a mix including *askerî* and *reaya*, rich and poor, townsmen and villagers, manumitted slaves, Muslims and non-Muslims, men and women, mainly adults but also under-age children, local people and temporary residents with diverse occupations and backgrounds, who contributed to the diversity of attire and languages in the city. Much of the information contained in it is haphazard but certainly not to be neglected. It provides interesting details but should be used as a statistical source only with caution. It does, however, include members of most segments of Sofian society. Its very randomness, I believe, will allow us, if not to derive statistics, yet to delineate the features of the rich people as a group living in Sofia, our main goal in this study; with one definite qualification – that it is a much better source for Muslim men and women permanently residing in the Rumelian capital city than for any other group. In short, while it is clear that the *tereke defters* were not drawn up with the purpose of answering our questions, for the time being, with all the reservations that they arouse, we have no better source for the period before the Tanzimat for most of the topics that they have been used to study so far.

60. Cf. Veinstein and Triantafyllidou-Baladié, 'Les inventaires – Crète', 202-03; Pascual, 'Les inventaires – Damas', 54.

61. This seems to have been a universal practice. For Damascus, see *ibid.*, 52.

62. According to the inventory of the estate of Mustafa Ağa, he possessed a house located in the *mahalle* of Kara Şahin valued at 40,000 *akçes* in the inventory (S 12, p. 16-20, doc. I, 1-10 Şaban 1082). However, his debts exceeded his estate, and the house was sold at auction to one of the moneylenders of Mustafa Ağa, Yasef v. Samail, a Jew. Since nobody offered more than 40,000, it became the property of Yasef in return for a debt amounting to 46,200 *akçes* (1-10 Muharrem 1082).

63. R 2, f. 10v, doc. II, of 1695: the goldsmith Petre v. Gika sold his house in the village of Chervena Voda, in the *kaza* of Rusçuk, to his son-in-law Niko v. Nedelko for 350 *guruş*. Several months later the value of the same house was estimated at 380 *guruş* in the inventory of the estate of Niko, compiled after his death in an attack by bandits in Anatolia (R 2, f. 26v, doc. II).

Some General Information

Before proceeding with building up the portrait of the wealthy Sofians, I shall first undertake a more general description of the estates valued and divided in the *kadı* court in Sofia. I have opted to compile a very detailed table for both men and women to avoid the rather indiscriminate classification of the vast majority of the Sofian inhabitants into large blocks such as 1-10,000 *akçes* and 10-100,000 *akçes* which include people belonging to different worlds where the standard of life is concerned. The number of the estates is lower than that cited above, as I have included only those which allow valuation – if not exact, at least the group to which the estate belongs. Within the group of ‘visitors’ I have included Muslim and Christian craftsmen and merchants recorded as temporary residents in Sofia, janissaries and other members of the military, men on the way to or back from the hajj, as well as visitors who stayed in the city with no clear purpose, renting rooms in *hans*, *odas*, or lodged with local citizens. The ‘villagers’, too, are a rather diverse group including ordinary peasants, but also the *kethüda* and the *bostancı* of a *çiftlik* owner and two *askerî*, a *sipahi* who left a rather modest property compared even to many of the ordinary *reaya*, but also an Ali Bey who seems to have abandoned life in town in favour of the village only recently, and who left the largest ‘rural’ estate.

As a basis for comparison I have considered the value of the estate before deducting court expenses and the debts of the person in question. This may be misleading about the real situation, because sometimes the debts exceeded or nearly exhausted the whole estate. On the other hand, it is the whole estate that reveals the real standard of life of the person in question. A very ‘male urbanite’ phenomenon, indebtedness was pervasive among the poorest, but also among the wealthy Sofian Muslims.

Finally, I have chosen to draw up the tables on the basis of a men/women division instead of a religious one because of the clear similarities in the conduct of both Muslim and Christian men and women, one of the major differences being that we find no women visitors – for any reason – in the city, reflecting the more closed way of life of all women, a code of behaviour imposed, though with variations, by the three major religions. I am far from claiming that all women stayed passive and away from the active economy of the town. On the contrary, as one can see from the estates and from other documents, women were owners of shops (*dükân*) and moneylenders, but not only. On some occasions, especially among the poorer women, some items, such as significant quantities of threads and clothes, lead me to think that they were earning their living as seamstresses. Both wealthy and poor, however, seem to have been engaged mainly in occupations that allowed them to stay away from the buzz of the economic heart of the city. Very often the possession of shops or other property among women can easily be attributed to inheritance rather than to entrepreneurial behaviour on the market. Unfortunately the tiny number of estates of Christians, women and men alike, allows only impressionistic conclusions about their position in the city’s social structure.

MEN

Akçes	Christians				Muslims				Total %	
	Local	Visitors	Villagers	%	Local	Visitors	Villagers	%		
Less than 1,000	-	-	-	-	7	2	-	6.6	9	5.3
1,000-5,000	1	3	3	24	23	6	2	22.1	38	22.5
5,000-10,000	4	1	1	21	26	2	3	22.1	37	21.9
10,000-20,000	1	4	4	31	18	2	-	14.2	29	17.2
20,000-50,000	-	1	1	7	17	1	1	13.6	21	12.4
50,000-100,000	2	-	-	7	7	2	-	6.4	11	6.5
100,000-500,000	1(+1)	1	-	10	15	1	1	12.1	20	11.8
More than 500,000	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	2.9	4	2.4
Total	10	10	9	100	117	16	7	100	169	100

As revealed by the tables, the estates range between absolute poverty and a very high standard of life of local Muslims with a far from surprising clustering at the bottom of the social ladder, in the categories between 1,000–10,000 *akçes*, but also with a significant group that can be defined as well-off and rich – 15% of the Muslim men and 13% of all men whose estates were recorded in the register. Judging from the content of the unvalued lists of some of the ‘visitors’ belonging to the upper strata of Ottoman society, one may surmise that there was a considerable group of men of means residing in Sofia, local people but also many more officials appointed in the administrative centre of Rumeli and merchants drawn by trade and other economic opportunities. At the extreme pole of poverty were about five per cent of the men, interestingly only Muslims, very often bachelors. Some of the temporary residents, janissaries, qualified for that group. The latter fact leaves space for conjecture as to whether they were indeed as poor as the register shows, whether they had other property elsewhere or had everything on and with them, whether part of their belongings, especially cash, were not misappropriated, etc. There were janissaries and other visitors in all groups, and it is difficult to judge what percentage of their whole estate was included in the available lists.

In analysing the ‘Christian’ estates we should bear in mind their very low number in the register. Even this scanty source basis, however, shows that there were Christians, both local citizens and temporary residents, among the wealthy inhabitants of Sofia. Indeed, one of the latter, an Armenian merchant, left one of the most

interesting estates, amounting to more than 100,000 *akçes*. He was also the only one who had no close relative with him and hence his estate was probably more easily and fully accessible to the agent of the Treasury. It is only indirectly that one can judge in the case of one of the Christians whom I have included among those with an estate of over 100,000 *akçes*. As mentioned above, in this register we find only a second division of property left by him – among his wife, and four children, a boy and three girls. Immediately below follow the division of the estates of the son and one of the daughters stating the amounts they had received from the core mass of their father’s property; even a rough calculation makes it one of over 200,000 *akçes*.⁶⁴ Since the exact amount remains unknown, I have put him in brackets in the table above. None of the available estates of Christians, however, is comparable with those of the richest Muslims, mainly *askerî*, whose profile I shall delineate below. As in the case of the Muslim visitors, it is clear that the inventories of the Christian visitors constitute only a part, and we do not know what part, of their entire properties.

WOMEN

<i>Akçes</i>	Christians			Muslims			Total %	
	Town	Village	%	Town	Village	%		
Less than 1,000	-	-		9	-	9	9	8
1,000-5,000	4	1	50	35	1	37	41	38
5,000-10,000	4	-	40	28	-	29	32	30
10,000-20,000	-	-		6	-	6	6	5.5
20,000-50,000	-	-		11	-	11	11	10
50,000-100,000	1	-	10	2	-	2	3	3
More than 100,000	-	-		6	-	6	6	5.5
Total	9	1	100	97	1	100	108	100

Polarisation is more conspicuous among women. The clustering in the lowest ranks is even more pronounced among them, the vast majority having left between 1,000 and 10,000 *akçes*. Women who may be called wealthy are only a very sparse group. None of them, even the richest Muslims, had property exceeding 500,000 *akçes*. No Christian woman emerges with more than 100,000 and the one with the largest estate was actually a minor who had received it entirely from her recently deceased father and brother.

The two tables show the vast majority of the Christian (76%) and Muslim (67%) men in Sofia as having at the time of their deaths assets valued at less than

64. Each of the under-age daughters received around 40,000 *akçes*, and the son just above 80,000. We should also calculate the share of the wife, as well as probably the significant expenditure for servants, hired labour and taxes, deducted before estimating the shares of the legatees.

20,000 *akçes*, with around 50% of both groups at even less than 10,000. This is also true of women – with 90% of the Christian and 74% of the Muslim women having left belongings estimated at less than 10,000 *akçes*. The percentage of the women whose estate was smaller than 1,000 *akçes* was higher than that of men. Unlike men, only one of the nine poorest women died bankrupt. Others, among the richest, had accumulated debts, but this is not comparable with the pervasiveness of the phenomenon among men of all social strata. Thus, four of the poorest (less than 1,000 *akçes*) and seven of the next poorest Muslim men among the Sofian residents died bankrupt. Six more among this group had debts which exceeded one half of their estates. This practice certainly was not limited to the lowest ranks of society. Bankrupt or nearly bankrupt men appear in all categories. As we shall see below, one of the wealthiest men in Sofia was actually a true 'credit millionaire'. Another man of the same group also left very little to his family. Four men of the group with estates between 100,000 and 500,000 *akçes* were also heavily indebted, leaving to their families nothing or next to nothing compared to the original value of their estates.

The tables also show that property status was very much gender and religion-related. Certainly Muslim men had far more opportunities than Christian men and Muslim women, and Muslim women more than Christian women. Because of the limitations of the source, I cannot tell whether Christian men or Muslim women had better prospects of becoming rich. The tables show the latter to be in a better position but this may be attributed to the limited number of 'Christian' inventories, and the issue should be left open for further consideration. On the other hand, it is striking that no Christians, men or women, figure among the lowest stratum of Sofian society whose estates were valued at less than 1,000 *akçes*. Nearly 45% of both religious groups belonged to the next poorest groups. Thus, we see a far more polarised Muslim community – with very rich but also very poor men and women. As for the Christians, they emerge as a more homogeneous group, but this might be attributed also to the limitations of the source.

The Rich and the Poor: Spatial Distribution

An interesting problem in relation to our topic is whether there existed some sort of segregation on the basis of property status. Before delving into the analysis of the data from that perspective, I should make it clear that the register contains the estates of inhabitants of 46 Sofian neighbourhoods. Some of them have just one 'representative' in the *defter* and it is a very poor foundation for purposes of identifying it as a poor, 'middle-class' or rich living quarter. Besides, the list is far from being comprehensive as some of the most stable *mahalles* of the city's residential parts recorded in sixteenth, in contemporaneous seventeenth, and in eighteenth-century documents such as Gül Cami, Pop Miloş and Semerciler are missing from it. I have no explanation for this fact. For the rest, my judgement is based on data ranging from two (for quite a few quarters) to twenty-six (Kara Danişmend) inventories, which, too, makes it tentative and subject to modification.

As elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire during the seventeenth century, many of the neighbourhoods in Sofia had a mixed population, though some must have been entirely Muslim, and some probably Christian.⁶⁵ The situation, however, was fluid and some, which in the sixteenth century emerge as religiously homogeneous, seem to have changed their profile considerably in the seventeenth century as a result of a twofold process, namely, normal property transactions between members of all confessions, and conversion to Islam. Thus, in the 1595 registration the *mahalle* of Novasel had only Christian inhabitants. As its very name ('new village') and location on the city's periphery and outside its old fortress walls suggest, its original inhabitants must have been immigrants, probably from nearby villages.⁶⁶ The register of the 1670s already shows an advanced stage in the spread of Islam there, with one Christian estate of a person who left more than 50,000 *akçes* and two of recent converts, one of which is actually the poorest estate in Sofia according to the register.⁶⁷ Muslims bought property in the *mahalle*, too.⁶⁸ In 1595 Alaca Mescid was registered as an entirely Muslim quarter.⁶⁹ The five inhabitants of the *mahalle* whose estates are recorded in the 1670s register were also Muslims. However, the inventory of one of the 'visitors', a Pabuççu David from Niš, explicitly indicates that during his sojourns in Sofia, where he exercised his profession, he resided in that *mahalle*.⁷⁰ Unfortunately, the document does not reveal his exact whereabouts, which is usually indicated with other temporary Sofians. In 1595, Kara Danişmend and Cami-i Atîk⁷¹ were also purely Muslim, but the *tereke defter* registers Christian infiltration in both.

Where the wealthy Sofians lived and whether they chose to live separately

65. S. Dimitrov, 'Zanayati i tãrgoviya v Sofiya prez XVIII vek' [Crafts and Trade in Sofia During the Eighteenth Century], in P. Dinekov *et alii* (eds), *Sofiya prez vekovete: Drevnost, srednovekovie, vãzrazhdane* [Sofia through the Centuries: Antiquity, Middle Ages, Revival] (Sofia 1989), 95-97; R. Gradeva, 'Jews and Ottoman Authority', 253-56.

66. Genç, *Sofya Kazası*, 137.

67. The latter two belong to Ayşe bt Abdullah and her sister Fatma bt Abdullah, dating from 1 and 14 Şaban 1087 respectively (S 12, p. 110, docs I and II). A new convert was also their third sister Mazlûme as well as Fatma's under-age daughter Havva, all bearing Abdullah as their patronym.

68. See, for example, S 149, f. 22v, doc. III, of 24 Cemaziyelâhır 1095: Mitre v. Bodo sold to Ayşe bt Ahmed his house in the *mahalle* of Novasel, abutting on the properties of two Muslims and a Christian, and a public road.

69. At that time it was integral with Mescid-i Hacı Şirmerd (Genç, *Sofya Kazası*, 127-28) which in the 1670s exists already as a separate *mahalle*, unfortunately represented by only one estate.

70. S 12, p. 69, doc. II.

71. According to Evliya Çelebi, there was no larger old mosque in Sofia than Koca Mahmud Paşa's, that is, Cami-i Kebir. Cf. D. Gadžanov, 'Pätuvane na Evliya Çelebi iz bălgarskite zemi prez sredata na XVII vek' [A Journey of Evliya Çelebi through the Bulgarian Lands During the Mid-Seventeenth Century], *Periodichesko spisanie na BKD*, 70 (1909), 698. If this is the case, this *mahalle* was also adjacent to the shopping centre of the town.

from the poor are not easy questions given the fragmentary data we have. The local men and women who left estates amounting to more than 100,000 *akçes* lived in seventeen different neighbourhoods, which seems a rather strong indicator that the wealthy were not isolated from the rest of the populace. Yet, one may speak of an 'elite' part of the town. Unlike modern times and very much like the rich in Damascus,⁷² the men and women of means in Sofia used to live in quarters clustered around and encircling the economic centre of the town.⁷³ Among them the *mahalle* of Kara Şahin stands out with five of the wealthy citizens, including three of those belonging to the highest group. It was adjacent to Yazıcıoğlu/Yazıcızade, where two more lived, including the richest man we have registered in Sofia. In the register of 1595, the latter is identified with an alternative name – *mahalle-i Beylerbeyi*,⁷⁴ that is, the residence of the governor of the province. Five other *mahalles* had housed at least two wealthy citizens who had died. At the same time we also find in them some of the poorest inhabitants of Sofia. Thus, Kara Şahin, the *mahalle* of five of the wealthiest Sofians, was the place of residence of an Ali b. Abdullah, whose meagre estate amounted to 1,090 *akçes*, with only 179 left after the deduction of various charges; this sum was collected by the Treasury as he had no heirs. It is also unclear where he had lived, as no place of residence is listed, only very modest personal belongings as well as some equipment revealing him as a weaver.⁷⁵ People who left estates amounting to 23,130, 430,995, 714, 6,417, and 5,980 *akçes*, also lived in the *mahalle* of Alaca Mescid. Some *mahalles* definitely attracted poor people, and many of them – Draz (only Muslims, with 2,305 and 933 *akçes*), İmaret (all Muslims, who left 2,206, 3,215, 793, 2,644, 5,872, 1,272 and 10,619 *akçes*), Mercan (all Muslims, with 3,019, 8,852, 3,400, 4,517, 853, 4,509 and 847 *akçes*) – were located at the extreme ends of the city, and clearly were not attractive even for the 'middle-class' people.

I could continue the list of such polar differences but it seems sufficient to conclude that while the rich tended to live closer to the central parts of the city, this does not mean that there were no others, people of lesser means, living alongside. None of the rich lived in the peripheral neighbourhoods. Probably the poorest were renting or simply were provided with a shelter with some of these rich, but this is in no way indicated. Since many of the poorest men and women were also single, it is clear that they had no home of their own.

72. Establet-Pascual, 'Damascene Probate Inventories', 384-90.

73. Unfortunately I have been unable to identify more than half of the neighbourhoods. In this I have used Dimitrov, 'Zanayati i târgoviya v Sofiya', 96; Todorov and Kalitsin (eds), *Turski izvori za bălgarskata istoriya*, 421-23, my own research, as well as findings of S. Ivanova, who shared them with me, for which I thank her.

74. Genç, *Sofya Kazası*, 120.

75. S 12, p. 102, doc. II, of 26 Muharrem 1086.

*The Rich Muslims: Aspects of their Formal Status*⁷⁶

Only two of the local wealthy Muslim men and women, as well as three of the wives of Sofian rich men, bear Abdullah as a patronym, as a formal connotation of a new convert. Whether that was the case, however, cannot be claimed with certainty, as during the seventeenth century Abdullah begins to appear as a first name for Muslims in Balkan towns. The name of the father of one of the men is not recorded. None of the sons and daughters of Abdullah, however, was married to someone with a similar background. In fact, the spouse of one of the possible new converts, el-Hac Mehmed b. Abdullah, was the daughter of an *ağa*. While men have no legal or social problems in marrying women of any background, Mehmed's case is surprising if we bear in mind a leading principle in Islamic family law that strongly advises in favour of status equality and even superiority of the husband. Most of the Muslim rich in Sofia seem to have been members of families that were well entrenched in local society.

The vast majority of the rich Muslim men in Sofia were military, genuinely so or just identified as members of the military establishment without further specification. Five men bore the title of *ağa*,⁷⁷ and it seems that this was often related to the family status if not directly inherited. Thus, two of them, the afore-mentioned Mustafa Ağa and Ahmed Ağa, were brothers,⁷⁸ sons of a *çavuş*, who lived in the same *mahalle* and were among the wealthiest Sofia citizens. In his lifetime Mustafa had been *kassam-ı askeri*.⁷⁹ In the list of his debts we find three records – to Mustafa Efendi (40,600 *akçes*), Amuca Hasan Ağa (45,000), and to both of them jointly (19,000), all formulated as *an mahsul-ı zeamet ba ferman-ı âli*, but it is not clear what the exact relationship between them was – probably it was only economic, and in what capacity Mustafa Ağa had collected the crops of these *zeamets*. His brother was involved in actual military activities and died in Anabolu during the Cretan campaign, as mentioned above. It is not clear what exactly their father's 'job description' as *çavuş* was.⁸⁰ At least one of Ahmed Ağa's two under-age sons

76. To avoid the frequent repetition of references, I have appended to my paper a list of the names of local Sofian Muslims who fall into the group of the 'rich', including also the names of the neighbourhoods where they lived, the gross and the net amounts of their estates, and the references in the inventories to their estates.

77. In this case I take it more as a 'title given to senior officers or officials in the military', 'master, elder', rather than as an indication of a Palace position or association with the janissaries. Cf. G. Bayerle, *Pashas, Begs, and Efendis: A Historical Dictionary of Titles and Terms in the Ottoman Empire* (Istanbul 1997), 2.

78. Evliya Çelebi lists among the impressive buildings in Sofia, apart from the residence of the *paşa*, also the *sarays* of Şehzade Çelebi, Yakub Ağa, Koca Mehmed Ağa, Koca Peltek Yakub Çavuş, the *molla*, Gani Efendi, Durganlı Ağa, and others. Either Yakub Ağa or Koca Peltek Yakub Çavuş could well have been the father of the two brothers (Gadžanov, 'Pätuvane na Evliya Çelebi', 698).

79. S 12, p. 27, doc. I.

80. As Bayerle defines them (*Pashas, Begs, and Efendis*, 29), *çavuşes* were "a military grade of soldiers of diverse duties". He describes them as serving as escorts in official

received a *timar*, most probably as the heir of his father in the military career, unfortunately without any data about its size.⁸¹ The daughter of Ahmed, Hadice, who died as a minor, ranked among the wealthiest Sofians with her share from her father's estate only. All this allows me to regard this family as one of the local Sofian elite in terms of both formal and property status.

I can only conjecture about the background of İsmail Ağa b. Sefer, the only real millionaire we have in the register, and it is mainly on the basis of his wealth that I consider him not to be a newcomer to the high ranks of Ottoman provincial society.⁸² Otherwise he was serving as a *zaim*, that is, in the *sipahi* cavalry, and lost his life in a battle with *hayduds* on the way to a military campaign.⁸³ The list of those indebted to him, including the former *defterdar* of Crete, as well as the 12 *hazinelî çerges* (tents) he had in his estate suggest involvement in the army finances. Halil Ağa b. Receb, another man in the list of the Sofian rich, had two brothers on his father's side also bearing the title of *ağa*, suggesting that this title was probably related to the family's entrenchment in Sofian upper-class circles.⁸⁴ It should be pointed out that all *ağas* that we find in the register are members of the group that I shall study in this paper. The only one who did not belong directly to it, Mehmed Ağa,⁸⁵ was the father of

ceremonies as well as personal escorts for ambassadors, as messengers, diplomats etc., and as executioners of high officials condemned to death, recruited from the *acemi* corps. Apart from the palace/*divan çavuşes* there were also 33 in the 5th *bölük* of the janissary corps who carried out the orders of the commanders to the troop officers during battle and performed various services as marshals. According to S. Dimitrov, provincial *çavuşes*, literally 'sergeants', were low-ranking military-police officers. His definition is based on eighteenth and nineteenth-century documentation: S. Dimitrov (trans. and ed.), *Osmanski Izvori za istoriyata na Dobrudzha i Severoiztochna Bălgariya* [Ottoman Sources about the History of Dobrudzha and North-Eastern Bulgaria] (Sofia 1981), 390. Unfortunately, I am not aware of any definition of the 'provincially stationed' *çavuşes* during the period in question. The two brothers no doubt belonged to the local elite, and it is not clear whether their father's position was just one through which he 'legalised' his property status, or was indeed somehow related to the Palace or the central janissary corps, at an intermediary stage between the very prestigious central corps, and the greatly enlarged one of later times.

81. S 12, p. 12, doc. I.

82. This, however, cannot be claimed with certainty, as he is one of the two local rich men who had a wife bearing the patronym of Abdullah, suggesting a new convert. The other such woman is the second wife of the single bigamous Sofian rich man. İsmail Ağa had no other relatives as his heirs except for his wife and two under-age daughters; cf. S 12, p. 29, doc. I.

83. This being in May 1672, he was probably on the way to the first Polish expedition of Sultan Mehmed IV (1648-87), which lasted from 5 June to 9 December 1672, ending with the conquest of Kameniec and most of the important forts of Podolya, sealed with the peace treaty at Buczacz (18 October 1672).

84. S 12, p. 55, doc. I.

85. S 12, p. 148, doc. I. It is not quite clear, however, if this was all he had or simply a portion of his estate that passed to a distant relative. The wording of the document suggests rather the latter.

one of the richest Sofian women, Hadiye Hatun, who was also married to an *ağa*.⁸⁶ Another two of the wealthiest Sofian Muslim women in the register were also either married to or daughters of an *ağa*.⁸⁷ Indeed Mümine bt el-Hac Abdülkadir, who was married to a 'hereditary' *ağa* (Mehmed Ağa b. Hasan Ağa), clearly came from the family of another wealthy Sofian. Since she was not the only heir of her father – she had one full sister and her mother was also alive – we may presume that her father's estate probably amounted to around one million *akçes*.⁸⁸ It seems that Mümine's mother, Mazlûme bt el-Hac Mehmed, must have remarried, but we do not know at what stage – following a divorce or the death of el-Hac Abdülkadir, or even after the death of her daughter – to another Sofian rich, Hacı Ahmed b. Abdünnebi, who died on the way back from the hajj. At the time of his death, they were living in the *mahalle* of Kuru Çeşme, which was also Mümine's place of residence.⁸⁹

Two more *ağas* figure in the register as officers who served in Sofia, the inventories of whose possessions reflect only part of their properties.⁹⁰ One of them, a Mehmed Ağa b. Mustafa, was the collector of the *avarız* from the *zimmi reaya* in the town of Sofia for 1083, and died in office. The monetary valuation of his possessions is not registered. Clearly, since he was a state official, his property, including the collected tax (but it is not quite clear which part of the money in his estate was his own and which the tax), was to be sent to Edirne. One of the documents related to his estate identifies him as inhabitant of Sofia, but it is not clear whether he was indeed a local person as no visible material ties between him and the town emerge.⁹¹ The other, Ali Ağa, is identified as "*ağa* of the *ağa* of the *vali*", without a patronym, place of residence, or a valuation, just a list of personal belongings, including silver arms and some cash, which were handed to the *mütesellim*.⁹²

86. Ahmed Ağa b. Muharrem (A.H. 1089). Several years earlier, in 1083, we find an Ahmed Ağa, obviously different from the Ahmed Ağa b. Yakub whose estate is recorded in the register. He featured among the debtors of İsmail Ağa as the current *kethüda yeri*, that is, commander-in-chief of the *altı bölük* stationed in Sofia. Probably the same Ahmed Ağa emerges as the *emin* of the *beytülmal* in the town in Rebiyülâhır 1086 (S 12, p. 85, doc. I). I wonder if all these were the same person.

87. Mümine bt el-Hac Abdülkadir, married to Mehmed Ağa b. Hasan Ağa; Hadice bt Ahmed Ağa, whose estate was integrated with her father's estate.

88. She left 350,489 *akçes*, the bulk of which (326,489 *akçes*) was directly inherited from her father.

89. Cf. S 12, p. 6, doc. III (1082), and p. 134, doc. III (1088). Neither Mümine nor Mazlûme's second husband had a house in the inventories of their estates.

90. Other *ağas* appear also as instrumental witnesses (*şühudülhal*) or are referred to in other documents, but it is impossible to identify their role in Sofian society.

91. S 12, p. 51, doc. I: a *ferman* from Edirne containing instructions what to do with Mehmed Ağa's estate; doc. II: the inventory itself showing a very well-to-do person; p. 53, doc. I: confirmation of the manumission of Mehmed Ağa's slave Hüseyin, an 18-20-year-old man of Russian background.

92. S 12, p. 5, doc. I.

Only one of the men bearing the title of *bey*⁹³ left property of more than – actually just above – 100,000 *akçes*. This is the wealthiest person among the 'rural' estates, the above-mentioned Ali Bey b. Mehmed, who as it turns out from another document, had recently cut his connections with the town, having sold his urban residence to his sister.⁹⁴ The other three *beys* left medium to small estates,⁹⁵ which probably indicates an honorific title but not necessarily a high position in the Ottoman military hierarchy, and certainly not one related to significant income. One of the local wealthy men, a Hüseyin Beşe b. Kurd, if we judge from his title,⁹⁶ belonged to the local janissaries, but was certainly not a *devşirme*.

Another group of the 'rich' is formed by craftsmen and tradesmen 'proper' who had a clear involvement in the economic life in the city as 'professionals': a dyer,⁹⁷ a person trading in *aba* clothes and other textiles,⁹⁸ an owner of three shops,⁹⁹ a man in the gun trade,¹⁰⁰ a man involved in the iron processing business and horseshoe production,¹⁰¹ probably a tanner,¹⁰² and a barber.¹⁰³ I should immediately point out that the estates of some of them bear the imprint of engagement with the military, the janissaries in particular. Information is also scanty about el-Hac Süleyman, who was involved in regional trade in iron and horseshoes. Many of his partners

93. *Bey*, or *beğ*, was by the time of Mehmed II (1451-81) a title for the military-administrative heads of the *sancak* and their *timar* cavalry units, eventually becoming a courtesy title for officers of the military; see Bayerle, *Pashas, Begs, and Efendis*, 19.

94. See the inventory of his estate and S 12, p. 24, doc. IV, a dispute between Ali Bey's wife Fatma and his sister Rabia about the property rights over a house in the *mahalle* of Siyavuş Paşa of a value of 11,000 *akçes*. As it turned out, Ali Bey had sold it to his sister and received 4,500 *akçes*. The rest, 6,500 *akçes*, was still to be paid.

95. S 12, p. 2, doc. I: Kenan Bey, 23,130 *akçes*; p. 21, doc. I: Hüseyin Bey, 10,690 *akçes*; p. 126, doc. I: Hasan Bey, 2,570 *akçes*. Interestingly, for none of them is the patronym indicated.

96. R. Gradeva, 'War and Peace along the Danube: Vidin at the End of the Seventeenth Century', in eadem, *Rumeli under the Ottomans*, 114-15.

97. S 12, p. 111, doc. II.

98. S 12, p. 128, doc. I, but an owner of a *saraç dükkânı*.

99. S 12, p. 25, doc. II. Unfortunately there is no information about the profile of the *dük-kâns*. Since it is a woman's estate, and that of the wealthiest woman in the register, Hadice bt Süleyman, and there is no indication about her affiliation on her father's or husband's side to any of the *askerî*, I suppose that by birth she probably belonged to the local (her father's sister was also there) upper class with family ties among the craftsmen and traders.

100. S 12, p. 82, doc. I, one of the four wealthiest men in Sofia.

101. S 12, p. 118, doc. I; he was more involved in religious circles, as his moneylenders are mainly people bearing the titles of *efendi* and *çelebi*, as well as the *vakıf* of Ahmed Efendi, of the Celveti Tekke, and the *vakıf* supplying beeswax for the *mahalle mescid*.

102. S 12, p. 32, doc. I, in possession of half a *dükân* at the *debbağhane* and some of the equipment.

103. S 12, p. 133, doc. II, identified as a barber and in possession of a barber's shop but also of several others.

and agents bore the title of *beşe*, and he had a debt to the “*akçe* of the 34th *yeniçeri bölük*”, suggesting, along with other indirect evidence, that he might have been a member of or somehow affiliated to the janissaries.¹⁰⁴

The learned institution does not seem to have been an easy way to wealth. Only three of the Sofian rich had some affiliation to this group. Two of them are women: Ayşe bt Hafız Mehmed, who also left a small collection of books, and Havva bt el-Hac Hüseyin, the wife and mother of *çelebis*;¹⁰⁵ the third is a Hüseyin Efendi b. Ali Efendi.¹⁰⁶ Some of the facts about them seem to confirm the already established tendency towards the transformation of the *ulema* into a closed estate, leading to inheritance of the position and intermarrying within the group. Thus, Hüseyin Efendi's wife was the daughter of a *çelebi*, but unfortunately the background of the husband of Ayşe and the father of Havva cannot be identified. It is difficult to classify the afore-mentioned Mehmed Mecdi Efendi, *defter emini* and inhabitant of Istanbul, among the Sofian *ulema*.¹⁰⁷ As stated above, following his stay in the town he had incurred a debt of 1,060 *guruş* to a Sofian Jew. To meet it, his son Abdullah Ağa brought three chests of belongings of Mehmed Mecdi Efendi, clearly just a part of his possessions. The debt, however, is indicative in at least two directions, namely, of the lifestyle and financial means of high Ottoman officialdom. The value of the content of the three chests alone compares with the value of the property of the wealthiest Sofians. The titles of father and son show that different career tracks were still possible within a family. Mehmed Mecdi's case leads also to another group of the Sofian rich among the Jews, which I shall discuss below.

Ebu Bekir b. Nasuh, another of the rich in Sofia, should probably be classified between the military and the learned men. My arguments for judging him so, and probably closer to the former than to the latter, are, however, indirect and, hence, insecure. The fact that he left some silver arms and horse trappings and that his brother is identified as an *ağa* speak in favour of ties with military circles. On the other hand, he had a compass arranged to show the direction of Mecca (*kıblenüma*), which might also be indicative as to his affiliation with *ulema* circles.

Finally, four of the rich Muslims should be identified as members of the *askerî* group but evidence about their real vocation is scanty.¹⁰⁸ None of them bore a title which can be directly associated with the military or the learned institution. All had

104. S 12, p. 116, doc. I; the former and the current *serdar* were also among his moneylenders.

105. Wife of Murtaza Çelebi b. Hızır, and mother of Mustafa Çelebi, and their other underage children. According to Bayerle (*Pashas, Begg, and Efendis*, 30) from the seventeenth century on, the term designated men of letters, indicating respect.

106. *Efendi* is a title for educated people, especially for scribes, signifying in particular traditional *medrese* education; see *ibid.*, 44.

107. S 12, p. 125, doc. II.

108. They must have been military as a special tax was paid to the *kadiasker* for the inventorying and division of their estates (*resm-i kismet*). Two had arms in their estates, probably more than ordinary Muslim men would have (S 12, p. 82, doc. I, and p. 92, doc. I), but the other two had none (S 12, p. 95, doc. I, and p. 134, doc. III).

dükkâns, and the respective goods in the inventories, but it is not clear how deeply they were involved in production or had only invested their money in profitable enterprises.

What we may conclude from this overview is that men bearing the title of *ağâ* as well as women, daughters and wives of *ağas*, usually belonged to the highest stratum of Ottoman provincial society. Not only that, but the *ağas* tended to marry within the group, the women in these families receiving the highest marriage payment (*mehr*).¹⁰⁹ This, however, is an observation that does not hold good of another honorary title, *bey*. Generally, a military career was a more secure path to wealth than any other group within the *askerî*, the *ulema* in particular.

The Muslim Rich: Family Status and Household

Most of the 'rich' in Sofia were married at the time of their death or had children but not a spouse, which indicates a terminated marriage without making it clear for what reason – divorce or widowhood. We have only two exceptions – Hadice, a minor, and her uncle, Mustafa Ağâ. The latter's estate reveals him very much as a man of worldly and intellectual pleasures. He might have been also a recent childless widower, but we have no way to peep into his intimate life. It is worth mentioning that in his estate we find three slaves whose value indicates that in all probability they were not used as simple servants – a male slave (*gulâm*), of the value of 25,900 *akçes*, and two female slaves (*cariye*) of the value respectively of 16,000 and 11,900 *akçes*.¹¹⁰ Be that as it may, his only heirs were his grandmother, his sister and his two nephews, the sons of Ahmed Ağâ, who died in Anabolu. Three of the men had under-age children but no wives among their heirs. It is not clear whether they were widowed or divorced at the time of their death, neither is it clear if at some point they had had more than one wife.¹¹¹ Only one, Hüseyin Beşe b. Kurd, had two wives, of whom one was in all probability a recent convert.¹¹² At the time of their death the rest must have been married to only one wife, but whether there had been others prior to that moment is again difficult to judge, as the 'accompanying' documents for appointment of guardians do not provide evidence in that respect. It seems that the three under-age children of Ahmed Ağâ were born of two different mothers, and that at the time of his death only one of them had been functional as a wife, but this, too, is quite uncertain. As for the mother of one of his

109. The *mehr* of the wife of the millionaire İsmail Ağâ, Hadice bt Abdullah, was strikingly low against the backdrop of the wealth left by her husband – just 6,000 *akçes*. For a comparison, Hadiye, the daughter and wife of *ağas*, had a *mehr* amounting to 20,000 *akçes*.

110. One of them bearing the name of Ruhsan(i) might have been a Christian, but the name may easily read also as Ruşen.

111. El-Hac Ahmed b. el-Hac Receb, with his under-age son and his mother as his heirs; el-Hac Süleyman b. [blank], with his under-age daughter as his heir; el-Hac Mehmed b. Yusuf, with his three under-age children, two sons and a daughter, as his heirs.

112. Bearing Abdullah as patronym.

sons, it is not clear whether she had died or he had divorced her prior to his own death. In any case, she remains unnamed in the available documentation, while the mother of the other two children was clearly a recipient of part of his property, but is not listed among his heirs. She was appointed supervisor (*nazır*) of the guardian of her under-age son (meanwhile the daughter had also died). Given her ambiguous status and her patronym – Abdullah, we may suspect her of being a former slave or a recent convert.¹¹³

Some indirect evidence inclines me to consider the existence of ‘hidden’ polygamy in many of the cases when there was just one legal wife.¹¹⁴ None of the rich Muslim women had any slaves at the time of her death,¹¹⁵ but eleven of the twenty Sofian rich men had, both men and women, and very often their value was very high. Interestingly the bigamous Hüseyin Beşe had none. Apart from the above-mentioned slaves of Mustafa Ağa, we should mention also the slaves of İsmail Ağa, our single millionaire, who all were very expensive – three men, estimated at 15,000,¹¹⁶ 12,000 and 7,000, and two women of a value of 15,000 and 20,000 *akçes* respectively. One actually wonders what his wife’s background might have been, as she bears the patronym Abdullah.¹¹⁷ While with the male slaves we may regard their value as an expression of the other talents or services they could perform for their masters,¹¹⁸ I am inclined to regard an expensive female slave more as a sexual partner to her master than anything else.¹¹⁹ It is difficult to judge what

113. See S 12, p. 26, docs I and II, and p. 27, doc. I – a short list of kitchenware and bedding are indicated as being, and remaining, in the hands of the said Saime Hatun, but she does not figure among the heirs receiving shares from the estate, unlike the deceased’s three children and grandmother.

114. On slave women in the Balkans, see Todorova, *Zhenite ot Tsentralnite Balkani*, 301-03.

115. It was a widespread practice for men and women in seventeenth-century Sofia to manumit their slaves. Cf. the documents included in M. Kalitsin, A. Velkov and E. Radushev (eds), *Osmanski izvori za islyamizatsionnite protsesi na Balkanite, XVI-XIX v.* [Islamisation Processes in the Balkans, Sixteenth-Nineteenth Centuries] (Sofia 1990), 250-92. See also S 12, p. 53, doc. I: manumission of Mehmed Ağa’s slave Hüseyin.

116. For the sake of correctness, I should point out that in another document including a list of the items given to his widowed wife the value of this slave is much lower – 10,000 *akçes*.

117. Cf. S 12, p. 149, doc. I – partly a repetition of the original division of the estate (p. 29, doc. I), entered as a list of items handed to the widow of İsmail Ağa and mother of his two under-age children. It is not clear if she had been a local *zimmi* convert or a former slave girl.

118. See for example S 12, p. 116, doc. I, where we see Yusuf, a *gulâm* of the deceased el-Hac Süleyman actively involved in his master’s business appearing both as a money-lender to his master, having given him a loan of 11,800 *akçes*, and as his ‘agent’ in his business with iron products, as his master also owed him a further 480 *akçes* for travel expenses. Interestingly, Yusuf is not included in the estate of his master.

119. The other estates of rich men where we find slaves: Veli Beşe: one female slave of the value of 12,200 *akçes*; Ahmed Ağa: a male slave, 9,000, and a female slave, 6,000 *akçes*; Halil Ağa: a female slave, 12,000 *akçes*; Şaban b. Muharrem: two female slaves,

the relations between master and slaves were in any of these cases, but it seems plausible to me to regard a considerable number of the slave women, probably also some of the men, as serving their masters' sexual needs, compensating them for their monogamy and allowing them to avoid at the same time the obligations that a legal wife would entail.

Being the wife of a Sofian rich man did not mean receiving a high marriage payment. Actually, I should say it could be strikingly meagre compared to the wealth of the husband, and even to the *mehr* of some of the wives of middle-class men in the city. We have evidence about the marriage payments of fourteen wives of rich Sofians.¹²⁰ Two of them, Mülâyim bt Abdullah, the second wife of Hüseyin Beşe b. Kurd,¹²¹ and Ümmühanı bt Ali, the wife of Berber el-Hac Şaban b. Mustafa, had been accorded only 600 *akçes*. The biggest was that of Havva bt [missing], the wife of Halil Ağa b. Receb, with 16,000 *akçes*,¹²² followed by Mazlûme bt el-Hac Mehmed who received 12,000 *akçes*,¹²³ and Fatma bt Ali Ağa, the wife of el-Hac Mehmed b. Abdullah, with 10,000. The majority of those whom we know received much less, 6,000 (3), 2,000 (5), 1,000 *akçes* (2). One received a slave of the value of 10,000 *akçes* but no *mehr* is indicated.¹²⁴

The situation is slightly better with the 'rich' women, that is, the women who feature as having their own property which made them a part of Sofian upper-class society on their own. The five adult women had the following *mehrs*: 20,000,¹²⁵ 12,000,¹²⁶ 7,000,¹²⁷ 6,000,¹²⁸ and 4,000 *akçes*.¹²⁹ The recipient of the highest,

13,000 and 10,000 *akçes*; el-Hac Süleyman: one male slave, 5,000 *akçes*, but see also the previous footnote for a debt this man had to another *gûlâm*; Ebu Bekir: a male slave, 5,700, and a male slave with a female slave, 10,560 *akçes*, but it is not clear if they were a family; el-Hac Mehmed: a male slave, 3,600 *akçes*; el-Hac Ahmed: a male slave, 6,480 *akçes*; Mehmed Ağa: two female slaves, 7,200 and 5,000 *akçes*.

120. There is no information about the *mehr* of Saime bt Abdullah, the widow of Ahmed Ağa. Although it is a secondary division of the estate, Saime is only identified as the mother of two of his children but not as his legatee; there is only a list of possessions, mainly kitchenware, that had been given to her – valued at 11,530 *akçes*. It is not clear whether these had been given to her instead of a *mehr*, as an inheritance, or otherwise.

121. His first wife, Emine bt Mehmed Bey, was accorded 2,000 *akçes* as *mehr*, and figures also as having lent 6,000 *akçes* to her husband, but it is not clear if that was a real or a fictitious debt.

122. Instead of her 16,000, however, Havva received only 5,732 *akçes*, as her husband died bankrupt.

123. S 12, p. 134, doc. II.

124. S 12, p. 82, doc. I. Hanife bt Nasuh, the wife of Şaban b. Muharrem, figures in the list of the several recipients of donations Şaban had made prior to his death with the enigmatic "by way of bequest to the above-mentioned wife for the price of a slave woman with the above-mentioned witnesses [el-Hac Yusuf, *el-tacir*, and Ahmed Çelebi b. Hüseyin] – 10,000 *akçes*".

125. S 12, p. 146, doc. I. 126. S 12, p. 6, doc. III. 127. S 12, p. 25, doc. II.

128. S 12, p. 36, doc. I. 129. S 12, p. 123, doc. I.

Hadiye, was the wife and daughter of *ağas*. The second highest in this group was accorded to Mümine bt el-Hac Abdülkadir. Although we do not know the social profile of her father, it is clear that he belonged to the group of the wealthiest Sofia citizens, having left over 326,000 *akçes* to his daughter. Interestingly Mümine, married to a 'hereditary' *ağa*, was accorded the same *mehr* as her mother, Mazlûme, the recipient of the second highest *mehr* in the group of the 'wives'. The third highest belongs to Hadice bt Süleyman, a woman of considerable means, who seems to have been more actively involved in her business affairs. Unfortunately, nothing can be deduced from the available documents about the background of either her father or her husband, as neither of them, or her paternal aunt, is identified by any title. Havva bt el-Hac Hüseyin, recipient of a marriage payment of 6,000 *akçes*, must have belonged to the upper middle class or even upper class; her husband had a debt of 40,000 *akçes* "from the deceased's share of her father's estate". It is not clear whether the money was all she had inherited, what part of her property was acquired by herself and what was inherited. She had a house in her ownership whose repair she had ordered from her husband Murtaza Çelebi and for which she owed him 15,000 *akçes*. I cannot judge why Ayşe bt Hafız Mehmed would have such a small *mehr*. Among the financially strong women in Sofia, she left one of the 'modest' estates, probably just above 100,000 *akçes*.

Had more been known about the fathers and the husbands than the scanty data provided by the *tereke defter*, I would have probably been more categorical in my conclusions. Even at this point, however, one may say that the size of the *mehrs* of 'rich' women and of 'wives of rich men' seems to have been directly related to the family background of the woman and not necessarily to that of her husband. Women of means and the wives of Sofian rich men certainly received among the highest *mehrs*, but this did not apply to all of them. In this respect, as becomes obvious, some did not differ much from the Sofian Muslim women of much lesser means.¹³⁰

While the register might be giving a somewhat distorted picture of the families of seventeenth-century Sofians, I still tend to believe that the data is revealing about the size of families. As seen above, the Sofian rich seem to have preferred the, at least legally, monogamous family. As for children, I suppose that our documents show the situation as it was among well-off Sofian Muslims in the 1670s, which was not in any way different from that of the rest of the Muslims living in the city. Seven of the married deceased, men and women, left no children and five had only one at the time of their death. In one of the latter cases, the single under-age child followed his father soon after.¹³¹ Four of the families had two children, five had three, but in two of these cases it is clear that there had been two different

130. According to Todorova ('Zhenite v Sofiya', 17), who draws her conclusions on the basis of the same *tereke defter* of 1671-78, 61% of Sofian women received a *mehr* of less than 1,000 *akçes*; 21% between 1,000 and 2,000 *akçes*; 14% between 2,000 and 6,000 *akçes*, and just 4% above 6,000 *akçes*.

131. S 12, p. 117, doc. I.

mothers. Just one family had four, and another five children. In both cases it is not clear whether all the children came from the current wife of the deceased, but most probably they did. We do not know how many of them actually survived. Some had half-brothers or sisters, yet another confirmation of the long-established fact of the avoidance of solitary life by both men and women in Muslim society, the so-called *polygamia successiva*.

The Muslim Rich: Real Estate and Economic Activity

Rich Sofian Muslims tended to invest a considerable part of their assets in real estate – houses, *çiftlik*s, *dükkân*s and other specific production units – and relatively more rarely in single vineyards, granaries, gardens, mills, in the villages around Sofia. Men and women show some differences of approach in that respect which I shall delineate in the lines which follow.

The possession of a house may be considered a basic item in the real estate part of the rich Sofians' estates. Interestingly, however, not all of them were in possession of any at the time of their death. This may be understandable where women are concerned but it is strange that five out of the twenty local Muslim wealthy men did not have houses. Certainly this data should be treated with caution as they might have turned them over – as a formal transaction or a gift, to their spouses or other close relatives prior to dying and thus prevented their inclusion in the estate, and ensured that they reached the right legatee. Unfortunately, I am unable to check if that had been the case or the wives were indeed the owners of the family home. In at least one case – that of el-Hac Ahmed b. el-Hac Receb – there is no wife among the heirs, just the deceased's under-age son and his mother. Certainly any donation could have also been made in their favour. Another, Halil Ağa b. Receb, who died bankrupt, left a plot for a house, but no house in the *mahalle* where he lived with his wife. Bearing in mind that his other two heirs were his two brothers on the paternal side and that his wife received only about one third of her due *mehr*, it seems quite probable that he had managed somehow to divert the house from the divisible bulk of the estate. In yet another case, the explanation may lie in the origin of the 'rich Sofian', Boyacı Hüseyin b. Osman, indicated in the record as originating from the village of Kilisa, *nahiye* İzladı (mod. Zlatitsa, part of the town of Srednogie), and who died as an inhabitant of the *mahalle* of Kara Şahin in Sofia. Whether the lack of a house was somehow related to the fact that he was not a Sofian himself and probably married to a local woman¹³² or to the fact that the couple was childless, and two brothers of the deceased were along with his wife the only heirs he had, is difficult to judge. The same is also the case with yet another Muslim – Hacı Ahmed b. Abdünnebi – who also died childless on the way back from the hajj, leaving his estate to his wife, brother and sister. The fifth, Ebu Bekir b. Nasuh, left a wife and an under-age son, Mustafa, who meanwhile died. The division of the estate is somewhat confusing, incorporating, as it seems, both and leaving as final heirs Ebu

132. But one who received a low *mehr*, amounting to just 2,000 *akçes*.

Bekir's wife, the mother of their under-age son, along with Mustafa's paternal uncle and half-sister on his mother's side. In any case the heirs of all five would have been confronted with serious problems and I suppose that the men in question may have arranged some of the inheritance issues prior to their deaths.

Two of the five women (the sixth being a minor) have no houses in the inventories of their estates and it is they who have left the largest estates: Mümine bt el-Hac Abdülkadir and Hadice bt Süleyman. In the former case, the scribe has explicitly indicated that the bulk of her property was inherited from her father and we may suspect that she died rather young.¹³³ The latter case is more obscure. She, too, had three *dükkâns* in her estate but their profile is unknown, and also had an easily discernible weakness for investing her money in jewels.

The rest – fifteen men and three women – had houses, sometimes more than one. Actually three of the wealthiest Sofian men had two houses each: in two of the three cases, they were located in the same *mahalle*, and in all three cases the one was much cheaper than the other but far from being really cheap when compared with the average prices of houses at the time.¹³⁴ One of the women, Ayşe bt Hafız Mehmed, even had three houses, all located in the same neighbourhood.¹³⁵ The use of these houses remains unknown, but their owners probably rented the cheaper ones to some of those in whose estates we do not find any real estate, even though I have not come across any rent from them in the assets of the estates. It seems that these second houses were not physically connected to the main residences of their owners.

It is to be expected that the most expensive house belonged to the wealthiest man according to the register – İsmail Ağa b. Sefer – estimated at 80,000 *akçes*. According to the very laconic record, it consisted of an inner and outer part, but without further description of the premises. We only learn from another entry that the widow of İsmail Ağa and mother of their two under-age daughters received “for the two minors” the cheaper house, valued at 15,000 *akçes*, along with other property worth 320,260 *akçes*, but it is not clear for what purpose, and the fate of the expensive house remains obscure.¹³⁶ The second wealthiest man in the register (Ahmed Ağa) had a house valued at 60,000 *akçes*. Six, including one woman, were in possession of houses valued at 40,000 *akçes*. Others had houses at 30,000,

133. Her estate amounted to 350,489 *akçes* of which the three single items were cash in excess of 326,000 *akçes* inherited from her father, three *dükkâns* at the *suk* of the goat hair spinners (12,000 *akçes*), and her *mehr* (also 12,000 *akçes*). Here heirs were her husband, her mother and her under-age full sister.

134. İsmail Ağa, with two houses in Yazıcıoğlu, valued at 80,000 and 15,000 *akçes*; Mustafa Ağa, with two houses in Kara Şahin – 40,000 and 6,000; Ali Bey, with his current house at the time of his death in the village of Musa at 2,000 *akçes* (!), and another house worth 11,000 *akçes* in the *mahalle* of Siyavuş Paşa, which he had sold to his sister, with still 6,500 of the price due at his death.

135. All were located in the *mahalle* of Yazıcızade, valued at 10,000, 5,000 and 4,000 *akçes*.

136. S 12, p. 149, doc. I.

25,000 and 20,000 *akçes*. The cheapest houses in which some of these people lived cost 7,000 and 8,000 *akçes*¹³⁷ corresponding to the prices of houses of 'middle-class' people.¹³⁸

As mentioned above, the entries in the inventories are rather sparing as to details about the items, and the houses in particular. Thus, we may get an idea about them only when we compare the values we have with transactions of houses which include identification of the rooms, and other premises such as a cellar, toilet, garden, oven, etc.¹³⁹ Only in the case of two of the houses do we learn from the inventories that they contained an inner and outer part. It is not clear, however, whether we owe this detail to a whim of the *kassam* or only these houses consisted of two parts. A chance record allows us to see what exactly at least one of these two looked like. Since it belonged to a person who died heavily indebted, his property was sold at auction. The house in question was bought for 40,000 *akçes* by one of the chief creditors of Mustafa Ağa, a Yasef v. Samail. It consisted of a summer trellis, two winter rooms on the ground floor, one underground storage room, and a garden in the inner part (*dahiliye*), and two large rooms on the first floor, two small rooms and two waiting rooms on the ground floor, a stable, a storage house, a grain shed, and a water well in the outer part (*hariciye*).¹⁴⁰ In Sofia in 1680 a nearly 30,000-*akçe* house (29,500) consisted of two rooms on the ground floor and four rooms on the first floor, one pantry, one storage house, two underground storage rooms, one well and one granary.¹⁴¹

The rich men in Sofia seem to have been more or less divided in their preferences for investment between agricultural property, in particular *çiftlik*s (twelve men and one woman), and *dükkâns* or other property related to 'industry' (twelve men and four women). A third major occupation of some of them was moneylending, but none of them was exclusively engaged in it.

Only five of the rich people in our sample combined possession of agricultural farms (*çiftlik*) with that of *dükkâns*. These were İsmail Ağa, who was in possession of a *çiftlik* in the village of Iliyançe (estimated at 15,000 *akçes* with the sown fields),¹⁴² as well as a *cevherhane* [maa] *yellik benam-ı vigna* in Samokov, that is, an ore-furnace (10,000 *akçes*), and a pottery kiln with a garden (20,000 *akçes*);

137. The houses of el-Hac Mehmed and of Usta Receb, respectively.

138. Compare with the average prices of houses in Edirne, Rusçuk and Vidin (1686-1700): Todorov, *The Balkan City*, 158-60.

139. According to Evliya Çelebi, there were seventy private *hamams* in the Sofian 'palaces', but I have not come across any mention of any in the transactions, even in the above-mentioned house worth 40,000 *akçes* (Gadžanov, 'Pätuvane na Evliya Chelebi', 701).

140. S 12, p. 28, doc. III, published in an annotated form in Andreev (ed.), *Ottoman Documents on Balkan Jews*, doc. XII, 25-26.

141. S 85, p. 11, doc. I.

142. Unlike most of the other inventories in which the property on the *çiftlik*/s was described in detail (sometimes not only the cattle but even the number of geese, ducks and hens, as well as the quantity of cereals), in this case its value is given as a lump sum without specifying its components.

Şaban b. Muharrem, with a *çiftlik* in Slatina¹⁴³ and a vineyard in Voynugofçe, who was involved in gun production and trade, as well as in moneylending; Mehmed Ağa, with a *çiftlik* in Breznik (15,000 *akçes*),¹⁴⁴ as well as a mill in the same village (8,000 *akçes*), and a *buzhane* in the *mahalle* where he lived (Karagöz Bey) (3,500 *akçes*); Hüseyin Beşe, with a *çiftlik* located within the boundaries of one of the peripheral Sofian *mahalles*, Siyavuş Paşa, with a straw summer hut and some wheat and oats for sowing (15,000 *akçes*), and two blacksmith's shops (*nalband dükkânı*) located by the *saray*,¹⁴⁵ and by the *kapan* (3,700 and 5,000 respectively); Hadice bt Süleyman, with a *çiftlik* in the village of Çepinçe-i Balâ, estimated as an integral entity with the cattle on it (40,000 *akçes*), and a four-stone mill in the village of Gorublyane (30,000 *akçes*), along with three unspecified *dükkâns* about which we only learn that they were located in the neighbourhood of the hospital (*tıbhane*) (12,000 *akçes*). The last-named woman is actually the only one in our sample who possessed a *çiftlik*, as the other women did not have any agriculture-related item, be it a mill, a garden or a vineyard.

Another eight Sofian Muslim rich men were in possession of only agricultural property, mostly *çiftliks*, some of them having more than one. Thus, Ahmed Ağa had one in the village of Hainlu, estimated at 25,000, and another in the village of Obradofçe, worth 4,000 *akçes*,¹⁴⁶ as well as a granary in the *mahalle* of Karagöz Bey, which is a different one from where he lived, worth 20,200 *akçes*, a mill in the village of Hainlu, worth 3,000 *akçes*, and a vineyard in Seslavçe, worth 1,500. Another Sofian, Halil Ağa, had no fewer than three: in Maleşevçe (20,200 *akçes*), in Çepinçe (5,300), and in Breznik (40,600), all values including the sown fields and the cattle. Apart from these, Halil Ağa also had considerable agricultural property, including two granaries, beehives, cattle and cereals, worth altogether 11,000 *akçes*, in the village of Zidarınçe. In other cases, we also find along with the *çiftlik* other agricultural property – one or more vineyards, or gardens.¹⁴⁷

143. It was estimated at 12,000 *akçes*, probably only the real estate property, but there were cereals, cattle, poultry, and beehives on its territory which were valued separately, amounting to 44,000 *akçes*.

144. In this case the value obviously covers only the structures comprising the estate, while all the cereals (wheat in the granary and seeds for sowing, 44,800, barley, 23,200, mixed, 7,000), cattle (bull, cows, buffaloes, calves, oxen), mares, stallions (item by item, amounting to 11,310), hay and straw (by carts, 2,300) are duly measured and valued.

145. Probably the scribe meant the residence of the *vali*.

146. Both were recorded as an integral value. These two *çiftliks* explain the enigmatic mentions in the estate of Ahmed Ağa's brother, Mustafa Ağa, of a *çiftlik* in Hainlu where only the grain and straw were valued, and of one in Obradofçe where again only the present wheat, barley, reeds and hay were valued but not the whole structures. Obviously in his capacity of guardian of the under-age children of his brother, he was sowing and gathering the crops there, too.

147. See, for example, Ebu Bekir's estate, which included a *çiftlik* in Çepinçe-i Balâ (1,600 *akçes*), and three vineyards in three different villages, Pançar (1,100), Lokorsko (1,000), and Podgumer (500), or Hüseyin Efendi, with a *çiftlik* in Slatina, including

Sometimes the *çiftlik*s are valued as an integral unit, on other occasions we are given the value of the *çiftlik*, clearly only the real property, and then follows (sometimes precedes) a detailed list of tools, cattle, horses, grain, rarely poultry, occasionally also kitchenware and some bedding, which are located on its premises, but this is not always explicitly stated. Probably this was directly related to the way in which the property was disposed of, as an integral entity or the different items going to different people, but this cannot be judged from the entries. In some cases cattle and sizeable quantities of grain are stored at the urban residence of the deceased or on sites in other Sofia neighbourhoods.¹⁴⁸ One of the Muslim rich men, Usta Receb, had only a vineyard in the village of Balşa and a garden in the area of Kuru Bağlar¹⁴⁹ in the vicinity of Sofia. It is not quite clear how we should classify Ali Bey's property. Obviously he had had a house in the *mahalle* of Siyavuş Paşa in Sofia, but had sold it to his sister, and at the time of his death was living in the village of Musa. No other rural property of his is registered, so we may assume that the latter residence, though estimated at only 2,000 *akçes*,¹⁵⁰ was a sort of compound including a living place and a *çiftlik* where cereals and hay were stored and cattle lived.¹⁵¹

The proximity of Samokov and Etropole, two of the major Balkan centres for iron extraction and working,¹⁵² had clearly been appreciated by Sofians and some of them invested extensively in ore processing, in iron working and trade. Among them are İsmail Ağa, Şaban b. Muharrem and Hüseyin Beşe, mentioned above as owners of both *çiftlik*s and *dükkâns*. The first had, as has already been said, an ore-furnace in Samokov (10,000 *akçes*), the second was in the iron business, but

cattle and seeds for sowing (30,000), as well as a vineyard in the village of Gorublyane (1,000).

148. See, for example, the estate of Mustafa Ağa, in which the property of the deceased is thematically arranged including "cattle located in the house and the *çiftlik* from the said estate", with a long detailed list assessed at the end as a total amount of 85,255 *akçes*, but it is not clear which were located where, as well as cereals at various agricultural units, but also in the granary in the house, the latter alone being valued at 46,460 *akçes*.
149. According to Evliya Çelebi, who visited Sofia several times in the 1650s, this was the most fashionable place for 'picnicking' among Sofians (Gadžanov, 'Pätuvane na Evliya Çelebi', 701).
150. This is far below the values of any of the houses of Sofian urbanites but ranging among the highest for villagers.
151. It should immediately be pointed out that the amounts of grain (wheat, barley and provender) (23,990 *akçes*), hay (8,000), nine beehives (450), and cattle and horses (24,405), make it comparable to a medium-sized *çiftlik*.
152. About iron extraction cf. S. Andreev and E. Grozdanova, *Iz istoriyata na rudarstvoto i metalurgiyata v bălgarskite zemi prez XV-XIX vek* [Historical Survey of Ore Mining and Metal Working in Bulgarian Lands in the Fifteenth-Nineteenth Centuries] (Sofia 1993), 17-58. These places had long traditions, and this is also reflected in the vocabulary, *samokov* and *vigna* being old Bulgarian terms in that industry which were adopted by the Ottomans.

probably mostly commissioning the making of guns and trading with them without having any real property related to it,¹⁵³ and the third had two blacksmith's shops. These, however, were not the primary investments of their owners, the values of the *çiftlik*s far exceeding those of the industrial enterprises. Yet, they show a difference in approach. For people like İsmail Ağa the *vigna* was just a profitable enterprise, a good investment, which he probably rented, but its existence had in no way made any imprint on his possessions and lifestyle. Hüseyin Beşe, on the other hand, despite his clearly military profile, was obviously also involved in the iron business. He was in trade relations with a *nalbur* from Samokov, was selling iron sheets in Pazarçık, and must have run his business directly.¹⁵⁴

Eight men and three women among the rich were only involved in 'urban' businesses, being in possession of *dükkâns* or engaged in trade. For three of them, iron-processing was their primary source of income. In the first place I should mention here el-Hac Mehmed b. Abdullah, who owned half an iron-extracting furnace (*samokov*), worth 18,000 *akçes*, and three-quarters of an ore-furnace (*vigna*), worth 3,000, and we find a variety of iron products in quantities which speak of trade-orientated production.¹⁵⁵ Three of his debts, amounting to 16,580 *akçes*, are iron-related, showing him as an active participant in the iron business on a regional scale.¹⁵⁶ So was el-Hac Süleyman, whose business was connected exclusively with trade in iron and iron items. It seems that he was buying the iron, commissioning the working of horseshoes and nails, probably also in Etropole, and then selling them mainly in Edirne, but it is clear that he was involved in neither the iron extraction nor in the iron working, just in trade with iron products. I am not sure whether that was exactly how he proceeded, but it is clear that he had no workshops related to iron processing, and that he was in active business relations with people who had. Thus, several Muslims and non-Muslims owed money to el-Hac Süleyman for iron and for horseshoes, 91,563 *akçes* altogether. Some of his debts, to blacksmiths and for custom duties (*gümriik*) for iron, horseshoes and nails, are also identified by the scribe as directly related to his involvement in the iron trade. His main target must have been the market in Edirne, where he had considerable amounts of pairs of horseshoes, nails and iron (valued at 138,000 *akçes*). He kept several *odas* there, being represented mainly by his *gulâm* Yusuf, to whom he owed 11,800 *akçes* (!) as a debt, as well as 480 *akçes* for travel expenses, and a Nalçeci Süleyman Beşe, to

153. In his estate we find that the inhabitants (as entities) of five villages around Sofia and Samokov owed him different quantities of iron, altogether 21,037 *kıyyes* for 22,525 *akçes*. There were also 35 guns (*tüfenk*), just a dull list, with values ranging between 105 and 366 *akçes* per item, the average being between 200 and 250 *akçes*.

154. In the inventory we find horseshoes, buffalo and donkey-shoes, a temporary *nalband* stall, pieces of iron, iron scales and weights.

155. He also had charcoal worth 20,000 *akçes*, an anvil and scales, as well as a variety of items – iron in rods or bars (17,640), forked iron (21,000), pieces of iron (1,950), pairs of horseshoes of different kinds of iron (1,385), etc.

156. Debts were to el-Hac Ömer b. Mehmed, Osman Çelebi b. Abdullah and Mehmed Efendi, all for the purchase of iron.

whom also he owed 16,800 *akçes*, and for travel expenses 2,350. Apart from these, he was also paying a wage to his *vekil* Ali Beşe, to whom at the time of his death he owed 4,800 *akçes*. Despite the large scale of his economic operations, el-Hac Süleyman was not very successful in this business, if we judge from the balance of his assets and debts, with only 28,996 *akçes* left to his heirs from the entire estate of 308,206 before the deduction of his debts and payments due. Havva bt el-Hac Hüseyin also had a blacksmith's shop (2,600), probably inherited property. It is not clear why hers was so much cheaper than the two belonging to Hüseyin Beşe, whether this was related to the size or the location,¹⁵⁷ or both. Unfortunately, we have no way of looking into how she managed her *dükkân*, as this property is not related to any specific items in her estate nor to specific debts or other business relations, and thus we may conclude that she was only the owner of a revenue source but not managing it directly.

Other enterprises and professions which were of interest for rich Sofians were the salt trade and soap production, dyeing, saddle-making, the fish trade, fur-tailoring (*kürk*), barbering, tanning, goat hair spinning, a shop at the *suk arasta*, but none of these emerges as a preferred field of business operations, rather each attracted just one person. Sometimes one individual had shops of different profiles and the entries do not allow me to judge which one had been the starting-point for the owner, whether he had made a successful career in one of them and expanded the business into other fields or had only inherited them. This is the case with a Berber el-Hac Şaban b. Mustafa, who had a barber-shop in the *suk* of the fishermen and the equipment, but also five more *dükkâns* – three at the *suk* of the fishermen and two at the *suk* of the *kürkçüs*, probably with the respective profile.¹⁵⁸ Another, el-Hac Mehmed b. Yusuf, had four salt-trade *dükkâns*,¹⁵⁹ and one soap-making workshop worth 5,000 *akçes*.¹⁶⁰ In the case of the former, whatever the profile of his other shops, we may assume, mainly on the basis of his sobriquet, that even if not an active barber at the time of his death, he might have begun his career as such. The latter, however, is difficult to define professionally as he seems to have run both businesses personally. With Boyacı Hüseyin we find a perfect harmony between a sobriquet and property, both directly related to his work.¹⁶¹ Interestingly, the goods stored in the workshop accounted for 135,600 out of his 141,240-*akçe* estate. Obviously he remained a newcomer in Sofia, earning his position mainly by

157. I suppose that the location was a very important factor in determining the value of a *dükkân* – as stated above, the one next to the *kapan* was valued at 5,000 *akçes* while the one near the palace at 3,700. In the third case the location is not indicated at all.

158. Nothing in the inventory reveals any details about them, except that each was valued at 6,000 *akçes*.

159. Two were valued at 600 *akçes* and two at 1,200.

160. Consequently, he had salt (9,597 *kıyyes* for 22,821 *akçes*), and soap (390 *kıyyes* for 5,850 *akçes*), as well as various fats and lime with ash as raw materials for the production of soap.

161. What he had was dyes, alum, varieties of silk, cotton, broadcloth, threads, but no roofed property, neither as a house nor as a workshop.

his skills,¹⁶² and his life remained very much concentrated around his occupation.¹⁶³ Interestingly, el-Hac Ahmed b. el-Hac Receb had a *saraç dükkânı*, whereas the rest of his estate reveals him as someone involved in trade in mainly coarse textiles and clothes produced from them.¹⁶⁴ Probably he simply owned the shop but was in the textile trade, selling some of his goods in Pazarcık.¹⁶⁵ Women who had shops should in all probability be considered simply *rentières* who, especially the younger among them, had inherited them.¹⁶⁶

One specific group which emerges among the Sofian rich men includes those who died while performing the pilgrimage to Mecca. As required, before undertaking the long journey, the pilgrims had settled their debts, where there had been any. What I find a striking similarity in all these estates, however, is that they had gone even further, sometimes having cashed most of their assets. They constitute the bulk of those who had no houses at the time of their death, but had *dükkâns* and considerable sums of money with them and/or with their families. The lists of their personal belongings are usually short containing sometimes just a few items of their clothing.¹⁶⁷ It is not clear if that was the normal practice, or only a coincidence reflecting simply lack of interest of the owners in their businesses. On the other hand, the journey to Mecca obviously allowed some of the pilgrims to engage in some trade on the way.¹⁶⁸

Unfortunately, the characteristic features of the register do not allow me to reconstruct the way in which these men and women managed their properties.

162. While his wife Fatma bt el-Hac Süleyman had a very small *mehr*, just 2,000 *akçes*, she was at the same time her husband's only moneylender, from whom he had borrowed 160 *guruş*, which could of course have been a fictitious operation.

163. Prior to his death he had donated money to the *vakıf* of the fountains (*çeşme*) in the *suk* of the *boyacıs* and to the *duagû* at the *suk* of the *boyacıs*.

164. Packs of long woollen socks, socks, small *kebe*, white *kebe*, just *kebe*, *şalvar*, collars, black *aba*, *çobanka*, red, white and yellow *kepenek*, in short, items which have nothing to do with a saddler's business.

165. A town on the main road located between Sofia and Plovdiv.

166. See the cases of Mümine bt el-Hac Abdülkadir, who had obviously inherited four *dükkâns* in the *Muytab suk*, estimated at 12,000 *akçes*, along with a considerable sum of money, explicitly stated to have come from her father's estate. The situation is perhaps similar with another woman, Havva bt el-Hac Hüseyin, who was clearly older than Mümine. She, too, owed at least a quarter, possibly more, of her property to her father.

167. These are el-Hac Hüseyin b. Ramazan who had half a tanner's workshop with some tools at the *debbaghane*, valued at 5,000 *akçes*; Berber el-Hac Şaban b. Mustafa, who, as already noted, had a barber-shop in the *suk* of the fishermen and the equipment, as well as five more *dükkâns*; Hacı Ahmed b. Abdünnebi, the owner of the most expensive *dükkân* that I have come across in this register: it was located in the *suk arasta* and estimated at 40,000 *akçes*. It is not clear whether this was the value only of the structure or included also goods and equipment in it.

168. Berber el-Hac Şaban had, for example, pearls valued at 12,480 *akçes* with him, which he was obviously bringing home but we do not know whether as presents or for commercial purposes.

Above we saw that one of the large-scale traders in iron products obviously relied on the assistance of servants/slaves and employees, but the scale of the enterprises is not very clear, except probably in the cases of el-Hac Süleyman and Şaban b. Muharrem, which were described above. İsmail Ağa also had a *kethüda*, an İbrahim Çelebi, but it is not clear what exactly he did for his employer, except that he carried out some trips on his behalf. Halil Ağa, on his part, had a *hazinedar*, but it seems that the latter was not particularly successful in managing his employer's business affairs and financial operations, as Halil died bankrupt, owing money also to his employee. Interestingly, the three owed different sums of money to their agents which are not described as salaries. Many of the rich paid wages (*ücret*) to people whom they hired mainly for some work on their estates.¹⁶⁹ Two deaths which fall outside our group reveal that the owners of *çiftlik*s probably had a *kethüda* as well as guards (*bostancı*) on the site.¹⁷⁰

Moneylending was not a popular occupation among the Sofian rich, and definitely not among the women in their ranks. Indeed, some have records of minor debts that two to three people owed them,¹⁷¹ but this was not a major occupation for most of them. Rather, in many cases it looks like a favour between friends, neighbours or colleagues. Only four seem to have been actively involved in this business, showing different approaches. Two, Mustafa Ağa and Şaban b. Muharrem, were engaged in massive moneylending to individuals and the inhabitants of entire villages, mainly ordinary peasants and craftsmen and rarely to people who bore honorific titles.¹⁷² Some owed them money for the purchase of some item, but most often there is no indication as to the reason for the loan. The same is also true of

169. For example, Şaban b. Muharrem owed, according to the division of his estate, wages (in cash, wheat, salt and cheese) to "the sons of Philip", "the sons of Koyu", "the sons of Zlatan" and "the sons of Vălcho". He also had "expenses for *oğlan*", which is not clear, and the *ücrets* of the *mütemed* of Osman Paşa, the *mütemed* of Ali Paşa, and a Mahmud were to be deducted from his estate, but it is not clear for what service. See also the estate of el-Hac Mehmed b. Abdullah, who owed the *ücret* of one *zimmi*, Bomagan (could this be *pomagan*, that is, assistant?), those of builders, as well as money for roof tiles and for a stone for a hoist, but we do not know if this construction work was related to his business or private life. See also Mustafa Ağa, who owed the wages of an unspecified number of seasonal workers on his own and on the two farms of his brother, and others.

170. See the estates of an Ahmed (no patronym) and a Jovan (no patronym), respectively *kethüda* and *bostancı* at the *çiftlik* of Mahmud Ağa in the village of Gorublyane. Neither of them had any heir. The former left horses, wheat and a cart, estimated at 3,430 *akçes*, but no clothes, the latter a few clothes and some vegetables, such as onions, cabbages and horse-beans, altogether worth 1,660 *akçes*. Probably both lived on the premises of the *çiftlik*, but we do not know, for example, how many *bostancı*s were employed there; cf. S 12, p. 12, docs III and IV.

171. See, for example, the estate of Usta Receb with four minor loans amounting to 1,000 *akçes* altogether.

172. At the time of his death, Mustafa Ağa had 68,860 *akçes* due, while Şaban b. Muharrem had given 159,722 *akçes* as loans.

the loans to villages or representatives of villages (usually Christians) with some exceptions: the village of Glaşova (?) owed 33,860 *akçes* to Mustafa Ağa for their *haraç*, while the inhabitants of Bayhanlu owed 7,632 *akçes* for their *celepkışan* and those of Bogdan Dol 7,082 *akçes* for *paşa zahiresi* to Şaban b. Muharrem. It is probably they who most closely correspond to the image of the classic moneylender who made entire villages dependent on him. The other two had an elitist approach. İsmail Ağa had loaned money (the sums are given in *guruş* and converted into *akçes* by the recorder) only to high state officials, such as the “former *defterdar* of Crete” (49,000), one of the scribes at the *divan* (70,000),¹⁷³ and the current *kethüda yeri* in Sofia (21,000), that is, a total of 140,000 *akçes*. Berber el-Hac Şaban loaned money to two men, both with the title *bey* and both local Sofians (86,400 and 43,000 *akçes*), that is, more than half of his entire estate.

One of the moneylenders, Mustafa Ağa, had no cash in his estate, but this is not surprising if we bear in mind that he died heavily indebted himself. Interestingly, many of the rich men and women had significant cash in their estates which remained outside any turnover.¹⁷⁴ Those who had the bulk of their assets in ready money were mostly people who died on their way back from Mecca. The money of those who died on the hajj was usually either entirely or largely with them. Those who had considerable sums of cash preferred to have them in different currencies, with the *frengi* / *frenk* and *macar altun* among their favourites, but also *seviliye* (?) *guruş*, *yıldız altun*, *şerifi altun*, *guruş* or *esedi guruş*, *para*, and only very rarely just *akçe*, sometimes *cedid harç akçe*. Two of our rich had chosen to divide their cash assets into two more or less equal parts, which they kept at home and at the *bedesten*.¹⁷⁵

173. It is not clear which *divan*, though – the imperial or that of the *vali* in Sofia.

174. Mümine bt el-Hac Abdülkadir, with 326,489 *akçes* (out of 350,489), obviously inherited from her father shortly before her own death; Veli Beşe, with 21,600 *akçes*; Ali Bey, 3,000 *akçes*; Ahmed Ağa, 96,705 *akçes* (in *macar altun*); İsmail Ağa, 314,335 *akçes* (in several different currencies); Hüseyin Beşe, 76,865 *akçes* (also in different currencies); el-Hac Hüseyin b. Ramazan, 110,550 (the bulk of his entire estate, probably having liquidated most of his belongings before his departure to Mecca); Havva bt el-Hac Hüseyin, 40,000 *akçes*, inherited from her father and kept by her husband, Murtaza Çelebi, so it is not clear if they were in circulation; Şaban b. Muharrem, 16,045 *akçes*; Usta Receb, 53,440 *akçes* (nearly half of the gross estate, kept in different currencies); Ayşe bt Hafız Mehmed, 3,320 *akçes* and two *altuns*; el-Hac Ahmed b. el-Hac Receb, 124,560 (more than half of his gross estate, probably also the result of his departure for Mecca); Berber el-Hac Şaban b. Mustafa, 33,780 *akçes* (in cash and pearls, which he was carrying on his way back from Mecca); Hacı Ahmed b. Abdünnebi, 179,400 *akçes* (again the bulk of his estate); Mehmed Ağa b. Süleyman, 120,000 *akçes*.

175. These were İsmail Ağa and Hüseyin Beşe. The tax collectors obviously kept some of the money at the *bedesten*. See the estate of Mehmed Ağa, *avarız* tax collector (S 12, p. 51, doc. I), where a rent for the *bedesten* and a fee for the *bedestenci* were drawn from the estate.

Glimpses of the Lifestyle of the Muslim Rich Sofians

The nature of the source permits only sketchy insights into the everyday life, mentality and spiritual life of the Sofian rich. Yet, these possibilities should not be bypassed when reconstructing their interests, and even some personal features.¹⁷⁶ In the lines which follow I shall delineate some aspects of their religion, intellectual interests and worldviews as they transpire from the register.

Seven of the twenty-six 'rich' Muslims had performed the hajj, actually four of them died on their way back from Mecca. To their number we should add Boyacı Hüseyin who left 36,000 *akçes berayı hac-ı şerif ber mucub-i vasiye*. None of the *ulema*-related men and women was him/herself or had *hacıs* among their closest relatives. None of the four wealthiest or any of the rich women were among the *hacıs* but two of the latter were daughters of *hacıs*. Pilgrimage obviously attracted the lower ranks of the well-off citizens of Sofia as well as the 'middle-class' people involved in crafts and not so much the military and the *ulema*.

Few of the rich Sofians dedicated property as *vakıf* and none established a new one, or at least none is recorded in the register. The majority of those who dedicated some money for charity allocated it for reading prayers and "for food" or "for cooking food" probably for the poor, but it is not clear how this was disposed of and distributed.¹⁷⁷ İsmail Ağa donated money for prayers to be read for his soul (4,000) and this is all he dedicated for pious purposes. El-Hac Mehmed b. Abdullah donated 100 *akçes* for the complete recitation of the Koran. At the end of their lives only Hadice bt Süleyman, Şaban b. Muharrem and Boyacı Hüseyin dedicated money, and not real property, for the public benefit, to several already existing institutions. According to the entry, Hadice had set aside one third of her property for pious endowments.¹⁷⁸ The list in fact includes donations amounting to 59,831 *akçes*, which is certainly less than a third of both her gross and net estate. Some of the money was dedicated for the repair of her own tomb (5,000) and for prayers to be recited for her soul (5,000). The bulk of Hadice's donation went for the Banabaşı mosque¹⁷⁹ – for candles (5,000), for the recitation of the 112th sura (*ihlâs*) (15,000)

176. I am currently working on a study of the relationship between books, literacy and religious beliefs of Sofians based on this and other *tereke* inventories. Clothes and furniture are topics which equally deserve separate treatment.

177. Recorded as *taamiye*, *tabh için taamiye*, or *harc-ı makul* (I suppose *makulât*). These were el-Hac Mehmed b. Yusuf, devoting 1,000 *akçes* for that purpose; Usta Receb, 2,050; el-Hac Mehmed b. Abdullah, 632; el-Hac Ahmed b. el-Hac Receb, 3,000; Berber el-Hac Şaban, 500; Mehmed Ağa, and Hadice bt Süleyman, 7,831.

178. I wonder if this was not related to her being childless at the time of her death, her heirs being her husband and her paternal aunt.

179. On the Banabaşı mosque, see in brief M. Kiel, 'Urban Development in Bulgaria in the Turkish Period: The Place of Turkish Architecture in the Process', in K. Karpat (ed.), *The Turks of Bulgaria: The History, Culture and Political Fate of a Minority* (Istanbul 1990), 116-21.

and for the repair of the fountain at the mosque (6,000).¹⁸⁰ Boyacı Hüseyin is the only one of the rich men who dedicated money for material objects for the public service – for the *vakıf* of the *çeşme* in the *suk* of the dyers (6,000).¹⁸¹ Hadice bt Süleyman and Şaban b. Muharrem donated money to their *mahalle vakıfs*, respectively Alaca Mescid (the *tekâlif* – 10,000 *akçes*) and Kara Şahin (the *avarız* – 10,000 *akçes*). In the end, in some of the estates we find considerable sums as bequests to people whose relationship to the donor remains obscure. I suppose that some of it was probably part of their charitable acts, but not all, as some of the cases clearly reveal an attempt to leave additional money to a particular relative.¹⁸²

While donations to pious endowments and charity to the poor, along with performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, are among the major obligations of Muslims, we also find in the register pervasive resort to protective talismans and amulets, a phenomenon which was not class or gender-related but seems to have been more popular among the ‘middle-class’ people. Some of the rich men and women in Sofia also seem to have been particularly susceptible to their power. Thus, Ayşe bt Hafız Mehmed had 14 silver *tılsıms* and two gold *endişes*, and Halil Ağa was in possession of a *çeşm*, probably an ‘evil eye’ – which did not save him from bankruptcy. Mehmed Ağa, who died in Sofia as collector of the *zimmi reaya*’s *avarız*, must have been a strong believer in their power.¹⁸³

Probably the Holy Book had a similar importance for some of the Sofians, especially those men and women who were in possession of just one book (usually the Koran or only a selection of suras, the *En’am-ı Şerif*), or two books, when the Koran would also be almost invariably present. I suppose that particularly when it is a case of less educated people, the Koran was venerated also as a magical and protective object, and was probably recited rather than read.

The rich Sofians were not great readers. Only nine of the men and two of the women among them had any books in their estates, but four of the men and one of the women had just a book or two.¹⁸⁴ Three more, including the other woman, had up to ten books, with the Koran more or less invariably featuring among them.¹⁸⁵

180. Hadice also donated a sum to the *vakf-ı Gence bt Abdullah* (4,000 *akçes*), but its nature is unknown.

181. He also set aside 2,400 *akçes* for the *duagû* at the same *suk*.

182. Among them I should mention in particular Şaban b. Muharrem who donated various small sums to several people, whom I cannot identify, but also to a Mahmud Ağa (43,200 *akçes*), as well as to his wife. Hadice also bequeathed 2,000 *akçes* to a Havva, and el-Hac Ahmed b. el-Hac Receb 12,000 *akçes* to an unknown person.

183. S 12, p. 51, doc. II. He had six tin-and-iron *bazubends*, that is, charms or amulets bound on the upper arm.

184. These are Ali Bey with an unidentified Turkish book; Hüseyin Beşe with *Kelâm-ı Şerif*; Şaban b. Muharrem with *Mushaf-ı Şerif* and *Muhammediyye*; Ebu Bekir b. Nasuh with two copies of *Mushaf-ı Şerif*; Hadice bt Süleyman also had two books – *Kelâm-ı Şerif* and *Muhammediyye*.

185. These are Mehmed Ağa, with ten, and Hüseyin Efendi, with nine books, as well as Ayşe bt Hafız Mehmed, with ten books.

Three had larger and really diverse collections: the two brothers Mustafa Ağa (68 books) and Ahmed Ağa (25), as well as Halil Ağa (14 and a *ruzname*). Interestingly, the group of book-lovers includes the two most prominent 'credit millionnaires' among the rich Sofians, while the single true millionaire did not leave even a Koran in his estate. Given the predominant number of the military among the rich, it is not surprising that they were also the 'readers'.¹⁸⁶ Books appear also in the estates of some of the high-ranking Ottoman officials entered in the register.¹⁸⁷ In some cases the books, usually a Koran, are valued very highly, and we may regard the copies in question as true bibliographic rarities with lavish illumination, and a conscious investment.¹⁸⁸ With Mustafa Ağa and Hüseyin Efendi, having the books and reading were probably related to a combination of a true interest and professional obligations. In the case of the rest of the Sofian rich who had more than two books, one may expect that reading was part of their pastime. Indeed, their collections include books on history, jurisprudence, poetry, and mysticism, dictionaries and encyclopaedic works, linguistics and grammar works, and many anthologies. Some items in the estates speak also of an active attitude and literacy. Among these I regard, for example, the presence of single sheets of paper, or just paper, reed pen knives (*kalemtraş*), inkpots (*hokka*) and pen-cases (*divit*), made of different materials.¹⁸⁹ Occasionally these could be very expensive and I wonder if this was not also a feature of their status, but their numbers certainly speak in favour of being actively in use.¹⁹⁰ Some Sofians, including İsmail Ağa, had only writing instruments. In his case it is not quite clear whether he used them in person, but bearing in mind his involvement with finances, he probably did.¹⁹¹ His interest, however, was not in intellectual activities. Though fragmentary, these data show that Sofia did have a reading society, not necessarily exclusively among the 'rich', but cer-

186. These collections are actually the largest in the whole register.

187. Mehmed Mecdi Efendi, *deFTER emini*, had three *mecmuas* and two *mukavva divits* in the three chests that his son sent to Sofia in order to meet his father's debt of 1,060 *guruş* to Macaroğlu Yuda (S 12, p. 125, doc. II). These were among the few items which did not end up with the moneylender, probably in conformity with the prohibition that 'Muslim' books should not be possessed by non-Muslims. Mehmed Ağa, *avarız* collector, also had three books, including the Koran (p. 51, doc. II).

188. The two most expensive books possessed by women are the *Kelâm-ı Şerif* (500 *akçes*), and the *Muhammediyye* (600 *akçes*), of Hadice bt Süleyman; the most expensive 'male' book is a Koran belonging to Mustafa Ağa (3,150 *akçes*). The other books, when there is a value, are far cheaper than Hadice's.

189. See, for example, the estate of Mustafa Ağa, who had sheets of paper (*evrak*) valued at 50 *akçes* altogether, 13 *kalemtraşes*, and just one *mukavva divit*; Ayşe bt Hafız Mehmed had a *mukavva divit* and two *kalemtraşes*.

190. See, for example, the silver *divit*, valued at 3,050 *akçes*, in Ahmed Ağa's estate; or the desk (*çekmece*), 330 *akçes*, *çekmece divit*, 520, *mukavva divit*, 30, *kullu divit*, 610, and silver *divit*, 1,248, *evrak*, 17, and a *ruzname*, in the estate of Halil Ağa; Hüseyin Efendi left a *kullu divit* for 2,000, and Mehmed Ağa, a silver *divit*, 1,250.

191. İsmail Ağa had a *dimişkî divit* (115 *akçes*), a silver *hokka* (150), and a silver *divit* (2,100).

tainly among them, too. The city provided a market for paper not only for books but also for the needs of the various bureaus and offices which functioned in the capital city of Rumeli. The opportunities in Sofia attracted specialised merchants¹⁹² and copyists.¹⁹³

Games, more or less intellectual, seem to have been part of Sofian men's entertainment. Backgammon (*tavla*) crops up in the estates of middle and upper-class men in Sofia. We find sets, sometimes more than one, in four of the inventories of the rich men, too – İsmail Ağa had one, valued at 41 *akçes*, so did Mustafa Ağa (71 *akçes*), and Halil Ağa (84 *akçes*), while el-Hac Mehmed b. Yusuf had two (10 and 5 *akçes*). Chess (*satranç*) was a more elitist recreation. It is present only in the estates of rich men: Mustafa Ağa, valued at 14 *akçes*, Hüseyin Beşe, at 85, Halil Ağa, at 120. The different values of backgammon and chess sets probably suggest different qualities of wood or finer work. Interestingly, the only other Sofian in whose estate we find both (*satranç maa tavla*), a Mustafa, was also in possession of a considerable quantity of tobacco and tobacco pipes and I wonder if he was not serving the public needs in that respect.¹⁹⁴ Given the ambiguous legal status of chess and even more so of backgammon, this data is surprising.¹⁹⁵ Their bad image is to a certain extent confirmed by the fact that we do not find them in the estates of *ulema*. Interestingly, the two most indebted men in the register, Mustafa Ağa and Halil Ağa, were in possession of both. Could the clue be in the already existing view that both games were occasionally related to gambling?

Expensive clothes and jewellery were no doubt a constituent element of the status of both men and women, and we find them in all the estates of the rich. In smaller quantities they may appear also in those of the 'middle-class' citizens. In fact, the acquisition of expensive clothes was a very personal trait, let us say, weakness, and not necessarily related to property status only. There were 'dandies' and 'coquettes' in all groups, certainly better discernible among 'the rich' than among the others. For some representatives of the group, collecting these items might have been a major diversion. Women invested in jewels, men in expensive silver arms, sometimes with inlaid precious stones, silver horse trappings and other accessories.

192. See S 12, p. 48, doc. I, the estate of el-Hac Musli b. Keyvan, from Saray, who was a temporary resident in Sofia. He traded in different types of broadcloth, bullets, *kebe*, *sahtiyân*, but also different types of rough and more refined paper, of which he had considerable quantities.

193. One of the 'visitors' might have been involved in this. See the estate of an Abdullah Efendi, who died 'as a guest' in the *mahalle* of Cami-i Atîk, where we find a kind of parchment, a *mukavva divit* and a *hokka*, a *çekmece*, scattered sheets of paper, several books, including one *mecmua* described by the scribe as *söktük*, that is, either 'with damaged binding' or 'ripped' (S 12, p. 129, doc. II).

194. S 12, p. 78, doc. I. Mustafa, who also must have been a military, had 221 *kıyyes* of tobacco estimated at 2,978 *akçes*, nine *kıyyes* at 117, and seven at 91. Apart from this, he had 18 *çubuks* worth 18 *akçes*, and three worth 53, and a *duhan tahtası* worth 8 *akçes*.

195. R. Hattox, *Coffee and Coffeehouses: The Origins of a Social Beverage in the Medieval Near East* (Seattle and London 1991), 103-04.

Although weapons must have been an important component of the rich men's social standing, those who were active as military men were disposed to acquiring more significant numbers.¹⁹⁶ The register allows me to record the relatively massive use of firearms by the local men, but the high-ranking military tended to invest more in weapons made of or adorned with silver. The register also permits me to trace the infiltration of a 'gadget' among the Balkan Muslims, namely, the clock and the watch. It should be pointed out that at the time when the register was compiled, there was already a *mahalle* with the name of *Saat* in Sofia. Pocket watches (*koyun saati*), however, were still accessible and interesting to only a very limited circle of Sofians, exclusively men and belonging to the group of the well-off citizens. They appear in only five estates – of four locals (Mustafa Ağa, Halil Ağa, Hüseyin Efendi, and İsmail Ağa)¹⁹⁷ and one visitor (Mehmed Ağa, *defter emini*).¹⁹⁸

Horses were also very important for the rich men, and not necessarily only the military. An exclusively male item was the *koçi*,¹⁹⁹ a big bullock-carriage for picnicking. Four of the rich men had at least one in their estates,²⁰⁰ and we learn from Mustafa Ağa's inventory that an Ahmed Ağa owed him 4,200 *akçes* for a carriage.²⁰¹ Having a *koçi* no doubt added to the prestige of its owner. Those who could not afford one for themselves only and the thrifter took advantage of the services of a *koçiyaş*, a carriage-driver. In those years there was at least one who had migrated from 'the infidels' lands' to Sofia, becoming a *zimmi*.²⁰² A couple of years later we find a reference again to a *koçiyaş* which might be indicative of a more or less constant presence of at least one in the town.²⁰³

196. Cf. the estates of İsmail Ağa and Ahmed Ağa. The former had also twelve *hazineli çergeres* and one *matbah çergesi*. Other members of the military also had tents and marquees in their estates, probably related to the performance of their obligations.

197. Mustafa Ağa had one estimated at 2,800 *akçes*, Halil Ağa one at 3,200, Hüseyin Efendi one at 1,260, while İsmail Ağa had, according to the original inventory, a clock made to stand on a table (*peştahla saati*) at 1,100, a broken (*meksur*) clock at 500, and three bags for watches; the second list gives a different picture of İsmail Ağa's watches: a broken watch worth 4,200 and two clocks made to stand on a table worth 1,100 *akçes*.

198. A pocket watch with silver sides, which like the rest of the estate, is not valued (S 12, p. 51, doc. II).

199. The word is of Hungarian origin.

200. Mustafa Ağa, valued at 5,000 *akçes*; İsmail Ağa, with two worth 4,900 and 6,000; Halil Ağa, 8,600; and Hüseyin Efendi, 6,000.

201. As discussed above, we cannot tell if this Ahmed Ağa was Hadiye's husband, the *kethüda yeri* or another high-ranking Sofian.

202. His name remains unknown, probably because it was difficult for the scribe or because the man was known simply by his profession. At the time of his death (1086 A.H.) he resided in the *han* of Siyavuş Paşa. The property he left behind, and which was taken by the Treasury as he had no known heirs, was rather modest and job-orientated. It consisted of clearly a simpler carriage valued at 2,800 *akçes*, a horse at 1,500, and some cash (S 12, p. 84, doc. II).

203. It is among the debts of a janissary, Baba Yusuf, *yoldaş* of the 34th *bölük* who died in 1088 A.H. while residing in the *han* of Semiz Ali Paşa. He left debts to the *koçiyaş* (1,500 *akçes*), and to a doctor (*hekim*, also 1,500), among others.

Women had *kaftans* with gold, silver or pearl buttons, expensive accessories, with those for the bath specifically featuring in all ‘female’ estates, suggesting that attending the public bath must have been a favourite pastime for many of them. Men wore various expensive furs (*kürk*), boots and shoes. Both men and women would have silver mirrors, silver trays, silver and porcelain coffee cups, bowls and plates.²⁰⁴ Coffee, indeed, must have been in vogue in Sofian society, coffee *ibriks*, *fincans*, *tepsis*, and other coffee-related utensils appearing in the estates of members of all social strata. For the rich they are invariably present, probably as an obligatory element in social life, but some display greater affinity to drinking coffee.²⁰⁵ Similarly, invariably we find in all the estates of rich Sofians silver flasks to hold scented water (*gülâbdan*) and incense boxes (*bihurdan*).²⁰⁶ It is mainly in rich people’s estates that there are special baklava and lamb trays. Though rarely, there might be a chair or two, as well as some furniture indicated as *frenk* or *macar* chests. They had Yemen, Persian or other expensive carpets, clothes described as *Şam*, *Yemeni*, *Acem*, *Londra*, velvet and fine-fabric bedding.

There are, however, some differences of approach and conduct, which are probably more gender-based. Muslim women, even those with considerable assets, avoided active participation in economic life.²⁰⁷ Women did indeed usually have more items related to the household, kitchenware and clothes, but these were far from restricted to the ‘female’ estates only. Coffee cups, baklava and lamb trays, but also spoons and numerous *makramas* (even *şerbet*) feature prominently also in the ‘male’ ones, especially those of the rich Muslims. Women, however, rarely, if ever, had any agricultural instruments and tools, or cattle. Even those who had some economic units, such as a *çiftlik* or a *dükkân*, were much more interested in jewels and expensive clothes. Thus, Hadice, the wealthiest woman in our register, had, as already noted, a variety of jewels and precious stones which amounted to 150,970 *akçes*, that is, more than one third of her gross estate, and far exceeding the value of all her real property, including a *çiftlik*, a mill and a *dükkân*. No less luxurious were some of her clothes, heavily inlaid with precious stones.²⁰⁸ Havva and Hadiye, too, invested much of their assets in jewels which formed a considerable

204. But only the real millionaire had two silver *leğens* and *ibriks*. Just three had cups and plates indicated as *İznik*.

205. Again İsmail Ağa is the only one who had a considerable quantity of coffee, valued at 3,500 *akçes*, but the exact quantity is not specified. He is also the only one to have been interested in having mastic (*sakız*).

206. Only two, İsmail Ağa and Ayşe Hatun, had musk or at least special bags to keep it.

207. Women’s entrepreneurship on the basis of this register has been studied in detail in Todorova, ‘Zhenite v Sofiya’, 25-28.

208. These included several pairs of gold earrings – with pearls and rubies, just gold, one of them being estimated at 14,000 *akçes*, gold bracelets, two of which valued at 28,000 and 20,000, a gold ring with three stones, at 1,400, gold and silver buttons, at 4,500 and 410 respectively, a gold anklet, at 8,750; scattered pearls worth more than 25,000, *altun* with pearls (13,200), *kaftan* with gold (5,600) and with pearl (16,000) buttons, just one belt with *pafıa* inlaid with precious stones, valued at 33,600, etc.

percentage of their estates. It is even possible to sense the personal preferences of the three women for specific jewels and stones. Thus, Havva was the only one who had emeralds, Hadiye had more diadems than the others, whereas Hadice had a conspicuous preference for pearls and rubies and was the only one to wear anklets. Ayşe's approach to life seems to have been more austere. Not that she had no jewels or expensive clothes. She certainly had, but they made up a much smaller part of the whole.²⁰⁹ This difference might have been related to her family background²¹⁰ or her more advanced age, she being the only one among the rich women who had grandchildren. Unfortunately, the other two rich women died too young to leave any personal imprint on their properties.

These human types are not a 'female' phenomenon. Actually, men provide us with the real extremes in this respect. While for women the taste for luxury did not entail financial problems and none of the rich among them died bankrupt or heavily indebted, some of the men in the group were, as explained above, real 'credit millionaires' and their assets were far fewer than their debts. Typical among them were Mustafa Ağa and Halil Ağa, who spent enormous amounts of money on luxury items. The former clearly lived more lavishly than he could afford. At the end of his life it turned out that he had accumulated debts to several people amounting to 365,000 *akçes*. Not only that, the scribe on several occasions indicated that, taking advantage of his position of guardian of his under-age nephews, he had also spent their whole inheritance of about 642,000 *akçes*. Similar is the case with Halil Ağa, whose estate was more than two times smaller than his debts. Both shared an interest in backgammon and chess, in books and watches, and in showing off in carriages. Strangely, in the person of Hüseyin Efendi, our only *ulema*, they had clearly a follower in more or less all their extravagances and weaknesses – with one significant difference. Hüseyin Efendi was probably more moderate in his spending and did not leave his family, the largest among all rich Sofians, bankrupt. Huge debts, which nearly annihilated the estate, were owed by el-Hac Süleyman, who was among the most economically active in our group, showing the dangers confronting large-scale traders. Others, with Şaban b. Muharrem as a typical member of the group, were probably more careful in spending, thriftier, and probably more pious Muslims. In İsmail Ağa one sees a real high-ranking military man who had accumulated considerable wealth, buying prestigious items such as weapons of precious metal, gadgets, a huge house, everything that would be regarded as a constituent component of his social status. Books and spirituality, however, were not central either to his, or to his colleagues' lives.

209. Among them we find an enigmatic *endişe/entişe*, which seems to be a very female object that appears in a variety of forms and of different metal, and which I tend to identify with an amulet or other similar item.

210. Her father was a *hafiz*.

*The Non-Muslim Rich: Family Status, Professional and Property Profile*²¹¹

The documents are rather jejune and do not allow me to build a full flesh-and-blood portrait of the well-off and educated Christians and Jews. For this we shall need other sources, largely produced by the religious communities themselves. Here I shall draw just a few strokes of the image of the non-Muslim 'rich', without aiming at a comprehensive portrait. The two local Christians are very difficult to define professionally, even less as persons. The estate that we have to hand of one of them, an unnamed inhabitant of the *mahalle* of Kalojan, is actually just an addition to its main body.²¹² At the time of his death he had a wife, one daughter of age, and three under-age children. Only the deaths of two of his under-age children reveal the presumed size of his estate at around 200,000 *akçes* as well as the composition of his family. This addition gives me grounds for thinking that the man in question was involved in large-scale grapes and probably alcoholic drinks production. Whether this was for personal needs only or whether he was also a tavern-keeper, however, is difficult to judge, as it is about his main occupation.²¹³

The situation with the other rich non-Muslims – one Christian and two Jews – who appear in the pages of the register, is slightly clearer. They were all involved in moneylending and it could well have been their main occupation. This is certainly the case with Rano, a *zimmi* who left an estate valued at 137,269 *akçes*, of which just below 75,000 came from money lent mainly to Christians from the town and nearby villages, but also to Muslims.²¹⁴ He kept more than 35,000 *akçes* in cash "in the *dükkân*", in short, a man with a clear profile of a moneylender but not a large-scale one. As mentioned above, no Jewish estates are recorded in this register. However, when we consider the group of the 'rich' living in the town of Sofia, we should not overlook at least two Jews whose names transpire from the records, where they feature as having lent more than 100,000 *akçes*. One of them is the above-mentioned Yuda, known as Macaroğlu, who had given a loan of 1,060 *gurus* only to the deceased Mehmed Mecdi Efendi, former *defter emini*.²¹⁵ Unfortunately, there is no other evidence about his activities, but this single sum is indicative that

211. The references to the documents related to the estates of the two Christians are included in the Appendix.

212. This second inventory includes assets estimated at 28,231 *akçes*, and after the deduction of taxes and wages, at 11,580.

213. What we know is that he had a considerable income only from the collected grapes, several large casks, including one with residue of pressed grapes (*cibre*), and one copper cask (could it be for *rakı* production?), significant expenditure for *hizmetkârs* and for the gathering of the grapes itself. Apart from that, just the shares of his under-age son Nikolcho and daughter Kaliche in their own estates reveal the possible size of the property that he had left.

214. Among the Muslims I should mention Mustafa Çelebi (1,100 *akçes*), Receb Sipahi (1,050), Ayvaz Bey (3,660), and İbrahim Bey (4,457).

215. S 12, p. 125, doc. II.

Yuda did indeed belong to the group of the wealthiest citizens of Sofia. Similar indirect evidence is also available about yet another Jew, a Yasef v. Samail, who was among the moneylenders to some of the wealthiest Muslims in the register, having lent 81,000 *akçes* to Mustafa Ağa alone, over 40,000 *akçes* to Halil Ağa, and 6,000 *akçes* to an İbrahim Çelebi b. Süleyman Bey, a *saraç*, who, although belonging to the medium stratum of Sofian society, shared many of the inclinations and tastes of the former two.²¹⁶ Thus, if my guesses are correct, the rich non-Muslims, at least in the sample provided by the *tereke defter*, were engaged in occupations which were peripheral to the 'respectable' ones – a tavern-keeper (?) and moneylenders. There is no trace of the prosperous merchants and craftsmen, Jews, Ragusans, local Orthodox Christians whom other sources mention. A sole exception is a Garabed, an Armenian merchant of the *acem taifesi* who was staying "as a guest" (*misafir*) at the *han* of Semiz Ali Paşa, clearly engaged in trade in silk and other textiles, but also in religious books²¹⁷ and other religious items (beads), whose estate in Sofia alone amounted to 1,832 *guruş*.²¹⁸

The available sources do not reveal these *zimmis*' real estate property. The inventory of Rano shows him in possession of only one vineyard, in the village of Pançar, estimated at 8,000 *akçes*. The valuation of the grapes in the estate of the unnamed Christian also suggests the existence of a considerable bulk of vineyards, but nothing more specific. We do not have any information about the houses in which these people lived; probably both had managed to transfer their property rights to their wives prior to dying but we do not know this for certain.²¹⁹ What Yasef could afford becomes clear when we see that it was to him that the house of Mustafa Ağa described above, estimated at 40,000 *akçes*, went. Whether after he acquired it he lived there, rented or resold it, however, remains a secret from us.

The dressing code of non-Muslims, as well as their right to ride horses and possess arms in an Islamic state, such as the Ottoman Empire, have often been discussed in the context of the discourse on *zimmi* status.²²⁰ The inventories of

216. S 12, p. 45, doc. I.

217. In his estate we find 280 copies of *Zebur kitabı* maa *İncil kitabı*, that is, The Book of Psalms of David with the Gospel. I wonder who his customers might have been for all these books.

218. S 12, p. 91, doc. I.

219. In this case we are confronted with a situation similar to that discussed above with the Muslim men who have no houses. Rano and his wife, Dano, were childless at the time of his death. His other heirs were two cousins whose shares were larger than that of his wife. Of course, it may well have been the case that their house belonged to her. See, for example, a case in which a Christian woman managed to ward off the claims of the Treasury over a house, a courtyard, two vineyards, a large wine cask, clothes, and a pair of scales, proving that all this property she had inherited from her father and had nothing to do with her deceased husband (S 308, p. 18, doc. I, and p. 45, doc. I, of 1619).

220. See M. Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore 1955), 195-98; B. Ye'or, *The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians under Islam* (London and Toronto 1985), 63-67; on the segregation and 'exchange' in clothing, and especially on the use of atypical attire, but also of arms by various strands of Ottoman society, non-Muslim merchants

the estates of Rano and Garabed show clearly that the dressing code was either rather lax or did not apply at the time of their compilation. Among Rano's belongings one comes across light blue *kürk* of *çuha* (800 *akçes*), purple short *kürk* of *çuha* (200), ornamented (*menkuş*) *çuha kürk* (2,000), ornamented *çuha dolama* (9,000), purple *çuha çakşır* (50), light blue *şalvar* (180), red fur cap (*kalpak*, 140). Garabed's clothing is more austere, but it, too, includes a red *kapama* (104), blue *çuha kürdiye* (275) and a cap made of pine marten's fur (140). Rano had as many as four swords (*kara kılıç*), two small guns (*tüfenk*) and a silver knife, as well as a horse (*at*, 3,000) and a colt (*tay*, 1,000). A sword (*kara kılıç*) and a big gun (*tüfenk*) are to be found, too, in the possession of the Armenian merchant, who had also a personal (unidentified) book and a *sade defter*, indicating not just interest in trade in books but also literacy on the part of their owner. Nothing in the estates of any of the other Christians relates to their spiritual life. Whether that was on purpose or was a reality of life, however, remains for us to guess.

*

By way of conclusion, I would like to point to the fact that despite their drawbacks, the *tereke defters* can help us reveal many aspects of Ottoman provincial society ranging from pure social history to curiosities related to everyday life. The inventories allow us to clothe in flesh and blood the generic images of the 'rich', the moneylender, the ruling class. From its pages emerge people with their personal traits – old and young, active businessmen and dandies, military men and *ulema*, coquettish women, pious pilgrims and probably gamblers, Muslims, Christians and Jews. All these men and women did once live in Sofia, as they did elsewhere in the vast Ottoman Empire.

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and bishops in particular, see S. Ivanova, 'Masquerade – Imperial Interludes', *ÉB*, 1994/1, 28-36; D. Quataert, 'Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720-1829', *IJMES*, 29 (1997), 403-25.

APPENDIX

The Local Sofian 'Rich'

MUSLIM MEN

1. Mustafa Ağa b. Yakub Çavuş, *mahalle* of Kara Şahin, gross value: 610,216 *akçes*/ net value: bankrupt – p. 16/I.
2. Veli Beşe b. Hasan, *mahalle* of Şuca Fakih, 122,565/91,623 – p. 21/II.
3. Ali Bey b. Mehmed, the village of Musa, former inhabitant of *mahalle* of Siyavuş Paşa, 101,054/91,254 – p. 23/I.
4. Ahmed Ağa b. Yakub Çavuş, *mahalle* of Kara Şahin, 642,170 – p. 27/I.
5. İsmail Ağa b. Sefer, *mahalle* of Yazıcıoğlu, 1,015,202/952,519 – p. 29/I, p. 149/I.
6. Hüseyin Beşe b. Kurd, *mahalle* of el-Hac A(li)şer, 291,023/243,443 – p. 31/I.
7. El-Hac Hüseyin b. Ramazan, *mahalle* of el-Hac İsmail, 133,267/127,967 – p. 32/I.
8. Halil Ağa b. Receb, *mahalle* of Kara Danişmend, 273,382/bankrupt – p. 55/I.
9. Şaban b. Muharrem, *mahalle* of Kara Şahin, 516,943/395, 439 – p. 82/I.
10. El-Hac Mehmed b. Yusuf, *mahalle* of el-Hac İlyas, 105,712/96,407 – p. 92/I.
11. Usta Receb b. Abdullah, *mahalle* of Karagöz Bey, 109,168/97,589 – p. 95/I.
12. Boyacı Hüseyin b. Osman, from the village of Kilisa, *nahiye* of İzladı, died as inhabitant of the *mahalle* of Kara Şahin, 141,240/67,791 – p. 111/II.
13. El-Hac Süleyman b. [blank], *mahalle* of Mansur Hoca, 308,206/28,996 – p. 116/I.
14. Ebu Bekir b. Nasuh, *mahalle* of Cami-i Atık, 127,429/57,979 – p. 117/I.
15. El-Hac Mehmed b. Abdullah, *mahalle* of Tahıl Bazarı, 141,532/76,255 – p. 118/I.
16. El-Hac Ahmed b. el-Hac Receb, *mahalle* of Muhtesibzade, 227,282/173,402 – p. 128/I.
17. Berber el-Hac Şaban b. Mustafa, *mahalle* of Hacı Bayram, 220,529/208,339 – p. 133/II.
18. Hacı Ahmed b. Abdünnebi, *mahalle* of Kuru Çeşme, 248,187/225,848 – p. 134/III.
19. Mehmed Ağa b. Süleyman, *mahalle* of Karagöz Bey, 346,066/316,686 – p. 138/II.
20. Hüseyin Efendi b. Ali Efendi, *mahalle* of Muhtesibzade, 103,817/75,067 – p. 143/I.

MUSLIM WOMEN

1. Mümine bt el-Hac Abdülkadir, *mahalle* of Kuru Çeşme, 350,489/344,089 – p. 6/III.
2. Hadice bt Süleyman, *mahalle* of Alaca Mescid, 403,995/255,491 – p. 25/II.
3. Hadice bt Ahmed Ağa, *mahalle* of Kara Şahin, 107,028/105,528 – p. 28.
4. Havva bt el-Hac Hüseyin, *mahalle* of el-Hac Yahşi, 156,107/136,387 – p. 36/I.
5. Ayşe bt Hafız Mehmed, *mahalle* of Yazıcızade, 84,563/72,607 + 26,136 + unvalued objects – p. 123/I.
6. Hadiye bt Mehmed Ağa, *mahalle* of Kara Danişmend, 182,325/170,824 – p. 146/I.

CHRISTIANS

1. Unnamed Christian, *mahalle* of Kalojan, presumed 200,000 – p. 10/III and IV, p. 11/I.
2. Rano, *zimmi*, *mahalle* of Cami-i Atık, 137,269/130,423 – p. 73/I.

VAROŞ: THE ELITES OF THE *REAYA* IN THE TOWNS OF RUMELI, SEVENTEENTH-EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

Svetlana IVANOVA

The *varoş* theme has been developed in the course of my research on the *mahalle* (neighbourhood, quarter) in the towns of present-day Bulgaria in the fifteenth-eighteenth centuries.¹ Within the framework of these neighbourhood-territorial communities, *reaya* and *askerî* were in a state of cohabitation; poor and rich people, and sometimes Muslims and non-Muslims, lived in immediate proximity. The basic, i.e., the religious, needs of the various confessional groups, as well as all kinds of social and municipal activities, in which the state and the political apparatus were only indirectly involved, were satisfied in the heterogeneous environment of the *mahalle*. The functioning of the *mahalles* as corporations² gave rise to the spontaneous processes of self-organisation of these communities, their internal structuring, and the nomination of leaders. On the other hand, the Ottoman state more and more actively engaged the neighbourhood-territorial communities in their own administration. In the course of the protracted engagement process, a certain degree of autonomy of the neighbourhood-territorial communities was developed, a new 'agenda' was established insofar as their internal life was concerned, and important new social relations started to appear among the *mahalle* members. Prominent among these relations were the collective responsibility for maintaining public order and, above all, the collective responsibility for the payment of taxes.

1. S. Ivanova, 'Mahalata v balgarskia grad XV-XVIII v.' [The *Mahalle* in the Bulgarian Town, Fifteenth-Eighteenth Centuries], unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sofia, 1991.
2. *Corporation: A relatively stable group sharing common interests, values, and norms of behaviour; it involves direct contacts between its members and distribution of functions between them for achieving some defined aims. A characteristic feature of the social structure of pre-industrial societies was the manifestation of the minor groups in the shape of corporations: village or neighbourhood territorial communes, town commune, religious order, guild, etc. Pre-industrial societies largely operated on the basis of 'horizontal' relations of a corporate type rather than on 'vertical' relations of supremacy and subjection. In pre-industrial societies, corporations as well as classes, were bound by specific legal statuses* (A. Gurevich, *Filosfskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar* (Moscow) [Philosophical Encyclopaedic Dictionary], s.v. 'Feodalizm' [Feudalism]; J. Szczepański, *Elementarne Poniatia Sotsiologii* [Basic Notions in Sociology] (Moscow 1969), 99.

In the Ottoman Empire, the *mahalles* were in practice represented before the authorities and governed in their intra-communal affairs not by one person, but by small groups of people. In the case of Muslims, these groups consisted of *askerî-beratlıs* and of *reaya*, and, in the case of non-Muslims, of *reaya*. The higher Orthodox clergy, the bishops, who were *beratlıs*, and could be viewed as part of the Ottoman ruling class, were not members of the representative bodies of the Christian *mahalles*. Thus, a *mahalle* was a basic neighbourhood-territorial community of the majority of those residing within its limits, i.e., the taxpayers, whom the sources called *reaya*, Muslims or *zimmis* (*kâfir*) and who were town-dwellers (*ehl-i şehir* or *medine-i mezburenin sakinlerinden*). By *reaya* I mean the taxpayers, regardless of their ethno-religious identity and place in the social division of labour, who eventually owned *mülk* property and *miri* land by means of a *tapu*; on the other hand, by *askerî* I mean *beratlıs*, who, in return for their (formally non-hereditary) services to the state obtained a *timar* or salary from the Treasury or from a *vakıf*. It is important to add, in view of our larger theme about Ottoman provincial elites, that the members of the *askerî-beratlı* estate, together with their provisory service-dependent status and remuneration, were given authorisation by the central authorities to carry out certain functions, or what Colin Imber has defined as the exercising, by authorisation, of 'small portions' of the sultan's power with respect to the *reaya* and the corporations.³

In the course of expanding the formal and informal functions of the neighbourhood territorial communities (of the *mahalles* in the case of the towns), specific *reaya* elites were also formed.⁴ Those whom we could eventually term 'elite' were the bearers of intra-communal autonomy. In a very relative degree this elite could be linked to positions of power – real or at least perceived as such by the public consciousness. The elites of the small neighbourhood-territorial communities of the *reaya* were collective representative bodies which acted as intermediaries between the authorities and the *reaya* in the execution of various tasks, and who had no political power, but participated in the administration in the widest sense of the word.

In around the seventeenth century, however, the urban communal structure became more complex. An institution – *varoş* – again with intermediary functions between the non-Muslim *reaya* and the administration, was superimposed on the Christian *mahalles*, in the same way in which *ayan* representation was, by the way, institutionalised in the Muslim *mahalles*. In this paper, I will dwell on the *reaya* elite, formed on the basis of participation in *reaya* administration, and, more particularly, on the elite of the non-Muslim town-dwellers, who constituted the *varoş* institution in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁵ I will consider the towns

3. C. Imber, *Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition* (Edinburgh 1997), 67-98.

4. *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (ed. D. Sills), s.v. 'Elites'.

5. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Ivanova, 'Mahalata'; eadem, 'Danachnoto oblagane na naselenieto v balgarskite gradove i formirano na negovite institutsii, XVII-XVIII v.' [The Taxation Levied on the Population of the Bulgarian Towns and the Formation of its Institutions, Seventeenth-Eighteenth Centuries], *Izvestia na darjavnite arhivi*, 65 (1993), 67-98; eadem, 'The *Varoş* of Vidin and *Kanun-ı Serhad*',

in present-day Bulgaria, i.e., in only one region of the Ottoman European provinces (Rumeli), whose specific features allow us to outline local characteristics confirming the multifarious character of Ottoman social history.⁶ Research is based on Ottoman documents, as well as on some Christian church records (codices [*kondika*]) of episcopal councils and registers of town communities, in Bulgarian and Greek.

Varoş as a Toponym⁷

In describing in detail the towns of the Balkans, Evliya Çelebi often explained what their *varoş* looked like. However, Evliya in some cases designated as *varoş* the intra-fortress space while in others the suburb, in contrast to the fortress – in Macedonia, in Aegean Thrace, and in the Bulgarian lands (Silistre). Sometimes the author specially noted that both Christians and Muslims lived in a given *varoş* – Vidin, Aytos.⁸ It is interesting to note that a *varoş* was not mentioned anywhere in the equally precise description given for some of the towns of present-day Bulgaria by the Catholic bishop Peter Bogdan, dating again from the middle of the seventeenth century.⁹

Thus, the question why the term *varoş* entered the terminology of the officious Evliya, but not that of Peter Bogdan, directs us to its definition. It is known that the word *varoş* is of Hungarian origin and means an unfortified *podgradie* (suburb) or an unfortified town settlement.¹⁰ The term began to be used in the Balkans, spread-

unpublished paper given at the conference 'The Ottoman Frontier' (Newnham College, Cambridge, 1999).

6. E. Gara, 'In Search of Communities in Seventeenth Century Ottoman Sources: The Case of the Kara Ferye District', *Turcica*, 30 (1998), 135-62.
7. N. Todorov, 'Gradat v balgarskite zemi prez XV-XIX v.' [The Town in Bulgarian Lands, Fifteenth-Eighteenth Centuries], in *Arhitekturata na Balgarskoto vazrajdanie* (Sofia 1975), 10-11; idem, *Balkanskiiat grad XV-XIX v.* [The Balkan Town, Fifteenth-Nineteenth Centuries] (Sofia 1972), 23; N. Danova, 'Elementi i institutsii na samoupravlenieto u balkanskite narodi do Reformite' [Elements and Institutions of Self-Government of the Balkan Peoples before the Ottoman Reforms], unpublished paper; S. Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia: Trade, Crafts, and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650* (Cambridge 1984), 270; T. Stoianovich, 'Model and Mirror of the Premodern Balkan City', in N. Todorov (ed.), *La ville balkanique, XVI^e - XIX^e ss.* (*Studia Balcanica* 3) (Sofia 1970), 100-04.
8. Evliya Çelebi, *Patepis* [Travel Notes], trans. S. Dimitrov (Sofia 1972), 21, 59, 94, 128; D. Gadžanov, 'Patuvane na Evlia Çelebi iz balgarskite zemi prez sredata na XVII v.' [The Journey of Evliya Çelebi through the Bulgarian Lands in the Middle of the Seventeenth Century], *Periodicheskoto spisanie*, 1909/9-10, 643-44, 647, 556-57, 656.
9. I. Duiichev (trans.), 'Opisanie na Balgaria ot 1641 g. ot arhiepiskop P. Bogdan' [Description of Bulgaria by the Archbishop P. Bogdan (1641)], *Arhiv za poselishtni prouchvania*, 1939/2, 174-210.
10. N. Gerov, *Rechnik na balgarskii iazik* [Lexicon of the Bulgarian Language], vol. 1 (Plovdiv 1895), 108-09; *Nova entsiklopedia u bjok Vuk Karadzich Larousse* (Belgrade), s.v. 'Varosh', 306.

ing eastwards, even before the Ottoman conquest.¹¹ On the other hand, the following terminology existed for denoting part of a town's built-up area in the Bulgarian towns in the period after the twelfth century: citadel (= *grad* or *hisar*), and fortified or unfortified town areas (= *podgradie*); these were also the place of the church parishes. There is no evidence that the name *varoş* had spread as far south-east as the Bulgarian lands before the Ottoman conquest.¹² In contrast to that, however, during the Ottoman period it became one of the terms that replaced the old toponymic nomenclature: in the Ottoman towns the *gradishte* or *hisar* was replaced by the term *kale/kala*; the parish by *mahalle*; the *podgradie* by *varoş*.¹³

Varoş might also be used to denote town settlements, like *kasaba* or *şehir*,¹⁴ but this was not widespread in the Bulgarian lands.

The term *varoş* appeared in Ottoman documents, referring to what are now Bulgarian lands, in the seventeenth century, while in the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century it appeared also in sources written in Greek and Bulgarian. With regard to the present-day Bulgarian territories, the term was used exclusively to denote the inner part of the towns, i.e., as an intra-town toponym (and not to denote a type of settlement, as *karye*, *kasaba*, or *şehir*) in three variants:

1. To denote the old part of the town's built-up area dating from the time before the Ottoman conquest, which should probably be identified with the medieval fortified or unfortified suburbs (*podgradie*). Not long after the Ottoman conquest
11. The territory of the town of Belgrade outside the citadel was until the end of the sixteenth century called *Varoş*. The separate fortified parts of the town that were inhabited later on were called German *Varoş*, Serbian *Varoş*, New *Varoş*. The authors of *The History of Belgrade* mention that in all towns in former Yugoslavia, which started as medieval suburbs and *varoşes* to become Ottoman *şehirs* and *kasabas*, the notion *varoş* was gradually narrowed down and eventually applied only to the Christian *mahalles*. In the case of Belgrade this narrowing down of the notion *varoş* was observable in the seventeenth century (*Istoria Beograda* [The History of Belgrade], vol. 1 [Belgrade 1974], 390-93).
12. V. Antonova, 'Za podgradieto na srednovekovnia grad Shumen prez XII-XIV v.' [On the Suburb of the Medieval Town of Shumen in the Twelfth to Fourteenth Centuries], *Godishnik na muzeite ot Severna Balgaria*, 15 (1989), 57; V. Zlatarski, *Istoria na balgarskata darjava prez Srednite vekove* [History of the Bulgarian State in the Middle Ages], vol. 3 (Sofia 1972), 15; D. Angelov, 'Kam vaprosa za srednovekovnia grad' [On the Question of the Medieval Town], *Arheologia*, 3 (1960), 12; the Bulgarian terminology corresponds to the Greek, which was diffused throughout the Balkans: *agora* or *kastorum*, and *emporium* or *tärg* – see: Stoianovich, 'Model and Mirror', 100-01; D. Poliviani, *Srednovekovniat balgarski grad prez XII-XIV v.* [The Medieval Town in Bulgaria During the Twelfth-Fourteenth Centuries] (Sofia 1989), 5-41.
13. B. Kojić, *Stari Balkanski gradovi, varosi i varosice* [Old Balkan Towns, *Varoşes* and Small *Varoşes*] (Belgrade 1976), 13.
14. M. Filipović, 'O "varošicama" i selima' [About Small 'Varoşes' and Villages], *Glasnik Srpskog Geografskog Društva*, 29/1 (1949), 73-76; Kojić, *Stari Balkanski*, 20; *Nova enciklopedija*, s.v. 'Varosh', 306; s.v. 'Grad', 490.

quest the same area could be called *varoş*, the idea being that the *varoş* was once inhabited by Christians. In fact, the *varoş* might be dominated by Christian inhabitants, but it was also possible that Muslims might have settled in it.¹⁵

In Bulgarian records of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the term *varoş*, in its meaning of an old zone of Christian habitation, acquired an additional shade of meaning – the *varoş* contained the ‘aristocratic’ quarters of the old citizenry, of ‘the aristocracy’, the ‘notables’, in contrast to the ‘low-born peasantry’, who were beginning to settle in the newly-emerging unprestigious *mahalles* on the outskirts.¹⁶

2. As an intra-town toponym, the term *varoş* could be used to denote also zones of town habitation that had emerged after the Ottoman conquest; these zones, however, were like the old *podgradie*, because they were juxtaposed to the citadel (*kale*) that existed in the town, or because their population consisted of Orthodox Christians.
3. In some settlements, especially in those with a predominantly Muslim population, the intra-town toponym *varoş* came close to the ordinary name for a *mahalle*. In such settlements it was not infrequent that the only Christian *mahalle* was called *varoş*, although at the same time Christians might be living interspersed in the Muslim *mahalles*, too.

Thus, in all three cases, the toponym *varoş* was used to denote a part of the town’s built-up area inhabited in that period or in earlier times by Christians.¹⁷ I wish to emphasise, however, that in a number of cases the toponym *varoş* could be used to denote a town zone inhabited by Muslims. In *tapu tahrir* and *cizye* registers of the sixteenth century the term *varoş* is usually not encountered with respect to the present-day Bulgarian lands and appeared in registers only as late as the ‘40s of the seventeenth century.¹⁸

It is difficult to come to an unambiguous interpretation regarding the intra-town toponym *varoş*. Even in documents referring to one and the same town, *varoş*

15. A. Ishirkov, ‘Mahalite v grad Lovech’ [*Mahalles of the Town of Lovech*], in *Lovech i Lovchansko. Geografsko, istorichesko i kulturno opisanie* [Lovech and its Surroundings: Geographical, Historical, and Cultural Description], vol. 2 (Sofia 1930), 120-21.

16. K. Shapkarev, ‘Kratko istoriko-geografsko opisanie na Ohrid i Struga’ [A Short Historical and Geographical Description of Ohrid and Struga], *Sbornik na Balgarskoto Knijovno Drujestvo*, 1 (1901), 13-14; a similar interpretation is also given by Gerov, *Rechnik*.

17. See also Kojić, *Stari Balkanski*, 13, 23; G. Tankut, ‘The Spatial Distribution of Urban Activities in the Ottoman City’, in *Structure sociale et développement culturel des villes sud-est européennes et adriatiques aux XVII^e-XVIII^e siècles* (Bucharest 1975), 245-46.

18. I will even venture a remark which, for the time being, I will refrain from commenting on. The term *varoş* can be found in sixteenth-century *tahrirs* for the Ottoman state’s Balkan provinces, including towns north of the Danube, in the delta of this river (e.g., Yergöğü, Kili, and Babadağı [today in Romania]), present-day Macedonia, eastern Thrace, etc. But it seemed assiduously to avoid crossing today’s state frontier of the Republic of Bulgaria.

could be ambiguously used as a toponym, and, under the influence of the changing situation, it might ‘float’ around a town’s territory. The situation in the Ottoman period was strongly influenced by the former state of a given settlement and by the eventual preservation of town-planning elements in the Ottoman period. The use of the toponym *varoş* in each specific town was influenced also by the existence of a citadel and/or of fortifications covering the whole or a considerable part of the town’s built-up area. The latter situation in practice occurred only in the case of riverside and coastal towns in the Bulgarian lands – on the Danube and along the Black Sea coast – which were at the same time border towns. In inland towns, the presence of fortresses and citadels as a town-planning element was only in the form of an obsolete relic (their use might be resumed in order to provide, at the most, safety against bandits), even as a ‘town-planning memory of the past’, and yet it could influence the current toponymy.

In any case, the term *varoş* was used between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries as an intra-town toponym to denote a specific part of a town’s territory and this causes confusion when it comes to interpreting the same term as the name of an institution.

Varoş as an Institution and Fiscal Practice

Apart from its use as a toponym, the term *varoş* was used in the Ottoman documents rather as the name of an institution of the overall Orthodox population of a given town.¹⁹ In various seventeenth-century registers for Ruse (Ott. Rusçuk), the Christian population of the town was registered in the *mahalles* Tuna, Orta and Kuyumcu (the last one appearing only occasionally), as well as in the *mahalle* Armeniyan; on the other hand, in a tax register for the Ruse *hass* we find the names of four *mahalles*, which bear this time the names of their priests. Starting from the middle of the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century, however, it is not infrequent that in Ottoman documents dealing with fiscal matters about Ruse we come across the generalising term *varoş*, instead of some of the said versions of the names of the Christian *mahalles*. Thus, on one occasion “the inhabitants of the *varoş* of *kasaba* Rusçuk, the *taife* of infidels” sent an *arzuhal* to the Sublime Porte with a complaint against the *hass* administrator who taxed them incorrectly. On the same occasion, an order was issued to the town *kadı*; this order referred to them only as the “*reaya zimmi*s from the Ruse *kaza*” (ill. 1).²⁰

In the seventeenth and eighteenth-century tax registers we find the term *varoş* in the place of the rubric ‘infidels’ (*gebran*). It precedes the subsequently listed Christian *mahalles*, or simply replaces them. The Christian *mahalles* of sixteenth-century Petriç were concealed a century later under the general heading “*mahalle-i nefis-i varoş*”, which housed the rather diminished Christian population of that town.

19. Ivanova, ‘Danachnoto oblagane’.

20. Oriental Department [henceforth: OrO] of the ‘Sts Cyril and Methodius’ National Library of Sofia [henceforth: NLCM], R5, f. 33-a, doc. II; f. 34-a, doc. II; f. 33-b, doc. I.

In Silistre, under conditions of a quite well-traceable continuity in the history of the Christian *mahalles*, in a register for *celepkеşan-ı ağnam*, together with nineteen Muslim and one Jewish *mahalles* we find the rubric “*varoş mahalles*”, which was a generalising heading for the town’s Orthodox population; under this heading the specific *mahalles* were registered (ill. 2).²¹ The Christians, settling slowly in Tatar Pazarcık, were denoted as living in *mahalle* Varoş. At the same time, Christian *cizye hanes* were formed also for Muslim *mahalles*, but for some time they were not concealed under the general term *varoş*. In a 1635 *cizye* register for Tatar Pazarcık, 50 *hanes* were described in “*nefs-i varoş*”, as well as in seven other *mahalles* of up to 17 *hanes* each, which were in fact old Muslim *mahalles*, penetrated by Christians and Jews. In a *nevyafte-i cizye* register dated 1651, the taxpayers of that town – 140 *hanes* – were unified under the general heading *nefs-i varoş* without being divided by *mahalles*.²² Again, in an *icmal cizye* register for Tarnovo (Ott. Tirnova), dated 1643/44, the Christians from the *varoş* were listed in eleven *mahalles*, while in a 1690/91 *mufassal cizye* register twelve *mahalles* were listed under the heading *taife-i kefere-i kaza-ı Tirnova*.²³

Without being absolute, I would say that the term *varoş* as a generalising name for the Christian community seems to have appeared first of all in the registers of taxes collected for the state, such as *cizye*, and *celepkеşan*; later on it entered the registers referring to *avarız*, *imdad* or various *tekâlif*, *masraf-ı vilâyet/tevzi defterleri*. In an account-book, described in the margin (*kenar*) of a *sicil* entry as “*defter* for the *masraf-ı vilâyet*: for ships, for the Silistre *vali* İbrahim Paşa, etc.”, among the different items also appeared 367 *guruş*, which had been borrowed from the *ayan* and other individuals for the purpose of hiring “*cerahors* from the *mahalles*, from the *varoş* and from the places”. The total amount according to the *defter* was 3,094 *guruş*, which had to be distributed by common agreement between *ayan*, *zimmis*, *erbab-ı timar* and *reaya*, on the existing 121.75 *hanes* in the *kaza*.²⁴

It should be noted that a practice was establishing itself (which was particularly distinct and early in the case of small communities such as the Jewish ones)²⁵ for the sultan’s subjects to pay their taxes to the state not individually and personally,

21. OrO, R50, f. 71-a, doc. II; R. Stoikov, ‘Bolgarskie derevni i ih naselenie v kratkih reisrah djizie XVII v.’ [Bulgarian Villages and their Population in the Seventeenth-Century Summary *Cizye* Registers], *Vostochnie istochniki po istorii Iugo-vostochnoi i Tsentralnoi Evrope*, 2 (1969), 229.

22. I. Batakliiev, *Grad Tatar Pazardjik* [The Town of Tatar Pazardjik] (Sofia 1923), 92; BOA, TD 26; OrO, Pd 17/28.

23. BOA, MAD 4023.

24. OrO, R4, f. 60-b, doc. I.

25. D. S. Goffman, ‘The *Maktu* System and the Jewish Community of Sixteenth-Century Safed: A Study of Two Documents from the Ottoman Archives’, *OA*, 3 (1982), 81-90; S. Ivanova, ‘Malkite etnokonfesionalni grupi v balgarskite gradove prez XVI-XVII v.’ [The Small Ethnoconfessional Groups in the Bulgarian Towns During the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries], in *Balgarskiat shesnadeseti vek* (Sofia 1996), 59-61, 63, 65-67, 70.

but through the *mahalles* in which they lived, in accordance with the *avarız hanes* that were due from the particular group. The territorially linked taxpayers were bound by collective liability to pay the taxes to the state, autonomously collecting the due amount among themselves. This group collection of taxes presupposed the creation of a certain internal organisation for carrying out various activities. In a *berat* for collection of the 1711/12 *cizye* in the *sancak* of Vidin from “*ehl-i zimmi kefere, yahudi, armen-i acem taifesi*”²⁶ according to three categories, it was pointed out that, in order to alleviate their *cizye*, some powerful people (*zi kudret*) from *mahalles* and villages, and *kocabaşıs*, had for several years been taking *cizye* cards (*evrak*) from the *cizyedars* as a lump sum (*toptan*); they were not distributing them over the *reaya-i zimmiyan* according to the various tax categories and according to their possessions, but were making calculations of their own.²⁷ In a *berat* for the 1759/60 *cizye* collection we read that, in order to alleviate their *cizye*, the *kocabaşıs* of some *mahalles* and villages took the cards as a lump sum and did not distribute them according to the tax ability (*istihkak*) of each *reaya*, but, whatever the property and income of a *reaya* was, they made calculations of their own and distributed them contrary to the Sharia.²⁸ These incidents point to some typical aspects of the fiscal practice, such as fixing the tax as a lump sum on the taxable community, and autonomous organisation of the collection of taxes by authorised agents from the communities themselves. The group and its leaders autonomously decided what tax share of the lump-sum amount was to fall on each household. It was exactly in the context of this fiscal autonomy and the subsequent practices that the main taxable object until around the seventeenth century was the Christian *mahalle*. But in the course of this century (I am afraid that I cannot be more precise about the chronology of the change) it became possible for a new institution – the *varoş* – to appear in the place of the *mahalles* or to be ‘superimposed’ on them as a taxable community of all the Orthodox inhabitants of a given town.²⁹

Different cases, connected with the settlement of tax issues of the urban Christian community, will substantiate my thesis about the *varoş* as a fiscal institution.

When the members of a group were unable to make payment in time, the group could take a loan. A collective loan taken by the inhabitants of Dupniçe was considered by the *vali*’s *divan* in Sofia in June 1709. The inhabitants of the *kasaba* of Dupniçe – *serdar* Nalil Çavuş, İsmail Çelebi, Hasan Efendi, imam Mehmed Efendi, *madenci* Osman Çelebi, *berber* Ali Çelebi, the *alaybeyi* of Köstendil *zaim* Mehmed Ağa, el-Hac Ahmed Odabaşı, İbrahim Yazıcı, el-Hac Mustafa, *saatçi* Ali, Mehmed Beşe, Ali Yazıcı, es-Seyyid Süleyman, Hasan Yazıcı, Ahmed Çelebi, Kurd Mehmed; from the *kâfirs kâfir çömlekçi* Itzvetan; from the *taife* of the Jews Yakooğlu Samuil,

26. On the *armen-i acem taifesi* (Armenian traders from eastern Anatolia and Iran), see S. Ivanova, ‘The Empire’s “Own” Foreigners: Armenians and *Acem Tüccar* in Rumeli in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’, *Oriente Moderno* n.s., 22 (2003), 3.

27. OrO, S60, f. 20-b, doc. I.

28. OrO, S16, p. 38, doc. I.

29. Ivanova, ‘Danachnoto oblagane’, 90-95.

Davidoglu and Avram (?) – had taken 625 *guruş* from Abdülkerim Çelebi. They had asked that half of the amount be concluded as a loan, and the inhabitant of Dupniçe İsmail Ağa, son of Ahmed, became guarantor (*kefil*) of the loan with his property. The said Muslims, Christians, and Jews had confirmed that they would pay back the amount within 101 days. On the money being demanded, however, the guarantor denied this fact, and then, eight months after the taking of the loan, two Muslims who had witnessed the event, gave testimony of what had happened.³⁰ Especially frequent are the documented cases when the taxable community appealed to the authorities for reduction of the collective tax burden in the event of a drastic change in the inhabitants' tax-payment ability. In the transcript of a document in a Ruse *sicil*, described in its margin as a "*ferman* for the *varoşlıs*", it is stated that the latter was issued with reference to an *arzuhal* by the "*varoş reaya*". The plaintiffs had written that they were overburdened by the requirement to provide carts and *cerahors* in connection with the transportation of cargoes necessary for the army, and that they had become unable to take on such obligations any longer and were poor. They insisted that they were not to be harassed with demands for *cerahors* and carts without a *ferman* by the Sultan. The order given in the *ferman* issued in 1694 was exactly to this effect: "As the *reaya* in the above-mentioned *varoş* are in a state of poverty due to excessive state fiscal demands (*tekâlif*), they should not be harassed by demanding *cerahors* and other *tekâlif* contrary to the Sharia and *kanun* and without a *ferman*" (ill. 3).³¹

It is evident that, just as the *mahalle* was a recognised body in terms of collective liability, so the *varoş* acted legitimately to make all payers take part in disbursing the community's tax liabilities, and to exert pressure on individual taxpayers to participate in discharging the tax obligations to the state. Between the lines of the documents we become aware of a phrase addressed to certain individuals: "You must pay together with us!". Its justification arises directly from the legitimate collective liability by which members of various corporations in the Empire were bound. "*Dülger kulları*" Jovan *zimmi* from Vidin, referred to as "*varoş zimmi*", complained that, in return for his service at the *saray* of "*saadetlü efendi*", he had been exempted from *tekâlif*, *cerahorluk*, etc., and was to pay *cizye* only. The *varoş reaya*, however, said: "You should join our *cerahorluk*".³² A 1694 "*ferman* for the *varoş* inhabitants settled in *çiftlik*s" was issued with reference to a complaint by the inhabitants of a Ruse *mahalle*. (The *mahalle* name is not mentioned, but I think that in fact it was a complaint not on behalf of a single *mahalle* but on behalf of the whole Orthodox community – *varoş* – in Ruse; none of the known registers for Ruse give evidence of a specific *mahalle* called Varoş; the term was used only as a general heading for the already known *mahalles* of Christians.) The plaintiffs wrote that some individuals possessed properties and lands in the said *mahalle* and were obliged to pay *avarız* and other *tekâlif*, decreed by a Sultanic order, together with the petitioners. When such individuals were required to pay the amount due,

30. OrO, S4, f. 25-a, doc. III.

31. OrO, R4, f. 57-a, doc. II.

32. OrO, S8, p. 51, doc. II.

however, they went to hide themselves in the *çiftlik*s of influential people. The *ferman* ordered that the owners of such properties, which were “subject to *avarız*”, had to pay the *tekâlif* in three categories together with the petitioners.³³ This document confirms once again that, in the distribution of taxes by the *varoş*, just as in the ordinary *mahalles*, the tax portions of the different households were not equal. The *varoş* proportioned the taxes at its own discretion in accordance with property categories, i.e., in accordance with the financial status of each taxpayer. Such was the situation in Tarnovo, as reflected in the *defter* of the community (*varoş* [the term was used in the document]), written in Greek and covering the period 1778-1819. The document was kept exclusively in connection with the distribution and collection of the taxes (*vergi*) from the Tarnovo Christians. Every year it provided a list of the local expenditures, that is, a complete analogue of the so-called *tevzi defterleri* for the *masarif-i vilâyet*. After that, on an annual basis again, a list of the taxpayers “from the *varoş*” was made, including a list of the widows and single men, too. The taxpayers from the *varoş* were distributed into the respective *varoş mahalles* (from the beginning of the nineteenth century separate lists of the single men were compiled as well). The document is in this section actually an analogue of the detailed *avarız* registers. In the Tarnovo *defter*, as in these registers, the heads of households were listed *mahalle* by *mahalle*. Here, however, the amount to be paid was fixed against the name of each taxpayer, instead of fixing the tax portions – *hanes* – for the *mahalle* in total.³⁴ It is evident that major differences existed between the average amounts paid by different *mahalles*, but also enormous differences between the amounts due from individual taxpayers.³⁵

All the Orthodox Christians who lived in a given town were perceived as members of the *varoş*, but, as the cited documents reveal, the *varoş* itself claimed, too, the role of such a representation, which meant control over all Orthodox Christians. *Takeci* Lipo, Vukadin, Istojan, Tote, Tasho, Giuro and others “from the inhabitants of the *varoş mahalle* in Sofia” lodged in 1723 a claim in court against the following craft-guilds and their representatives: from the *taife* of grocers Ahmed Halil, Mehmed Beşe, Ali Çelebi, Ahmed Ağa, as well as the *zimmis* from the said *taife* Mitre, Istanolja, Istamen, Petre, Vouchko; from the *taife* of the *mumcus* *mumcu* Istojan, Tano, Boshko, Todor; from the *taife* of the *bostancis* *bostancı* Ilia, David, Pencho, Petko. The claimants wrote that, for some time, upon each stay (*nüzül*) in Sofia of the *vali* of Rumeli, they had been giving him certain things under the name of a gift (*hediyeye*). During the stay in Sofia of the current *vali*, *vezir* Osman Paşa, however, the grocers, *mumcus* and *bostancis*, who, according to the old custom, had

33. OrO, R4, f. 57-a, doc. III.

34. N. Danova, ‘Kam istoriata na Tarnovskata gradska obshtina prez Vazrajdaneto’ [On the History of the Community of the Town of Tarnovo During the Bulgarian Revival], *Istoricheski pregled*, 1 (1980), 108, 119-20, 123; eadem, ‘Une source inutilisée de l’histoire de la ville de Tarnovo de la fin du XVIII^e s. et du début du XIX^e s.’, *ÉB*, 1979/1, 83-84, 88, 99.

35. Ivanova, ‘Danachnoto obligane’, 79-80; Danova, ‘Une source inutilisée’, 86-87, 93.

to take part in the said gift in accordance with their specified shares, refused to pay. The guild members replied that they had presented their gift and were not to give a gift together with the “*varoş* infidels”.³⁶

It is probably in such moments of dispute that it becomes most obvious that the *varoş* was viewed as a fiscal mechanism, as a legitimate institution authorised by the official authorities to collect independently the taxes from all possible kinds of corporations, being an institution placed above them.³⁷

The emergence of the *varoş* institution as an intermediary between the Orthodox subjects and the state provided the possibility of uniting, or separating into an institution of their own, the Christians who lived in Christian *mahalles*, in *çiftliks* on the outskirts of towns or in the *çarşıs*, as well as those who lived in predominantly Muslim, i.e., mixed *mahalles*. In one instance in Sofia, name-by-name listed representatives of “the *mahalles* in the *varoş*” addressed some Christians, listed name by name again, “who live in Muslim *mahalles*”, but who were “from the *reaya* of the *varoş*, from which they have moved out”. The plaintiffs complained that they could not fulfil their collective obligations connected with payment of the tax shares (*hanes*) for *avarız*, *bedel-i nüzül*, *celepkışan-ı ağnam*, *iştira* and other *tekâlif-i şakka*, and insisted that the defendants pay together with them (*imdad*). The claim was rejected.³⁸ In this case *varoş* seems to have been used as a toponym, denoting a certain part of the town’s built-up area. The *varoş* inhabitants were trying to act as representatives of a territorial community, referring to the subjects’ territorial bondage, which presupposed a prohibition on moving to another place, and, in its extreme form, serfdom. Indeed, a tendency towards serfdom, for the purpose of tilling the *miri* land, can be traced in the early Ottoman *kanuns*. Serfdom, however, did not take root in Rumeli.³⁹ And, just as the majority of *sipahi* claims to make *reaya* return to their previous places of residence were rejected, so the *varoş* inhabitants from various towns stopped referring to the territorial bondage of Christian inhabitants who had changed their places of residence, and so they began to emphasise treating the *varoş* as an all-Christian institution. It was not rare for Rumeli Christian *varoş* inhabitants to lose their disputes with Christians who lived in Muslim *mahalles*, because each taxable community was interested in having a greater number of taxpayers, on whom the tax burden would be spread in accordance with the apportioned *hanes*. The idea of the *varoş* as an all-Christian institution, however, was to gain further consolidation.

At the end of the seventeenth century, in *cizye* registers following the *cizye* reform, the Orthodox Christians in a good number of towns were described more or less according to the following pattern: *zimmi* Orthodox population, permanently residing in their *mahalles*, including Greeks, Jews, Armenians; separately regis-

36. OrO, S269, f. 92-a, doc. III.

37. Ivanova, ‘Danachnoto oblagane’, 93-94.

38. OrO, S149, f. 40-a, doc. IV.

39. S. Ivanova, ‘Institutat na kolektivnata otgovornost v balgarskite gradove prez XV-XVIII v.’ [The Institution of Collective Responsibility in Bulgarian Towns, Fifteenth-Eighteenth Centuries], *Istoricheski pregled*, 1990/1, 33-44.

tered were the non-Muslims who lived in Muslim *mahalles*; separate again were the rubrics of *haymana* (with the variant *prishaletz* [newcomer], *yava*, etc.). The number of *haymanas* sometimes considerably exceeded the number of the old non-Muslim inhabitants of a given town.⁴⁰ It was most probably under the immediate influence of the wars and as a more general consequence of the structural changes in the Empire that the migrational influx into towns was intensified. This fact influenced the organisation and the structuring of the urban population, resulted in the emergence of mixed *mahalles*, and was perhaps yet another factor in the generalising *varoş* establishing itself as an institution of corporate, supra-*mahalle*, tax coverage of the Christians from mixed *mahalles*, i.e., of all the Orthodox inhabitants, irrespective of their territorial distribution. In other words, when the territorial bond could no longer be the only one valid, it was replaced by another type of binding of the subjects of a given corporation – the collective fiscal liability of people of the same confession. It was just a possibility, which might or might not be acted upon at an earlier or later stage.

The taxable community of Christians – the *varoş* – often acted together with the town-wide representative body, eventually the *ayanlık*, on problems which were common for a given town. Thus, a *sebeb-i tahrir*, issued by the Varna deputy judge (*müvellâ hilâfet*) el-Hac Hasan, arranged the payment of *iştira* by the “imams of the Varna *mahalles* Ümit Efendi, Ramazan Efendi, Receb Efendi, Kurd Ali Halife, as well as by name-by-name listed representatives of the villages in that *kaza* (the majority of them Muslims), and by the *varoş* of the said town – papa Janaki, Papasoğlu Janul, Kiriakol, Larniaki, Dimitri, son of Uskurdo” (ill. 4).⁴¹ A report dated 1694 by the Varna *kadı* Mehmed, certified that ox-carts for the transportation of munitions and food for the Ottoman artillery were provided by the following town representatives: from Kalender Hoca *mahalle* imam Mahmud Efendi, son of Abdullah; from Papazzade *mahalle* imam İbrahim Efendi, son of Mustafa; from Şaban Efendi *mahalle* imam Receb Efendi; from Alaeddin Efendi *mahalle* imam Şaban Efendi, son of Nasuh; from the *varoş*⁴² the infidels (*kâfir*) Linovrana (?), Sarı Papas and Dimitri; from the Armenian *taife* Haltasız.⁴³

The situation was not the same in all the towns, and did not develop absolutely simultaneously, but the tendency was the same – a taxable community of the

40. S. Parveva, ‘Kam demografskia oblik na grad Nikopol prez 1693 g.’ [On the Demographic Aspect of the City of Nikopol during 1693], in *300 Godini Chiprosko vastanie* (Sofia 1988), 27-37.

41. OrO, f. 20a, a.u. 221.

42. The Christian *mahalles* in Varna are well known and usually appear during the seventeenth century under the rubric *varoş*; see S. Ivanova, ‘The Town of Varna from Late Medieval Times till the Beginning of the National Epoch’, *ĖB*, 2004/2, 112-15, 127-29.

43. OrO, f. 20, a.u. 303 and 309; see also H. İnalçık, ‘Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700’, *ArchOtt*, 6 (1980), 322; idem, ‘Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration’, in T. Naff and R. Owen (eds), *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History* (Carbondale and Edwardsville – London and Amsterdam 1977), 32.

Orthodox Christian urban population was gradually formed, an institution which was a hierarchical link in carrying out the fiscal activities in towns. As I have already noted, it was superimposed on the Christian *mahalles*, on the groups of Christians living and working in the *çarşıs* and *çiftlik*s, and on the *haymanas*. The authority and the tasks of the *varoş* institution, as well as the mechanisms of its functioning in the fiscal sphere, were similar to those of the *mahalles*. It should, however, be emphasised that even though the *varoş* was superimposed on the *mahalles*, it did not exclude or replace them. Along the whole chain of fiscal activities, some tasks were in fact carried out by the *mahalles*, and others – above all those of representation before the official state authorities – by the *varoş*.

In trying to identify the characteristics of the *varoş* as an all-Orthodox fiscal institution, I shall dwell again on the instances connected with the failure in practice to observe the principle of urban Christians and Muslims living in separate quarters.⁴⁴ The following people from the *taife* of *kâfirs*, who lived in some Sofia *mahalles*, appeared at the Sofia court: Istojan, Istefan, Jovan, another Jovan, Nedelko, Jovan, Dimo, Istanoy, Niko, Istojan, Todor, Ilia, Istanko, Miladin, Istojan, Istoyko, Gruyo, Nikola, Vukadin, Istoicho, Krustio, Istojan, Mano, Nedelko, and stated their claim in the context of a court litigation, which had been referred to the Sultan by means of an *arz* and had been considered also by the *vali* of Rumeli. According to the *hüccet* that they had in their hands, imam Hüseyin owed them money – 400 *guruş* – which, they insisted, had to be refunded to them. The defendant explained that the *vali*, Hasan Paşa, had sent an order to the Sofia *kadı* stating that the *kâfir taifesi*, i.e., the infidels who lived in the Muslim *mahalles* of Sofia, were to settle in the *varoş* of the town. They could be allowed to remain in their homes but were required to deliver 1,200 *guruş* to Hasan Paşa. The *vali*, in his turn, had appointed the head of the Sofia imams, imam Hüseyin, together with an inhabitant of Banabaşı, Sufi Hazır, to collect the amount and to draw up and stamp a *defter*. The imam had proceeded according to the town's custom: he had invited the *mahalle* imams and had received from them the amounts, described by him as *salariye* (annual charges), due from the infidels in their own (i.e., Muslim) *mahalles*. He had handed over this amount, in the presence and with the participation of the *mahalle* imams, to the *mübaşir* Sufi Hazır, who in his turn had given them a *tezkere*. Afterwards, however, as Hüseyin asserted, he had been accused of having appropriated one-half of the amount. In this legal case, the Sofia court gave consideration to documents, too, – *hüccets* and *fetvas* – in the presence of “all the inhabitants of the town (*beled*) of Sofia, young and old, imams, *müezzins*, *ağas*, *vilâyet ayan*, *kethüdas*, *serdars*, *kethüda yeris*, *zaims*, *timariots*, *kethüdas* of craft-guilds and guild members” and a further 91 Muslims listed name by name, who confirmed what had been stated.⁴⁵ In the small number

44. Ivanova, ‘The *Varoş* of Vidin’; M. Kiel, *Art and Society of Bulgaria in the Turkish Period: A Sketch of the Economic, Juridical, and Artistic Preconditions of Bulgarian Post-Byzantine Art and its Place in the Development of the Art of the Christian Balkans, 1360/70-1700: A New Interpretation* (Assen/Maastricht 1985), 143-205.

45. OrO, S4, f. 2-a, doc. I.

of cases known to us, when maintaining the segregation of Muslims and Christians was insisted upon, the opposing parties were, on the one hand, the community of Muslims, and, on the other hand, the community of Orthodox Christians. In such cases, the Orthodox community might also be called *varoş*, understood both as a territorial unit, i.e., as a toponym, and as a community. The incidents point also to the strain generated by the intensified migration from village to town and the change in the proportion between Christians and Muslims in some towns. The disruption of the territorial links between Christians required an organisational solution. It seems that at the beginning, the Muslim *mahalles* covered fiscally their non-Muslim inhabitants, who, on the other hand, were linked to their religious community, for example in order to satisfy their religious and ritual needs. Later on, for all Orthodox Christians, just as for Armenians and Jews, a representative institution of a non-territorial type, i.e., the *varoş*, began to establish itself, representing them as taxpayers regardless of where they lived. This new situation gave rise to altercations which seemed of an inter-confessional nature, but were in fact caused essentially by the financial concern of Muslim *mahalles* that the tax burden should be shared with their Christian inhabitants, which came into conflict with the interests of the *varoş* as a representative structure of the Christian urban population. A *ferman* to the *kadı* of Hezargrad was registered in a *kuyudat defteri*. By an *arz* addressed by the *mevlâna* el-Hac Ahmed, *kadı* of Hezargrad, to the Sultan's *divan* in Edirne, it was reported that the infidel *reaya* from Kayacık Binarı *mahalle*, also called *varoş*, had appeared before him and complained that the *hanes* (tax portions) of their *mahalle* had been increased. Finding themselves incapable of paying taxes and dues, the *reaya* had scattered (*perakende*). Since their *mahalle* was bordered on İskender Bey *mahalle*, the said *reaya* had bought property there and had moved out. During the subsequent new listing of the *kaza*, the remaining *varoş* inhabitants had insisted that those who had moved to İskender Bey *mahalle* were *reaya* of the old *varoş* and for that reason they had been listed as taxpayers at the *varoş*. However, part of the *reaya* living at the time of registration in İskender Bey *mahalle*, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, were too poor and remained unregistered (*haric ez defter*). It was in fact specified that those who remained off the register, i.e., those *reaya* who did not take part in the payment of *avarız*, were only Muslims. As for the *kâfirs* from İskender Bey *mahalle*, it had been decided by the *vilâyet* inhabitants' general consent that they were to help (*imdad*) the *reaya* from Kayacık Binarı *mahalle*, also called *varoş mahallesi*. Thus, until that moment, the non-Muslims from İskender Bey *mahalle* had kept delivering their *tekâlif* together with the *varoş* inhabitants. The inhabitants of İskender Bey *mahalle*, however, started to complain that "you live in our *mahalle* and you should help us with the *tekâlif*". So, the *arz* requested the issuance of an order rejecting this demand. On checking the *mevkufat defteri* in the Treasury, it was found that, when a list of the *kaza* had been made in the year 1111, four *avarız hanes* were fixed on twelve inhabitants of Kayacık Binarı *mahalle* (*varoş mahallesi*), while in İskender Bey *mahalle* five *avarız hanes* were fixed on fifteen people. It was decreed that if, indeed, it had been unanimously decided that the non-Muslims who had moved to İskender Bey *mahalle* should pay together

with those from the *varoş*, then it was to continue this way. The *ferman* was dated 5 May 1703 (ill. 5).⁴⁶

As I have mentioned, widely accepted in historiography is the opinion that the rather substantial changes in taxation during the seventeenth century – with regard to the *cizye*, *avarız* and *vilâyet* expenses – inevitably played a decisive role in the consolidation, unification and pervasive spread of ‘municipal’ bodies of the urban population. The collection of state taxes made it imperatively necessary for the fiscal officials to be in contact with a group of taxpayers and not with individuals. The whole of Ottoman fiscal practice was accommodated to this requirement, i.e., to working with existing communities of taxpayers, uniting the individual taxpayers and having legitimate authority in the fiscal sphere as agents and intermediaries of the fiscal officials. Thus, the fiscal tasks paved the way for the autonomy of non-Muslim communities and for the development of their intra-communal structure.⁴⁷ It seems that it was exactly in the course of these fundamental transformations that the *varoş* was formed, too, as an institution having fiscal tasks with respect to the whole Christian community of a given town. This development occurred, in the first place, under the impetus of the changes in the Ottoman Empire’s fiscal practice, i.e., the enhanced role of extra-ordinary taxes and local expenditures. Furthermore, a considerable role was probably played by the demographic and social processes – the migration to towns, where the newcomers became agricultural workers for *çiftlik*s (*ırgat*, *çapacı*, etc.), or entered the *çarşı* as *bekârs*, living in *odas*, *dükkâns*, etc., as well as in Muslim *mahalles*. This disrupted the territorial links between the Christians, who no longer lived in one and the same *mahalle*. Thus, it was gradually becoming a practice for the tax duties of Christians to be transferred by the state directly on to the Orthodox community, and it was the latter who handed in the necessary amount of money, made delivery in kind, or provided people for state *angarya* (enforced tasks). All intermediate activity was concentrated in the community and was reflected in a small number of documents, kept quite unsystematically in the beginning. Hence it can be presumed that, at least with respect to their fiscal functions, the communities of Orthodox Christians in the Bulgarian towns began to be formed, as an additional link standing over the *mahalles*, somewhere around the middle of the seventeenth century, at least for the purpose of organising the fiscal duties of the Christian townspeople. Definite evidence of this evolution

46. OrO, D 178, p. 54, doc. II; in an *avarız* register from 1641-1709 we find a *mahalle* “Kayacık Binarı ...[?], otherwise called *varoş*, one of the *mahalles* of the *kaza* of Razgrad” (BOA, MK 2596).

47. Danova, ‘Kam istoriata’, 118; V. Paskaleva, ‘Obshtinnoto samoupravlenie v balgarskite zemi i drugite balkanski provintsii na Osmanskata imperia ot XV v. do Berlinskia kongres’ [Communal Self-Government in the Bulgarian Lands and other Balkan Provinces of the Ottoman Empire from the Fifteenth Century to the Congress of Berlin], in *Balgaria 1300. Institutsii i darjavna traditsia*, vol. 1 (Sofia 1982), 503; B. Braude and B. Lewis, ‘Introduction’, in B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*. Vol. 1: *The Central Lands* (New York and London 1982), 12; İnalçık, ‘Military and Fiscal Transformation’, 314-16, 322.

is found in the *defter* of the Tarnovo *varoş* – a source originating from the *varoş* institution itself, which Nadja Danova called a Christian community council (as I have mentioned, the *defter* was written in Greek and dates from the second half of the eighteenth century) – from which we learn in detail how the *varoş* carried out its fiscal functions.⁴⁸ Yet, it seems that the most important role in consolidating the *varoş* as an institution was played, on the one hand, by the strengthening of the urban Christian community and the sophistication of its needs, and, on the other hand, by the legal framework of the *zimma* pact.

*The Varoş as a ‘Municipality’*⁴⁹

The *varoş* institution can be regarded as representative not only in purely fiscal issues, but also in communal matters.⁵⁰

We have found *defters* compiled only for the collective expenses of the *varoş* (*masarifât-ı varoş*). Their compilation was probably necessitated because, apart from the *vilâyet* expenses which were payable by the town inhabitants of all confessions, there were also specific expenses only for the Orthodox residents of a given town. By this I mean particularly expenses which satisfied the specific problems of cult (for instance, the *teftiş* of a church – presumably a check relating to church repair requested by the Christians) and expenses for their own communal/municipal tasks.

An entry, made in a Sofia *sicil* on 30 October 1761, was a *defter* of the *vilâyet* expenses from May to October 1761 and included the following expenditure: repair of a toilet and its sewage pipe, repair of bridges in Sofia, rent for a six-month lease (*icare*) of the court building (*mahkeme*), money for the *naib*, the *kethüda*, the *kâtib*, the court servant, the *başçuhadar*, the *muhzırbaşı*, the *muhzırs*, the *tercüman* Molla Mehmed, etc. The amount was charged on the villages. It was further indicated that, from the one-year expenses between October 1760 and October 1761, 2,500 *guruş* were deducted, which would be paid by the Jewish and Christian inhabitants of the Sofia *mahalles*. The Jews had to pay 833 *guruş*, and the Christians the remaining 1,667 *guruş*, but the latter amount had to be increased owing to the following expenses, specific for the *varoş reaya* according to a register of accounts (*defter-i*

48. Danova, ‘Kam istoriata’, 108, 119–20, 123; eadem, ‘Une source inutilisée’, 86–87.

49. Eadem, ‘Kam istoriata’, 118, 123; eadem, ‘Une source inutilisée’, 93, 98; Paskaleva, ‘Obshtinnoto samoupravlenie’, 503; Braude and Lewis, ‘Introduction’, 12; İnalçık, ‘Military and Fiscal Transformation’, 314–16, 322; H. Hristov, *Balgarskite obshtini prez Vazrajdaneto* [The Bulgarian Communities During the Bulgarian Revival] (Sofia 1973), 46, 61; I. Iurdanov, ‘Balgarskata obshtina v gr. Sofia v nachaloto na XIX v.’ [The Bulgarian Community of Sofia at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century], in *Sbornik v chest na P. Nikov* (Sofia 1940), 538–44.

50. The town *mahalles* were subjected to the principle of group responsibility when there was a criminal offence, but in this respect the *varoş* was employed mostly unsystematically and this aspect of its activity will not be studied in the present paper; see Ivanova, ‘Institutat na kolektivnata otgovornost’.

müfredat): for the *arabacı*, for a *saraydar*, for wages of those hired (*hizmet*) at the *varoş* and for the other necessary expenses laid out for them, 1,536 *guruş* in total, as well as for the wage (15 *guruş*) of the man who took out the grain that was due from the *mahalles* in accordance with their shares, and for the wage (20 *guruş*) of the *kâtib*, who went to distribute (*tevzi*) the above-mentioned amount on the *mahalles*. Thus, the total amount grew to 3,338 *guruş*. Of the total amount thus obtained, 13 *guruş* and 54 *akçes* had to be collected from each tax share (*sehm*) (each *mahalle* had several such shares set for it). Additionally, 50 *guruş* had to be entered as money overdue (*baki*) from the *mahalles* Orta Mescid, el-Hac İsmail, Saat-i Atik, and Alaca Mescid, which were written in a separate *defter* by *başkâtib* Ali Efendi. Then followed a list of Sofia *mahalles* and their shares; it also included Muslim *mahalles* with a Christian population.⁵¹

In a Sofia *sicil*, book-keeping entries were made for the expenses (*masraf*) of the *reaya* of the *varoş* (of Sofia), disbursed over the period 24 January to 20 July 1765 for the following: the *saray* of the Rumeli *vali* Köprülüzade Efendi, where he stayed when coming to Sofia, pay for three carts and for the person who took care of the *saray*; for a *kandilci*; for a cowherd who took cows to pasture; for checking (*teftiş*) the church of the “*başefendi*” (probably the bishop); for the *molla efendi* (probably money given to the *kadı*) and for pocket money; for the *mütesellim ağa*; for the *kethüda bey*; for the salary of eight horse guides (*yedekçi*); for the salary of the field-keepers (*çayır bekçisi*) of the meadows of “our” *molla efendi* and of the *mütesellim ağa*; money given to Sarvan Paşa; expenses disbursed for foreign ambassadors (*elçi*); (again) for six-month pay for two carts performing service at the *saray* and for two *saraydars*; for six-month pay for the *kethüda* of the *varoş* (35 *guruş*); for the salary of six *çömlekçis* for the *paşa*’s *saray*, expenses disbursed for the *terzi*başı of the *terzis*, etc., or a total of 1,564 *guruş* and 23 *paras*; the amount was distributed on the shares (*sehm*) of the *mahalles* as *masarif*at of the *varoş*. Then followed a list of the Sofia *mahalles* with their shares (ill. 6). Such *defters* were usually compiled in general for a given *kaza* and the amounts were distributed among countryside people and townspeople alike, including the *varoş*. This *defter*, however, is a separate *defter* of expenses, referring to the *varoş* only, as an independent corporation among the town population. Again in a Sofia *sicil*, the “expenses of the *varoş reaya*” for the second half of 1764 were entered, among them “700 *guruş* for repair of the church of the *başefendi*”, six-month pay for the *kethüda* of the *varoş*, etc.⁵²

Similar information is given by *sicil* documents referring also to the Vidin *varoş*. By the way, the connection between the urban Christian *varoş* and the rural Christian communities is prominent. Thus, on 15 October 1700 a “*defter* on the part of the *zimmis* of the Vidin *varoş*” was entered in a Vidin *sicil*, the *defter* being compiled by ten people (*vekils*) listed name by name, as well as by forty people from the villages of the neighbouring *nahiyes*. It included such expenses as for a *menzil*, for *elçis*, for the *ambar*, for *cerahors*; 40 *guruş* “borrowed from the bishop for a *masraf*

51. OrO, S21, p. 18, doc. I; p. 20, doc. I.

52. OrO, S22, p. 31, doc. I.

of ours”; “*kira* for the former *nazır* Ali Ağa”; 53 *guruş* “which we have spent on some expenses (*masraf*) of ours”; expenses of the *mahkeme*, for a *naib*, for (the issuance of) a *hüccet*; 25 *guruş* “for our expenses (*masraf*)”. Then followed a list of the neighbourhood-territorial corporations among which the amount was distributed, i.e., “*nefs-i varoş*: 260 *guruş*” and the villages of the *kaza*. A similar document of a somewhat later period included also expenses for *martoloses*, for the repair of the *saray* and 110 *guruş* “for some expenses (*masraf*) of the *varoş reaya*”.⁵³

The analysis of the items of expenditure of the *varoş* in fact reveals its functions. Worth noting is the sending of collective petitions which indicated the institutionalisation and legitimacy of the *varoş* in the eyes of the authorities. Particularly indicative of the *varoş* as a representative community of the Orthodox Christians was the financing of activities connected with the maintenance of the churches and the clergy, and the performance of purely municipal tasks.

The variety of municipal activities is illustrated also by the documents of the *varos*es themselves as secular ‘municipalities’, although very few of them have been preserved and they refer only to some Bulgarian towns.

I have already mentioned the special *defter* in Greek, which covers the period after the 1770s, and was compiled in order to serve in the collection of state taxes from the Tarnovo Orthodox Christians. Lists of the Christian community’s expenses – something similar to the *masraf defters* for the *vilâyet* expenses in *kadı sicils* – were entered in it. These were sums for gifts and bribes given to the local Ottoman notables – a recurring item in the few documents of the Orthodox population’s own, in *kondikas* of episcopates, monasteries and municipalities, but also in *sicils* (including the *sicil* examples cited above), which in fact reveals some essential characteristics of public life in Rumeli and the relations between the provincial elites and the *reaya*; payment of penalties and indemnities; collection of money for garbage disposal; repair of public buildings, roads, bridges, etc. Also preserved with the *defter* were some Ottoman documents about the community’s real-estate properties, owned and managed as *vakıf* of the *varoş*; in addition, some of the sources of income of the *varoş* as a municipal and religious community become clear, throwing light also on the activity connected with the acquisition, use, and maintenance of these properties. For instance, a *tezkere* by the *voyvoda* of Tarnovo dated 1792, regarding a vacant plot of land of the *varoş reaya* in Bacdarlık *mahalle*, has been preserved in *nefs-i varoş*. In 1815, in the vineyard of Marnopol, the *reaya* of the Tarnovo *varoş* and their *kocabaşıs* bought from the heirs of *kapıcıbaşı* Hüseyin Ağa a *mülk*, owned by a *tapu*, for the sum of 1,000 *guruş*; the *varoş reaya* were represented by the *vekil* Yorgooglu, Acı Dimcho, *köybaşı* Kochi, Acı Paraskeva and Pencho Bazirgân; the land became a purchased real-estate property *mülk* of the *varoş reaya*. In 1800 the *voyvoda* of Tarnovo granted to the *varoş* inhabitants two *dönüms* of a vacant plot of land (*arsa*) located on the territory of one of the *varoş mahalles* – Cedid. For a long time, on that spot “the *reaya* of the *varoş mahalles* have been carrying out, during the days of *Paskalya* (Easter), their false rites

53. OrO, S14, f. 14-b, doc. I; f. 15-b, I.

(*ayin-i batılaları*). Because this is a building which is not in anybody's possession, it is granted to the *reaya* by *tapu temessükü* and against *resm-i tapu*". Of interest is the *pusula* about the sums payable to the heirs of Köprülüzade İbrahim Ağa by the villages of Pavliken and Hak Binarı, as well as by the *varoş reaya*. Regarding the total amount of the debt – 2,317.5 *guruş* – it was mentioned that it had been transferred to the "*kefalet* of the *varoş* population", for which the said *pusula* was given to them, i.e., to the *ehl-i varoş*. When the villages paid this sum "on our part (i.e., on the part of the *varoş*) we shall hand over the *eda tezkeresi* (payment receipt) to them".⁵⁴ This case, again, implies the connection existing between the *varoş* as an all-Christian 'municipality' and the Christian population of the surrounding villages. Particularly important for the characteristic of the *varoş* as a municipality are the *defter* entries about the salaries paid to *varoş* officials and to church and education functionaries, about the alms given, etc.⁵⁵ The activities specified above, whose financing was provided by the *varoş* as evidenced by the institution's own *defter* in Tarnovo, repeat those from the *sicils* but include also the financial operations related to the Christian foundations as *vakıf* of the *varoş*. (As we shall see below, the information found in the *kondika* of the metropolis in Samokov and in Plovdiv [Ott. Filibe], dating from the second half of the eighteenth century, is similar.)

The Organisation of the Orthodox Church and the Varoş

So far I have repeatedly mentioned that the *varoş* was an institution of the Christian Orthodox population in towns. The urban population consisted of two large groups, differing in their status: Muslims and non-Muslims. The latter included in towns in today's Bulgaria some small ethno-confessional communities, such as Jews, Ragusans, Gypsies and Armenians, who often collected and delivered their taxes independently and were designated as a separate section of the non-Muslims by means of ethnonyms added after the general group of *zimmis*, or as independent *cemaats*. The *zimmis*, described simply as non-Muslims, but more frequently as '*kâfir*' and very rarely as '*nasrani*', were Orthodox Christians and usually they were the majority. The first names of *zimmi* payers, found in *mufassal* registers, represent another categorical proof that they were Christians, and a considerable part of them Slavs. Added after the names of men, either in *cizye* registers (especially those related to the large-scale re-registration connected with the *cizye* reform of the 1690s) or in *hüccets* where they appear as separate individuals, we find the designations *sırf* (Serb), *eflâk* (Vlach), *rum* (Greek), and, particularly in the *cizye defters*, *bulgar* (Bulgarian). All such individuals were most probably Orthodox, too, but were not differentiated in an independent corporation. The separation into a group (eventually as a separate *taife*, or *cemaat*) of a part of the Orthodox Christians according to an ethnic criterion was rarely encountered and it applied

54. These documents are to be found in the *Kondika*, NLCM, Bulgarian Historical Archive IIA7805 (1802), but lack signatures; see also Danova, 'Une source inutilisée', 87.

55. Ibid., 93, 98-99.

above all to the Greeks, as was the case in Sofia, Plovdiv, Ruse, Varna, etc. For instance, the *vilâyet* expenses for *ulaks* in Ruse were distributed among the *acems* (Armenians) and the Greeks in the presence of all *vilâyet* “*ayan*, imam *efendis* and the other *reaya*, present in the courtroom, and the poor”.⁵⁶ For a sultan’s hunt in 1684, hunters (*avcis*) from Sofia were required, the quota being distributed among the town *mahalles*, the *taife* of Jews from Tekke *mahalle*, the infidels (*kâfir*) from the *varoş*, the *taife* of candle-makers, the *taife* of Greeks (*rum*) from the *varoş*, the *taife* of *acems*, the *taife* of *latins*.⁵⁷ Presumably, when the Greeks were a relatively small community, and, above all, a community clearly differentiated on the basis of some social criterion (e.g., trade activity), they were cited as a separate group in the Ottoman documents. In cases where the Greeks constituted a substantial part of the Orthodox population, it might well be that they were not forming an independent structure. It was even possible that they might lend a Greek aspect to the Orthodox community in a given Bulgarian town, or at least to its elite – a fact which is confirmed by historical sources in Greek and Bulgarian dating from the second half of the eighteenth century.⁵⁸

This information implies nothing else but the fact that, in principle, in the Ottoman fiscal documents, the term *varoş* was used for the Orthodox Christians who were the majority among the non-Muslims in the various towns.

The status of the non-Muslims, and particularly of the Orthodox Christians, was based on the *zimma* pact. In keeping with their legal framework and restrictions, the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman sultan had at their disposal a legal institution, i.e., the Orthodox Church. Having its own formalised status and being governed by its own normative system – canon law, which was officially recognised in the Ottoman Empire by means of the episcopal *berats* – the Church’s legal status was put into effect through a relatively unified hierarchy. For their various activities, the episcopates had at their disposal an apparatus of clerical and lay persons – a council of clergy and laymen (notables [*archons*]) – with legal competences which gradually encompassed even wider spheres of the private and obligatory law than those originally foreseen. The church hierarchy also carried out the collection of church taxes,⁵⁹ and began gradually to be engaged in the collec-

56. OrO, R4, f. 92-a, doc. II.

57. OrO, S85, f. 94-b, doc. I.

58. R. Gradeva, ‘Villagers in International Trade: The Case of Chervena Voda, 17th to the Beginning of the 18th Century’, to appear in *Oriente Moderno*; Ivanova, ‘Town of Varna’; eadem, ‘Malkite etnokonfesionalni’, 69-71.

59. J. Kabrda, ‘Turetskie istochniki o istorii pravoslavnoi tserkvi v Osmanskoi imperii’ [Turkish Sources on the History of the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire], *Vostochnie istochniki po istorii narodov Iugo-vostochnoi i Tsentralnoi Evropy*, 2 (1969), 172-73; O. Todorova, *Pravoslavната tsarkva i balgarite* [The Orthodox Church and Bulgarians, Fifteenth-Eighteenth Centuries] (Sofia 1997); I. Snegarov, ‘Po vaprosa za klasovite otnoshenia prez Vazrajdaneto’ [On the Question of Class Relations During the Bulgarian Revival], *Istoricheski pregled*, 1951/2, 204; J. Kabrda, *Le système fiscal de l’église orthodoxe dans l’Empire ottoman (d’après les documents tures)* (Brno 1969).

tion of the *cizye*; later on (according to fragmentary data from domestic Bulgarian sources dating from the second half of the eighteenth and the nineteenth century), it became possible for the Church to be engaged in the collection of the municipal taxes (*vergi*) from the Christian population. 18,000 *guruş* were required from the Sofia Bishop Jeremija for the *tekâlif* and the other *vilâyet* expenses, according to “his *cizye vekâlet*” (i.e., his authorisation for the collection of the *cizye*) from the Orthodox *reaya* in Sofia. In 1777 it was arranged for this amount to be paid in portions.⁶⁰ The bishop of the infidels from Sofia, Jeremija, owed Süleyman Bey 30,000 *akçes* of a Sharia loan, taken for (meeting) the *cizye* (?) and this sum was handed in at the Patriarchate in Istanbul. The bishop of the infidels in İznebol and Breznik *kazas* had given a security for the loan, and guarantors (*kefil*) were Hüseyin Beşe, priest Petko, priest Dimitre, priest Mihail, priest Petre, priest Lambo, priest Miho, son of Giuro. In the *hüccet*, certifying the debt, it was additionally noted that ten months later the loan was repaid (ill. 7).⁶¹ It was exactly the engaging of the church hierarchy in various fiscal issues that made some aspects of its activity similar to that of the *varoş*. What is more, this made possible the overlapping of the two institutions – the religious council and the secular ‘municipality’ (*varoş*).

One of the basic characteristics of the church institutions was their link with donorship through which they supported themselves.⁶² In connection with donorship, a hierarchy was set up which actually duplicated closely the hierarchy of the Church: parish councils or churchwarden councils (*nastojatelstvo*, *ktitoria*) at the parish churches, episcopal councils at the episcopates (these were in fact the episcopal courts), or councils of the elders and the abbot at the monasteries.⁶³ These were collective bodies which managed, used and controlled the Christian foundations. They included both clergy and laymen, which was in conformity with the Church’s synodical principle, requiring not one-person but group management of each church unit. It seems that gradually a group of people with good property status – donors – was formed around each church, although this also included some less wealthy but esteemed people, who managed the financial affairs of that church. Because of their limited material resources, combined financial efforts by a group of Christians – be they peasants or townspeople, men or women – were required as a necessary condition for the achievement of a given donorship aim.

It was precisely on the foundations’ management boards – the parish councils – that individuals appeared who were among the few Christians with elite titles:

60. OrO, S25, f. 5-b, doc. III.

61. OrO, S1bis, p. 10, doc. I.

62. S. Ivanova, ‘Hristianska i miusulmanska blagotvoritelnost po balgarskite zemi v XVI-XVIII v. (dokumenti, uchastnitsi, institutsii)’ [Christian and Muslim Charity in the Bulgarian Lands in the Sixteenth-Eighteenth Centuries (Documents, Participants, Institutions)], in P. Mitev (ed.), *Daritelstvo i vzaimopomosht v balgarskoto obshtestvo prez XVIII-XIX v.* (Sofia 2003), 78-88.

63. M. Bur-Markovska, ‘Za vrazkata mejdu hristianskoto naselenie i manastirite’ [On the Relations Between the Christian Population and the Monasteries], in *Balgaria 1300. Institutsii i darjavna traditsia*, vol. 2 (Sofia 1984), 420.

epitrop, *ktitor*, *nastojatel* (the same load of meaning was carried by the titles *kir* and *aci/hadji*, which were not connected with donorship but are very often encountered next to the name of a donor). They managed the foundations' entire activity, which was documented in a limited number of documents and took material form in existing buildings, in marginal notes and in donation inscriptions and portraits, in which invariably present were the terms *ktitor*, *epitrop*, *nastojnik* – a nomenclature inconsistently used, but bearing all the distinctive features of elite status. They were the active part of the Christian elite, engaged in the organisation of the Christian cult.

A parish was formed by the congregation of a given church, headed by its priest. But with respect to the Bulgarian lands this was valid above all for the village churches. In town *mahalles*, the connection was not so unambiguous because the church buildings were not evenly distributed in the different town quarters. First of all, this was due to the fact that in a considerable number of cases the churches were in the old zones of the town's built-up area, while the new Christian *mahalles*, which appeared in the fifteenth-eighteenth centuries, covered new areas where it was difficult to build a new church. The relatively small number of inhabitants living in one *mahalle*, whose material resources were insufficient to support a separate place of worship, as well as the restrictions imposed on cult buildings in the Ottoman state,⁶⁴ did not allow every Christian *mahalle* to have its own church and, therefore, made it necessary for the Christians and their *ktitors* to combine their efforts towards satisfying, at least to a minimum degree, the needs of the whole Christian community of a town. (The opposite was the case with the Muslims – practically every Muslim *mahalle* had a *mescid* or mosque.) Thus, after the conquest of Vidin in 1689/90, it became necessary for the Christian community to take care of the Orthodox churches in that town. A *ferman*, sent to the Vidin *kadı* and dated December 1699, referred to an *arz* by the *kadı*, requested by the non-Muslim *reaya* (*ehl-i zimmi*) of the *kaza* (in my opinion, what was actually meant was the centre of the *kaza* – the town of Vidin itself). They declared that they had in their hands some churches from the time of the conquest which had become dilapidated with time and had to be inspected so that an order for repair could be issued.⁶⁵ Because of this situation, the church parish in a considerable number of Bulgarian towns did not represent a homogeneous territory, and therefore could not unite its members by a territorial-neighbourhood bond. This was probably one of the factors for the great integrating role played by the Christian community in towns, despite a strong heterogeneity in its internal structure. One way or another, until the end of the eighteenth century the parish network in towns often could not establish itself as a territorial-neighbourhood unit in the structure of the Christian population and did not coincide with the *mahalle* (the Muslim *cemaat* and *mahalle*, on the contrary, completely coincided), and therefore the parish council, too, as the body that managed the finances of a church, was not obligatory for a territorial-type corporation. The parish councils

64. R. Gradeva, 'Ottoman Policy towards Christian Church Buildings', *ÉB*, 1994/4, 14-36; Kiel, *Art and Society*, 184-90.

65. OrO, S14, f. 4-b, doc. I.

were formed around a church, were subordinated to the town bishop (or his deputy) and, to a certain degree, could acquire a town-wide significance.⁶⁶

It is unambiguously shown by sources that in some places it was precisely the urban community of Christians (and not the Christian *mahalle*) that functioned as a leadership institution in the spiritual matters of all Orthodox Christians, with its own spiritual life, joint activity, and leading figures. It was exactly this community that carried out the entire activity connected with providing for the cult and for educational, town-development and social activities. The all-town Christian institution was formed around the episcopal body; it actually coincided with the episcopal (metropolitan) council, and may be called a religious council with court functions, which were connected with the organisation of the cult and with management of the religious charity (in the case of towns where there was no bishop, a deputy bishop was supposed to be appointed, who also headed the local church council). The territory of its activity was gradually expanded and the urban Christian community became engaged in the management or support of religious life in the surrounding villages.

In fact, however, this same religious council, which consisted of laymen and clerical figures, also engaged itself in the fiscal tasks of the secular 'municipality' (*varoş*). It became possible for the urban secular Christian community and the religious council around the episcopate to merge and to act in the capacity of a single body. But, at one moment this body functioned as a secular 'municipality', and at another moment as a religious council. The nature of the functions of this 'unified' institution was variable: fiscal functions, representation of Christians before the authorities, administration of justice, organisation of construction or maintenance of churches and schools, management of church property, leadership of the local spiritual life and religious charity, education and social support. According to documents in Greek, dating from the second half of the eighteenth century, such conditions existed, for instance, in Plovdiv. The register book of the metropolis in that town shows that it was concerned with the issues of a typical religious council (metropolitan council) around a bishop, but also with municipal tasks. For instance, the *kondika* of the Plovdiv metropolis contains an entry dated 1781 stating that the honourable clergy and the nobles (*archons*) of the sacred metropolis and the notables and *corbaci*s of the town of Stanimaka and the village of Ambelian had held a meeting, according to the old custom; at that meeting the Metropolitan Bishop accepted the accounts of the Monastery of the Holy Virgin in Bachkovo. The same codex contains a note dated 1799 stating that a *hatt-ı şerif* had been received in Plovdiv, forbidding the construction of *konaks* in the *varoş*. A copy of the order was

66. Ivanova, 'Hristianska i miusulmanska blagotvoritelnost', 80-84; eadem, 'Gradskite teritorialni obshtnosti i organizatsiata na kulta na miusulmani i hristiani' [Urban Territorial Communities and the Organisation of the Cult of Muslims and Christians], in *Turskite zavoevania i sadbata na balkanskite narodi, otrazeni v istoricheski i literaturni pametnitsi ot XIV-XVIII v.* (Veliko Tarnovo 1992), 128-33.

given to the Metropolitan Bishop Kiril, who gave it to his *dikaiophylax* for keeping together with the other necessary papers of the council.⁶⁷

Originating from the town of Tarnovo and dating again from the middle of the eighteenth century, both metropolitan *kondikas*⁶⁸ and a *defter* of a secular ‘municipality’ have been preserved as two archival sources independent in type, connected with the activity of two different institutions, but, on the whole, registers from secular communities and/or religious councils have been preserved only in the case of some of the Bulgarian towns and are dated as late as the nineteenth century.⁶⁹ According to Danova’s observations on these records, in Tarnovo the same individuals at one moment took part, as *varoş* leaders, in meetings concerning the settlement of fiscal and municipal tasks, while at another moment they, designated, however, from a nomenclature viewpoint as clergy and *offikia* holders, constituted the metropolitan council. According to still another document – a codex of the Greek school in Tarnovo – dating from the same period, we find on its board of management the same names that took part in the management of the *varoş* and in the metropolitan council.⁷⁰

The Samokov *kondika* (in Bulgarian) contains entries from 1756/57 on both the budget of the town’s only church – the cathedral – and the budget of the secular Christian ‘municipality’. It also contains entries on the activities of churchwardens; lists of endowed items and money contributions to the church and lists of the church’s own money; expenses connected with the maintenance of church property. In the period 1790–1800, special notes were made of laymen’s donations and their spending on building the church – for materials and the wages of workers, for icon painters, etc. Described in the *kondika* was financial aid, given to the Ipek Patriarch, to whom the metropolis was subordinate, and an account was given of money spent on the repair of the bishop’s *konak* in 1782 and 1783. Every year the annual church accounts were examined in the bishop’s *konak* around St George’s Day in the presence of the *çorbacı*, and periodical entries were made about the money lent at interest, by *temessük*, and, starting from 1790, receipts and expenditure began to be written down separately. The *kondika*, however, also contains entries connected with the municipal activities of the Christian secular ‘municipality’, the respective ‘budget’ items being similar to those found in *kondikas* from other Bulgarian towns and especially in the *defter* of the Tarnovo ‘municipality’; even the terms used

67. I. Snegarov, ‘Gratski kodeks na Plovdivskata mitropolia’ [A Greek Codex of the Bishopric of Plovdiv], *Spisanie na Balgarskata Akademia na Naukite*, 41–42 (1946), 231, 240.

68. Idem, ‘Stariat Tarnovski tsarkoven kodeks. Dokumenti’ [The Old Church Codex of Tarnovo – Documents], in *Godishnik na Sofiiskia universitet-Bogoslovski fakultet*, 11 (1934), 1–8; idem, ‘Stariat Tarnovski tsarkoven kodeks’ [The Old Church Codex of Tarnovo], in *Sbornik v chest na L. Miletich. Za 70-t godini ot rojdenieto mu, 1863–1933* (Sofia 1933), 516–17.

69. P. Dinekov, *Sofia prez XIX v. do Osvobojdenieto na Balgaria* [Sofia in the Nineteenth Century up to the Liberation of Bulgaria] (Sofia 1937); Iurdanov, ‘Balgarskata obshtina’.

70. Danova, ‘Kam istoriata’, 120.

were identical, reminding us of the synchronicity in the development of social life. Thus, entries were made in the Samokov *kondika* about the salaries given to the teacher, for instance, in 1793, or about the expenses for supporting the poor or poor students in 1791. Particularly indicative is the fact that entries were also made of those municipal expenses which were part of the liabilities to the state or in connection with meeting the so-called local expenses. For instance, an entry was made in 1757 about the ‘cutting of the *vergia*’ – 3,672 *guruş*, meaning probably the annual tax of the Christian population in Samokov.⁷¹ The Samokov *kondika* also contains entries about expenses incurred for gifts to Ottoman officials, e.g., in 1757. Worth noting is the fact that the functionaries of the ‘municipality’ were all lay persons. The *kondika*, however, does not contain minutes of the decisions and the activities of the metropolitan council.⁷²

The above-mentioned Tarnovo *defter* belonged to an institution called – in the document itself – *varoş* or *politeia*, exactly as in the *kondika* of the Tarnovo metropolis, written in Greek and dating from the second half of the eighteenth century, where it was again referred to as a *politeia* or *varoş*, while the same institution in the Ottoman registers for Tarnovo was called *varoş*.⁷³ The *kondika* of the Plovdiv metropolis, written in Greek, also referred to the *politeia* or the *varoş* of Plovdiv. Similar documents of the Sofia episcopate and of the Sofia ‘municipality’, written in Bulgarian and dating from the beginning of the nineteenth century, used the term *varoş*, but later, in the nineteenth century, the Bulgarian term *obshtina* appeared.⁷⁴

However, these terms (Ottoman *varoş*, Greek *politeia*, Bulgarian *obshtina*) conceal one simple fact: the overlapping, in the towns already mentioned, of the institutions of the Orthodox population, i.e., of the secular *varoş* corporation with primarily fiscal tasks, and of the religious council, formed around the local episcopate, which took care of church affairs. With the merging of the religious councils and the secular ‘municipalities’, universal institutions – called *obshtina* in Bulgarian – of the Orthodox urban population established themselves, characterised by a rather heterogeneous structure which consisted of the *mahalles* of the Christian population, but also the Christians from mixed *mahalles*, the church parishes, the parish councils and the school boards of trustees, guilds with eventually Christian members only, etc. In their overlapping, the *varoş* and the religious council probably mutually enriched each other from a functional point of view. On the one hand, the state was transferring more and more tasks, predominantly of a fiscal nature, on to the com-

71. The designation of this – at its core – fiscal activity as ‘cutting of the *vergia*’ (from the Turkish word *vergi* [tax, duty]) is also met with in other *kondikas* and documents in Bulgarian and is a translation of the Turkish term *tevzi*, which is also used in the Bulgarian documents but written in Cyrillic characters.

72. H. Semerdjiev, *Samokov i okolnostta mu* [Samokov and its Vicinity] (Sofia 1913), 17-20, 107, 135-36, 241-42, 290.

73. The earliest mention of the term in the register of the merchant *varoş* is in 1763 – Danova, ‘Kam istoriata’, 123; see also Snegarov, ‘Stariat Tarnovski tsarkoven kodeks’ (1933), 524.

74. Dinekov, *Sofia prez XIX v.*, 355.

munity of Christians as a whole. On the other hand, the Christian community itself, undertaking to meet the growing public, everyday, and cultural needs of the urban Christian population, was consolidated. The rates and the degree of synchronicity in the development of the two processes were specific for each town, but in all cases the overlapping of the church hierarchy with the administrative one was one of the basic characteristics of the development of the institutional structure of Rumeli towns.

However, the question is when and to what extent the specific church units (specifically the episcopates) were in a position to apply their legal status in practice. The answer to this question is important for the present paper, because the entity which was termed *varos* by the Ottoman administration and was used for fiscal purposes could be an already existing structure of the Orthodox Church, i.e., the episcopal council. Nevertheless, the possibility of the Ottomans eventually using structures of the Orthodox Church depended on the extent to which those were actually able to function in a specific region, in accordance with their legal status in the Empire. Therefore, the chronology of the functional consolidation, locally, of the institutions of the Orthodox Church can help us identify also the chronology of the institutional development of the *varos*. And vice versa, it may be possible for us, on the basis of data derived mainly from Ottoman documents about the functioning of the *varos*, to infer a certain stabilisation of the religious councils. Therefore, I would venture a hypothesis: I presume that in those places where the Orthodox councils, superimposed on the local parishes, parish councils and monasteries, were sufficiently stabilised in their institutional development, there existed a greater possibility for the Ottoman authorities to engage them in fiscal practice, i.e., for the *varos* to overlap with a religious episcopal council. I want to stress this conditionality. The Ottoman fiscal machine did not create the corporations of the population. It actively modelled them but 'preferred' to work with existing social formations. Inasmuch and in those places where Orthodox municipalities did more or less exist and function in Bulgarian towns, they might also undertake the functions of an all-town corporation, which would serve as an intermediary in the fiscal sphere. Judging by the Ottoman fiscal documents and their mentioning of the *varos* institution, it can be accepted that, from the second half of the seventeenth century onwards, the authorities began to rely on the Orthodox religious councils which legally existed in the Empire and consisted of laymen and clerical figures.

At least as regards the use of the term *varos* in documents, this remains an analogue of a secular institution connected with state-imposed fiscal activities. But, inasmuch as the corporations of the urban population were confessionally separated, and as the Christians under the *zimma* pact had to have their own autonomous bodies for the management of their cult and social activities, it became possible for the *varos* to act as a church council, too. Despite its strongly marked secular characteristics, the *varos* somewhat paradoxically turned in fact into an institution of religious separatism, as did also the *millet*, by the way.

The Varoş Leaders

So far, various figures engaged in carrying out the *varoş* functions have been mentioned. They formed the internal organisation of the *varoş* which allows us to define the latter as an institution. It is exactly this internal state of organisation, the differentiation of the roles within the group, that made possible more efficient activities, allowing the *varoş* to interact with the administrative hierarchy of the state, but also to work to satisfy the needs of the *varoş* inhabitants. In the Ottoman state, all corporate communities were headed by intermediaries between the authorities and the separate individuals. This situation determined the very essence of the corporations in the Empire – they were always engaged as a primary structure of a non-bureaucratic type, as a direct intermediary between the individual subjects and the ruling authorities. One of the basic role characteristics of the corporation representatives was the role of intermediary between the administrative and the corporate structure of society. On the other hand, inasmuch as the corporations had to satisfy various cult demands and needs for their members, some internal structuring of the group was also necessary, which was reflected most clearly in the existence of a collective leadership. Observations on the microstructure of Ottoman Rumeliot urban society have shown a tendency towards coincidence of the corporate communities' formal and informal structures, towards coincidence of the representative (intermediary) bodies and the internal-life governing bodies whereby they were probably stabilised, but were also rendered conservative and hardly susceptible to changes in the process of social development.

Let us now dwell on the specific *varoş* representatives, on their public activities, on the nomenclature used for them in the sources. Both in the Ottoman *sicils*, and in the few *varoş* institution's own documents and those of Christian institutions in general, there is abundant evidence of collective gifts given to various functionaries on specific occasions (such as a private or public event, or a holiday) or during their usual tours.⁷⁵ These acts were typical of the Ottoman provinces and social etiquette. I would even define them as behavioural stereotypes which were not limited only to the Christians. Performing them simply engaged, among others, the Christians as well, as a community, and not the separate Christian *mahalles*. Giving such gifts was a form translated into etiquette of one of the basic functions of *varoş* leaders – to be in contact with the Ottoman authorities and, in the first place and most often, to keep in touch with the local Ottoman functionaries and notables.

Joint actions by the *varoş* leaders, often undertaken together with Muslim notables, in sending petitions to the central authorities have been registered. This is evident from the expenses envisaged for preparing a petition and sending it by

75. A. Sućeska, 'Vlianieto kad odanochuvaneto na raiata so nametite 'avariz-i divaniye, tekâlif-i 'örfiye i tekâlif-i şaqqa vraz razvoiot vo Makedonia vo 16 vek' [The Levy of the *Avariz-ı Divaniye*, *Tekâlif-i Örfiye* and *Tekâlif-i Şakka* Taxes on the *Reaya* and its Impact on the Situation in Macedonia in the Sixteenth Century], *Glasnik na Institutot za natsionalna istoria* (Skopje), 1970/1-3, 71-86.

courier to Istanbul. The Christian notables and the *ayan* acted jointly in receiving state emissaries and foreign delegations. Furthermore, the Christian representatives and the *ayan* organised all kinds of *angaryas*, ordered by the central authorities. They also dealt with matters of a municipal nature, such as the repair of administrative buildings, bridges, streets and other communication facilities, water pipelines, etc. These functions determined one of the basic characteristics of the leadership corps of the *reaya* in general and of the *varoş* in particular: it was an intermediary between the population and the authorities in the administration of the *reaya*. If it is true that the corporations of the population were the lowest units in the hierarchy by which the Ottoman authorities ruled the provinces, then the *reaya* leaders personally carried out the – admittedly limited – tasks connected with the administration of the *reaya*.

The Christian community leaders acted as a representative leading body in intra-communal life as well, and especially in providing for the Christian cult. It was these people, who lived together but were of differing degrees of wealth, who were bound together by collective responsibility as subjects and had equal needs in professing their faith, that formed the collective body whose members were the givers and recipients of donations and who paid taxes together. But, just as the bigger donors formed the group of *ktitors* and *epitrops* and were on the parish council, so those who paid higher taxes would be the *varoş* leaders. The Christian *reaya* in the Plovdiv region complained in 1721 that Andon Dragui, Mavridioğlu, Konstantin, Atanasoğlu Kosta and papa Jani, having available funds, had reached an agreement with the Plovdiv *kadı* and, against a bribe, had repaired the church in the Plovdiv district. They maintained, however, that they had spent an additional 30 purses of money. They had distributed this sum of money among the poor according to a list and wanted to collect it forcibly, threatening those who refused with punishments.⁷⁶ Irrespective of the conflict situation, it is interesting to note how the population had been organised by its notables to meeting its religious needs. The money was collected from the population most probably by the same persons and in the same way as was done with state taxes.

In trying to identify the social profile of the group from which the *varoş* leaders were elected, we might give a reminder that research on the *mahalle* has established the cohabitation of ‘poor and rich’ in it. Even at such a micro-level, no evidence has been found of any distinct territorial zoning of the towns by a social or, as we have already mentioned, a religious criterion. So, the urban population of one and the same confession represented a mixture of people with different financial resources. It was particularly important, however, that the tax portion of each household within the total amount of *avarız* and *tekâlif*, due from the community, was not fixed in equal portions for everybody, but according to ‘each person’s capacity’. An *adaletname* dated 1740 stipulated: “Everybody is to pay in full his due share from the *avarız* and the other taxes imposed in accordance with everybody’s tax-paying

76. A. Refik, *Bulgaria pod tursko upravljenje* [Bulgaria under Turkish Rule] (Sofia 1938), 70-71.

capacity – upper, medium, or lower”.⁷⁷ This meant that the wealthier members of the community (whether a *mahalle* or a *varoş*) were obliged to take on the higher tax burden. How deeply this was rooted in the public mentality is evidenced by the following incident: in 1730 the population in the Tarnovo region complained that the *kocabaşıs* and the priests of Drianovo, Gabrovo, with the backing of the Tarnovo inhabitant Hüseyin, had taken the collection of the *cizye* into their own hands. In the eyes of the petitioners it was particularly disgraceful that “contrary to the law, they collect equal shares from everybody, irrespective of one’s wealth”.⁷⁸

At first glance, by assuming higher tax duties, some community members seemed to be losing, or manifesting a surprising altruism. As evidenced by the documents cited, as well as by some domestic records (particularly straightforward were some sermons to be found in the religious literature known as ‘Damascenes’),⁷⁹ the notables were often tempted to turn to their own advantage their participation in the distribution and collection of taxes. This, however, might bring certain, though indirect, benefits – prestige, moral authority, patronage. The patron was not a single person; it was the group of the well-to-do community members who assumed the responsibility, assumed the higher tax burden, assumed also the burden of leadership of the micro-group, i.e., the burden of some small power, while the less wealthy community members probably obtained a certain sense of security.⁸⁰

As shown by the names of the *mahalles*, as well as by certain documents concerning the delivery of the taxes of Christians, very often the priests, and even the episcopate, were engaged in fiscal activity. Apart from being literate, because of the nature of their duties, they were well aware of the property and civic status of the Christians in their congregations; the priests had some experience, fiscal in its essence, as intermediaries in the collection of church taxes. A Ruse *sicil* has preserved notes concerning the payment of outstanding arrears of the 1695 *cizye* tax which had to be collected by the *cizyedar* for Nikopol, Svishtov (Ott. Zıştovi), Ruse, Giurgevo, Hezargrad, Eski Cuma. He in his turn had appointed the Ruse inhabitant el-Hac Halil as *cizyedar*. This person had to distribute 1,000 *cizye* cards of 4.5 *guruş* each and to collect and dispatch the sum. A separate *kadı* document reported the existence of arrears and then followed a list of taxable units and persons, with explanations about the amount owed or paid by everyone. Among them was “the *varoş* priest from Ruse [the name is illegible], who had owed 2 *guruş*, but had already handed them over to the *mübaşır*”. Then followed “the other priest of the *varoş*, priest Stojan” who also had paid his debt of 4 *guruş*. Then followed

77. S. Dimitrov, ‘Kam istoriata na pogolovnia danak prez XVIII v.’ [On the History of the *Cizye* Tax During the Eighteenth Century], in *Iubileen sbornik v chest na akademik D. Kosev* (Sofia 1985), 70-71.

78. Idem, ‘Dvijenie protiv pogolovnia danak prez 1730-1731 g.’ [The Movement Against the *Cizye* Tax in 1730-1731], *Vekove*, 1979/2, 158.

79. D. Petkanova, *Damaskinite v balgarskata literatura* [Damascenes in Bulgarian Literature] (Sofia 1965).

80. V. Gordlevskii, ‘Stambul v XVI veke’ [Istanbul in the Sixteenth Century], *Izbranie sochinenia*, 4 (1968), 39.

outstanding arrears of 47.5 *guruş* owed by all the inhabitants of Giurgevo, which amount was with Baba Ali who had departed for Belgrade, etc.⁸¹

It seems that after the *cizye* reform at the end of the seventeenth century the role played by the communities in Christian settlements and by the priests in the distribution of the *cizye* cards, received from the *cizyedars*, into the three official categories in accordance with property status, was re-confirmed. A *ferman* describing the new procedure was sent to the Vidin *kadı*. It was specially pointed out that the distribution of the *cizye* cards in the three tax categories had to be carried out with the participation of the priests, notables (*kocalar*) and old people (*yaşlı*), while the tax official had to keep a *defter* of the *mahalles* in the *kasabas* and of the villages, with the names and surnames of the priests; the respective *cizye* documents had to be circulated to the villages and *kasabas* through “the village *kocalar*, *papaslar* and *mahalle başı*”.⁸² However, unlike the *mahalle* imams or *ayan* who were *berathıs* and were formally authorised to carry out certain administrative tasks, the priests were not appointed and did not have also to participate in the *mahalle* management. Control over the priests was exercised, apart from by the metropolitan bishops and churchwardens, also by the members of the ‘municipalities’.⁸³ That was how the clergy, who had gained experience in the management of Christian charity and foundations, in the Church’s administration of justice and in fiscal activities, turned out to be well-prepared and actually engaged in the execution of the fiscal tasks of the *varoş*.

Along with the priests, in the capacity of tax agents of the Christian community we also find ordinary laymen (who personally may have been acting as *offikia* holders in some clerical body). A Sofia *sicil* dated 1684 noted that the tailor Gruyo and Mihail were authorised agents on behalf of the infidel *varoş* of that town for the collection of the *cizye*.⁸⁴ As a matter of fact, *tahrir defters* from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries contain entries of numerous Christian *mahalles* named after laymen, whose names sometimes were listed first among the residents of their *mahalles*. It is possible that these persons may have been the so-called *offikia* holders, i.e., officials with the episcopates, who were in charge of various functions in the Church, including those associated with donorship, court functions of the bishops and their councils, etc.

The *defter* of the Tarnovo *varoş*, apart from clergy, gives evidence also of secular figures as functionaries of the institution. These were the local elders, designated by the names *proestos*, *kocabaşı*, *çorbacı*, *baş*, *kabzımal*, *kabakçı*, *muhtar*,

81. OrO, R4, f. 74-a, docs I and II; it will be recalled that in those times in the town there were two churches and in Ruse most frequently mentioned were two Christian *mahalles* (Tuna and Orta) and sometimes to them was added Kuyumcu *mahalle*; see also S. Ivanova, ‘Kam predistoriata na Rusenskata obshtina prez XVII-XVIII v.’ [On the Pre-History of the Ruse Municipality in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries], *Almanah za istoriata na Ruse*, 1 (1996), 51-58.

82. OrO, S14, f. 27-a, doc. I; f. 4-a, doc. I; f. 33-a, doc. I.

83. Todorova, *Pravoslavnata tsarkva*, 106-61.

84. Danova, ‘Une source inutilisée’, 97.

seymen, *serdar*, *pisar* (clerk). The same people collected the *vergi* for the state, took part in the parish council and were described in the documents as “highly esteemed *çorbacıs* and noble *acıs* and the other notables of the town”.⁸⁵ According to Danova, reference was definitely made to a group of people who “for some reason had differentiated themselves as an elite of the town and fulfilled the respective social functions”. In most cases they were wealthy people (judging by the high taxes they paid according to the *varoş defter*, and by such titles as *acı*), although this was not absolutely obligatory. The genesis of this elite was connected, in the author’s opinion, with participation in the activity of the secular ‘municipality’ (*varoş/politeia*).⁸⁶ Among the Christian notables in towns we come across the old title of *kocabaşı* (head of a certain community, ‘mayor’); at the beginning of the eighteenth century the title *kabzımal* appeared as well. We should not omit the term *çorbacı*, which was typical precisely in the description of certain social phenomena in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the Bulgarian language. The term established itself as a generalising term for Christian notables in an urban, but also in a rural environment⁸⁷ (the first sources, which evidenced the use of this term in the seventeenth century, and especially the foreign travel accounts, accentuated the role of the *çorbacı* in meeting and accommodating Ottoman and foreign travellers of high standing). A special place was devoted to these social characters in the Damascene homilies, which can be viewed as the most representative texts written by Orthodox intellectuals during the period under consideration, and as reflecting most directly the topical problems of the day. There we find a description of the generalised image and functions of the Orthodox notables-representatives before the Ottoman authorities, i.e., the *çorbacıs*. They also contained appraisals of the *çorbacıs*; in other words, they depicted a typical medieval model portrait of an estate, with its social and ethical characteristics, as well as the requirements for this estate’s morality and way of life.⁸⁸

In the Ottoman documents cited in this paper we find evidence of the existence of the positions of the *vekil* of the *varoş*, and *kethüda* of the *varoş*.⁸⁹ In the records written in Bulgarian and Greek, together with the term *varoş*, we also find the collective noun *varoşlı*, as well as a number of other formulations, such as “meeting of the *varoş* leaders”, “meeting of the *çorbacıs* from all craft-guilds” (1817); “meeting of the Christian *çorbacıs*, small and big” (1817); “meeting of the *varoş çorbacıs*”

85. Eadem, ‘Kam istoriata’, 119-20; eadem, ‘Une source inutilisée’, 97.

86. Eadem, ‘Kam istoriata’, 120; eadem, ‘Une source inutilisée’, 94, 97, 99-100.

87. T. Georgieva, ‘Za genezisa na burjoaznite elementi v sotsialnata struktura na balgarite’ [On the Genesis of Bourgeois Elements in the Social Structure of the Bulgarians], *Istoricheski pregled*, 1977/2, 87-90; eadem, ‘Za proizhoda i sotsialnata sashtnost na chorbadijite prez XVIII v.’ [About the Origins and Social Character of the Chorbadijis During the Eighteenth Century], *Godishnik na Sofiiskia universitet/Istoricheski fakultet*, 68 (1974), 169-86.

88. P. Dinekov, K. Kuev, and D. Petkanova, *Hristomatia po stara balgarska literatura* [Chrestomathy of Old Bulgarian Literature] (Sofia 1978), 513-14.

89. OrO, S14, f. 14-b, doc. I; S22, f. 31-a, doc. I.

(1819-42), who “‘cut’ the taxes by *mahalles* and by craft-guilds and by *bekârs*” in Sofia,⁹⁰ or “*epitropos tou genous*” and “*to koinon tes politeias*” in Tarnovo.⁹¹ Some of the nomenclature used for denoting the leaders in the Christian community – *varoş* or *politeia* – in the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Bulgarian sources was taken from the nomenclature of the Orthodox Church and its institutions,⁹² especially those connected with religious donorship and with participation in the management of Christian foundations, as well as those used to denote the members of church councils-parish councils such as *nastojatel*, (*e*)*pitrop*, *ktitor*.⁹³ It was exactly their bond with religious donorship, expressed also in the nomenclature used for denoting them, which showed that *varoş* leaders were generally well-to-do and wealthy people by the standards of their community; while managing the Christian foundations in accordance with the Orthodox canons they gained experience in a public activity, i.e., in a closed religious corporate sphere. There, of all places, they did not need the sanction of the Ottoman administrative authorities, as all these structures were under the authority of the Orthodox Church personified by the local *beratlı* bishop and, according to the *zimma* pact, they did not need any other sanction, including state sanction, for their separate, and therefore independent, existence and internal organisation.

The documentary evidence on neighbourhood-territorial, religious or professional Ottoman corporations of the population (*mahalles*, villages, craft-guilds and other *cemaats*) definitely shows that they were represented before the state authorities, with regard to fiscal, criminal and other internal problems, by groups consisting of several people, authorised by their corporation. They played the role of intermediaries before the authorities and organised the fulfilment of state and communal tasks. These were representative groups made up of clergy and laymen which were not constituted as a result of any formal procedure nor can it be asserted that they had a strictly defined membership. As in the case of the *mahalle*, the representative body of the *varoş* was nominated through the procedure known from the practice of all corporations in the Empire: the *vekâlet* (authorisation). In other words, a group of individuals authorised somebody to carry out their common task which was an obligatory task for every single member of the community. Being engaged in the Ottoman system of social administration, corporate communities were not administrative and bureaucratic bodies, but their members were bound together by

90. Iurdanov, ‘Balgarskata obshtina’, 538-44.

91. I. Snegarov, *Istoria na Ohridskata arhiepiskopia-patriarshia* [History of the Ohrid Archbishopric-Patriarchate], vol. 2 (Sofia 1995), 389-97; idem, ‘Tarnovskata mitropolia’ [The Tarnovo Bishopric], *Spisanie na Balgarskata Akademia na Naukite*, 52 (1935), 207-54; idem, ‘Gratski kodeks’, 184.

92. I. Snegarov, ‘Po Vaprosa za klasite i klasovite otnoshenia prez Vazrajdaneto’ [On the Question of Class and Class Relations During the Bulgarian Revival], *Istoriesheski pregled*, 1951/2, 204.

93. V. Marković, ‘Ktitori, nihove dujnosti i prava’ [*Ktitors: Responsibilities and Rights*], *Prilozi za knijevnosti, yezik, istoriu i folklor*, 5 (1925), 100-25; Ivanova, ‘Hristianska i miusiulmanska blagotvoritelnost’, 78-88.

collective responsibility and it was exactly as a result of this that *de facto* (but not *de jure*) the collective group was treated as a legally responsible group.⁹⁴ In fact, the population delegated a *vekâlet*, ensuing from the collective responsibility. This *vekâlet*, however, was usually not registered in court. The duty to act as authorised agents was taken up by the 'worthiest' among equals (naturally by the imams, and the priests), viewed *de facto* by the official authorities as representatives of their communities. However, these agents were not given the scope to take independent decisions beyond the specific task of which they were in charge.

In those cases where unanimous action by several such corporations was required, e.g., when *avarız* or *imdad* had to be distributed among the town *mahalles* or when several craft-guilds had to distribute among themselves their obligations towards the army, this was done with the participation of one representative per corporation. What is more, a tendency towards a certain formalisation of this corporate representation in the person of a single individual can be traced. For a number of reasons, and also because it was a profession-based structure, this tendency found its earlier materialisation in the case of craft-guilds and the recognition of their *kethüdas* by the *kadı*. (Halil İnalcık is justified in calling this procedure a formal election of craft-guild chiefs who were pre-recognised by the authorities.⁹⁵) Especially in the case of neighbourhood-territorial type corporations, which were most directly related to the religious identity of their members, formal election did not appear until the time of the Tanzimat.

In absolutely the same way, the *varoş* leaders were in fact a collective body. They represented, in their capacity as *vekils* before the court and administrative authorities, not just a population, but a corporation of people who were bound together by collective responsibility and were putting into effect their common status as *zimmis*. I presume that the inclusion of individuals in this collective body was on the basis of authority, originating from participation in church affairs and donorship, and from one's wealth. The *varoş* elites were recruited in an elite manner and functioned in an elite and multifunctional way on the basis of authority. The data showing that some public-service positions may have been paid are unsystematic. And this fact, together with the nature of their tasks and the manner of their execution in a stereotyped, traditional, well-known way, did not necessitate the formation of administrative bodies for a wider sphere of public activities concerning the non-Muslims; it meant a delay in the bureaucratisation of their institutions and a re-confirmation of the traditional elements of self-government in their corporate life.

The Ayan

The development of the institutional structure of the Christians was as if a mirror image of the situation of the Muslims, and particularly of the *ayanlık*.⁹⁶ The

94. Imber, *Ebu's-su'ud*, 240, 260-65.

95. H. İnalcık, 'The Appointment Procedure of a Guild Warden (*Kethüdâ*)', *WZKM*, 76 (1986), 135-42.

96. S. Dimitrov, 'İstoriata na edin ajanin' [The History of an *Ayan*], in *Sbornik v chest*

ayanlık, too, began to develop from the assistance rendered in fiscal activities, and this remained one of its basic tasks. In a 1757 *buyruldu* (presumably issued by the *vali*), which was addressed to “the pride of the *ayan*” the Sofia *mütesellim* Mehmed Ağa, to the *ağas* and *zâbits* and the other officials in Sofia, it was made known that a *ferman* (*nişan-ı şerif*) had been issued for the appointment of an *ayan* by the sharia court and with the participation of all, so that he would see to the affairs of the poor *reaya* and of the population of the *mahalles*, of the *kaza*, of the *vilâyet*, and to the affairs of the state (*devlet*). Kâtibzade Abdüllatif Ağa was appointed such an *ayan*, i.e., *ayan* of the *kaza*, of the *ağas*, of the *zâbits* and the *vilâyet* population, and of all the officials, while el-Hac Osmanzade Osman Ağa was appointed to supervise him (*nazır*).⁹⁷

It becomes clear that, at least pro forma, the local *ayan* were specially authorised by the local communities, by the *reaya* taxpayers and notables, as fiscally responsible representatives of the local population before the fiscal authorities⁹⁸ in accordance with the ‘*vekâlet* procedure’, and were approved by the *kadıs*. To the *kadı* court in Ruse came the imams of the following *mahalles*: el-Hac Musa, Cami-i Cedid, Kara Mustafa, Cami-i Atîk, Fayık, Bacanak, Erik Ramazan, Mahmud Voyvoda, and Mesih Voyvoda (those were in fact the Muslim *mahalles* of that town), as well as listed representatives of the villages, who declared that they appointed el-Hac Ahmed Ağa, son of Mehmed, as *ayan*: “he is our representative in the *kaza*, he is our *vekil* in *vilâyet* affairs”.⁹⁹

The assumption of tax duties, the distribution of the fiscal burden among community members, the attempts to reduce this burden and to involve a maximum

na akad. D. Kosev (Sofia 1974), 65-78; A. Sućeska, *Ajani. Prilog izučavanju lokalne vlasti u našim zemljama za vrijeme turaka* [*Ayan: A Contribution to the Study of Local Power in our Lands During the Turkish Period*] (Sarajevo 1965), 123; D. Sadat, ‘Rumeli Ayanları: the Eighteenth Century’, *Journal of Modern History*, 44 (1972), 346-63; Y. Nagata, *Tarihte Âyânlar: Karaosmanoğulları üzerinde bir İnceleme* (Ankara 1997); A. Anastasopoulos, ‘Lighting the Flame of Disorder: *Ayan* Infighting and State Intervention in Ottoman Karaferye, 1758-59’, *IJTS*, 8/1-2 (2002), 76-77; Ö. Ergenç, ‘Osmanlı Klasik Dönemindeki “Eşraf ve A’yan” üzerine Bazı Bilgiler’, *OA*, 3 (1982), 105-18; Y. Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Âyânlık* (Ankara 1994); Y. Nagata, ‘The Role of Ayan in Regional Development During the Pre-Tanzimat Period in Turkey: A Case Study of the Karaosmanoğlu Family’ in his *Studies on the Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire* (Izmir 1995), 119-33.

97. OrO, S159, f. 40, doc. II.

98. Sućeska, *Ajani*, 123; V. Mutafchieva, *Kardjaliisko vreme* [The Epoch of the Kirdjalis] (Sofia 1977), 49-50; İnalçık, ‘Centralization and Decentralization’, 32; İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Meşhur Rumeli Ayanlarından Tırsinikli İsmail, Yılık Oğlu Süleyman Ağalar ve Alemdar Mustafa Paşa* (İstanbul 1942), 6; see an *adaletname* of 1789 about the procedure for the election of a *kethüda* in S. Dimitrov, *Osmanski dokumenti za istoriata na Dobrudža i Severo-iztochna Balgaria* [Ottoman Sources on the History of Dobrudža and North-Eastern Bulgaria] (Sofia 1981), 287.

99. OrO, R38, f. 27-a, doc. I.

number of taxpayers in tax payment – all this was, both for the Christian and for the Muslim community, the result of one and the same evolution in social practice, embodied by the state legal mechanism of collective responsibility. And just as the *varoş* could have formed itself as an institution superimposed on the Christian *mahalles*, representing them as a whole, as a Christian community, so the *ayanlık* began to function, superimposed on the Muslim *mahalles*, as a representative mechanism of the Muslim community in a given town, but at the same time – and this was a distinguishing feature between the Christians and the Muslims – as a representative of the whole town population.

On 19 April 1757, the inhabitants of the town of Şehirköy in the Rumeli *eyalet*, i.e., the former *alaybeyi* of *sağ kol* es-Seyyid Emin Mehmed Bey, and Beklizade Serdar Mehmed Ağa, son of Ali, declared the following before the court of the Rumeli *vezir* Ali Paşa and before his sharia judicial council, in the presence of the *ayan* of Şehirköy *kaza*, namely, el-Hac Yusuf Ağa, son of Hüseyin, and es-Seyyid Mehmed Bey, son of Mustafa, who had been appointed by a *hüccet* and who were the cause of the writing of the document: “For nine years those mentioned have been *ayan* of the said *kaza* by means of a *hüccet*. They have been distributing and collecting the taxes. But as they have been accused of acting in their own interest, the accused now confirm that they have been removed from the *ayanlık* and will not interfere in *vilâyet* affairs according to a vizierial decision. As a guarantee for their pledge they deposited in the state treasury 15,000 *guruş* each”.¹⁰⁰ On 9 April 1709, representatives (*vekils*) of the *zimmi reaya* from the village of Yakorut, and two Muslims came to the Rumeli *vali*, and together they complained against Abdurrahman Ağa, son of el-Hac Yusuf, who had been one of the *vilâyet ayan* from 1689 to 1709. He was to deliver their *tekâlif* and other *vilâyet* expenses to the officials, but started collecting excessive amounts from the population. He asked to have an inspection made of his accounts (*muhasebe*). These accounts, covering the period 1696-99, had been inspected by the *naib* of Razlog and no violations had been found. In the light of the testimony of the witnesses of the earlier act, the *reaya* were precluded from raising claims.¹⁰¹

The *ayan* were also directly engaged in various duties connected with the maintenance of public order. In 1698 a *ferman* to the *kapıcıbaşı* Mehmed, to the *kadıs* of several *kazas* in the Nikopol (Ott. Niğbolu) *sancak*, including Ruse, to the *ayan* and the officials, stated that raids by outlaws had become more frequent. They were ordered to recruit, “by agreement with the local population”, a certain number of soldiers from each *kaza*, or a total of 670 horsemen armed with rifles, who, headed by the said *kapıcıbaşı*, were to go in pursuit of the outlaws. A similar *ferman* was sent in 1701/02 to the Mustafapaşa, Hasköy, Kırkkilise and Pınarhisar *kazas*, to which a special *bostancıbaşı* was delegated. “I also order the *kadıs*, the *vilâyet ayan* and the officials, that, as soon as my sacred order arrives, the people fit for fighting

100. OrO, S16, p. 87, doc. I.

101. OrO, S4, f. 12-b, doc. I.

in the said *kazas* be summoned. You should go to the place where the rebels are, and, secretly, by tricks, with guards and additional help, together with a posse, you should surround them...”¹⁰²

Among the Muslim notables living in the Varna *kaza* who met at the Varna court in 1767 in order to outline measures in connection with the ‘infidel’ attacks in the region, were the former *kadı* of the *kaza*, *müderris* of Varna, *kadı* of Serfice, who ranked next to the servants of God in Varna, a *şeyh* who was the imam of a mosque, a *vaiz*, a *çavuş*, an imam in a *tekke* – Yahya Efendi, a *hatib*, a *naib*, *müez-zins*, *askerî*, craftsmen and, in general, those living in the Varna *kale*: “*mustahfizat, ulema, suleha*, imams, *hatibs* and all the *askerî* and the residing *fukara* and *zayıf kulları*”.¹⁰³ The *ayan*, as is well known, were engaged in carrying out the activities of the centre.¹⁰⁴ However, *ayanlık* functions covered all kinds of matters of a municipal nature with which the urban population was concerned, and above all those of the Muslims. In this way the institution itself acquired the appearance of a religious – Muslim – council which was similar to the other ethno-religious communities within the scope of the urban territorial community. The very fact of co-habitation within the individual settlement of different religious communities – the Muslims and the various groups of the non-Muslims – already predetermined their structural differentiation. Because of certain circumstances, no specific municipal bodies existed in the towns of Rumeli until the Tanzimat.¹⁰⁵ A number of ‘town cases’, reflected in *kadı* protocols and *arzuahals*, confirms that the all-town representative body of the ‘*ayan* and officials’, apart from acting on state tasks, acted also as a municipal body, representing the Muslim population. The ‘*ayan* body’ sent petitions to the capital with complaints against various functionaries, including military, fiscal, religious, judicial ones, or to combat banditry; purely municipal in nature were some submissions connected with the construction and maintenance of the urban infrastructure, with participation in the *vakıf* staff and investment issues, etc.¹⁰⁶ Particularly eloquent were the conflicts with Christians. It was the local Muslims who, through their commissions, exercised control over the legality of various church repairs, even those pre-approved by the state, or who insisted on closing taverns, etc. The documents often referred to the Muslims of a given town in general, and everything implies that at a given moment they really acted as a group of common interests, resolved to protect and impose them.

Thus, Ottoman bureaucracy, localised in towns, and the local notables, who were connected with the local economy and with the *iltizam* in particular, gradually formed a multifunctional body. Its tasks involved a larger range of problems

102. B. Tsvetkova, *Haidutstvoto v balgarskite zemi prez XV-XVIII vek* [Hayduk Activity in the Bulgarian Lands During the Fifteenth-Eighteenth Centuries] (Sofia 1971), 284-85, 291.

103. OrO, f. 20, a.u. 1182, f. 1-2.

104. Mutafchieva, *Kardjaliisko vreme*, 21-23.

105. K. Karpat, ‘The Background of Ottoman Concept of City and Urbanity’, in *Structure sociale et développement culturel des villes sud-est européennes*, 333-34.

106. Ivanova, ‘Hristianska i miusiulmanska blagotvoritelnost’, 88-95.

than those covered by the state apparatus in the pre-absolutist regimes in Western Europe, and, with time, the scope of its municipal tasks increased.¹⁰⁷ The functions of the group of the *vilâyet ayan* coincided with the well-known task of corporate communities in the Ottoman state: the role of intermediary between the central authorities and the population.¹⁰⁸ In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Ottoman authorities transferred some administrative tasks to the members of the *sipahi* hierarchy (by means of the *timar* system *sipahis* were given authorisation with respect to the transfer of *miri* land, e.g., through the *tapu* procedure, and above all by ceding certain *miri* proceeds as *timars* or *vakıf* income; again by means of the *timar* system and in accordance with the *bad-ı hava* procedure, obligations connected with the maintenance of public order were transferred, to say nothing of the authorisation to carry out various legal and administrative functions, which were devolved, on behalf of the sultan, on the local sharia court authorities, e.g., the contracting of Islamic marriages, obligations connected with the joint ownership of *vakıf* income sources and with the management of *vakıfs* at the *Haremeyn-i Şerifeyn* administration office, etc.).¹⁰⁹ The marginalisation of the *sipahi* estate, which was pushed into the periphery of *miri* land relations, and above all the attempts to overcome the centrifugal tendencies in the Ottoman provinces, were among the factors that urged the Porte to address the *ehl-i şer'*, i.e., the Sharia people, the *kadıs* and the most influential people among the local Muslims. Thus, a corporate body was formed, which consisted of officials and local notables and was engaged in the collection of taxes, pricing, the recruitment of soldiers, the combating of banditry and the maintenance of public order, and which even made suggestions on the replacement and appointment of officials.¹¹⁰

Hundreds of documents contain the names of people who took part in the all-Muslim representative body. By the way, that was how Evliya Çelebi described them in all the Rumeli towns. In the *fermans*, addressed to the *kazas*, they were concealed under the general description 'vilâyet ayan and officials' (*ayan-ı vilâyet*

107. I. Smilianskaia, *Sotsialno-ekonomicheskaia struktura stran Blijnego vostoka na rubeje novogo vremeni* [Social and Economic Structure of the Lands of the Near East on the Eve of the Modern Era] (Moscow 1979); İnalçık systematised the municipal tasks of the Muslim representative bodies as follows: 1. care for the economic welfare of the town; 2. initiatives for the maintenance of public buildings and other relevant activities; 3. intervention in the appointment of the local officials and religious-educational functionaries (İnalçık, 'Centralization and Decentralization', 43-45).

108. Mutafchieva, *Kardjaliisko vreme*, 20-23; Sućeska, *Ajani*, 22-25; İnalçık, 'Centralization and Decentralization', 57-59; K. Karpat, *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis* (Leiden 1973), 37, 91; S. Faroqhi, 'Political Initiatives 'From the Bottom Up' in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire', in H. G. Majer (ed.), *Osmanistische Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte: In Memoriam Vančo Boškov* (Wiesbaden 1986), 26.

109. Imber, *Ebu's-su'ud*, 120-21, 131-37, 147, 156, 165; V. Mutafchieva, *Agrarnite otnoshenia v Osmanskata imperia prez XV-XVI vek* [Agrarian Relations in the Ottoman Empire in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries] (Sofia 1962), 44-48, 146-51, 161-67.

110. İnalçık, 'Centralization and Decentralization', 27-52.

[*ve*] iş erleri); this comprised a wide circle of functionaries of the court system, *ulema*, representatives of the *askerî* estate, as well as of the *mahalles* (such as imams). This was a representative body of the town, but also, more specifically, of the town's Muslim population, which I call informal *ayanlık*, because they were not officially appointed as *ayan* but, like the *varoş* leaders, were prominent thanks to their social authority, and, unlike the *varoş* leaders, also thanks to the fact that they were *berathis* occupying a specific state-service post, i.e., a 'local' nomenclature of a medium and low level. Whereas the *sipahi* or the *paşa* were appointed by the state, the *ayan*, being formally *berathis*, rose from local society on the basis of their wealth and authority. They were connected with the Ottoman state's sources of income, but not through the relations characteristic of the *timar* system, where the special status was lost when someone was struck off the register, or even through the unquestionable, though paid, loyalty of the janissaries. Formally, the *ayan* were economically independent, and rooted in the local *carşı* and in the local *çiftlik* farm; without them the local *iltizam* exemption-purchasing system could not have functioned normally, and they were involved in profitable local trade businesses and even initiated and supported the local production of goods.¹¹¹ Apart from the *askerî* and Sharia bodies, among the members of the group of *ayan* were also religious functionaries, whereby the *ayanlık* itself acquired a more Muslim aspect.

Let us come back to the election of *ayan* and to the degree to which this could be regarded as an internal 'Muslim matter'. The first *mirahor* İsmail Ağa, *ayan* of Ruse, whose duty was to take care of the current accounts and of the *masrafı* of the *memleket* and the other affairs of the population, had appointed Kethüda Ahmed Efendi as his *vekil*. The latter had to distribute (*tevzi*), according to the old custom, the *masraf-ı memleket* every six months. The above having been ascertained, with the participation of İsmail Ağa, the court and everybody, a protocol was drawn up for all the items of local expenses incurred from St George's to St Demetrius' Day of 1797. The "Muslims and *reaya*" mentioned from the population of Ruse who were present in court were: the imam of Cami-i Cedid *mahalle* Hâfız Hüseyin Efendi, and from the *cemaat* [of the same *mahalle*] Hacı Hüseyin Ağa, Hacı Memiş Ağa, Hacı Abdi Ağa and *hâfız* [illegible]; the imam of Hacı Musa *mahalle* Mehmed Efendi, and from its *cemaat* Hacı Abdullah and Hüseyin Ağa; the imam of Kara Mustafa *mahalle* Mehmed Efendi, and from its *cemaat* Hacı Mustafa Ağa, Mumi Ağa and Hacı İbrahim Ağa; the imam of Fayık *mahalle* Mehmed Efendi, and from its *cemaat* Hacı Mehmed Ağa, Hüseyin Ağa and Ahmed Ağa; the imam of Erik Ramazan *mahalle* Memiş Efendi, and from its *cemaat* Mehmed Ağa, Süleyman Ağa, Hacı Hüseyin Ağa and Mehmed Efendi; the imam of Mahmud Voyvoda *mahalle* Kabzuma Efendi, and from its *cemaat* Mahmud Ağa, Abdi Efendi and Hacı Memiş Ağa; the imam of Cami-i Atık *mahalle* İsmail Efendi, and from its *cemaat* Hacı Osman Ağa, Hacı Hüseyin, Mehmed Ağa and the *voyvoda* Mehmed Ağa; the

111. Mutafchieva, *Kardjaliisko vreme*, 16-24; T. Georgieva, *Enicharite v balgarskite zemi* [The Janissaries in the Bulgarian Lands] (Sofia 1988), 153-66, 173-92; Dimitrov, 'Istoriata'.

imam of Mesih Voyvoda *mahalle* Memiş Efendi, and from its *cemaat şerefetlû* Mehmed Ali Bey Efendi, the *cizyedar* Ahmed Ağa and Hüseyin Ağa; the imam of Kuyumcu *mahalle* İbrahim Efendi, and from its *cemaat* Hüseyin and Abdullah; the imam of Bacanak *mahalle* Abdullah Efendi, and from its *cemaat* [illegible] Ağa, Hacı Hüseyin, Hacı Ahmed and Hacı Mehmed Ağa; from “the *memleket*” of “Hacı Musa Armenian” *mahalle* [illegible], Agop, Bedrus and Kirkor; from “the *memleket* of Tuna *mahalle*, called *varoş*”¹¹² Dobre, Ivancho and the teacher (*daskal*) Kosti together with the *bazirgâns*. Then followed the names and the representatives of the villages of the *kaza*, followed by the list of district expenses itself.¹¹³ It is interesting to note that the participants included Christians; therefore, the idea of a purely religious council is undermined.

There is evidence of similar cases in Vidin as well. The *nazır* of the Vidin *mukataa* Ahmed Ağa, who had been authorised to take care of *reaya* affairs, submitted in court, according to the old custom, the accounts for the money spent for a period of one year, beginning 1 March 1727, for the following items: *ücret* for *menzil* horses, for the *muhafız* of the Vidin *vezir* Osman Paşa, for *ağalık* of the above-mentioned *nazır* and for other *vilâyet* expenses, such as *harc-ı bab* and *harc-ı lâzım*. In the presence of the *vilâyet ayan*, as well as of Aci Kino, Papasoğlu Guiorgui, Arsenie, *kürkçi* Guiorgui and Miladin, who were from the *varoş* of Vidin itself, as well as in the presence of *zimmis*, listed name by name, from the *kaza* villages, calculations were made and the sum amounted to 6,000 *guruş*, which was payable to *nazır* Ahmed Ağa. Those present recognised this debt and distributed it (*tevzi*), giving to the *nazır* the distribution *defter* in which a portion (*hisse*) payable by the *varoş* was foreseen.¹¹⁴ At a sharia court session, held at the home of *nazır* Yusuf Ağa in 1728, a *hüccet* was drawn up, stating that the said *nazır* was a *vekil* responsible for the affairs of the *reaya*. The following were present: the *zimmi* from the Vidin *varoş* Jani, son of Ilia, Guiorgui, son of priest Nedelko, the other Guiorgui, son of Niko, Aci Kino, son of Jani, Aci Ligo, son of Istojanole, as well as residents of the villages of the *kaza*, listed name by name. In the presence of “the pride of the *ayan*” Alibeyzade Yusuf Ağa, *nazır* of the *malikâne* of Vidin, they stated that, since Vidin was a border town and road traffic passed through it, it was necessary to have a *vekil* who would see to the important and necessary matters and would provide *konaks* for the *kapı halkı* and for all who passed through Vidin. These individuals, listed

112. Tuna *mahalle* is one of the oldest Christian *mahalles* to exist under this name in Ruse. Here it is designated by the name *varoş*, which permits a narrow toponymic treatment of the term *varoş*. It also permits us to suggest that by the toponym *varoş* a part of the town territory coinciding with the territory of Tuna *mahalle* was determined. However, I still consider that the example should not be exaggerated. Numerous documents indicate that during the same period of time in Ruse there were other Christian *mahalles* besides Tuna and Orta; therefore, I consider that simply in this particular case the name of one of the Christian *mahalles* was used, but later these *mahalles* were called *varoş*, meaning the whole Christian community.

113. OrO, R10, f. 139-a, doc. I; f. 140-a, doc. I.

114. OrO, S19, f. 2-b, doc. II.

above, appointed Yusuf Ağa as *vekil*, and he accepted this duty.¹¹⁵ When interpreting these documents, it should be borne in mind that the Vidin Muslims had military obligations in one or another form and the *reaya* taxpayers in that town were exclusively Christians, while the villages contained almost no Muslim *reaya*.¹¹⁶ This is why it is not surprising that the local *ayan* were approved in the presence of the Christians with whom they actually had to 'work'. Since a Christian population was present in most Bulgarian towns, it is possible to expect a similar practice to have been followed on a larger scale. Furthermore, our examples clearly show how the all-Christian representative body, the *varoş*, maintained relations with the *ayanlık* as partner institutions of the same kind.

Although they were *askerî* and *beratlîs*, and had 'classic' military, administrative, and religious functions, the local *ayan*, just like all other representative bodies of the *reaya*, arose from custom and through the *vekâlet* as a private-law procedure. It is interesting to note, however, that it was only the *ayan*, among all other representatives of the local neighbourhood-territorial corporations, who received a formal appointment, through the formal *vekâlet* procedure attested by the sharia court. Such validation was not required, however, for the other 'officials' (*iş erleri*). Like the other corporate representative bodies, the group consisting of the *ayan* and their officials began to be treated as ruling body and in that sense they represented an element of the local administrative structure in the Ottoman Empire. The *ayan*'s participation in ruling was most categorically legitimated by the very inclusion of the *ayan*'s top circles among the addressees of various *fermans* sent to the provinces with regard to state and military tasks, as well as to private-law issues. In this way, the *berat* procedure was circumvented, and joint action, within an 'estate sandwich', composed of *reaya* and *askerî*, of Muslims and non-Muslims, became possible.

In their development, all corporate institutions (including the *ayanlık*) followed the road of formalisation. In practice, the Ottoman state carried out a large-scale bureaucratisation by incorporating all kinds of social groups into the system of local administration. The crossing of the line between bureaucracy and the corporations in Ottoman local administration – the two existed more or less separately in the 'classical' period – can be traced particularly well, especially in the case of the *ayan*. The result was not a town administration in the narrow sense of the word, but townsmen of high reputation, elected by their equals and forming something like a town oligarchy. This 'administration' was responsible for the enforcement of several laws and rules, tax collection, the maintenance of public safety and the support of the army, but it also took into consideration the interests of the town, engaged in consultation with others, took decisions, drew up petitions, received orders from the central authorities, and executed them.¹¹⁷

115. OrO, S19, f. 23-b, doc. I.

116. S. Ivanova, *EF*, s.v. 'Widin'.

117. Faroghi, 'Political Initiatives', 26; P. Sugar, *Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804* (Seattle 1977), 82-83.

Conclusion

The development of the corporate structure of the population in various towns, even if only in the Bulgarian lands, was not uniform and did not take place absolutely simultaneously, but the tendency was the same: a taxable community of the Orthodox townspeople was gradually formed, which, in keeping most fully with the seventeenth and eighteenth-century sources, can be called *varoş*. This was a name used for the Christian community in a given town, denoting an institution which came into being in the course of tax distribution and collection and which was a hierarchical unit in urban fiscal practice, but which expanded its competences to include municipal activities. The powers and tasks of this institution, as well as the mechanisms of its functioning, were similar to those of the *mahalles*. The *varoş* overlapped with the religious councils, eventually existing in towns, or at least it acquired the character of a church council, since all of its members were Christians. The development of the *varoş* institution was subject to the general trends in the development of local institutions in the Ottoman Empire, dominated by the *ayanlık*.

More generally speaking, the following ascending hierarchy of corporations of the population was formed: 1. a family/taxpayer; 2. a *mahalle* or another primary taxable community which at the same time was bound together by collective responsibility for the maintenance of public order and by the autonomous execution of a number of municipal and religious tasks; 3. a fiscal community in a given village or town, where it was represented by the *ayan*, who at the same time represented the interests of the Muslim portion of the town's population, and of the *varoş* and/or episcopate for the Orthodox Christians (the small ethno-confessional groups were represented by their *cemaats/taifes* which, in a considerable number of cases, could be viewed simultaneously as *mahalles* and as a town-wide ethno-confessional community); 4. a representative corps of the population of a given *kaza*. The character of the horizontal and vertical links between the elements of this hierarchy was determined by collective responsibility and necessarily implied autonomous status in the execution of certain functions.¹¹⁸ The following document could give us some idea of how this hierarchy functioned, how its lower-level elements (the village, the *mahalle* and the various *cemaats*, i.e., the small social groups) did not lose their importance as basic elements of the administrative structure through which the *reaya* were administered. The Rumeli *divan*, seated in Sofia, circulated in 1756 an order (*buyruldu*) to the *kadıs* of Sofia, Berkofça, Şehirköy, İhtiman, Radomir, Şirıştnik, Razlog, İznebol, and Breznik, to the "pride of the *ayan*" the *mütesellim* of Sofia, to village *zâbits* and *vilâyet ayan* and officials, and to the population. The order noted the existence of widespread banditry, i.e., attacks by armed bandits on *suks*, markets in towns, *kasabas* and villages; the bandits plundered the *reaya* and the *beraya*, and had completely disrupted public order in the *kazas*. It was ordered that, with the participation of the sharia court, the *divan*-delegated *mübaşir*, and the population of the towns, *kasabas* and villages of the *kazas*, the people were to

118. Ivanova, 'Danachnoto oblagane', 94-96.

be bound by mutual guarantees (*kefalet*): the *reaya* would stand guarantors of one another and for all of them the imams and the priests of the *reaya mahalles*; all the members of the *cemaat* of the inhabitants of villages had to become mutually guarantors to one another; the *müderrises*, the *şeyhs*, the *softas*, the dervishes and the *fukara* in *tekkes* and *hanegâhs* would stand surety to one another; so would those who were in *hans* and *hamams*, and for all of them the *han* keepers and the *hamamcıs*; the *kethüdas* and *yiğitbaşıs* were to provide *kefalet* for the craft-guilds, and the guild-members for one another. Their names and descriptions were to be entered in the *sicil*, and anyone who did not have a guarantor was to be expelled from the *kaza*.¹¹⁹

It was not the first time that in the seventeenth century, particularly in the central part of Rumeli, the Ottomans made an attempt to integrate the 'traditional' (*âdet*) institutions of their non-Muslim subjects, existing under the *zimma* pact, into their own administrative apparatus. This took place in parallel with the gradual 'islamisation' of Ottoman domestic policy. It was not only the secular *mahalles*, but also the religious non-Muslim councils that began to concentrate administrative functions in themselves. This connection between the institutions of the *zimma* pact and of the *reaya* administration gave rise to the *millets*, which were invested with much more power and political resource than the classic micro-structures on which Ottoman rule had relied in the early centuries. The Ottoman state, however, succeeded in maintaining corporateness in its own favour by strengthening the public-law elements in the corporations' activities, thereby proportionally restricting or at least controlling their autonomy.

The corporate principle was ubiquitous in medieval society, one of its obligatory elements being the small group. The corporations were engaged in administration as primary social structures of a non-bureaucratic type; hence, one of the basic formal role characteristics of the leadership corps of neighbourhood-territorial communities was the intermediary role between the political-power structure and the corporate structure of society. Corporate leaders in the Ottoman Empire were always a group without fixed membership and without special authorisation, elected in accordance with a criterion which is vague for contemporary man – they were 'trustworthy people'. This was probably due to the traditional way of acting as intermediaries or representatives without a formal status. Traditionalism in the functioning of these corporations seems to have made the fulfilment of these tasks accessible to practically every person of authority, because the status of these intermediaries was, to a very great extent, determined by their public authority, and brought them such authority. This authority, however, neither originated from the *mahalles* or the *varoş*, nor was it focused on them, but just made use of the credit already gained through the power-holders' other activities.

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THE ÇİFTLİK SAHİBLERİ OF MANASTIR AS A LOCAL ELITE, LATE SEVENTEENTH TO EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY

Michael URSINUS

Among the notables of Manastır, headquarters of the *valis* of Rumeli in the western half of the *paşa sancağı*,¹ one particular socio-economic group appears to have attained prominence earlier and on a wider scale than in most other districts of the Ottoman Balkans: the ‘landed gentry’ of the local *çiftlik sahipleri* (*çiftlik* owners).² Not only would their rise to the status of a local elite seem to have come in good time to serve them well (in terms of their own proprietary and rent-collecting standards), but also, their conspicuous involvement in the affairs of the locality, especially their prominent role in the district’s tax allocation system (by means of *tevzi* or ‘distribution’ [of the tax load])³ during meetings of the local ‘town assembly’ (*meclis-i memleket*) at the *kadi*’s court, resulted in a documentary fall-out in the court records or *kadı sicilleri* of Manastır which appears to be exceptional.⁴ As far as I can see, the series of *çiftlik* survey registers (a kind of *çiftlik yoklama defteri*

1. For much of the period under investigation Manastır (today Bitola in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) shared with Sofia (also situated within the central *sancağ* of the *eyalet* ‘where the pasha or governor resides’, hence *paşa sancağı*) its role as the seat of the provincial government of Rumeli. See M. Ursinus, *EP*, s.v. ‘Manastır’.
2. On *çiftlik* formation and the emergence of a ‘landed gentry’, see, out of a growing corpus of literature, G. Veinstein, ‘Âyân de la région d’Izmir et le commerce du Levant (deuxième moitié du XVIII^e siècle)’, *ROMM*, 20 (1975), 131-47; H. İnalcık, ‘The Emergence of Big Farms, *Çiftlik*s: State, Landlords and Tenants’, in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont and P. Dumont (eds), *Contributions à l’histoire économique et sociale de l’Empire ottoman* (Leuven 1983), 105-26; Y. Nagata, *Some Documents on the Big Farms (Çiftlik)s of the Notables in Western Anatolia* (Tokyo 1976) and idem, *Tarihte Âyânlar: Karaosmanoğulları Üzerinde Bir İnceleme* (Ankara 1997). More specifically on the situation in and around Manastır: B. McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600-1800* (Cambridge and Paris 1981), 73-79, 121-70.
3. The ‘classic’ account of *tevzi* is to be found in H. İnalcık, ‘Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700’, *ArchOtt*, 6 (1980), 283-337, esp. 335-37.
4. But see, for instance, H. Gandev, ‘L’apparition des rapports capitalistes dans l’économie rurale de la Bulgarie du Nord-Ouest au cours du XVIII^e siècle’, *Études Historiques* (Sofia 1960), 207-20, who, in another ‘classic’ study, was able to trace more than 120 ‘estates’ through the *sicils* of Vidin.

composed for *tevzi* purposes) of the kind first utilised by Bruce McGowan for his study on the emergence of landed estates in the district of Manastır have no direct parallel elsewhere.⁵ McGowan suggested twenty years ago that the *çiftlik* survey registers in the Manastır series must initially have been composed in the face of considerable resistance by the *çiftlik sahipleri*,⁶ before being institutionalised as a means of ensuring an equitable allocation (if not to say distribution to at least some of the *çiftlik sahipleri*'s personal advantage) of the district's fiscal burden. By this time – the early eighteenth century – they were regularly entered into the record books at the local *kadı*'s court as a unique and distinctly local data base.⁷ Its character is distinctly local in the double sense of having originated within the locality (the *kaza* under the jurisdiction of the *kadı*) and through consultation with a local body (the district's *çiftlik sahipleri*), and secondly because such surveys for local *tevzi* purposes by their nature and origin are hardly ever to be found in the Empire's central archives. As the result of a negotiating process (between the *kadı* on the one hand and the locally influential landholders on the other) which only under certain conditions (which happened to be fulfilled at Manastır) found expression in a whole series of a kind of *çiftlik yoklama defterleri* recorded in the *mahkeme*, they are unique. If the historian's aim is to trace the history of a local elite such as the *çiftlik sahipleri* in its local context, utilising data generated by its own involvement in the administrative process, then the evidence is to be tapped primarily from local sources. It is the purpose of this contribution to demonstrate to what extent local sources such as the *kadı sicilleri* can, on occasion, even include evidence from administrative processes which commonly go unrecorded because (it would appear) they are of an 'informal' nature: From the point of view of the *kadı* and the central authorities in Istanbul, districts (*kaza*, *nahiye*), towns (*nefs-i şehir*), villages (*karye*), quarters (*mahalle*) or 'privileged' units (such as villagers performing the special duty of *derbendci*, *doğancı* or *çeltükçi*) and confessional groups like the *cemaat-ı Yahudiyan* (to mention only the most typical) all constituted accepted entities in the administrative process and were recognised in the centrally administered *avarız* tax allocation system from of old, either as entities subject to, or exempt from, the *avarız* tax.⁸ Not so the *çiftlik sahipleri*. Long regarded (by the Ottoman land laws and the Ottoman *kadı*) as the principal usurper of the old

5. See below, Appendix. Translations (into Macedonian) of some of the documents can be found in A. Matkovski (ed.), *Turski izvori za ajdustvoto i aramistvoto vo Makedonija* [Turkish Sources for Brigandage and Banditry in Macedonia], III: 1700-1725 (Skopje 1973), IV: 1725-1775 (Skopje 1979), and V: 1775-1810 (Skopje 1980).

6. McGowan, *Economic Life*, 161f., quoting *fermans* dating from 1694 and 1695.

7. Ibid., 162-64. The *tevzi* list in Manastır *kadı sicili* (henceforth abbreviated as Sic. Man.) 65, f. 3b-5b appears to be unique in that it not only gives the identity of each *çiftlik* holder, but also the identity of each cultivator under their respective *çiftlik sahibi*. See ibid., 218 n. 160.

8. Ö. L. Barkan, *İA*, s.v. 'Avârız', II: 13-19; more recently L. T. Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660* (Leiden-New York-Cologne 1996), 81-118 (Chapter 3). For a synopsis of the tax allocation system at Manastır see McGowan, *Economic Life*, 157-61.

order,⁹ the *çiftlik*-holding 'landed gentry' only gradually came to be tolerated as a fact of life, provoking various attempts at incorporation into the fiscal regime from the turn of the eighteenth century (if not earlier), but was never officially recognised prior to 1858.¹⁰ As a result, negotiating with the *çiftlik sahipleri* about their share of the overall tax burden to be collected from the district's adult male population went beyond the established and recognised pattern of levying taxes on the basis of the traditional fiscal entities associated with the *avarız* system. Consequently, such negotiations must largely have lacked official recognition, remaining 'informal' instead, and (according to the general evidence of the *kadı sicilleri* from across the Balkans) more often than not appear to have passed without being recorded in the *sicils*.¹¹ Yet in certain places, and as part of the locally administered *tevzi* allocation – not the centrally assessed *avarız* system – the details of what had been agreed upon were copied into the pages of the court record book – for everyone to see and check if need be – by which act the negotiated outcome of the assessment (which *çiftliks* to tax fully, which to tax partly and which to spare altogether),¹² if not the negotiation as a whole, must have attained a quasi-official status.

In passing, I have repeatedly referred to the *çiftlik sahipleri* of Manastır as a local elite. Without even attempting to propose a general definition of local elites, common sense seems to suggest that the *çiftlik sahipleri* of Manastır constitute an obvious case in point since they were by definition locally rooted, had a vested interest in local affairs (not least for their own good), and tended to assume the role of intermediaries between what they regarded as their locus of (financial or fiscal) interest on the one side and officialdom on the other (unless they had been promoted to officialdom themselves). Predominantly Muslim, they include not only members of the military, the learned institution, religious personnel, administrative staff and artisans, but also, more occasionally, dervish *şeyhs*, women and even

9. Ibid., 135-52, especially 141.

10. One of the principles of the Ottoman Land Law of 1858 was to allow proper legal tenure of (former) *miri* lands in order to subject landholders to full tax liability. Yet the state largely failed to reduce the power of the large landholders, since many of them now had proper legal tenure of *miri* land which they were able to effectively treat as freehold (*mülk*). For a brief contextualisation of the Land Code of 1858 and references to the relevant texts, see R. H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (New York 1973), 99ff.

11. Exceptions are rare. A special case in point is the unusually detailed early nineteenth-century recording of the *çiftliks* in the district of Çelebi Pazar (Rogatica) from the *sicils* of Saray Bosna (Sarajevo); see A. Sućeska, 'Popis čifluka u Rogatičkom kadiluku iz 1835. godine' [Register of *Çiftliks* in the District of Rogatica of the Year 1835], *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju*, 14-15 (1969), 189-271.

12. The mechanisms of (temporary) reductions (*tenzil*) for *tevzi* purposes are discussed in my 'Natural Disasters and *Tevzi*: Local Tax Systems of the Post-Classical Era in Response to Flooding, Hail and Thunder', in E. Zachariadou (ed.), *Natural Disasters in the Ottoman Empire (Halcyon Days in Crete III. A Symposium Held in Rethymnon 10-12 January 1997)* (Rethymnon 1999), 265-72.

non-Muslims.¹³ Yet however many diverse elements of society and members of different social strata they may include, they are united in the fact that they are in possession of one or more former peasant holdings worked by farm labourers for which they are fiscally responsible. But does this already constitute membership of an elite? There is, *inter alia*, a problem of delineation: A *çiftlik sahibi* in possession of just one or two former peasant holdings (which, perhaps surprisingly, constitutes the majority of cases) is in a completely different order of magnitude from a big landholder with several hundred labourer households under his control. While the latter would immediately be recognised as a member of the local elite, the former, by virtue of his registered possession alone, hardly qualifies at all (unless he held possessions elsewhere) – were it not for the fact that many *çiftlik sahipleri*, at least in Manastır, also held certain fiscal rights over plots of land other than their own *çiftlik*s. El-Hac Mehmed Ağa for example, who, in 1724, is recorded with just two taxable households on his *çiftlik* in the village of Srpçi, controlled no fewer than 9.2% of all taxable households across the *kaza* of Manastır. On top of being a *çiftlik sahibi*, el-Hac Mehmed Ağa, like many of his fellow landowners, operated as a *deruhdeci* or fiscal intermediary for the equivalent of no fewer than 232 taxable households in the district of Manastır alone.¹⁴

But more about this later. Let me first give a brief outline of the local context in which the ‘landed gentry’ of Manastır evolved from being a landholding elite to one also holding far-reaching fiscal rights over the remaining ‘free’ peasant households during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The fertile plain of the Crna river to the north and east of Manastır (known from medieval times as the lowlands of Pelagonija) lent itself to the cultivation of grain, primarily wheat. For centuries the area forwarded substantial wheat surpluses to the region’s main commercial centres such as Siroz and Selânik, over and above supplying the local markets with the necessary foodstuffs. Consequently, the lowland districts near Manastır are among the first in Ottoman Rumelia to have witnessed the emergence, out of the ruins of the increasingly obsolete *timar* system, yet partly in co-existence with it, of a *çiftlik* economy. While the vast majority of the *sipahis* appears to have lived in the town by 1635, with “their interest in their villages slipping since they frequently leased out their right to collect their incomes

13. For a certain Şeyh İsmail as a *çiftlik sahibi* with two cultivators in 1711 see Matkovski (ed.), *Turski izvori*, III: 77 (no. 85). Yakov Yahudi is mentioned in the same *defter* as a *çiftlik sahibi* in the village of Oleveni with two cultivators: *ibid.*, 78. A document of 1713 lists a certain Fatma Hatun in her capacity as a *çiftlik sahibi* with four cultivators in the village of Mogila as well as the mother of a certain Halilbeyzade with three cultivators in the village of Çayırılı (all district of Manastır): *ibid.*, 102f. (no. 108). Other references to the above are mentioned below, n. 22.

14. On the *deruhdeci* institution in Manastır: M. Ursinus, ‘Mütâfâcî Ahmed und Seinesgleichen: Zur Bedeutung des *der’uhdecilik* in Manastır im 18. Jahrhundert’, in E. Radushev, Z. Kostova and V. Stoyanov (eds), *Studia in Honorem Professoris Verae Mutaŭčieva* (Sofia 2001), 351-74.

to other individuals”,¹⁵ local *çiftlik* owners had already begun to leave their mark in the court records from Manastir, including a certain Mehmed Ağa (not identical with the above), who, in 1641, requested registration in the *sicil* of the fact that he employed as many as 150 *urgats* (farm labourers) each year at a wage of 10 *akçes* per head, presumably on his own *çiftlik*s in the area.¹⁶ By 1710, at the very latest, almost a third of the adult male population must already have been living on *çiftlik*s, some large (with up to 85 labourers), but most of them small (of around two to three *nefers*), rather than in ‘free’ (or, to use the administrative term, *hanekeş*) villages.¹⁷ The prominence of the *çiftlik sahipleri* in local affairs, last but not least in the local revenue collecting system known as *tevzi*, as *deruhdecis* or tax farmers of more usual description, was to continue well into the 1830s.¹⁸ While on their *çiftlik* holdings their word must have carried the law, their bargaining power (executed individually or collectively, as the case required) not only vis-à-vis whole ‘free’ or *hanekeş* village communities, but also with the state authorities, is evident from the start.

Let me quote McGowan once more:

The strain of the long war with the Holy League (1683-99) could scarcely have been surmounted at Manastir had it not been for the equitability introduced by the locally administered tevzi system. But the system was not without enemies. It was subverted even during the war by military men who sought either to protect reaya who already worked on their chiftliks or to bring additional villagers under their control, thus cheating the tax collectors of the contributions due from them. The frustration of the central government with this situation is given voice in a ferman addressed to the Manastir district (and three others) in connection with the avarız/nüzül collections of 1694:

*“When the time had come for the collection of the avarız and the bedel-i nüzül from the districts named and our collector arrived and began to make collections as required by the decree and by the (mevkufat) register which had been given him, some of the notables (ayan) of the province and timar holders appeared as middlemen (deruhdeji), and in order to mediate (deruhte eylemek) on behalf of various villages did not permit a tevzi register to be given on time, and because of the hindrance and delay of the timar holders they have caused difficulty for the imperial kitchen accounts (...)”.*¹⁹

15. A general outline of the setting of Manastir in the demographic and economic developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is given in McGowan, *Economic Life*, Chapter 5 (‘*Chiftlik* Agriculture and Fiscal Practice in Western Macedonia, 1620-1830’), 121-70. Here I quote from p. 147.

16. *Ibid.*, 136.

17. *Ibid.*, 164.

18. Ursinus, ‘Mütâfçı Ahmed’, 353-57.

19. McGowan, *Economic Life*, 161-62.

In fact, the difficulties were such that they produced what has been called the ‘tax base crisis of the 1690s’ – not merely for the imperial kitchen, but the imperial treasury as a whole. More and more taxable *reaya* were lost to the *çiftlik sahibleri* – either as future farm labourers or as tax refugees on the private estates. To make matters worse, the *çiftlik sahibleri* of Manastır, at some point during the 1690s, succeeded in having the entire *çiftlik* holdings within the district taken out of the local *tevzi* tax apparatus, thereby turning their possessions into *de facto* tax-exempt holdings. “Not until 1709 was the *tevzi* system at Manastır reformed to adapt to a trend that must have been obvious for a long time: the growth of *chiftlik* agriculture at the expense of the local villagers”.²⁰ In addition, in their guise as *deruhdecis*, the *çiftlik sahibleri* of Manastır also succeeded in tightening their (fiscal) grip over the peasant holdings. As I have shown elsewhere, by 1724 they controlled almost 93% of all *hanekeş* (i.e., ‘free’) households of the district (including the capital town), with nearly 42% in the hands of the five most prominent *deruhdecis*. Less than forty years later, in 1761-62, they collectively already controlled 98%, with the five biggest *deruhdecis* holding, or, to use McGowan’s term, “mediating (*deruhte eylemek*)” more than 64% of all ‘free’ taxable households. This was to rise further, to an overall (fiscal) control over the so-called ‘free’ villages of nearly 100% by 1823, when the five most powerful *deruhdecis* (who were also among the most wealthy *çiftlik sahibleri*) shared a total of little less than 80%.²¹ Thus, after having taken possession of a large share of the former peasant holdings, probably in the course of the 1690s, the *çiftlik sahibleri* of Manastır, throughout the eighteenth and the first decades of the nineteenth century, were ‘mediating’ the remaining local peasantry at the rate of over 90%. It seems that the assumption of *deruhdecis* powers, in addition to the exploitation of *çiftlik* holdings, constituted merely another, albeit lucrative, form of private control over the (primarily) agrarian resources of the country from which the *çiftlik sahibleri* of Manastır must have derived much of their income and power.

It is hardly surprising, then, to find *çiftlik sahibleri* cum *deruhdeciler* much in evidence within the military, judicial, religious and administrative set-up of the provincial capital. Even if titles can be no safe guide to actual functions held, it may still be worth showing the distribution of those titles by which the *çiftlik* owners were identified in the *çiftlik* survey register of 1710: there are 47 mentions of the title of *ağa*; 35 references to *sipahi*; 34 to *celebi*; 32 to *efendi*; 18 to *kethüda*; 11 to *bey*; 8 to *beyzade*; 7 to *ağazade*; 5 to *efendizade*; 5 to *paşa*; 3 to *zaim* and *zaimzade*; 3 to *yazıcı* and 2 to *hoca*. In addition, there are two mentions each of a *vaiz efendi*, a *kapıcızade*, a certain Şeyh İsmail and a *çuhadar ağa*, one of a *bayrakdar*, a *kadıazade*, a *muhtarbaşı*, a certain *bakkal* Ramazan, the *paşa*’s brother (*paşa karındaşı*), a *sarraf*, and a certain Yakov, no doubt a Jew.²² This tallies rather

20. Ibid., 162. There is, however, an entry in Sic. Man. 30 (1115-16/1703-04), f. 13b, which suggests that at least some *çiftlik*s had already been subject to some form of taxation by that date. The question deserves further study.

21. Ursinus, ‘Mütâfçı Ahmed’, 366.

22. Matkovski (ed.), *Turski izvori*, III: 63-68 (no. 75).

neatly with McGowan's distribution list of 1731, where we meet the same titles – in order of declining frequency – of *ağa*, *sipahi*, *çelebi*, *efendi* and *kethüda*.²³ Most individuals can be easily traced through time by means of the Manastır *çiftlik* survey registers, including those of lesser rank and more modest substance such as our old acquaintance *bakkal* Ramazan, who, having been fiscally responsible as *deruhdecı* for one *nefer* in the village of Mogila in 1710, is recorded as being in control of two labourers there in another *çiftlik* survey register of 1713,²⁴ and can still be found, in yet another such document of 1724, as 'mediating' one 'household' in the same village.²⁵ In the case of more prominent local *çiftlik* owners/*deruhdecıs* like el-Hac İbrahim Ağa it is possible to establish their often wide-ranging operational network built around their landholdings and fiscal responsibilities. In 1724, İbrahim Ağa held *çiftlik*s in the district of Manastır which amounted to 20 households in the villages of Podmol, Zagoric, Rahotino, Optičari and Krklino, while his interests as *deruhdecı* were looked after by various *yazıcıs* who controlled a total of 283 local 'households' in his name, the equivalent of 11.2% of all taxable households in the district!²⁶ Whether this İbrahim Ağa is identical with the *ayan* of Manastır of the same name referred to in a document of 23 February 1709 is far from clear;²⁷ but it can safely be assumed that a man of the standing of our İbrahim Ağa also held positions of distinction within the military-administrative set-up of the provincial headquarters of the *Rumeli valisi*. About a hundred years later, by the early nineteenth century, similar *çiftlik* owners/*deruhdecıs* are to be found in the highest echelons of provincial officialdom. Rüstem Bey, scion of the powerful Zaimzadeler; Abdülkerim Bey of the equally influential Mustafapaşazade *hanedans*; Selimağazade Ahmed Bey and Yahyabeyzade Mustafa Bey were big *çiftlik sahipleri* cum *deruhdeciler* who by this time regularly shared out among themselves the office of *ayanlık* in the *kaza* of Manastır, sometimes held jointly by more than one representative of the most powerful local *hanedans*, such as between 1809 and 1816, when this arrangement appears to have been the rule.²⁸ Even the office of *Rumeli kaymakamı* (lieutenant-governor), the second in command after the *Rumeli valisi* himself, is by now regularly, and occasionally repeatedly, awarded to members of the 'landed gentry', among them Zaimzade Rüstem Bey (he became *kaymakam* in 1818 and again in 1823). At the time of his second appointment to the highest possible provincial posting short of the *beylerbeyilik*, Rüstem Bey was 'mediating' more than 700 of the Manastır district's nearly 4,000 'ploughs' (*çifti*), the biggest individual share controlled by a local *deruhdecı*. Of these, 30 *çifts* are recorded as belonging to his own estate, in other words, they represent his personal

23. McGowan, *Economic Life*, 164.

24. Matkovski (ed.), *Turski izvori*, III: 102.

25. Ursinus, 'Mütâfçı Ahmed', 371.

26. Ibid., 365.

27. Matkovski (ed.), *Turski izvori*, III: 48f.

28. M. Ursinus, *Regionale Reformen im Osmanischen Reich am Vorabend der Tanzimat. Reformen der rumelischen Provinzialgouverneure im Gerichtssprengel von Manastir (Bitola) zur Zeit der Herrschaft Sultan Mahmuds II. (1808-39)* (Berlin 1982), 193f.

çiftlik holdings.²⁹ In choosing Rüstem Bey for the job of being their man on the ground, the provincial government had opted for one of the most substantial local *çiftlik sahibleri* and principal *deruhdecis*. Success breeds success. Ever since his first appointment as *kaymakam*, Rüstem Bey had been able to eclipse his fellow *deruhdecis* by entering into more and more apparently mutually advantageous contracts with village communities – at the expense of his competitors. One such contract, duly recorded in the *sicil*, will be quoted here in full:

Trpče Krste, Lazar Ferka, Stanoja Stanko, Gekula Šiniko (there follow another 23 names of Christian heads of households) as well as the remaining inhabitants of Belacrka village in the district of the town of Manastir came to the meeting of the kadi's court, when one of them, in the name of all others, and as their representative, made the following statement: "We (herewith) dismiss our former deruhdecı Seyyid Abdülkerim Bey and appoint (in his stead as) our (future) deruhdecı Seyyid Rüstem Bey, with whom we enter into an agreement (akd eylemek), on condition that it can be revoked, according to which we empower him to advance our taxes every year, so that we can apportion and discharge them at the end of each year, and that we pay him a remuneration of one thousand piastres (per annum for his services)". Their statement was copied down in this place. On the 15th of Şevval in the year 235 (26 June 1820).³⁰

It becomes apparent how the wealth accumulated through *çiftlik* holdings and *deruhdecı* powers helped aspiring people to get into high positions, yet could also in turn be considerably furthered by holding high positions in the local apparatus.

Quite clearly, the *çiftlik* cum *deruhdecilik*-based local elite had made itself indispensable in the day-to-day running of one of the most important centres of provincial government in the Ottoman Empire, first and foremost as regards the levying of taxes, the provisioning of troops, and the recruitment of auxiliaries. The *kadı*, appointed to the locality for rarely more than a year as the representative of central government,³¹ was well advised to rely on their local knowledge and their information about the actual situation on the ground as there was hardly any other to be had in the general absence of state-administered *tahrirs*. Relevant data detailing the up-to-date conditions about the ability-to-pay³² out there in the *çiftlik*s and villages which, after all, constituted the tax-base of the realm, were available, in

29. P. Džambazovski (ed.), *Turski dokumenti za makedonskata istorija* [Turkish Documents on the History of Macedonia], IV:1818-1827 (Skopje 1957), 70.

30. *Ibid.*, 39.

31. The terms of office of the *kadis* and *naibs* of Manastir are detailed in Ursinus, *Regionale Reformen*, 268-73.

32. At some stage in the development of *tevzi* at Manastir, the quality of the soil appears to have been taken into account by establishing three distinct tax rates: *ibid.*, 166-74, esp. map on p. 170.

Manastır at least, only courtesy of the *çiftlik/deruhdecilik*-based 'gentry', and, as will be shown before concluding, as the result of continued negotiations with and among this local elite.

The documents to be discussed in a few more details here are among the most prominent features in the *sicils* of Manastır. They typically extend over four to five or even more pages and contain up to several hundred names, including not only those of the villages, the *çiftlik sahibleri* or *deruhdecis*, but occasionally reach down to the names of the farm labourers themselves.³³ According to what can be gleaned from their preambles, they emanate from regularly convened, usually biannual, meetings in the presence of the *kadı*, the local *ayan-ı vilâyet*, the *zaims*, *timarlıs*, *iş erleri* and (other) inhabitants of the district.³⁴ Following a list of the *hanekeş* villages with their respective quota of the overall tax load, the individual *çiftlik*s are recorded one by one, under the name of their geographical location. Below each of them, the *çiftlik sahibleri* are set down individually and by name, each – as in the case of the villages – listed with their respective fiscal quota. In Manastır, this is usually (1) a sum payable in piastres, (2) a certain number of 'individuals' (*nefer*) or (3) of 'poll-tax receipts' (*varaka*), or (4) of 'ploughs' (*çift*).³⁵ Care is to be taken not to read the denominations without due caution: the 'poll-tax receipts' (cf. 3) employed in this context have been shown to be used in a much more restricted sense than the original meaning would suggest: even decades after the *cizye* reforms of the 1690s which made the poll-tax a liability on every non-Muslim male individual, in the first half of the eighteenth century the term '*varaka*' still denotes the poll-tax receipt of a non-Muslim head of household.³⁶ Here, in the detailed *çiftlik* surveys, the local magnates collectively laid open the situation in their own backyards – if 'lay open' is what they did. We must remember that during the 1690s they had apparently succeeded in keeping their estates out of the local *tevzi* apparatus altogether, but by 1709 at the latest their holdings are recorded in the *kadis'* *sicils* and must therefore have been subject to taxation. From then on, the *çiftlik*s appear to have been as much subject to the apportioning of various obligations as were the *hanekeş* villages. But were the *çiftlik*s truly taxed in line with the *hanekeş*? It can be demonstrated that, by the early nineteenth century, the *çiftlik*s in the *kaza* of Manastır paid at a special rate which was different from that of the *hanekeş* villages. There can be no doubt that the *çiftlik sahibleri* were able to see to their interests. But the question is this: How far would they dare go in pursuit of their own interests, and when would their movements be checked by their peers who, in consequence

33. As in Sic. Man. 65 (1202/1787-88), f. 3b-5b. The same holds true of the 1835 *çiftlik* survey register for Çelebi Pazar (Rogatica) published in Sućeska, 'Popis čifluka'.

34. See for instance Matkovski, *Turski izvori*, III: 63-68 (no. 75).

35. The practice for *tevzi* purposes of apportioning tax loads by means of the number of recorded *nefer*, *varaka* or *çift* is discussed more fully in my 'Hane' in Kalkandelen, 'Rüüs' in Selanik. Regionalspezifische Verwaltungspraktiken und -begriffe im Osmanischen Reich bis zum Beginn der Tanzimat', in my *Quellen zur Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches und ihre Interpretation* (Istanbul 1994), 25-47.

36. Idem, 'Mütâfçı Ahmed', 360f.

of the mechanism of collective fiscal responsibility inherent in the *tevzi* system, would have to shoulder the tax-dodger's share collectively? Noting that the overall numbers of recorded *çiftlik*s hardly changed over the 114-year period under review, McGowan raises the question of under-recording: "Possibly large *chiftlik* owners were successful in discouraging *chiftlik* censuses so that the earlier figures survive as stereotypes".³⁷ While this may be true for the second half of the eighteenth century, it certainly does not apply to the early period, when several detailed surveys can be shown to have been executed afresh based on such varying criteria as *nefer*, *varaka* and *çift* (see below in the Appendix). Undoubtedly, more research is needed in this area. But one thing seems obvious enough: *çiftlik* surveys and their derivatives, the corresponding *tevzi* registers, are not to be read uncritically at face value. They constitute carefully negotiated platforms of local co-operation between the central powers (or their representatives in the area, such as the *kadı*) and the locally powerful, as well as the outcome of negotiations *among* the locally powerful, i.e., the more prominent members of the local elites. With this taken into account, they will shed light on the realities of a *per se* 'unofficial' relationship between 'the state' and its representatives and some powerful players on the ground as few other sources of this period can.

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APPENDIX

LIST OF 'ÇİFTLİK SURVEY REGISTERS' IN THE *KADI SİCİLLERİ* OF MANASTIR (abbreviated as Sic. Man.)

NOTE: This list does not include the relevant material from the nineteenth century, which is discussed in my *Regionale Reformen*, 163ff.

1. Sic. Man. 33 (1120-21 A.H./1708-09), f. 31b-34a (collection of *celepkeşan* in *çiftlik*s)
2. Sic. Man. 34 (1121-23 A.H./1709-11), f. 11a-12b (*tevzi* list based on 'nefer', includes *çiftlik*s)
3. Sic. Man. 34 (1121-23 A.H./1709-11), f. 30b-32a (*tevzi* list based on 'çift', for *çiftlik*s only [total of 960 'çift'])
4. Sic. Man. 34 (1121-23 A.H./1709-11), f. 41b-43a (*tevzi* list based on 'evrak', includes *çiftlik*s [with 1,274 'evrak'])
5. Sic. Man. 35 (1124 A.H./1712), f. 10b-11b (*tevzi* list including *çiftlik*s which are assessed on the basis of 'evrak' [total of 1160 'nefer'])

37. McGowan, *Economic Life*, 164.

6. Sic. Man. 35 (1124 A.H./1712), f. 32a-33b (*tevzi* list based on 'evrak', includes *çiftlik*s [with 1204 'evrak'])
7. Sic. Man. 35 (1124 A.H./1712), f. 34a-35a (*tevzi* list for *çiftlik*s)
8. Sic. Man. 38 (1129-31 A.H./1716-19), f. 58b-60a (*tevzi* list for *çiftlik*s [946 'çift'])
9. Sic. Man. 38 (1129-31 A.H./1716-19), f. 73a-74b (*tevzi* list for *çiftlik*s [920 'çift'])
10. Sic. Man. 39 (1132-34 A.H./1719-21), f. 108a-112b (*tevzi* list based on 'evrak' including *çiftlik*s)
11. Sic. Man. 40 (1135-38 A.H./1722-26), f. 4a-b (*tevzi* list for *çiftlik*s; incomplete)
12. Sic. Man. 40 (1135-38 A.H./1722-26), f. 8b-9a (*tevzi* list including *çiftlik*s which are taxed per 'çift' [1,000 'çift'])
13. Sic. Man. 40 (1135-38 A.H./1722-26), f. 39a-b (*tevzi* list based on 'çift' including *çiftlik*s [villages and *çiftlik*s together give a total of 4,200 'çift'; villages alone: 2,517])
14. Sic. Man. 42 (1141-43 A.H./1728-31), f. 92b-94b (*tevzi* list for *çiftlik*s)
15. Sic. Man. 42 (1141-43 A.H./1728-31), f. 101b-104a (*tevzi* list based on 'evrak' including *çiftlik*s [1,317 'evrak'])
16. Sic. Man. 44 (1147 A.H./1734), f. 13a-15a (*tevzi* list based on 'evrak' which includes *çiftlik*s)
17. Sic. Man. 44 (1147 A.H./1734), f. 21a-23b (*tevzi* list including *çiftlik*s which are taxed per 'çift')
18. Sic. Man. 45 (1148-49 A.H./1735-37), f. 47b-49b (*tevzi* list based on 'çift' including *çiftlik*s [these alone hold 1,241 'çift'])
19. Sic. Man. 46 (1150 A.H./1737-38), f. 50b-54b (*cizye* register listing 'evrak' including *çiftlik*s [662 plus 90 plus 390 'evrak' in three sub-districts or *kols*])
20. Sic. Man. 65 (1202 A.H./1787-88), f. 3b-5b (*tevzi* list including *çiftlik*s which are taxed per 'çift'). In this document the names of the cultivators fiscally liable working under each *çiftlik sahibi* are given.
21. Sic. Man. 65 (1202 A.H./1787-88), f. 5b-6b (*tevzi* list including *çiftlik*s which are taxed per 'çift')
22. Sic. Man. 66 (1202-03 A.H./1787-89), f. 9b-11a (*tevzi* list including *çiftlik*s which are taxed per 'çift')
23. Sic. Man. 66 (1202-03 A.H./1787-89), f. 46a-47a (*tevzi* list including *çiftlik*s which are taxed per 'çift')
24. Sic. Man. 67 (1204-05 A.H./1789-91), f. 28b-29b (*tevzi* list for *çiftlik*s based on 'çift' [1,000])

THE MIXED ELITE OF A BALKAN TOWN: KARAFERYE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Antonis ANASTASOPOULOS

Karaferye (Greek Veria), a town lying to the west of Salonica, belonged during the Ottoman period to the latter's *sancak*, and was the administrative centre of a *kaza*. If Western visitors of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are to be trusted, it was inhabited by about 8-10,000 people.¹ Its population consisted of Muslims, Christians and some Jews; on the other hand, most of the numerous villages of the region were Christian.

This paper will revolve around two issues. One is the difficulty in defining Karaferye's 'elite',² given that Ottoman registers and documents are almost the only sources that we possess about the town in the second half of the eighteenth century, as is the case for most of the Ottoman period prior to the nineteenth century. The second issue is whether the Muslim and Christian elites should be treated as a unified or two independent power groups. In other words, I would like to touch upon the question of to what extent religion was a critical factor in determining the character and alliances of the elite. I would like to link this second issue to the question of communal representation, since the elite was in various instances required by the state to formally represent the local population before Ottoman authorities, or to handle local affairs, such as taxation and security. In fact, provincial elites in the Ottoman Empire gained political legitimacy and secured their prestige and status by defending the interests of their district – obviously in conformity with how *they* perceived these interests – against 'threats', be they external or internal.

It is reasonable to assume that Karaferye's elite did not differ in its basic characteristics from the elites of other regions of the Ottoman Empire – especially those of the Balkans. The Muslim provincial elite of the eighteenth century is predominantly identified with the *ayan*, a widely used term whose content is at best rather broad: as Harold Bowen defined it several decades ago, "at first [it] denoted merely the most distinguished inhabitants of any district or town-quarter, [but eventually] the

1. Félix-Beaujour, *Tableau du commerce de la Grèce, formé d'après une année moyenne, depuis 1787 jusqu'en 1797*, vol. 1 (Paris 1800), 128; W. M. Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. 3 (London 1835), 291.
2. For a discussion of the notion of the elite see the 'Introduction' to this volume.

term, often used as a singular, acquired a more precise significance, coming, in the eighteenth century, to be applied to those among such persons as then first exercised political influence and were accorded official status".³ Halil İnalcık classifies the social groups from which the *ayan* emanated as i) the *ulema*, ii) current and former *kapıkulları*, iii) those who traded in precious goods, as well as wealthy persons and *mültezims* who were engaged in caravan trade, financial transactions and the purveying of provisions, and iv) leading guildsmen.⁴ As for the preconditions for a provincial notable to attain to local leadership, the following were required according to Engin Akarlı's succinct codification: i) a sound financial basis, ii) a military force, iii) influence over and close ties with other notables, and iv) good contacts with more powerful figures in the area and in Istanbul.⁵

On the Christian side, there was a group of notables whose aspirations and attitude were quite similar to those of the *ayan*; this was the *kocabaşı* of the Ottoman sources. If we consider the twin meaning of the term *ayan* as influential figures and the actual political leadership of a region,⁶ then *kocabaşı* as used in Ottoman administrative jargon is nearer to the latter meaning. *Kocabaşı* were the leaders or representatives of the Christian community of a given district. However, a variety of Greek terms used to describe this group (*proesti*, *prouchontes*, *archontes*, etc.) may be treated as almost identical with *ayan* in its two senses. For instance, in his study of the finances of the mountain village of Zagora in Thessaly, Socrates Petmezas distinguishes for methodological purposes between the common people and the *proesti*, i.e., those who signed at least once the annual account of the communal treasury, and further distinguishes between the *proesti* as a social group and the actual communal leaders (i.e., the communal council) of a given year.⁷ Next to

3. H. Bowen, *EP*, s.v. 'A'yān' (the degree to which official status was accorded to the *ayan* is an issue of discussion). Halil İnalcık refers to the *ayan* as "provincial notables" and points out that "when seventeenth and eighteenth century Ottoman texts referred to ayan within the urban setting, they usually meant men of wealth": H. İnalcık, 'Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration', in T. Naff and R. Owen (eds), *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History* (Carbondale and Edwardsville – London and Amsterdam 1977), 27, 41.
4. *Ibid.*, 37-38.
5. E. D. Akarlı, 'Provincial Power Magnates in Ottoman Bilad al-Sham and Egypt, 1740-1840', in A. Temimi (ed.), *Proceedings of Second International Symposium of CERPAO-ACOS: La vie sociale dans les provinces arabes à l'époque ottomane* (Zaghuan 1988), 42-44.
6. I refer here not strictly to the distinction between the *ayan-ı vilâyet* and the 'official' *ayan* of a region, but also to the *ayan* being treated both as a social group and active political figures.
7. S. Petmezas, «Διαχείριση των Κοινοτικών Οικονομικών και Κοινωνική Κυριαρχία. Η Στρατηγική των Προυχόντων: Ζαγορά 1784-1822» [Management of Community Finances and Social Domination. The Strategy of Communal Leaders: Zagora 1784-1822], *Mnemon*, 13 (1991), 96, 100-01. See also the appointment of a *vekil* in the Peloponnese by the *prokriti* of his region, which resembles the appointment of the 'official' *ayan* of a district, in M. Pyliā, «Λειτουργίες και Αυτονομία των Κοινοτήτων

the *kocabaşıs* stood the clergy, usually, but not always, as a separate category as far as the internal politics of the community was concerned; the local metropolitan was undoubtedly an elite figure, but even common priests often appear to have had a say in how the affairs of their town quarters and villages were run, their office rather than their personal qualities providing a good stepping-stone for acquiring influence and eventually authority.⁸

Despite the fact that even the term *ayan* carries both a specific and a non-specific meaning (if we wish to suppose that a region's elite was limited to this group), members of Ottoman provincial elite as subjects of historical research – especially when studied solely on the basis of *sicils* and other formal records – tend to be more or less identified with holders or claimants of political power and in general with those active in local politics. In other words, it is those who politically represented their communities, who were frequently present in formal public institutions such as the court of justice, or whose names appeared in petitions to the Porte either as petitioners or as troublemakers who are first and foremost treated as members of the elite. State decrees intensify the 'politicisation' of elites, because they attribute a pronounced political role to the *ayan*, who were, for instance, expected to distribute and collect taxes and provisions, guarantee public order and organise the security forces of their *kazas*, and recruit men in times of war; *ayan* are in many respects treated as the intermediaries *par excellence* between the state and its subjects in the provinces; in contrast to *kadis*, these intermediaries were not state functionaries but self-made individuals or families, products of Ottoman society. But what about other categories of the elite, such as the social, economic, or intellectual elites? Did they fully identify with the political elite or not?

Indeed, I think that there is a wide range of elite persons in Karaferiye of whom we know very little. For instance, *tevzi defters* provide the names of landholders, and *tereke defters* allow us insights into the wealth, and occasionally the intellectual interests, of certain individuals.⁹ But we are more often than not unable to follow their activities and strategies systematically, because many of these people did not leave any other mark on official records, and other types of sources are missing.

της Πελοποννήσου κατά τη Δεύτερη Τουρκοκρατία (1715-1821)» [Functions and Autonomy of Moreot Communities During the Second Phase of Ottoman Rule (1715-1821)], *Mnemon*, 23 (2001), 74. Cf. G. D. Kontogiorgis, *Κοινωνική Δυναμική και Πολιτική Αυτοδιοίκηση: Οι Ελληνικές Κοινότητες της Τουρκοκρατίας* [Social Dynamics and Political Self-Government: Greek Communities in the Ottoman Period] (Athens 1982), *passim*, and J. Strauss, 'Ottoman Rule Experienced and Remembered: Remarks on Some Local Greek Chronicles of the Tourkokratia', in F. Adanır and S. Faroqhi (eds), *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography* (Leiden-Boston-Cologne 2002), 212-13 and n. 91.

8. Cf. Kontogiorgis, *Κοινωνική Δυναμική*, 277-95.

9. Book collections in *tereke defters* are indexes for the literacy and intellectual interests of the elite. Subscriptions for books (or the actual copying or writing of a book) are other such sources.

The *tevzi defters* in particular are the single most important source on landholding in eighteenth-century Karaferiye. When compared with other *sicil* entries they provide information about the control exercised by the urban population, and more specifically the elite, on the hinterland. When examined in the long duration, they provide information on the stability or changes in the composition of the elite. However, there are serious technical limitations in their use; for instance, they simply provide names devoid of patronymics, which in several cases renders identification of the persons mentioned problematic, and do not specify the exact legal character of the relation between the landholder and the land.

Merchants also often go undetected. Dimitraki Bekella, a *berath* merchant of Karaferiye, is a characteristic case. Surviving *sicil* and *ahkâm defterleri* entries as well as letters written by and to him demonstrate that he was a wealthy and cultured merchant whose strategy aimed at defending his status and wealth against threats coming from his co-religionists (because of his tax exemption), Muslim officials (because of his wealth) and business partners (because of financial disputes).¹⁰ Bekella is, I think, a good example of elite individuals who are hardly visible to the modern scholar; even though they were important and active members of local society, they did not leave very many marks on the *sicils*. The same often applies to *mahalle* imams, too. They certainly played a part in local life, but this is not always evident, and it is often not easy to decide whether they should be counted among the elite (İnalçık refers to them as those who “headed city quarters”;¹¹ the stress is again on the political role of the elite).

Bekella’s case is typical also in that often in Karaferiye all that we have about a person is either indications or scattered information concerning his activities; it is like putting together the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, but never managing to see the full picture, because some central pieces are missing. There are no local histories of Karaferiye and no biographical dictionaries of its distinguished personalities which would allow us to draw a clearer picture of the profile of the local elite. Thus, we know, for instance, of a local bully, Kara Ahmed, who is interesting in that he was one of those persons who swayed between legality and illegality, but always ended up being among the leading figures of the region. We also know of Rüşdi Ali Efendi, a retired *kadı* and the ‘official’ *ayan* of Karaferiye for a number of years, another person whose activities were not always legal, as he was accused of forming *çiftlik*s and refusing to pay his dues to the legitimate landholder, or of collaborating with outlaws. However, we cannot follow their entire careers; we only can glue some – relatively few – of pieces together.¹²

10. Bekella’s case is analysed in A. Anastasopoulos, ‘Building Alliances: A Christian Merchant in Eighteenth-Century Karaferiye’, forthcoming in *Oriente Moderno*.

11. İnalçık, ‘Centralization and Decentralization’, 38.

12. On Kara Ahmed and Rüşdi Ali Efendi, see A. Anastasopoulos, ‘Imperial Institutions and Local Communities: Ottoman Karaferiye, 1758-1774’, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge, 1999, 85-86 and *passim*.

Three *sicil* entries of 1759 are of particular interest in our quest for the elite of Karaferye, because – like the *tevzi defters* – they contain the names of several of its inhabitants. These documents were compiled when the town population was required to undertake a number of pledges (*nezzr*) towards the state.¹³

The first entry contained the names of 93 persons; each of the 23 listed *mahalles* of Karaferye was represented by four persons, apart from one which was represented by five. The second entry included the names of 340 persons representing 28 *mahalles*; the representation pattern was very irregular, as it fluctuated between five and twenty-four persons per *mahalle*. The third entry contained the names of 160 inhabitants of 12 Muslim neighbourhoods of the town; distribution was again irregular, but not identical to that of the second entry.

Most of the Muslims in these three entries bore a title such as *ağa*, *efendi*, *beşe*, *celebi*, or *bey*; several were *seyyids* or *hacıs*; in some cases the profession (*berber*, *yazıcı*, *vaiz*, *müezzin*, *hatib*) or the status (*sipahi*, *ceribaşı*, *molla*, *kethüda*, *serdar*) of the person was also indicated; in several cases, an imam was among the neighbourhood representatives.¹⁴ There were also several who bore a family name of the type so-and-sozade, which is a clear indication of a *de facto* aristocratisation of Ottoman society. It seems that there was also some sense of hierarchy as the name of Rüşdi Ali Efendi, the ‘official’ *ayan*, was listed first in his *mahalle* preceded by a formula of praise, an honour which was reserved for him and only two other persons among the dozens listed in the three *sicil* entries;¹⁵ moreover, two of the entries started the listing of the neighbourhoods with Rüşdi Ali’s *mahalle*.¹⁶

13. Karaferye Sicil (hereafter KS) vol. 81/p. 224, KS 81/373-74, KS 81/391 (compiled between January and June 1759); the *sicils* of Karaferye are kept at the Imathia branch of the General State Archives of Greece in Veria. To put these pledges in context, see A. Anastasopoulos, ‘Lighting the Flame of Disorder: *Ayan* Infighting and State Intervention in Ottoman Karaferye, 1758-59’, *IJTS*, 8/1 & 2 (2002), 73-88 (unfortunately printed with certain mistakes). The people of Karaferye were rendered liable to the payment of fines in the event of their tolerating the return of outlaws to their district. On *nezzr*, see S. Faroqi, ‘Introduction’, in her *Coping with the State: Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman Empire 1550-1720* (Istanbul 1995), xix-xx, xxi-xxii, as well as her ‘Räuber, Rebellen und Obrigkeit im osmanischen Anatolien’ reprinted in the same volume (pp. 163-78).

14. In 5 out of 11 Muslim neighbourhoods in KS 81/224, and in 7 and 8 out of 12 neighbourhoods in KS 81/373-74 and KS 81/391, respectively; if we count mosque personnel, such as *müezzins*, *hatibs*, *vaizes* and *kayyims*, and not only imams, the figures rise to 6, 11 and 10, respectively.

15. In fact it is only he and another person who are honoured with a *fahrül*... type of title, the third person being a *müfti* whose name is preceded by the title of respect *fazilellü* (uncertain reading). Unlike the other person, Rüşdi Ali’s name is preceded by the formula of praise both times that it appears in these lists. Cf. I. Tamdoğan-Abel, ‘Individus et pouvoir dans une ville ottomane au XVIII^e siècle’, in M. Anastassiadou and B. Heyberger (eds), *Figures anonymes, figures d’élite: pour une anatomie de l’Homo ottomanicus* (Istanbul 1999), 12.

16. In one of these two entries, Rüşdi Ali’s name is nevertheless absent.

Things look quite different on the Christian side. Here the scribe recorded merely personal and fathers' names without any other details, except for indicating three priests (*papa*), two *acis*, a Pilāvçı and a Bekçioğlu in the first entry.¹⁷ Still, there are some cracks to the wall of uniformity that the two entries project, thanks to the information that we possess from other entries and sources. For instance, the name Kritopuli, which appears either as a first or as a paternal name in three *mahalles* is in fact a well-known family name of Karaferye. The Kritopoulos family had gained tax exemption by sultanic decree in the fifteenth century and some of them continued to live in the same town quarter as in the sixteenth century. We know from another *sicil* entry that one of the eighteenth-century Kritopouloses was a merchant (*bazirgân*), but not much else about them really.¹⁸ Probably Dimitraki veled-i Manol of the entries was Dimitraki Bekella, who was mentioned above, but this is not clearly indicated anywhere. Dimitraki's father was indeed called Manol; the oration delivered on the occasion of his death is highly formulaic, but gives us an idea of what a member of the elite took pride in: landholding, wealth, slaves (possibly meaning servants), but also good repute, glory, nobility, and an extensive family.¹⁹ Would it be different for Muslim or Jewish notables?

Presumably the names included in these three entries were the names of the representatives and not of the whole of the male town population, unless Karaferye's inhabitants were really much fewer in number than Western observers estimated a few decades later. But why were there only four representatives per town quarter in the first entry and many more in the next two? Were they the governing body – so to speak – of each quarter in the first case and a more representative group of the political, social and economic elite in the other two?²⁰ On the other hand, can all these

17. The limited number of priests among the representatives (they appear to be altogether absent from the second entry, unless a “Timotyō v. Dimo” of the Ayandon neighbourhood is the same person as “papa Timotyō” in the first entry) is somewhat surprising; according to an entry dated 1 September 1670, thirteen priests were among the thirty-seven representatives of the town's *zimmi* population (I. K. Vasdravellis [ed.], *Ιστορικά Αρχεία Μακεδονίας: Β'. Αρχείον Βεροίας - Ναούσης 1598-1886* [Historical Archives of Macedonia. II: Archive of Veria-Naoussa 1598-1886] [Thessaloniki 1954], 53 [no. 65]). See also E. Gara, ‘In Search of Communities in Seventeenth Century Ottoman Sources: The Case of the Kara Ferye District’, *Turcica*, 30 (1998), 143-44, 145, 153-54.

18. On the Kritopouloses, see A. Anastasopoulos, «Χατζηκατβίας, Χαριτόπουλος, Κριτόπουλος: Στα Ίχνη μιας Παράδοσης για την Οθωμανική Άλωση της Βέροιας» [Chatzekatvias, Charitopoulos, Kritopoulos: Following the Traces of a Tradition about the Ottoman Conquest of Veria], in T. Kiousopoulou (ed.), *1453: Η Άλωση της Κωνσταντινούπολης και η Μετάβαση από τους Μεσαιωνικούς στους Νεώτερους Χρόνους* [1453: The Fall of Constantinople and the Transition from the Middle Ages to Modern Times] (Irakleion 2005), 211-25, where other relevant bibliography is cited.

19. For the text of the funeral oration, composed by a professional orator, see D. Vikelas, *Η Ζωή μου* [My Life] (Athens 1908), 9-10.

20. The guilds are a social factor which is missing from the three lists, as representation by *mahalles* conceals their possible influence on local society; see, for instance, Anastasopoulos, ‘Lighting the Flame of Disorder’, 84-85 for the distinction between guilds and

people justifiably be treated as members of the elite by modern scholars? We cannot answer any of these questions with certainty, but it is a fact that these people were set apart from the rest of the community and this presupposes a process of selection. Even if not an elite in the proper sense, instances such as these pledges provided them with the opportunity to come forward as the leading figures of the place.

If we now turn to the issue of religion, Muslims and Christians appear on the basis of these entries to form two completely separate groups, since *mahalles* are listed as either Muslim or Christian; no mixed neighbourhoods are cited. In the absence of deeds of property sales from this period, it is difficult to say if it was really so, but it appears more likely that the *mahalles* of these entries were technical rather than real-life units.²¹ In other words, they may have been so adjusted as to conform to the precepts of the state's Islamic ideology about segregation along religious lines rather than to reality.²²

In the third of the lists referred to above, only the Muslim inhabitants of Karaferye take the pledge. What was the reason behind only one part of the town population taking a pledge? Perhaps it was because half of the people against whom

merchants: merchants (*bazirgân*) were individuals and members of the elite; guilds (*esnaf*) were collectivities, even though some of their members may have been wealthy. Cf. H. İnalçık, 'Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire', *The Journal of Economic History*, 29 (1969), 104-06.

21. Evidence from seventeenth-century Karaferye, Kandiye, Kayseri and Ankara, as well as from eighteenth-century Aleppo suggests that no rigid segregation upon confessional lines was applied in Ottoman neighbourhoods, despite the fact that these may officially have been labelled as Muslim or non-Muslim: E. Gara, 'Kara Ferye 1500-1650: Menschen, Lokalgesellschaft und Verwaltung in einer osmanischen Provinz', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Vienna, 2000, 33-34; E. Karantzikou, «Η Οικιστική Μορφή της Πόλης του Χάνδακα κατά την Περίοδο της Τουρκοκρατίας» [Settlement Pattern in the Town of Kandiye under Ottoman Rule], *Kretologika Grammata*, 17 (2001), 116; S. Faroqhi, *Men of Modest Substance: House Owners and House Property in Seventeenth-Century Ankara and Kayseri* (Cambridge 1987), 154-58; A. Marcus, *The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century* (New York 1989), 317-18. On the other hand, Gara and Faroqhi refer to one late sixteenth and one mid seventeenth-century instance when it was required that Christian residents move out of 'Muslim' neighbourhoods (Gara, 'Kara Ferye', 34; Faroqhi, *Men of Modest Substance*, 241 n. 19). Certain aspects of the *mahalles* as administrative units, as well as their relation to other divisions such as parishes, are discussed in M. Tsikaloudaki, «Μορφές Διοίκησης και Διαχείρισης του Αστικού Χώρου στην Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία: Το Παράδειγμα της Χριστιανικής Κοινότητας της Φιλιππούπολης (18ος - αρχές 19ου αι.)» [Forms of Administration and Management of the Urban Space in the Ottoman Empire: The Example of the Christian Community of Philippopolis (Eighteenth-Early Nineteenth Centuries)], *Mnemon*, 22 (2000), 9-30; for Christian *hanes* in Muslim *mahalles*, see *ibid.*, 23-25.

22. It is interesting to note that the Orthodox Church and Christian literati were also in favour of segregation between Muslims and Christians lest Christians should become assimilated or convert to Islam: R. Gradeva, 'Turks and Bulgarians, Fourteenth to Eighteenth Centuries', in her *Rumeli under the Ottomans, 15th-18th Centuries: Institutions and Communities* (Istanbul 2004), 207-11.

the pledge was taken were janissaries,²³ but, in any case, this differentiation between Muslims and non-Muslims is again an indication of a society which is either deeply divided or depicted so in formal documents in accordance with bureaucratic and religious requirements.

If we were presented with these two interpretations, I think that the scale would tilt in favour of the latter. The fact that, as stated above, *zimmi* names in the aforementioned entries were devoid of any title does point in this direction: apparently the reason for this was that this was how *zimmi*s should be referred to according to the principles of an Islamic state such as the Ottoman Empire.²⁴ Indeed, Greek, and also Ottoman, sources amply testify to the fact that prominent Christians at least bore family names and adorned their names with markers which declared their superiority over common *zimmi*s (*aci*, *kyr*, *-aki*).²⁵ What other reason could there be for not citing such distinguishing signs?

On the other hand, it would be an over-simplification to dismiss this bias against non-Muslims as a mere administrative practice with no impact on society whatsoever. It is, in this regard, not insignificant that a late eighteenth-century foreign observer, such as Beaujour, did not treat the population of contemporaneous Salonica as a single entity but as being composed of three separate communities, formed along religious lines, each with its own leadership and internal institutions.²⁶ Thus, it appears that religion was not a negligible social factor, and religious segregation as practised by the state was not without an impact on the organisation of society.

But would this then mean that Muslim and non-Muslim members of the elite were two (or more) different entities devoid of any common interests and attitudes? Quite to the contrary, there are several indications from Karaferiye and elsewhere in the Balkans that this was not so. Muslim and non-Muslim elite figures co-operated in business ventures ranging from trade to tax farming, amassed land through legal and illegal means, extended credit to the weaker members of society, rendering them dependent on them, shared similar luxury tastes, clothing and lifestyle, hired the services of or collaborated with mercenaries and outlaws.²⁷ Nevertheless, there

23. And all of them were Muslims, but this applies to the other two entries, too.

24. Cf. Tamdoğan-Abel's comment about oppressive *ayan* in her 'Individus et pouvoir', 13.

25. See, for instance, N. K. Giannoulis, *Κώδικας Τρίκκης* [Church Register of Trikala] (Athens 1980), *passim*, and KS 81/870/entry no. 1 (13 November 1758).

26. Félix-Beaujour, *Tableau du commerce de la Grèce*, 1: 48-49. Obviously Beaujour was not the only one who proceeded to such a differentiation; on the contrary, it was very common in works of the Ottoman period from Evliya Çelebi to western travel journals to geographical works.

27. See, for instance, Vasdravellis (ed.), *Ιστορικά Αρχεία Μακεδονίας: Β'*, 160-61 (no. 183), 171-72 (no. 191), 173-74 (no. 194); also S. I. Asdrachas, «Πραγματικότητες από τον Ελληνικό ΙΗ' Αιώνα» [Realities from the Greek Eighteenth Century], in *Σταθμοί προς τη Νέα Ελληνική Κοινωνία* [Milestones Towards Modern Greek Society] (Athens 1965), 25-33, and B. McGowan, 'The Age of the *Ayans*, 1699-1812', in H. İnalcık with

were considerable differences too: *ayan* could aspire to obtaining state appointments; Christian notables could not. *Ayan* were among the addressees of state decrees; Christian notables very rarely were, even in regions where they represented a large section of the population. *Ayan* could invest extensively in tax-farming; Christian notables apparently could only farm minor sources of revenue.²⁸ In other words, *ayan* were in a privileged position when compared with their Christian counterparts in the context of Ottoman institutions. Therefore, the two groups of notables could well have been unequal in terms of career prospects, but very similar to each other in terms of profile, values, and everyday life.²⁹

So, can we down-play or bypass the role of the Ottoman state when we talk of provincial elites, and thus obtain a picture closer to everyday reality? I believe that the answer is clearly no. No matter how weak the central government or its local representatives were in the eighteenth century, the state had provided the framework within which provincial society functioned, and was a force to be reckoned with when it came to a region such as Karaferiye and to *ayan* who were nothing like the Buşatlıs, Osman Pasvanoğlu, or Ali Paşa of Yanya in terms of resources and might. I think that the relation between the local elite and the state is very basic to understanding the balance of power in the region. The Muslim and non-Muslim elites operated within the Ottoman context, and this was what made them who they were.³⁰ The state may have occasionally or chronically found it difficult to impose order and effectively control its provinces, but nobody could simply do as they wished.

D. Quataert (eds), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge 1994), 669. Compare with the twin processes of "localization" and "Ottomanization" described for the Arab provinces by E. R. Toledano, 'The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research', in I. Pappé and M. Ma'oz (eds), *Middle Eastern Politics and Ideas: A History from Within* (London and New York 1997), 154-55.

28. S. I. Asdrachas *et alii*, *Ελληνική Οικονομική Ιστορία ΙΕ'-ΙΘ' Αιώνας* [Greek Economic History, Fifteenth-Nineteenth Centuries], vol. 1 (Athens 2003), 327; see also Petmezas, «Διαχείριση των Κοινοτικών Οικονομικών», 85-86, and Pylia, «Λειτουργίες και Αυτονομία», 79-80.
29. See Gara, 'In Search of Communities', 156-60 for instances of co-operation but also signs of friction between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities of Karaferiye in the seventeenth century, and McGowan, 'The Age of the *Ayans*', 665 for a massive tax exemption granted to the Muslims of Bosnia. Cf. Strauss, 'Ottoman Rule Experienced and Remembered', 207-08, 214.
30. On fiscal and other mechanisms which promoted the identification of the provincial elites with the Ottoman state in the eighteenth century, see A. Salzmann, 'An Ancien Régime Revisited: "Privatization" and Political Economy in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire', *Politics and Society*, 21 (1993), 393-423, and Toledano, 'The Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites', 155-57. Identification of the Christian notables with the Ottoman state appears as an accusation against them in polemical works, such as *Ελληνική Νομαρχία* [Greek Polity] (Athens 1980), 97-98, and K. T. Dimaras (ed.), *Ρωσσοαγγλογάλλος* [The Russian, the Englishman and the Frenchman] (Athens 1990), 20-21; both originally appeared in the first decade of the nineteenth century.

For instance, when local antagonisms break out, we learn about them thanks to petitions submitted to the Porte and state decrees issued in response to them; prior to the nineteenth century, the state was involved in such crises usually not because it spied on developments through agents of its own, but because it had been invited to do so by that local side that realised that the battle was being lost. Thus, most major intra-elite clashes ended up as affairs in which the state played an active part, because the members of a certain faction chose or were forced by circumstances to have recourse to it. When doing so, the elites needed to respect and adapt to the rules of sultanic justice and invoke the name of the people, even though the outcome of their conflict might hardly matter as far as the conditions of life of the common people were concerned. Therefore, in many cases those who petitioned against a member of the elite or an elite group were not their real opponents, but the unidentifiable ‘population’ of the region, even though the petition had really been written and submitted by a limited number of elite individuals. This seems to be what the Metropolitan of Salonica referred to when he accused the merchant Bekella of having masked himself as the community in making false allegations against the local metropolitan.³¹

Elite clashes provide the researcher with a welcome opportunity to study networks, alliances, strategies and occasionally (especially when confiscations were ordered) the resources of the elite. If within certain bounds, crises could be beneficial to elites, too. For one thing, they could come forward as the political leadership of their community and increase their influence and political power. Besides, on the economic level, disorder provided some with an opportunity to tighten their grip over indebted villagers and to encroach upon more land. Of course, one needed to always be cautious and on the alert. The line between success and banishment was a thin one. But then again, we should not forget that if someone possessed, as Akarlı suggests, a sound financial basis, a military force, influence over and close ties with other notables, and good contacts with more powerful figures in the area and in Istanbul, plus a modicum of negotiating skills, i.e., if he was a decent, self-respecting *ayan* in the turbulent Balkans of the second half of the eighteenth century, he had a good chance of renegotiating his status with state agents and his elite rivals, and returning to grace.

(University of Crete – Institute for Mediterranean Studies/FO.R.T.H.)

31. M. A. Kalinderis, *Ta Avtá Έγγραφα της Δημοτικής Βιβλιοθήκης Κοζάνης 1676-1808* [The Unbound Documents of the Municipal Library of Kozani 1676-1808] (Thessaloniki 1951), 30. Cf. Pylia, «Λειτουργίες και Αυτονομία», 73.

**AYAN IN ANATOLIA AND THE BALKANS
DURING THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES:
A CASE STUDY OF THE KARAOSMANOĞLU FAMILY**

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Introduction

The present symposium, entitled ‘Provincial Elites in the Ottoman Empire’, will emphasise a bottom-up rather than Istanbul-centred top-down view of the subject, which will, it is hoped, enable us to see vividly various scenes occurring in every local society throughout the Empire. For example, through such an approach, we should be able to observe continuity in daily life among the people of provincial society and symbiosis between its Muslim and non-Muslim members, despite the fact that the state system had been transferred from the Byzantine to the Ottoman Empire. What this shows is that changes which occurred in Istanbul did not always have a great effect on the everyday life of local residents.

Since the single term ‘provincial elites’ includes people of various origins and social positions, it will be necessary first to define the term ‘*ayan*’, which will be the provincial elite dealt with in this paper. Its usage here differs from the *ayan-ı vilâyet*, who played important roles in local society from the early stages of the Ottoman Empire. H. İnalcık has classified the origin of provincial elites within the Empire who were referred to as *ayan* or *eşraf* into the following four categories: (1) *ulema: müfti, nakib, müderris, seyyid*; (2) *kapıkulları: yeniçeri serdarı, sipah kethüdayeri, dizdar, muhtesib*; (3) those who traded in precious goods and (4) leading guildsmen. İnalcık then surveys how such *ayan* gained power in local society by being appointed to the positions of *voyvoda, mütesellim*, etc. in the course of time from the seventeenth century onwards.¹ In this last stage of the *ayan*, their political and socio-economic power was based on the exercise of tax-farming (*iltizam*) rights, large estate (*çiftlik*) management and religious endowment (*vakıf*) activities. This last stage will be discussed in the present paper by taking up the example of the Karaosmanoğlu family of the province of Manisa (called Saruhan in the Ottoman administration) in western Anatolia.

1. H. İnalcık, ‘Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration’, in T. Naff and R. Owen (eds), *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History* (Carbondale and Edwardsville – London and Amsterdam 1977), 27-52.

As a result of the rise of the *ayan* in each province from the middle of the eighteenth century on, the political authority of the central government was to be weakened for a century. Therefore, the eighteenth century has recently been referred to at times as “the age of the *ayans*”.² In response to such circumstances, the central government implemented a centralisation policy of political reform in an attempt to weaken *ayan* power. It is generally said that the centralisation policy of Mahmud II did significant damage to that power, and the use of the term *ayan* was avoided in favour of *vücu*h from that time on. However, the political damage done to the power of the *ayan* was mainly felt only in the area of *iltizam* operations, while their social and economic influence based on *çiftlik* management and *vakıf* activity continued unscathed in each region throughout the Tanzimat and subsequent periods. Therefore, one area of focus in researching the history of the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century should be to illuminate the real picture of the struggle being waged between the central government and *ayan* over land and human resources.³

The research that has been done on the *ayan* has a rather long history, dating back to the 1930s,⁴ but recently the focus of study has been on their socio-economic bases, such as the *iltizam* and *çiftlik*. In his study of the historical background of the formation of the *çiftlik* and its development from the beginning of the seventeenth century, F. Braudel refers to the work done by R. Busch-Zantner and T. Stoianovich, which shows that the increasing demand for agricultural products in the markets of Western Europe was tied to the development of market-orientated farm management in Eastern Europe. Braudel points out that *çiftlik* management was being conducted in the neighbouring Balkans under similar conditions.⁵

In response to this suggestion, I. Wallerstein and R. Kasaba have suggested the possibility that the economies of the Balkan countries might have been incorporated into the ‘world system’ through the agricultural production of *çiftliks*,⁶ although this notion has met with criticism from historians of the Ottoman period. In the light of reports submitted by French consuls residing in Izmir between 1748 and 1778, G. Veinstein argues in an article published in 1976 that the foundation of the power and influence of Hacı Mustafa Ağa, founder of the Karaosmanoğlu family’s fortune, did not lie in proprietorship over the vast *çiftliks*, but in administrative and fiscal authority wielded in the positions of the deputy governor (*mütesellim*) and tax-farmer of Manisa province. That is to say, Veinstein holds that Hacı Mustafa Ağa

2. B. McGowan, ‘The Age of the *Ayans*, 1699-1812’, in H. İnalcık with D. Quataert (eds), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914* (Cambridge 1994), 637-758.
3. Cf. H. İnalcık, ‘Tanzimat’ın Uygulanması ve Sosyal Tepkileri’, *Belleten*, 28 (1964), 361-83.
4. Cf. Y. Nagata, *Muhsin-zâde Mehmed Paşa ve Âyânlık Müessesesi* (Tokyo 1976), 1-12.
5. F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, trans. S. Reynolds (London and New York 1973), 724-25.
6. I. Wallerstein and R. Kasaba, ‘Incorporation into the World-Economy: Change in the Structure of the Ottoman Empire 1750-1839’, *Gelişme Dergisi*, 8/1-2 (1981), 546.

was in a position to lend money at high interest rates and act as a mediator between European merchants and indigenous producers through his tax-farming rights, enabling him to control foreign trade within the province.⁷ In his 1981 book based on the Islamic court registers (*kadı sicilleri*) of the judicial district of Manastır (present day Bitolj or Bitola) in western Macedonia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, B. McGowan has suggested that the existence of plantation-like farms on Ottoman lands did not always and everywhere imply a connection with foreign trade.⁸

In 1976, I myself published a volume of collected data concerning the *çiftlik*s held by *ayan* in western Anatolia, including those of the Karaosmanoğlu family, based on the Islamic court registers of the judicial district of Manisa.⁹ After scrutinising the data on the Karaosmanoğlu family *çiftlik*s contained in this book, İnalçık came to such conclusions as:

*Undoubtedly, the key mechanism which gave the âyâns their share of control in foreign trade in agricultural products was the mukataa-iltizâm system. Now we all agree on this point. The real struggle among the âyâns centered around the question of who was getting the mukataas in an area.*¹⁰

This conclusion seems to confirm Veinstein's and McGowan's ideas, following the assertion that:

*The net effect of these five studies has been, in my view, to demote the importance of investigating chiftlik agriculture and at the same time to reassert the importance of the fiscal struggle between imperial center and periphery...This tentative finding seems to be corroborated by recent work of Halil İnalçık, in which tax gathering, tax farming and tax allocation are emphasized as the institutional bases of the provincial ayan class.*¹¹

In his paper entitled 'On the *Çiftlik* Debate' delivered to the congress on 'Large-Scale Commercial Agriculture in the Ottoman Empire', Veinstein fully surveyed the historical background of the formation and development of *çiftlik*s, and reached such important conclusions as:

7. G. Veinstein, '«Âyân» de la région d'Izmir et commerce du Levant (deuxième moitié du XVIII^e siècle)', *ÉB*, 12/3 (1976), 75; H. İnalçık, 'The Emergence of Big Farms, *Çiftlik*s: State, Landlords and Tenants', in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont and P. Dumont (eds), *Contributions à l'histoire économique et sociale de l'Empire ottoman* (Leuven 1983), 124; B. McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade, and the Struggle for Land, 1600-1800* (Cambridge and Paris 1981), 171-72.
8. *Ibid.*, 135.
9. Y. Nagata, *Some Documents on the Big Farms (Çiftlik) of the Notables in Western Anatolia* (Tokyo 1976).
10. İnalçık, 'Emergence', 126.
11. McGowan, *Economic Life*, 171-72.

*If the existence of çiftliks and impact of export trade on the Empire are two certain phenomena, their connection is much more questionable. First, the genesis of çiftliks is much more complex than has frequently been assumed, and the role of internal factors, not deriving from market expansion must not be overlooked.*¹²

Here, he is criticising the theoretical framework suggested by the research to date, especially that of Braudel and Wallerstein, who asserted that the impact of foreign trade determined the foundation and development of large scale *çiftlik*-type farms. However, at the end of his paper, Veinstein confesses: “These first impressions would have to be confirmed by a more extensive study of the available historical sources, mainly the Ottoman ones”.¹³

Despite the above hypotheses, the empirical data on *çiftliks* and the *ayan* themselves have yet to be sufficiently accumulated, as McGowan had already mentioned: “...with respect to Ottoman rural history, archival research will provide most of the new facts and most of the surprises in the decades to come”.¹⁴ Therefore, the point I would like to make here is that the empirical research must focus on particular periods, regions, and family lines. In a paper delivered to an international congress held in Tokyo in 1989¹⁵ and in the book entitled *Tarihte Âyânlar: Karaosmanoğulları Üzerinde Bir İnceleme* (*Ayan in History: A Case Study on the Karaosmanoğlu Family*) and published in Turkish in 1997,¹⁶ I insisted that the management of *çiftliks* and *vakıf* activities must be taken into account as sources of *ayan* power in addition to tax-farming as opposed to the emphasis placed on the political importance of *iltizam* by conventional research.

Let me add that the data I have collected to date is by no means adequate and that I have had few opportunities since then to go to Turkey in an effort to collect more information; but, fortunately, Feridun Emecen has discovered some new documents concerning Hacı Mustafa Ağa's estate which was confiscated by the government,¹⁷ enabling us to deliver to the Turkish Historical Society an article introducing these source materials.¹⁸

Therefore, in this paper I would like to explore in greater depth the

12. G. Veinstein, ‘On the Çiftlik Debate’, in Ç. Keyder and F. Tabak (eds), *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East* (Albany, N.Y. 1991), 53. I am very thankful to E. Frangakis-Syrett for sending this book to me.

13. Veinstein, ‘Debate’, 53.

14. McGowan, *Economic Life*, 171.

15. Y. Nagata, ‘The Role of Âyâns in Regional Development During the Pre-Tanzimat Period in Turkey: A Case Study of the Karaosmanoğlu Family’, in *Urbanism in Islam: The Proceedings of the International Conference on Urbanism in Islam: Oct. 22-28, 1989* (Tokyo 1989), I: 166-91.

16. Idem, *Tarihte Âyânlar: Karaosmanoğulları Üzerinde Bir İnceleme* (Ankara 1997).

17. I wish to express my gratitude to Feridun Emecen here.

18. Y. Nagata and F. M. Emecen, ‘Bir Âyânın Doğuşu: Karaosmanoğlu Hacı Mustafa Ağa'ya Ait Belgeler’, *Belgeler*, 25/29 (2004), 1-72.

Karaosmanoğlu family in the light of these newly-discovered documents and data already contained in the above-mentioned source collections. However, this study may not be a typical case of *ayan*, because of the fact that the Karaosmanoğlu family was one of the most powerful *ayan* in the Empire, its political and socio-economic power being based on *iltizam*, *çiflik*, *vakıf* and such administrative offices as *voyvodalık*, *mütesellimlik* and *muhasıllık* in the Saruhan, Aydın and Karesi provinces, enabling it to place almost all the Aegean provinces under its political influence. On the other hand, the related documentation on the Karaosmanoğlu family clearly shows the multi-faceted activities being conducted by *ayan* during the period in question.

1. A Brief History of the Karaosmanoğlu Family¹⁹

Thanks to the research done by Ç. Uluçay, we have a general picture of the Karaosmanoğlu family and its political and socio-economic activities.²⁰ It may have originally been a Turkmen family which migrated from south-eastern Anatolia and settled in the village of Yayaköy located on the slope of a small mountain on the northern edge of the Manisa plain.²¹ During the sixteenth century, these Turkmens had been engaged in the transport with Aleppo, the centre of international trade at that time, and the Mediterranean port cities of Syria. For transport they used camels, called *tulu* in Turkish, which have one and a half humps, since this species is a cross between a female Arab camel with one hump and a male Bactrian camel with two humps.²²

From the second half of the seventeenth century, Izmir developed as a centre of the international trade between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. As the result of this western shift in the trade route, Turkmens gradually migrated to western Anatolia with their camels, as proved by the many *fermans* that were issued to bring Turkmen groups from central and western Anatolia back to south-eastern Anatolia and northern Syria.²³ According to an edict issued on 29 January 1738, some 100

19. For a more detailed history of this family, see Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 25-58.

20. M. Ç. Uluçay, 'Karaosmanoğullarına Ait Bazı Düşünceler', in *III. Türk Tarih Kongresi* (Ankara 1943), 243-60; idem, 'Karaosmanoğullarına Ait Bazı Vesikalar', *Tarih Vesikaları*, 2/9 (1942), 193-207, 2/10 (1942), 300-08, 2/12 (1943), 434-40, 3/14 (1944), 117-26.

21. Cf. S. Külahçioğlu, *XVIII. ve XIX. Yüzyıllarda Manisa ve Çevresi* (Ankara 1978), 23.

22. G. Kamo, *Katiku Bunkasi* [Cultural History of Domestic Animals] (Tokyo 1973), 673-75; R. W. Bulliet, *The Camel and the Wheel* (Cambridge, Mass. 1975), 231-34.

23. M. Ç. Uluçay, *XVII. Asırda Saruhan'da Eşkıyalık ve Halk Hareketleri* (İstanbul 1944), documents no. 186 (384-85), 199 (397-98), 209 (413), 217 (426-27), 224 (438), 227 (441-42), 228 (442-43) and 235 (452-53); İ. Gökçen, *16. ve 17. Asır Sicillerine göre Saruhan'da Yürük ve Türkmenler* (Manisa 1946), documents no. 52, 70, 77; A. Refik, *Anadolu'da Türk Aşiretleri* (İstanbul 1930), document no. 124. As a result of these Turkmens' migration to western Anatolia, the *Deveciyan Mahallesi* was formed in the city of Manisa, its inhabitants being engaged in the trade with Izmir by using their camels (Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 19, 33-34).

camels were being kept by the Karaosmanoğlu family near Yayaköy village.²⁴ In the list of Hacı Mustafa Ağa's estate we find 18 caravans composed of 148 camels,²⁵ and the list of Hacı Hüseyin Ağa's estate includes 13 caravans composed of 68 camels.²⁶ Such facts seem to show the family's Turkmen origin. Uluçay tells the story that one day, Kara Osman Ağa, who gave the family its name, ordered his followers to hang sheep livers in the villages around Manisa. All the livers rotted, except the one hung in Yayaköy village. This is why Osman Ağa selected this village as his summer residence.²⁷ This story shows that Yayaköy village was similar to the summer camps (*yayla*) of nomad families. Yayaköy became the family's home town, and most of its members chose to retire and live out their remaining years there.

Kara Osman Ağa was a wealthy peasant possessing several parcels of arable land and livestock in Yayaköy and its vicinity. He was also an influential figure in Manisa, having served as *kethüda* of the *mütesellim* of Saruhan. After his death in 1706, his eldest son, Hacı Mustafa Ağa, drew the Sultan's attention by sending soldiers, provisions, and animals to the battlefield against Iran as a *serdengeçti ağası*. He was appointed as the *mütesellim* of Saruhan in 1743, which he remained until 1755.²⁸ During this period he extended his political and social influence over the entire province through the acquisition of tax-farming rights and commercial activities, in addition to his political power.

Hacı Mustafa Ağa was executed in 1755 by order of the Sultan as a result of numerous written complaints about him sent to Istanbul by local inhabitants.²⁹ In spite of the government's repeated declarations refusing the Karaosmanoğlu family tax-farming rights and *mütesellimlik* appointments, it was not long after the death of Hacı Mustafa Ağa and his eldest son, Ataullah Ağa, that the government was forced to relent and grant the family these privileges, owing to the fact that during the two Russo-Turkish Wars, one beginning in 1768 and the other in 1787, the government needed the Karaosmanoğlu family to supply soldiers, provisions and animals to the battlefronts. Consequently Hacı Ahmed Ağa, the second son of Hacı Mustafa Ağa, and his eldest son, Hacı Hüseyin Ağa, were appointed as *mütesellim* of Saruhan successively from 1773 onwards. From that time on, the family governed the entire province, and its sphere of influence extended even to Aydın in the south and to Bergama in the north. When the *Sened-i İttifak* was negotiated in Istanbul in 1808 between Sultan Mahmud II and powerful *ayan* of Anatolia and the Balkans, the Karaosmanoğlu family was represented by Hacı Ömer Ağa, Hacı Hüseyin Ağa's cousin and the *voyvoda* of Bergama. This period marked the zenith of the power

24. Ibid., 25-26.

25. See the documents concerning Hacı Mustafa Ağa's estate introduced in this paper.

26. Y. Nagata, 'Karaosmanoğlu Hacı Hüseyin Ağa'ya Ait Bir Tereke Defteri', in *IX. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara 21-25 Eylül 1981: Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler* (Ankara 1988), 2: 1055-62.

27. Uluçay, 'Vesikalar', 2/9, 197.

28. Veinstein, 'Âyân', 79; Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 26-30.

29. Ibid.; Veinstein, 'Debate', 46-47.

and fame of the Karaosmanoğlu family. After the death of Ömer Ağa in 1812 and Hüseyin Ağa in 1816, Sultan Mahmud II decided to confiscate their property and destroy the family's influence in the region, in an attempt to establish sultanic hegemony over the province. However, the family succeeded in retaining its property after much effort, but wound up being seriously damaged by the Sultan's centralisation policy in the process.

In 1829, a rebellion led by Kel Mehmed occurred in Aydın province,³⁰ and in order to quell this disturbance, the government was again forced to appoint two members of the family, Küçük Mehmed Ağa and Hacı Eyüb Ağa, to the posts of *mütesellim* of Saruhan and *voyvoda* of the Tire district in Aydın province, respectively. It was in this way that the Karaosmanoğlu family's influence in these provinces was able to continue for a while longer. However, its position was becoming nearer to that of bureaucrat than *ayan*. For example, Hacı Eyüb Ağa's elder brother, Yakub Paşa, was appointed to the governorship of Rumeli in 1842. He died in 1854 in Jerusalem while still in office as the governor there. However, Hacı Eyüb Ağa's son, Mehmed Sadık Bey, died in 1862 while serving as *kaymakam* of Manisa.³¹ What this shows is that the family's influence continued, but became limited to Manisa province throughout the Tanzimat and later periods.

2. Political Relations Between Ayan and the Central Government

As explained above, most of the *ayan* had obtained such official titles as *ayan*, *voyvoda*, *mütesellim*, *muhassıl* and even *vali*. By means of such titles they were able to spread their influence over all their districts or provinces. As a result, from the last years of the eighteenth century almost all the provinces in Anatolia and the Balkans became divided and ruled by powerful *ayan*, like the Karaosmanoğlu and Çapanoğlu families in Anatolia, and Tepedelenli Ali Paşa and Alemdar Mustafa Paşa in the Balkans. They utilised their power to influence political issues involving the central government and to check its authority in their home provinces. In response, the sultans and the central government constantly promoted political reforms aimed at centralising the administrative structure of the Empire and establishing its authority in the provinces. However, state revenue to implement these reforms was insufficient because of the fact that *ayan* held control over the collection of taxes to be sent to Istanbul by virtue of their tax-farming rights. In response, the government introduced a policy of confiscating (*müsadere*) the property of *ayan* upon their deaths in order to fund its centralisation reforms. By granting to *ayan* such official titles as *voyvoda*, *mütesellim* and *vali*, the sultan put them in the position of *kapıkulları*, who were obliged to remit their properties to their master after their death. The following documents related to negotiations between the sultans and the Karaosmanoğlu family show this concept quite clearly.

30. M. Ç. Uluçay, *Atçalı Kel Mehmed* (Istanbul 1968).

31. Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 55-58.

...Karaosman-zadeler kadimî şevketlü kudretlü mehabetlü velinimeti-miz Efendimizin bende ve bende-zadeleri olup fermanber kullarından olduğundan maada merhum mumaileyhin (Hacı Ömer Ağa) altı nefer kerimesi ve iki evlâdı olup bunlar da şevketlü Efendimizin carîye ve kölesi olmağla haklarında inayet ve merhamet-i şahane erzan buyurularak işbu muhallefat bedeli iki bin beşyüz keseye müsaade ve ihsan-ı şahane buyurulsa hanedanlarını müceddeden fîruzan ve kendüleri çırağ ve ihya buyurulmuş olacağı ve uhde-i âcizanemde olan Bergama mukataası iltizamı dahi kendü vatanları olmağla kesb-i şeref ve itibar için sabıkî üzere mumaileyh Küçük Hüseyin Ağa kullarına ihalesine müsaade-i şahane erzan buyurulsa...

(Letter [şukka] sent by Aziz Paşa to Mahmud II after Hacı Ömer Ağa's death and dated 1 Rebiyülevvel 1228/March 4, 1813.)³²

...devlet hademesi olduğunuzdan cümlenizi Cabbar-zade misillü Der-i âliye'ye celb ve sipahi ve silâhdar ağalıkları gibi menasibda istihdam ederler. Sonra Aydın ve Saruhan sizlere haram olup iltizamat ile temettü ve intifa şöyle dursun, bu tarafta olan külliyyetlü emlâk ve akarâtınız bile il elinde kalup telef olur. Bu dakikayı güzelce mülâhaza edin, netice fena olur...

(Letter [mektub] sent from a bureaucrat in Istanbul to the family after Hacı Hüseyin Ağa's death and dated 9 Muharrem 1232/December 1, 1816.)³³

Whenever a member of the Karaosmanoğlu family died, the head of the family was required to inform Istanbul of it, because members of the family had often been appointed to official positions, such as the *mütesellimlik* of Saruhan or district *voyvodalık*, within the province or on its periphery. For example, when Hacı Ahmed Ağa, who had been the former *mütesellim* of Saruhan, died in 1793 at Yayaköy village, where he had retired, Hacı Hüseyin Ağa, then head of the family, informed the government of the death. In order to finance his *Nizam-ı Cedid* reform programme, Sultan Selim III ordered the family to pay about 5,000 *keses* (2,500,000 *guruş*) in lieu of confiscating its estate. However, as the *mütesellim* of Saruhan, Hacı Ahmed Ağa had already contributed soldiers and provisions to the battlefield. As this example shows, the inheritances of some family members were confiscated by the sultans for reasons other than criminal acts.

After the news of a family member's death arrived in Istanbul, the sultan quickly ordered the inheritance of the deceased to be confiscated. The information relating to the amount of the inheritance often was so exaggerated that the family had to enter into negotiations to reduce the amount of compensation to be paid to the sultan.

Confronted with the danger of confiscation by the sultan, some members of the family chose to endow large parts of their estates in the form of semi-family *vakıf*s,³⁴ which will be discussed later in this paper. It was in this way that the family

32. Ibid., 43.

33. Ibid., 51.

34. For the semi-family *vakıf*, see B. Yediyıldız, *Institution du vaqf au XVIII^e siècle en*

could avoid the confiscation of its estates. The most typical example of this was the *vakıf* set up by Küçük Mehmed Ağa, Hacı Hüseyin Ağa's cousin, who inherited the largest part of the latter's property. In 1816 Mehmed Ağa proceeded to construct such religious and public facilities as 1 mosque, 4 *medreses*, 7 *çesmes*, 6 roads and a bridge and then endowed them with 189 pieces of real estate for their maintenance. It is quite probable that he felt that Mahmud II's centralisation policy would be applied to him after the death of Hacı Hüseyin Ağa. Likewise, İbrahim Nazif Ağa, the grandson of Hacı Ömer Ağa, made an endowment of 207 pieces of real estate and 23,347 olive trees in 1813, then fled to Egypt.³⁵

3. The Karaosmanoğlu Family's Socio-economic Base

1) İltizam³⁶

Members of the Karaosmanoğlu family made enormous profits through farming a large number of *mukataas*. For example, Hacı Hüseyin Ağa made a profit of 84,000 *guruş* through tax-farming operations during 1816, 1.9 times the profit raised that same year from his eight *çiflik*s.

The following document shows Mustafa Ağa's estate and his relations with the people of Manisa province.

Data Relating to the Estate of Hacı Mustafa Ağa Confiscated by the Government in 1756³⁷

- (1) *Yaya karyesinde hareminde bağçede medfun zuhûr eden akçe: 271,250 guruş*
- (2) *Ba temessük ve temessüksüz olarak zimem-i nâsda olan akçesi: 342,000 guruş*
 - (a) *İzmirli Bulgaraki keferede 12,000 guruş: Mesfûr Bulgaraki İzmirli olup müflisen Frengistan'a fîrar etmiştir*
- (3) *Şehirlerde bulunan gayri menkul (mallarından bir kısmı):*
 - (a) *Manisa'da Göktaşlı mahallesinde konak*
 - (b) *Turgutlu'da büyük bir han (tahtanî 36 oda, fevkanî 45 oda)*
 - (c) *Manisa'da bazı mahallelerinde bulunan cüllah odaları, toplamı 73 oda*
 - (d) *Turgutlu'da bulunan penbe kozağı der-mağaza, toplamı 45 mağaza*
- (4) *Yayaköy'de bulunan hayvanlardan (bir kısmı): deve (148 re's), deveci merkebi (13 re's), deveci bargir (3 re's), deveci katırı (3 re's)*
- (5) *Marmaracık kazasında mevcut koza öşürü: 500 kantar*
- (6) *Ba defter-i müfredat zimem-i nâsda olan koza öşürü:*
 - (a) *Zimem-i nâsda Kırkağaç kantariyle ber vech-i tahmin koza, 500 kantar*
 - (b) *Sazköy'de Vakıf timarından hasıl olan koza öşürü, 235 kıyye*

Turquie: étude socio-historique (Ankara 1990), 23 and also Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 145-46 and n. 21.

35. Ibid., 160.

36. For detailed information on the family's *iltizam* activities, see A. Abdul Rahman and Y. Nagata, 'The Iltizam System in Egypt and Turkey: A Comparative Study', *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 14 (1977), 169-94; Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 59-97.

37. BOA, Baş Muhasebe, 3349.

- (c) *Azkır timarından hasıl olan koza öşürü*, 86.5 kıyye
- (7) *Yayaköy'de ve Manisa'da olan buğday ber vech-i tahmin*, 80,000 keyl-i İstanbulî
- (8) *Yeni işтира eylediği Durasallı Çiftliğinde mevcud (olanlardan bir kısmı): çift alâtı (10), saban demiri (15), Arab cariyesi (3), Gürcü sagır ve kebir cariyesi (4), Arab gulâmı (2), Gürcü gulâmı (1), penbe kozağı (200 kıyye), çeşitli hayvanlar (katır 3, kısırak 56, tay 9, tohum atı 1, camus 54, kara sığır 102, celeb camus 19, kara sığır tosunu 35, merkeb 25, erkek camus 20, kara sığır öküzü 14): toplam 339 re's*
- (9) *Yeni Çiftlikte mevcud (olanlardan bir kısmı): koza ber vech-i tahmin 90 yük, kölenin kozası 2 yük, kara kabuklu koza 10 yük, erkek ve dişi camus 143, kısırak maa tay 95, iğdiç bargır 1, kara sığır, erkek ve dişi 152, merkeb 10, çiftlik damında kara sığır öküzü 44, merkeb 8, camus 16: toplam 469 re's.*

Item (1) indicates that Mustafa Ağa himself or his sons secretly buried 271,250 *guruş* in the garden of his mansion at Yayaköy village, an amount equivalent to approximately 38% of the cash (700,000 *guruş*) that his eldest son, Ataullah Ağa, promised to pay to the government in order to have his father's inheritance returned.³⁸ It appears that the cash was buried in order to avoid confiscation; however, it might also have been earmarked for lending or for financing the purchase of tax-farming rights.

Item (2) shows the large amount of loans made by the family to individuals, whole villages and nomadic groups. The total amount of 342,000 *guruş* accounts for about 48% of the amount of compensation paid to the government in item (1). Not all of these loans were related to tax-farming; however, the data indicates that Mustafa Ağa had financial relationships with people which sometimes went beyond the regional framework of the province of Saruhan.

Items (8) and (9) indicate that Mustafa Ağa owned two *çiftlik*s, called Yeni and Durasallı; a rather large amount of cotton (102 *yüks* = about 17 tons) was produced there. However, items (3-d), (5) and (6) offer supporting evidence for what Veinstein argued in his 1976 article.³⁹ That is to say, this data seems to support his contention that Mustafa Ağa controlled regional commerce not as a landowner but as a tax-farmer. Mustafa Ağa collected a large amount of cotton as taxes in kind, which was stored in 45 warehouses in Turgutlu,⁴⁰ then apparently exported to Europe.

He owned eighteen caravans, each of which was made up of seven or eight camels, as shown in item (4). Furthermore, it is a well known fact that he owned a *han* called *Küçük Karaosmanoğlu Hanı* at the trading port of İzmir.⁴¹ He also owned some *frenkhanes* in the central quarter (*mahalle*) in İzmir, called *Frenk*

38. Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 30.

39. Veinstein, 'Âyân', 75.

40. This city, with Kırkağaç, was the collection centre for agricultural products like cotton and wheat yielded in the countryside of the district; *ibid.*, 73.

41. İ. Kuyulu, *Kara Osman-Oğlu Ailesine Ait Mimari Eserler* (Ankara 1992), 157-58.

mahalles, facing the Aegean sea coast. Their tenants included English, French, Venetian and Dutch merchants, including two consuls.⁴² The person identified as “İzmirli Bulgaraki kefer”, appearing in item (2-a), left debts of 12,000 *guruş* owed to Mustafa Ağa and fled to Europe. He seems to have been a mediator between Mustafa Ağa and European merchants.

Item (7) indicates that 80,000 *keyls* of wheat (approximately 2,050 tons) was stored in the warehouses in both Yayaköy and Manisa.⁴³ Only a part of this wheat seems to have been harvested from his *çiftlik*s, the major portion having been collected as tax in kind through tax-farming.

It was in this way that Hacı Mustafa Ağa was able to control regional production and distribution; however, there was one weak link, his tax-farming rights, which consisted of merely a sub-contract to the main contractor, who resided in Istanbul. İnalçık refers to such *ayan* sub-contractors as “on-the-spot operators”.⁴⁴ Mustafa Ağa was eventually dismissed from the *mütesellimlik* of Saruhan and then put to death over a dispute involving tax-farming rights.⁴⁵ To judge from this denouement alone, tax-farming does not seem to have been a very stable economic activity. Financially speaking, *sarrafs* played an important role in the tax-farming system and entailed enormous operating expenses. That is the reason why *ayan* tended to leave large debts to *sarrafs* upon their deaths.⁴⁶

2) Çiftlik⁴⁷

According to *tahrir defters* of 1531 and 1575, there was a large amount of marshland and pastureland on the plain of Manisa owing to flooding from the Gediz River, and many nomadic groups were grazing their herds there. Therefore, the plain was probably thinly populated at that time.⁴⁸ However, it was gradually developed through various means from the beginning of the seventeenth century, eventually becoming a rich plain filled with Karaosmanoğlu family *çiftlik*s by the middle of the eighteenth century. The family possessed about 50 *çiftlik*s on the Manisa plain and in the Bakır River basin of the Bergama region.⁴⁹ In this sense, the family should be regarded as a large-scale landowner; however, the share occupied by *çiftlik*s in the family's total wealth was not very large. For example, in Hacı Hüseyin Ağa's estate, totalling 2,164,391.5 *guruş*, the share of his 8 *çiftlik*s, including *tarlas*, *bahçes* and olive groves came only to about only 290,269 *guruş* (12.6%),

42. BOA, Baş Muhasebe, 41290.

43. Cf. L. Güçer, *XVII-XVIII. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan Alınan Vergiler* (Istanbul 1964), 31-32.

44. İnalçık, ‘Emergence’, 112; Veinstein, ‘Debate’, 46.

45. Idem, ‘Ayan’, 76; idem, ‘Debate’, 52; Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 27.

46. For an example, see ibid. 200-01 (Ek II).

47. For more detailed information on the family's *çiftlik*s, see ibid., 89-142.

48. Idem, ‘16. Yüzyılda Manisa Köyleri: 1531 Tarihli Saruhan Sancağına Ait Bir Tahrir Defterini İnceleme Denemesi’, *TD*, 32 (1979), 731-53; F. M. Emecen, *XVI. Asırda Manisa Kazası* (Ankara 1989), 157-221.

49. Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 202-03 (Ek III).

in contrast to such moveable assets as jewellery, gold and silver, and other precious goods kept in his mansions in Manisa and Yayaköy, which amounted to 341,205.5 *guruş* (14.8%); *hans*, houses, shops and factories in various cities, which amounted to 488,065 *guruş* (21.2%); and outstanding loans and profits from tax-farming, which totalled 800,315 *guruş* (34.8%). The share of *çiftlik*s in the total wealth of another family member, Yetim Ahmed Ağa, came to only 19%.⁵⁰ These figures show that the property held by *ayan* was by no means dominated by *çiftlik*s, but rather consisted of a complex portfolio of both moveable and immoveable assets.

Conventional research done to date on the historical process and the legal aspects of the formation of *çiftlik*s has suggested that in general *çiftlik*s were gradually formed through various processes during the seventeenth century.⁵¹ The origins of the Karaosmanoğlu family *çiftlik*s were just as diverse, but here only the case of *çiftlik*s reclaimed from pastureland will be discussed, since this process demonstrates a strong inter-relationship between the exercise of tax-farming rights and the emergence of *çiftlik*s. Let us take the example of a *mukataa* called “*Koru-ı Cebel-i Manisa*” or “*İlgin Korusu*”, which an influential bureaucrat in Istanbul, İvazpaşazade Halil Bey (later Paşa), contracted for life (*malikâne*) and Hacı Mustafa Ağa sub-contracted from him. *Koru* means ‘little forest’ in modern Turkish, but it indicated ‘pastureland’ in the Ottoman-Turkish language documentation of the time.⁵² That is to say, the name of this *mukataa* originated from ‘pastureland’, although some arable land and villages, even *çiftlik*s, had already appeared in it at the time Hacı Mustafa Ağa sub-contracted the collection of its taxes.⁵³

Since the revenue from this *mukataa* was decreasing by the year, Halil Bey sent an investigator to Saruhan province to record a *hududname*, which indicated that this *mukataa* covered the vast area centring around today’s Saruhanlı village, which is located in the central region of the Manisa plain (see Map 1). The reason for the decreasing revenue was that some residents of Manisa and its environs had purchased the usufruct (*tasarruf hakkı*) to the land under state ownership (*rakabe*),⁵⁴ and even some *çiftlik*s had been formed within the *mukataa*.⁵⁵ In addition, those who held the land around the *mukataa* as *timars* farmed out the collection of their taxes to Mustafa Ağa. Halil Bey’s investigator reported that the borderlines between different holdings had become unclear, stating that Hacı Mustafa Ağa himself, who had sub-contracted the tax-farming of both *Koru* and its surrounding *timar* lands for the last 34 years, had admitted that he did not know where the borderlines were.⁵⁶ Soon after, the Karaosmanoğlu family *çiftlik*s appeared in and around this *mukataa*.

50. Ibid., 177.

51. Veinstein surveyed previous research in detail in his article ‘Debate’, 37-47; H. Gerber, *Economy and Society in an Ottoman City: Bursa, 1600-1700* (Jerusalem 1988), 88-102; İnalçık, ‘Emergence’, 108-14.

52. Emecen, *Manisa Kazası*, 164, 206, 215, 216.

53. Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 99-102.

54. Ibid., 66-67, 99-102; cf. Gerber, *Economy and Society*, 99-102.

55. Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 89-94.

56. Ibid., 64-67; Veinstein, ‘Âyân’, 75, n. 23.

After Hacı Mustafa Ağa's death, his sons, Ataullah Ağa, Hacı Ahmed Ağa and Pulat Mehmed Ağa, continued to sub-contract the collection of many of the taxes imposed on villages on the Manisa plain. They owned five *çiftlik*s, called Durasallı, Yeni, Mihaili, Burunören, and Papaslı.⁵⁷ It is obvious that they inherited Durasallı and Yeni *çiftlik*s from their father, although it is uncertain where these two *çiftlik*s were located. However, the other three were all either within the area of Kuru or on its immediate periphery. This case clearly shows that the *çiftlik*s that existed in the early stage of the family's history were formed through tax-farming operations. The *çiftlik*s of Kara-ağaçlı, Koldere and Mütevellî, which were later owned by the family, were all concentrated in this vicinity (Map 1).⁵⁸

The size of a *çiftlik* differed from place to place according to its geographical layout. For example, *çiftlik*s in some parts of Bosnia province were small in scale, being restricted by the region's mountainous topography, as in the vicinity of Sarajevo, where some 912 private holdings (*arazi*) and *çiftlik*s were recorded in Saray, Visoko and Fojnica sub-districts (*nahiye*) alone.⁵⁹ On the other hand, some *çiftlik*s in south-western Anatolia were over ten thousand *dönüms* (1 *dönüm* = about 920 sq. metres) in size.⁶⁰ Compared with these figures, the Karaosmanoğlu *çiftlik*s should be regarded as of medium size. For example, Hacı Hüseyin Ağa's *çiftlik*s varied in size between about 600 and 1,700 *dönüms*. A *çiftlik*, however, usually included some pastureland for livestock raising and uncultivated land on its boundary, but these areas are seldom referred to in the relevant documentation; only arable land (*tarla*) was registered in the documents. A large number of domestic animals was usually raised on *çiftlik*s, as we observe in items (8) and (9) above concerning Hacı Mustafa Ağa's *çiftlik*s, although the data do not refer to the exact location of the pasture.⁶¹ Therefore, any one *çiftlik* could very well have been much larger than what was recorded in the documents.

The area of each parcel of arable land in a *çiftlik* was about the same as a peasant's traditional small holding of one *çift*, or 60-150 *dönüms*.⁶² It shows that the "*çift-hane system*" (small peasant landownership)⁶³ defined by İnalcık continued, despite the spread of *çiftlik*-type landholding or "plantation-like *çiftlik*s". The landscape of a typical *çiftlik* by no means resembled a sweeping panorama of cultivated land spreading out as far as the eye can see. Rather a typical *çiftlik* would consist

57. Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 67; F. Yılmaz, 'Kara Osman-oğlu Ataullah Ağa'ya Ait Malların Müsaderesi ve Bir Kira Defteri', *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi*, 5 (1990), 239-51.

58. Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 67-68.

59. Idem, *Materials on the Bosnian Notables* (Tokyo 1979), 1-2, and documents introduced in this book.

60. İnalcık, 'Emergence', 117; Nagata, *Documents*, 30-36.

61. A *çiftlik* often involved an *ağıl* with same name as the *çiftlik*. See idem, *Âyânlar*, 138.

62. Idem, *Documents*, 38-40, 42-43, 45-48, 50, 53; idem, *Âyânlar*, 232, 236-37, 238-39, 241-43.

63. H. İnalcık, 'Köy, Köylü ve İmparatorluk', in *V. Milletlerarası Türkiye Sosyal ve İktisat Tarihi Kongresi: Tebliğler*, M. Ü. Türkiyat Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi, İstanbul, 21-25 Ağustos 1989 (Ankara 1990), 1-11; idem, 'Emergence', 105-08.

of several parcels of cultivated land sparsely intermingled among pasture or fallow land.

As for arrangements between landlords and peasants, share-cropping was widely employed, as McGowan has pointed out in the case of western Macedonia.⁶⁴ H. Gerber, however, has confirmed the existence of “salaried agricultural labourers” from seventeenth-century Islamic court registers in the judicial district of Bursa.⁶⁵ On the Karaosmanoğlu family *çiftlik*s, arrangements varied between ‘slavery’ (*kölelik*), ‘service’ (*hizmetkârlık*) and share-cropping (*ortakçılık*), but share-cropping seems to have been the most widespread custom. Although ‘service’ involved ‘wages’, it does not seem to have been a form of ‘wage labour’ in the capitalistic sense of the term.⁶⁶

3) Çiftlik Management: The Case of Hacı Hüseyin Ağa⁶⁷

The list of Hacı Hüseyin Ağa’s estate describes in detail how he managed his *çiftlik*s. Hüseyin Ağa owned 8 *çiftlik*s in total and leased 3 of them to tenants for fixed rents. The documentation, however, does not contain any detailed information concerning these latter 3 *çiftlik*s, only that one was located on the Macune plain near Yayaköy and the other two near the city of Turgutlu. All three guaranteed a rather large income of 31,200 *guruş* from the *muaccele* (down payment) paid at the time the contract was concluded, but annual revenue from them amounted to only 2,311.5 *guruş* in total. Since the documents concerning the other 5 *çiftlik*s provide us with very extensive information, the following analysis will concentrate on them: namely, Ulu-bara, Kayışçılar, Burunören, Mihaili and Kara-ağaçlı.

At the head of the accounts relating to all 8 *çiftlik*s there appear such notes as “*müteveffa-ı mumaileyhin Manisa kazalarında ve Yayaköyü kurbunda mülkiyet üzere uhde-i tasarrufunda olan çiftlikatı*” (*çiftlik*s located in Manisa district and near Yayaköy village were possessed by the late Hüseyin Ağa as his private property).⁶⁸ This particular note shows that Hüseyin Ağa held his *çiftlik*s as if they were his private possessions, but we do not know if such possession had a legal basis or not; and he never endowed these *çiftlik*s as *vakıf*s.

To begin with, the arable land on the five *çiftlik*s in question can be divided into two types from the viewpoint of the use of the land: the first type was arable land directly exploited by the landlord, the other was land leased to free peasants (called *reaya* in the documentation), with the exception of Ulu-bara Çiftlik, where the second type did not exist. In the case of the first type, all of the harvest belonged to the landlord, while in the case of the second type, rent was paid in kind or in cash by the *reaya*. The total area covered by either type was approximately the same: the former covered 3,327 *dönüm*s (53%), the latter 2,911 *dönüm*s (47%). The *reaya* farming

64. McGowan, *Economic Life*, 171.

65. Gerber, *Economy and Society*, 103-04.

66. Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 117-19.

67. For detailed information on the management of Hacı Hüseyin Ağa’s *çiftlik*, see *ibid.*, 119-42.

68. *Ibid.*, 232 and 222 for another piece of arable land.

the second type paid 1/6 of the wheat harvest and 1/3 of the barley harvest as rent in kind, except on Kayışçılar, where rent was paid in cash at a fixed rate of 750 *guruş*. The landlord's income in 1816 from the second type was small (4,386 *guruş*) compared to 39,219 *guruş* from the first type.⁶⁹ Therefore, the problem arises as to why Hüseyin Ağa chose to lease to *reaya* almost half of his arable land, despite such a small yield, and who exactly were these "*reaya*". İnalçık has asserted that "wage labor" was introduced to the first type,⁷⁰ but there is no evidence that confirms such an assertion, except the fact that all of the harvest went to the landlord.

On Kara-ağaçlı Çiftlik, 19 out of the 20 *reaya* were Greeks.⁷¹ Some Western travellers' accounts also describe many Greeks working on the Karaosmanoğlu family *çiftlik*s.⁷² E. Frangakis-Syrett points to this fact, citing the account of S. P. Cockerel:

*However, the cultivators of the çiftlik could also be sharecroppers, like the Greeks who settled the lands of Karaosmanoğlu at the end of the eighteenth century.*⁷³

According to Ottoman-Turkish documents, most of these Greeks had recently migrated from the Morea peninsula, especially after the suppression of the Greek 'rebellion' of 1770 there.⁷⁴ These Greeks might have been searching for a new means of livelihood in the new world to which they migrated, and its landlords were searching for manpower to work their *çiftlik*s. Therefore, it is probable that Hüseyin Ağa leased to these Greeks (*reaya*) the second type of arable land on his *çiftlik*s, thus guaranteeing their livelihood in exchange for cultivating the first type without any direct compensation for that work. Although the documents do not directly confirm such a scenario, the English consul Francis Peter Werry reported in 1801 that "...tenant farmers, who, after working the *ayan*'s land for a certain number of days each week, were then free to cultivate their own plots".⁷⁵ In Bosnia there was the custom that tenants worked on *çiftlik*s several days without any pay, and the number of these days

69. Ibid., 125; İnalçık, 'Emergence', Table 1.

70. Ibid., 117.

71. Nagata, *Some Documents*, 46-48; idem, *Âyânlar*, 241-43.

72. E. F. Werry (ed.), *Personal Memoirs and Letters of Francis Peter Werry* (London 1861), 62; T. G. Keppel, *Narrative of a Journey Across the Balkans and in Asia Minor in the Years 1829-30* (London 1831), 296-99; B. Poujoulat, *Voyage à Constantinople* (Paris 1840), 95-96.

73. E. Frangakis-Syrett, *The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century, 1700-1820* (Athens 1992), 6.

74. Nagata, *Muhsin-zâde*, 64-65; idem, *Âyânlar*, 112, 125-27; idem, 'Greek Rebellion of 1770 in the Morea Peninsula – Some Remarks through the Turkish Historical Sources –', *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko (The Oriental Library)*, 46 (1988), 96-97.

75. Frangakis-Syrett, *The Commerce of Smyrna*, 6-7.

determined the rents they paid in kind as *reaya*: 1/9 to 1/5 of the harvest.⁷⁶ This form of working arrangement might be what is called '*angarya*' in Turkish.⁷⁷ However, in this case it would be difficult to equate *angarya* with what is usually referred to as *corvée*; the term rather indicates a simple contract concluded between landlords in search of manpower and *reaya* looking for work.

The most lucrative agricultural product in the *çiftlik* was cotton, which accounted for 45% of the total income from Hüseyin Ağa's five *çiftlik*s in 1816.⁷⁸ In this sense, Hüseyin Ağa may have been managing his *çiftlik*s with the cotton export market in mind. Nevertheless, cotton was cultivated on only three *çiftlik*s (Kara-ağaçlı, Ulu-bara and Kayışçılar), taking up about 8% (259 *dönüms*) of the total arable land (3,254 *dönüms*) on the five *çiftlik*s.⁷⁹ Therefore, Hüseyin Ağa's *çiftlik* management was hardly characterised by monoculture.⁸⁰ The Islamic court registers of Manisa indicate that monocultural agricultural production specialising in such colonial crops as cotton and madder-root appeared in the region only after the Commercial Convention of 1838; but even in this case, monocultural colonial crops were cultivated not on the *çiftlik*s of *ayan*, but rather on the farms of small peasants⁸¹ and landowners who were new to the region.⁸² *Palamut* (valonia) and tobacco were the main colonial crops grown in the mountain areas of the region during this period.

The management of *çiftlik*s by *ayan* should be considered in the light of trends both in international markets and in domestic affairs. As to why Hüseyin Ağa did not adopt a pattern of *çiftlik* management specialising in cotton production: first, Saruhan province was relatively close to Istanbul, so he was often ordered to deliver wheat and sheep to supplement the food scarcities in Istanbul or to supply troops on the front lines of the Russo-Turkish Wars.⁸³ Secondly, although the documents do not say so explicitly, it may be that he was forced to consider his own region's self-sufficiency from the standpoint of a local '*ayan*', that is, a leading member of the region's society who was obliged to respond to the demand of local cultivators for seed and domestic animals to be used in agricultural production.

Agricultural technology at the time still depended on traditional methods using primitive agricultural tools like the *karasaban*, *orak* and *döğen*. Land exploitation seems to have been based on a traditional crop rotation method leaving fields fallow

76. H. İnalçık, 'Bosna'da Tanzimat'ın Tatbikına Ait Vesikalar', *Tarih Vesikaları*, 1/5 (1942), 374, 380.

77. For details, Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 125-28.

78. İnalçık, 'Emergence', Table 1; Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 132.

79. Cf. Veinstein, 'Debate', 48.

80. Cf. İnalçık, 'Emergence', 119.

81. Veinstein, 'Âyân', 76. For the Arab provinces of the Empire, see Ç. Keyder, 'Introduction: Large-Scale Commercial Agriculture in the Ottoman Empire', in Keyder and Tabak (eds), *Landholding*, 3.

82. Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 180-90.

83. Ibid., 134, Table 8.

for periods of time.⁸⁴ This may be the reason why each parcel of arable land within a *çiftlik* approximated to the traditional one-*çift* holding mentioned above and why a lot of arable land was left uncultivated (*hâli*).⁸⁵ Veinstein points out:

*...the capacity for resistance and adaptability of the old agrarian structures and labor relationships was much greater in the Ottoman empire than has been imagined. And even when the çiftlik did exist, it did not necessarily indicate a radical change in those older structures.*⁸⁶

Given the climatic conditions of regions like Anatolia and the Balkans, where extensive agriculture on dry fields was dominant, we can conclude that the above-mentioned traditional agricultural technology was suitable, at least geographically; but this does not mean that the emergence of *çiftlik*s did not affect social life in the region. The Karaosmanoğlu family took advantage of the potential productivity of the Manisa plain through its *çiftlik* management, and many Greeks who migrated from the Morea peninsula and other places found their first means of livelihood in working on the family's *çiftlik*s and *ağl*s as tenants or shepherds, after which in the course of time some of them were able to improve their economic lots by becoming landed farmers.⁸⁷

4. Vakıf Activities

There were Karaosmanoğlu family members who invested the wealth they had accumulated from the rural area through tax-farming and *çiftlik*s in the urban sector. They lived in grand mansions (*konak*) in Manisa, Yayaköy, etc.,⁸⁸ and constructed or possessed houses, commercial buildings (*han*) and many kinds of shops and factories. The rent that accrued to the family from such real estate is not widely reported, but it is clear that the Karaosmanoğlu family gave back a part of its wealth to the region through endowment, in the form of *vakıf* activities.

Theoretically, a *vakıf* can be classified into two categories: an endowment out of definitely pious motivation and one made for the maintenance of a family's future subsistence. When considered in the light of such a classification, the *vakıf* activities of the Karaosmanoğlu family represented a definite mix of the two types of *vakıf*, since a part of the income collected as real-estate rent was used to maintain religious and public facilities built and endowed by family members, while another part of that income was reserved to support the donor's (*vâkıf*) family and

84. Ibid., 129-30; cf. P. Stirling, *Turkish Village* (New York 1965), 48; J. C. Dewdney, *Turkey* (London 1971), 123.

85. Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 129-30.

86. Veinstein, 'Debate', 53; Gerber, *Economy and Society*, 105.

87. Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 128.

88. For a detailed description of the family's *konak*, see C. MacFarlane, *Constantinople in 1828. A Residence of Sixteen Months in the Turkish Capital and Provinces; with an Account of the Present State of the Naval and Military Power, and of the Resources of the Ottoman Empire* (London 1829), 193.

its descendants. Modern historians have often criticised such *vakıf* activity on the part of *ayan* as the exploitation of religion for the sake of self-interest. I do not agree with this view, since both kinds of *vakıf* activity actually enabled mosques to be built, schools and libraries to be opened, and fountains (*çeşme*) to be installed. That is to say, regardless of the intention of the donors, *ayan* not only contributed to the development of education and culture in the region, but also to the preparation of the infrastructure of the region as a whole by building numerous *çeşmes*, *hans*, houses, shops and factories in the cities, and roads and bridges which served for the transporting of their rural produce to the city.

Tables 1 and 2 contain the data which I have collected from 17 *vakıf* deeds left by 9 members of the Karaosmanoğlu family. Table 1 is a list of religious and public facilities built by them⁸⁹ and includes 6 mosques, 9 *medreses*, a *hadis mektebi*, a *sıbyan mektebi*, a *kütüphane*, and many *çeşmes*, roads and bridges located throughout the region. Table 2 shows the family-held real estate assets endowed as *vakıf* in the cities and villages for the purpose of maintaining the facilities listed in Table 1.

The characteristic features of this data can be summarised as follows:

1. Landed property, such as *çiftlik*s and arable lands (*tarla*), with the exception of gardens and vineyards, was never endowed as *vakıf*, though such terms as “*mülkiyet üzere*” appear at the head of the documents concerning Hüseyin Ağa’s eight *çiftlik*s. This probably reflects the fact that the private ownership of agricultural land was never established *de jure*, and remained only *de facto*.
2. Some members of the family, like Hacı Osman Ağa, Ataullah Ağa’s son, Küçük Mehmed Ağa, Hüseyin Ağa’s cousin, and Küçük Hüseyin Ağa, Hacı Ömer Ağa’s son, fearing the potential danger of Mahmud II’s centralisation policy, made an endowment of most of their estates while they were still alive in order to minimise the amount of property that would be inherited by their children after their death.
3. As shown in Table 1, early members of the family, like Hacı Mustafa Ağa, Kara Mütesellim Mehmed Ağa and Pulat Mehmed Ağa, purchased or built such commercial buildings and houses in İzmir as *hans*, *frenkhanes*, *yahudihanes* and *rumhanes*. This fact shows that the family had been involved in foreign trade through that port city from an early stage of its history. For example, Hacı Mustafa Ağa endowed 2 *hans*, 8 *frenkhanes* and a *yahudithane* for the maintenance of a mosque he constructed in Yayaköy village. All of these *hans* and dwellings were built or purchased in such quarters (*mahalle*) along the Aegean Sea coast as Frenk, Cami-i Atik and Kasaphızır, and their tenants were Europeans, Greeks and Jews.⁹⁰

89. Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 144-45; M. Aktepe, ‘Manisa Âyânlarından Kara Osman Oğlu Mustafa Ağa ve Üç Vakfiyesi Hakkında Bir Araştırma’, *VD*, 9 (1971), 367-82; idem, ‘Kara Osman Oğlu Hacı Osman Ağa’ya Ait İki Vakfiyesi’, *VD*, 10 (1973), 161-74; idem, ‘Kara Osman Oğlu Mehmed Ağa bn. Hacı Ömer Ağa’, *VD*, 11 (1976), 57-66; O. Bayatlı, *Bergama’da Karaosman Oğulları: Hacı Ömerağa Oğlu Mehmetağa Vakfı* (İzmir 1957); cf. Kuyulu, *Mimari Eserler*.

90. BOA, Baş Muhasebe, 41290.

4. The *vakıf* activities of the family spread from the central cities of the region, such as Manisa, Turgutlu (Kasaba) and Bergama, to such peripheral towns as Akhisar, Kırkağaç, Kınık and even to villages. This course and period of *vakıf* expansion corresponds exactly with the process of the spread of the family's influence over the whole region. On the other hand, the construction of roads and bridges indicates the family's intent of establishing a transportation network to support the export of agricultural and livestock products from their *çiftlik*s to the cities. Most noteworthy in this context were such cities as Kırkağaç and Bergama.

Kırkağaç had been developed through the *vakıf* activities of Hüseyin Ağa and Küçük Mehmed Ağa. As shown in Table 1, they constructed religious and public facilities and endowed many shops and factories in that city, including 2 *hans*, one of which, Penbe Hanı, was a centre for the cotton trade in the region.⁹¹ MacFarlane noticed that it was in this *han* that Armenian merchants did business with Turkish and Greek producers in raw cotton.⁹² Küçük Mehmed Ağa, who inherited most of Hüseyin Ağa's estate, endowed this *han* in 1817.

Bergama, the capital of the ancient kingdom of Pergamon, was a fairly important city in western Anatolia during the second half of the sixteenth century,⁹³ but seems to have fallen into ruin during the seventeenth century. The Karaosmanoğlu family possessed many *çiftlik*s in its surrounding areas and reconstructed the city through the endowment of 134 houses, shops and factories. It was in this way that Bergama became the family's second urban centre after Manisa.⁹⁴

5. The real estate endowed as *vakıfs* in the cities consisted of houses, shops and small factories mainly for the convenience of the people's daily life. This fact shows that the family promoted urbanisation not with the intent of increasing industrial development, but rather to meet the needs of the people who had newly immigrated to the cities in the region and peasants and labourers working on the family's *çiftlik*s and *ağuls*. *Hans* were purchased or newly constructed by family members in all the cities of the region, indicating the emphasis placed on commercialising rural production.

91. Veinstein, 'Âyân', 73.

92. MacFarlane, *Constantinople*, 172-73.

93. L. T. Erder and S. Faroqi, 'The Development of the Anatolian Urban Network During the Sixteenth Century', *JESHO*, 23/3 (1980), 273, Map 1, 284.

94. Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 158-60, 203 (Ek III). Cf. O. Bayatlı, *Bergama'da Yakın Tarih Olayları – XVIII.-XIX. Yüzyıl* (Izmir 1957 [2nd reprint]), 29-53; Werry, *Personal Memoirs*, 62; MacFarlane, *Constantinople*, 152-73.

5. The Image of Ayan

Since many *ayan* held the title of *ağa*, the term *ayan* tends to be associated with the image of a man possessing political power, a large landowner ('*toprak ağası*' in contemporary Turkish) and a military figure. One of the reasons for the frequency of the title of *ağa* is that the central government intended to incorporate *ayan* into the establishment by appointing them as *kapıcıbaşı* in the Topkapı Palace during the early stages of their careers,⁹⁵ then promoting them to higher administrative offices, such as the *voyvodalık* and the *mütesellimlik*. For example, before he was appointed as *kapıcıbaşı* and was called an *ağa*, Hacı Hüseyin Ağa had been called an *efendi*, an honorific title for an *ulema*, since he was a *müderris* of a *medrese*. With the permission of the Sultan, he built a library of stone in the courtyard of the Muradiye Mosque located on the outskirts of Manisa and donated to his own collection of 1,000 manuscripts.⁹⁶ Most of Manisa was destroyed by fire immediately after World War I, but this library remained standing; and thanks to the more than 400 volumes of the Islamic court registers of Manisa preserved there,⁹⁷ Uluçay was able to make great progress in the study of the Karaosmanoğlu family's history.

Many books, beginning with the Koran, were often recorded in the lists of estates left by *ayan*, indicating their intellectual interests. For example, the 81 books possessed by Pulat Mehmed Ağa included such genres as *divan*, *tarih*, *tefsir*, *fıkıh*, *kanunname*, *fetva*, and *aktarlık*. Hacı Osman Ağa founded a library and donated to it many books which were prohibited from circulating outside the library. He also founded a *hadis* school with 12 rooms for children to come from the countryside and board and study free of charge.⁹⁸ Such examples add a definite cultural aspect to the conventional military and political image of *ayan*.

Conclusion

The case of the Karaosmanoğlu family was taken up here in an attempt to bridge the gap between theory and reality in the study of local elites, referred to as *ayan*.⁹⁹ This family started its rise to fame from the middle of the eighteenth century and succeeded in establishing overwhelming political and socio-economic supremacy in Manisa province. Under the 'patronage' of the family, rural Manisa developed in the agrarian fields of cultivation and animal husbandry, while the region's urban sector grew significantly, to the extent that "...like other parts of the Middle East,

95. İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Saray Teşkilâtı* (Ankara 1945), 406-07.

96. Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 45-46; S. Karaöz, *Manisa İl Kütüphaneleri* (Ankara 1974), 27.

97. M. Ç. Uluçay, 'Manisa Şer'iye Sicillerine Dair Bir Araştırma', *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, 10 (1953), 287-88.

98. Manisa Şer'iye Sicil Defteri, 240, 40-43; Nagata, *Âyânlar*, 149-50; for examples of Bosnian notables, see idem, *Materials*, 86-87, 109-11, 119-23.

99. Veinstein, 'Debate', 47.

*Turkey was distinctly more urbanized than most of Europe and North America in the 18th and early 19th centuries”.*¹⁰⁰

The Karaosmanoğlu family’s socio-economic strength stemmed not from a single institution, like *iltizam*, but rather a multi-faceted portfolio of *iltizams*, *çiftlik*s and *vakıf*s, which is why the socio-economic influence of the family continued through the Tanzimat and subsequent periods, despite barriers erected by the centralisation policy of the central government. That is to say, although that policy weakened the family’s political power stemming from its tax-farming rights, its socio-economic influence based on *çiftlik* management and *vakıf* activities did not waver. Therefore, the family’s power and influence were composed of a dual structure in the shape of the concentric circles shown in Map 2: the outer circle representing a superficial source of power based solely on the political vicissitudes of tax-farming rights, the narrower inner circle describing a firmer socio-economic sphere secured by both landholding (*çiftlik*) and religious foundations (*vakıf*).

The empirical data on *ayan* presented here on the basis of information about the Karaosmanoğlu family are, however, only a starting-point for the research that still needs to be done. Therefore, the conclusions presented here still await further verification through the accumulation of more historical sources of both Ottoman and foreign origins.

Finally, I would like to suggest one way in which this subject could be applied to the area of comparative world history, for there are definite parallels in the history of Japan and China. It is a well-known fact that wealthy Japanese peasants, called *gono*, emerged in many regions of that country from the latter half of the eighteenth century onwards. This class of cultivators was instrumental in enlarging the sphere and scale of commodity production of cotton and rice, establishing food-processing industries for soya-bean paste (*miso*) and rice beer (*sake*), and developing a cottage textile industry. *Gono* also played an important role in popularising the culture of the capital city of Edo in rural areas. As to their political role, they were first involved in the establishment of the *Tokugawa Shogunate* regime as chiefs of village communities, then after the Meiji Revolution, the government appointed some of the more powerful *gono* as prefectural governors in the place of the feudal lords (*daimyo*) of the *Tokugawa* period.

In China, also, notables called *qiangshen* played a very important role in provincial society from the second half of the seventeenth century up to the Nationalist Revolution of 1912. They had originated from minor bureaucrats or retired bureaucrats living in the provinces and rose to power through the production and marketing of such commodities as tea, rice and cotton, thus playing a leading role in China’s modernisation. The word ‘gentry’ is often translated into Chinese as *qiangshen*.


These historical facts show that ‘provincial elites’ came to power during the early modern period in Japan and China and challenged the central governments that were in power at that time. While there are definite pitfalls involved in compar-

100. C. Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914* (Chicago and London 1980), 34.

ing *gono* and *qiangshen* with *ayan* of the Ottoman Empire, since the social, cultural and historical backgrounds of each country were quite different, it is still interesting and maybe even necessary to consider carefully the *ayan* of the Ottoman Empire in a framework of comparative 'gentry studies' in world history.

(Meiji University)


Map 1: Manisa province in the 19th century



* Underlined are çiftliks of the Karaosmanoğlu family

1/500 000

Map 2: Aegean province in the 19th century



1/1 500 000

Table 1: List of religious and public facilities built by the Karaosmanoğlu family

<i>Donors*</i>	<i>Facilities</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Place</i>
Mustafa Ağa (1747) (1751) (1752)	Mosque Medrese Sıbyan school	1 1 1	Yayaköy Yayaköy Manisa/Çapraslar-ı sagır
Kara Mütesellim Mehmed Ağa (1790)	Mosque Medrese	1 1	Manisa/Bedesten-1 atfık Manisa/Bedesten-1 atfık
Pulat Mehmed Ağa (1791) (1793)	Çeşme Kuyu (well) Döşemeli yol (paved road) Bridges Bridge Döşemeli yol	1 7 1 ? 1 1	Manisa/Palamut Pazarı Akbaldır Deresi Manisa (suburb) Manisa (suburb) On the Nifçayı Büyük köprü – Cevizlik
Osman Ağa (1793) (1798)	Hadis school Library Sebil (fountain) Çeşme (fountain) Bridge Bridge Kuyu	1 1 1 2 1 1 15	Manisa Manisa Manisa Manisa On the Göksu On the Kumçayı -----
Hüseyin Ağa (1804)	Medrese Mosque Medrese Fountain	1 1 1 23	Manisa/Çaşnigir Camii Kırkağaç/Orta Cami Kırkağaç/Orta Cami Kırkağaç and its vicinity
Mehmed b. Ömer Ağa (1804)	Sebil	1	Bergama/Suk-ı Sultani
Küçük Hüseyin Ağa (1814)	Medrese Mosque Mosque	1 1 1	Bergama/Kadı Hayrettin Bergama/Kadı Hayrettin Süleyman Village
İbrahim Nazif Ağa (1813)	Dershane (school)	1	Bergama
Küçük Mehmed Ağa (1817)	Mosque Medrese Medrese Medrese Medrese Çeşme Döşemeli yol Bridge	1 1 1 1 1 7 6 1	Kayacık Kayacık Kırkağaç Kırkağaç Gelembe Palamut (nahiye) Yayaköy and its vicinity Vicinity of Yayaköy

* Numbers in parentheses show the dates of *vakıf* deeds.

Table 2: Some immoveables donated by the Karaosmanoğlu family and their location

<i>Cities</i>	<i>İzmir</i>	<i>Manisa</i>	<i>Turgutlu</i>	<i>Kırkağaç</i>	<i>Akhisar</i>	<i>Bergama</i>	<i>Kınık</i>	<i>Villages</i>	
<u>Immovables</u>									<u>Total</u>
Han	1	7	4	2	1	6	2	-	23
Frenkhane	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
Rumhane	22	6	6	-	-	2	-	1	37
Yahudihane	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	4
Konak/Menzil	2	2	2	-	-	2	-	-	8
Berber	-	2	8	5	1	2	1	3	22
Hamam	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	3
Kahvehane	-	6	11	2	-	1	-	2	22
Şerbethane	2	4	7	1	-	4	3	-	21
Bakkal	-	8	4	20	-	16	1	35	84
Börekçi	-	3	11	2	-	-	2	4	22
Duhancı	-	2	1	2	-	-	2	-	7
Etmekçi	-	5	5	2	1	5	7	7	32
Kasap	-	-	-	1	-	7	-	-	8
Aktar	3	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	5
Yemişçi	-	2	-	1	-	4	1	-	8
Abacı	-	-	2	6	-	1	-	-	9
Bezzaz	-	7	1	3	-	1	-	-	12
Derzi	-	-	-	2	-	15	-	-	17
Mutaf	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	5
Yorgancı	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	3
Boyacı	-	-	2	4	-	3	-	-	9
Çizmeci	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	-	6
Demirci	-	-	-	3	-	17	-	1	21
Doğramacı	-	-	-	1	1	7	2	-	11
Keresteci	-	2	-	6	-	1	-	-	9
Mumhane	1	-	-	3	-	2	1	-	7
Nalband	-	2	2	1	-	3	-	-	8
Pabuççu	-	-	2	25	3	27	-	-	57
Saraç	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Yağhane	-	4	3	-	2	3	1	15	28
Değirmen	3	5	6	17	1	1	-	23	56
Total	48	68	78	113	13	138	23	93	574

* Shops of unknown occupation are not included in this table.

**EXPORTING GRAIN FROM THE ANATOLIAN SOUTH-WEST:
THE POWER AND WEALTH OF TEKELİOĞLU MEHMED AĞA
AND HIS MAGNATE HOUSEHOLD**

Suraiya FAROQHI

About ninety per cent of the Ottoman population, the exact percentage remaining unknown and doubtless varying from one century to the next, lived in the rural world. Most of these people were peasants, while others were nomads and semi-nomads; in certain regions of Anatolia, the latter must have formed an appreciable percentage of all the inhabitants. Yet as documentation both Ottoman and foreign concentrates on the towns, this overwhelming majority of the population has generally received short shrift in the historical literature.

Between the 1950s and the late 1970s there was some interest among Ottomanist historians in pre-nineteenth century demographic developments, and while the relevant studies tended to concentrate on towns, they did not ignore the rural population. These pieces of research typically foregrounded the question of to what extent, and during which years, the general population expansion of the sixteenth century affected the Ottoman lands as well.¹ Conversely, the seventeenth century being known for population stagnation and sometimes even decline on a Mediterranean-wide basis, some historians have also asked themselves how this particular development translated into the Ottoman world, especially that of the Balkans.² In this context, studies have been undertaken that tackle the difficult question of whether the food supply as recorded in taxation-related documents was sufficient to feed the villagers concerned, and whether population increase under the conditions of 'traditional agriculture' necessarily led to an uneconomic sub-division of holdings and the cultivation of ever more marginal lands.³

1. Ö. L. Barkan, 'Tarihi Demografi Araştırmaları ve Osmanlı Tarihi', *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, 10 (1951), 1-26; idem, 'Essai sur les données statistiques des registres de recensement dans l'Empire ottoman aux XV^e et XVI^e siècles', *JESHO*, 1 (1958), 9-36; L. Erder, 'The Measurement of Preindustrial Population Changes: The Ottoman Empire from the 15th to the 17th Century', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 11/3 (1975), 284-301.
2. B. McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600-1800* (Cambridge and Paris 1981).
3. H. İslamoğlu-İnan, *State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire: Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia During the Sixteenth Century* (Leiden 1994).

In the background of this issue, there has always been the intent to question the widespread assumption that Ottoman rule brought economic stagnation and isolation to the Balkan countryside particularly. In the recent past, this issue has been much debated, especially in Bulgaria and Greece, with marked political overtones. Sometimes claims have been made that there was a catastrophic decline of the earlier population accompanied by a large-scale immigration of Turkish nomads.⁴ Many Ottomanists working with Ottoman archival data have attempted to establish realistic figures for both population losses, which were often due to plague epidemics rather than to war, and also for immigration from Anatolia. That late medieval populations are so poorly documented has made it particularly easy for historians with nationalist agendas of one kind or another to make claims that fit in well with their respective world views.

In this context of supposed 'stagnation and decline', the question of large landholdings, the so-called *çiftlik*s, has long played a major role. In the 1950s it was assumed that the emergence of the coerced labour that often worked these landholdings should be placed in the context of the so-called second serfdom, that is, the institution of peasant servitude in eastern Central Europe, where it had previously been unknown, in order to facilitate the production of grain for a Western European market.⁵ This idea was discredited with respect to Eastern Europe after it had been shown that peasant servitude was instituted in countries where the exportation of grain was as yet unknown, such as sixteenth and seventeenth-century Russia. In the Ottoman context, it was demonstrated that *çiftlik*s were often located close to the Black Sea, that is, in an area that before the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) produced only for the Ottoman administration and capital, and in no way for export.⁶ Many *çiftlik*s apparently were instituted so that the holders could skim off peasant surpluses, without necessarily aiming at export or even at sale on the domestic market. For such grain could equally well be used to feed large retinues and establish the owner in a position of local power. That the people who acquired such *çiftlik*s were often in a position to manipulate the taxation process further has strengthened the now dominant view that *çiftlik*s were usually of political and not of economic origin.⁷

All this is reasonable enough. Certainly Anatolian magnates of the eighteenth century acquired their holdings by means of tax-farming contracts, or because they

4. For a critical discussion of this debate, see A. Zhelyazkova, 'Islamization in the Balkans as a Historiographical Problem: The Southeast European Perspective', in F. Adanır and S. Faroqhi (eds), *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography* (Leiden 2002), 229-35.
5. T. Stojanovich, 'Land Tenure and Related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 1600-1800', *The Journal of Economic History*, 13 (1953), 398-411.
6. McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe*, 76-77.
7. H. İnalcık, 'Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700', *ArchOtt*, 6 (1980), 283-337 and idem, 'The Emergence of Big Farms, Çiftlik: State, Landlords and Tenants', in J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont and P. Dumont (eds), *Contributions à l'histoire économique et sociale de l'Empire ottoman* (Leuven 1983), 105-26.

were able to mobilise the necessary support at the Ottoman court permitting them to acquire especially productive lands. However, this observation does not contradict the fact that by the last quarter of the eighteenth century, and certainly in the early 1800s, Ottoman regions with easy access to the Mediterranean were drawn into the European market. Not that such a pull had been completely unknown in previous centuries, but at this particular time, the force of French, British or Habsburg demand made itself felt with an intensity that was quite novel. Thus, holdings acquired by political means became even more valuable because of the market nexus. In the present paper we will discuss such a case, which is all the more remarkable as the area in question had not previously played any major role in international trade.

A Remote Place on the Mediterranean Coast

Before the advent of citrus cultivation in the 1950s, and later of tourism, what was then the little town of Antalya, and the Anatolian South-West in general, were at least in most years rather out-of-the-way places of which not much notice was taken at the centre of the Ottoman Empire.⁸ Even the detailed tax registers (*mufassal*) that normally inform us about the numbers, religious backgrounds and obligations of sixteenth-century taxpayers have all been lost. As a result we are limited to bits of rather summary information as relayed in an abridged (*icmal*) register of 1530.⁹ Antalya's harbour had been important in Seljuk times but the town was marginalised after the Ottoman conquest of Egypt and Rhodes (1517 and 1521), when the trade route passing from Cairo to Bursa and Istanbul became entirely maritime.

To a considerable extent Antalya lived off its gardens, and Evliya Çelebi had good things to say about them when he passed through the area in 1671. He praised the high-quality lemons and other citrus fruit grown there, of whose medicinal properties he was fully aware. Moreover, the so-called garden of Tekeli Paşa even

8. A register of pious foundations in the archives of the Tapu ve Kadastro Genel Müdürlüğü in Ankara (TK 567, undated but compiled after the death of Süleyman Kanunî, fols 13a and 16a) contains references to two theological schools (*medreses*) in all likelihood situated in Antalya: Mevlâna Muhiyeddin and Sultan Hatun. In 981/1573-74 a teacher who was giving lessons in rural Finike and Elmalı was ordered to teach within the fortress walls of Antalya instead, so there must have been an institution able to accommodate him: BOA, Mühimme Defterleri no. 24, p. 90, no. 242.

For information on the town in the late 1940s see X. de Planhol, *De la plaine pamphylie aux lacs pisidiens: nomadisme et vie paysanne* (Istanbul and Paris 1958), 380-89 and J.-P. Roux and K. Özbayrı, *Les traditions des nomades de la Turquie méridionale, contribution à l'étude des représentations religieuses des sociétés turques d'après les enquêtes effectuées chez les Yürük et les Tahtacı* (Istanbul and Paris 1970). This latter book, in spite of its title, also contains a good deal of information on methods of making a living in the rural areas to the west of Antalya.

9. İ. Binark *et alii* (eds), *166 Numaralı Muhâsebe-i Vilâyet-i Anadolu Defteri (937/1530), Hüdâvendigâr, Biga, Karesi, Saruhân, Aydın, Menteşe, Teke ve Alâiye Livâları* (Ankara 1995), 575. According to this register the town contained 701 taxpayers.

contained date palms, then as now at the northernmost limit of their distribution. In addition the town with its numerous khans must have served as a local market for the nomads who visited the coastal plains in winter.¹⁰

Yet the port remained functional, though small by Evliya's standards, and occasionally throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Antalya, which French traders called the *échelle* of 'Satalia', was visited by traders subject to the Bourbon kings.¹¹ Some of these visitors, who bought small quantities of wax, leather and carpets, were optimistic enough to induce the French state to appoint a consul, who during the 1600s and 1700s was in residence at least during certain years. But business remained disappointing. In part this was because of the widespread incidence of malaria from which this and other coastal plains of the Mediterranean region suffered during the summer. In consequence, the attempt to establish a regular presence of French traders was ultimately given up.

Other travellers were rare but not totally absent: thus Hans Wild, an ex-soldier and ex-slave from Nuremberg, at some time between 1604 and 1613 spent time in this place after a shipwreck. However, as he was seriously ill during the few weeks he stayed in Antalya, his opportunities for collecting information were doubtless limited; but he did notice the abundance of citrus fruit and the Ottoman custom of transporting lemon juice in 'barrels' – terracotta vessels would have been a more adequate description. He also noted the trade in carpets brought into the town "from elsewhere" and the sale of used copperware to be transported to Cairo for 'recycling'.¹² Later in the century, the Dutch artist Cornelis de Bruyn, while on his travels in the Ottoman Empire, passed through Antalya and produced what is probably the oldest surviving view of the port.¹³

In 1811-12, the Irishman Francis Beaufort, hydrographer and naval expert, visited the town and included a short description of it in his book.¹⁴ This experienced geographer mentioned the stout walls of the city, which once had aroused the admiration of Evliya Çelebi, adorned with inscriptions from Roman times and two coats of arms as well as a 'barbarous' medieval Latin text, witnesses to a 'Frankish' presence already noted by de Bruyn. The streets were arranged in parallel tiers on the rising ground, rather like seats in a theatre. While Beaufort was not able to visit the inner walled part of the town, he counted five high minarets, which presumably corresponded to the number of Friday mosques. His informants told him that the population amounted to 8,000 people, to my knowledge one of the very few

10. *Evliya Çelebi Seyahatnamesi*, 10 vols (Istanbul and Ankara 1314/1896-97 to 1938), 9: 285-90.

11. R. Paris, *Histoire du commerce de Marseille*. Vol. 5: *Le Levant, de 1660 à 1789* (Paris 1957), 435-36.

12. J. Wild, *Reysbeschreibung eines Gefangenen Christen Anno 1604* (Stuttgart 1964 [reprint]), 246-47.

13. C. de Bruyn, *Reizen van Cornelis de Bruyn door de vermaardste Deelen van Kleinasië...* (Delft 1698), 383-84 and appended illustration.

14. F. Beaufort, *Karamanien oder Beschreibung der Südküste von Klein-Asien*, trans. F. A. Ukert (Weimar 1821), 80-84.

early estimates that has come down to us.¹⁵ Two-thirds of the inhabitants were supposed to have been Muslims, while the remainder were Orthodox Turcophone Karamanlis.¹⁶

Antalya's economic importance increased briefly in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. During those years, the wars that accompanied the French Revolution and Napoleon's rise and fall led to an enormous increase in the demand for grain.¹⁷ With prices so high, it became an attractive proposition to smuggle wheat and barley from the Anatolian peninsula to the islands, where the grain was picked up by local or European shippers. Greek traders from Hydra and Psara were particularly assiduous in this business. Merchants ran the risk of putting in wherever their small boats could find shelter, even though the unlicensed exportation of wheat, barley or rice from Ottoman territory was strictly forbidden, and all types of grain merchants were strictly controlled.¹⁸

While one might assume that the exporters of these comestibles must have avoided Antalya, where their illegal activities were most easily detected, this was not always the case: Beaufort tells us that local administrators typically received a cut, and therefore the port of Antalya, when he visited in 1812, was full of boats loading grain for Malta and Messina. In addition, we may surmise that the farmers of customs dues wanted as high a turnover as possible, and therefore abetted the grain merchants. The money that was earned through this trade led to a significant demand for items produced outside south-western Anatolia, and some of these goods did pass through the local port and pay customs duties, as evidenced by a surviving register.¹⁹ This document mentioned some raw silk, which throughout the nineteenth century alimented a minor local industry. In addition, Antalya traders purchased cottons from Egypt and Cyprus; the ports of both these places may have relayed textiles produced in their respective hinterlands as well as imports from Great Britain. Soap came in from Crete and Palestine, two provinces that had been noted for this product from the eighteenth century in the Cretan case, and even from the sixteenth where the Jerusalem area was concerned.²⁰ In addition, Beaufort mentioned fabrics, ironware and other manufactured goods from England and the

15. *Evliya Çelebi*, 9: 286-88 reports 3,000 houses within the walls but does not estimate the population *extra muros*, apart from the Orthodox inhabitants, who supposedly accounted for 190 households.

16. *Ibid.*, 287-88 also says that there were five mosques within the walled city and eleven in the town as a whole. He also noted the presence of "Urum keferesi" who knew no Greek but spoke an "invalid" (*batıl*) dialect of Turkish.

17. Beaufort, *Karamanien*, 83; T. Stoianovich, 'The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant', *The Journal of Economic History*, 20 (1960), 234-313.

18. S. Aynural, *İstanbul Değirmen ve Fırınları* (Istanbul 2001).

19. S. Faroqhi, 'Ondokuzuncu Yüzyılın Başlarında Antalya Limanı', in *VIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi* (Ankara 1981), 2: 1461-71.

20. Y. Triantafyllidou, 'L'industrie du savon en Crète au XVIII^e siècle', *ÉB*, 1975/4, 75-87; A. Cohen, *Economic Life in Ottoman Jerusalem* (Cambridge 1989), 96-97; *idem*, *The Guilds of Ottoman Jerusalem* (Leiden 2001), 168 points out that in the eighteenth century, large quantities of soap were sent from Jaffa to Anatolia.

Germanies, which arrived by caravan from Izmir.²¹ Money entered the town in significant quantities, as grain producers wanted to be paid in cash rather than in goods. However, it is likely that with the depression that followed the end of the wars in 1815, foreign demand for Anatolian grains declined considerably and the town must have returned to its former 'introverted' state.

Local Wealth and Power

The income generated by grain-smuggling enriched some of the locals. Merchants apart, the most likely candidates were the local aides of the provincial governors, who in the eighteenth century normally represented Ottoman power on the local level. Of special importance was a family known as the Tekelioğulları. Not much is known about its history; whether by choosing this name, the heads of this provincial 'political household' wanted to link up with the princely family that had governed this region in pre-Ottoman times, remains unknown.²² In 1211/1796, Mehmed Ağa b. Hacı Osman, the most prominent member of this dynasty, who possessed the rank of an imperial chief gatekeeper (*serbevvaban-ı âli*) and operated as a 'commander' (*salar*) in the area, founded a mosque known as the Müsellim Camii.²³ Local tradition also attributed to this dignitary Antalya's large-scale and more imposing Mehmed Paşa Camii. But architectural investigation has resulted in the conclusion that the mosque in its core dates from the seventeenth century at the very latest. Presumably it is identical with the building that Evliya Çelebi knew under the name of 'Tekeli Paşa'.²⁴ Thus at the very most, Mehmed Ağa in the late eighteenth century could have sponsored repairs. A surviving foundation document made out by this personage mentions only the Müsellim/Mütesellim mosque.²⁵

Thus, albeit on a more modest level, the Tekelioğulları did in Antalya what more prominent local notables such as the Karaosmanoğulları were doing in the region of Izmir and Manisa. While mosques sponsored by members of the Ottoman dynasty at this time were almost never built in the provinces, local magnates attempted to

21. Beaufort, *Karamanien*, 83-84.

22. On the history of this dynasty compare B. Flemming, *Landschaftsgeschichte von Pamphylien, Pisidien und Lykien im Spätmittelalter* (Wiesbaden 1964). In Ottoman times the area was known as the *sancak* of Teke, part of the *vilâyet* of Anadolu.

Linking up with pre-Ottoman Anatolian dynasties was apparently a strategy of 'ennoblement' practiced by a few Anatolian magnates. Thus, a contemporary of the Tekelioğulları called himself Çandaroglu after the famous fifteenth-century dynasty: İ. H. Uzuncarşılı, 'Nizam-i Cedid Ricalinden Kadı Abdürrahman Paşa', *Belleten*, 35 (1971), 245-302 and 409-51; see p. 255. I am most grateful to Jun Akiba (Tokyo) who has pointed out this extremely well-documented article – the Internet makes it possible.

23. *Türkiye Vakıf Abideleri*. Vol. 1: *Adana, Adıyaman, Afyon, Ağrı, Amasya, Ankara, Antalya, Aydın* (Ankara 1972); compare p. 535 for the inscription. The Mehmed Paşa Camii is discussed on p. 546.

24. *Evliya Çelebi*, 9: 287.

25. *Türkiye Vakıf Abideleri*, 1: 546 calls it Müsellem, while Uzuncarşılı uses the name of Mütesellim.

fill the gap. In the Arab lands this 'vice-regal' charity was practised on a larger scale and has recently been well studied: thus, the Calilis of Mosul or the 'Mamluk' governors of Baghdad left their mark on the relevant townscapes by sponsoring extensive religious buildings and public utilities.²⁶

However, at the end of his life, Tekelioğlu Mehmed Ağa, and later on his sons, seem to have overreached themselves when they 'dealt with' Kadı Abdürrahman Paşa, a refugee from the political struggles in the capital that accompanied the deposition of Selim III (r. 1789-1807), the brief reign of Mustafa IV (r. 1807-08) and the advent of Mahmud II (r. 1808-39). Kadı Abdürrahman Paşa, whose family had originated from an area adjacent to the home of the Tekelioğulları, had been one of the 'strong men' upon whom Selim III relied when he instituted the new-style army known as the *Nizam-ı Cedid*. While the Tekelioğulları concentrated on south-western Anatolia, Kadı Paşa had much wider-reaching ambitions: his service to Selim III led him to the Balkans and also to Istanbul. But after the Sultan's fall, Kadı Paşa was forced to flee, ultimately seeking refuge in a cave close to his home town of İbradı. But he was soon betrayed by the locals, who feared the wrath of Tekelioğlu Mehmed Ağa, an old enemy of his. Given the requisite orders by the government of Mustafa IV, the Tekelioğulları killed this formerly prominent dignitary and sent his severed head to Istanbul. And while they had no official authority to assassinate the latter's two sons as well, they did so anyway (1808). Afterwards the Tekelioğulları refused to surrender the considerable wealth of Kadı Paşa and his sons on which they had managed to lay their hands, using considerable brutality in order to discover its hiding-places (1809).²⁷

Tekelioğlu Mehmed died while this conflict was still being fought out, but his son and successor İbrahim was in turn killed on the orders of Mahmud II, and so was one of his relatives, known as Mustafa of Cairo (or the Egyptian). As was usual in such cases, the properties of the family were confiscated. Details concerning these events were furnished by Beaufort, who was actually present in the area. In 1811, Mehmed Ağa, whom the British visitor gave the title of *paşa* even though he does not seem to have had any official claim to it, was still alive. In his ship off the Anatolian coast, news reached Beaufort that the 'Paşa's' brother Ahmed had taken Antalya *manu militari* with the help of a member of the Karaosmanoğulları, carrying off the dynasty's treasury in order to send it to his sponsors in the western Anatolian port of Kuşadası. However, Mehmed Ağa was able to retake the town after a few days, Ahmed fled and was killed, and the treasure, supposedly amounting to a million piastres, was ultimately returned to the Tekelioğulları. By the early summer of 1812, however, Mehmed Ağa had died, and his son Hacı Muhammad

26. İ. Kuyulu, *Kara Osman-oğlu Ailesine Ait Mimari Eserler* (Ankara 1992); D. Rizk Khoury, *State and Provincial Society in the Ottoman Empire: Mosul, 1540-1834* (Cambridge 1997), 200-05. On Baghdad, see T. Lier, *Haushalte und Haushaltspolitik in Bagdad 1704-1831* (Würzburg 2004).

27. Uzuncarşılı, 'Nizam-i Cedid Ricalinden', 440-50. Apparently the Tekelioğulları set fire to Kadı Paşa's residence in order to cover up their depredations, but the story became known in Istanbul nonetheless.

had made his submission to the Sultan (by now Mahmud II). While hoping for an official appointment, the new power-holder was also wary of a possible assassination. As Beaufort met the 'young *bey*' in person, we may hope that he got the name right, and thus he must have talked not to İbrahim himself, but rather to one of his brothers or half-brothers. How İbrahim and Muhammad related to one another remains unknown, if indeed the name given by Beaufort is not simply erroneous.

In addition there was a certain Bekir Paşa involved in these events whose role I have not been able to elucidate: his name does not occur in the descriptive overall headings of the documents concerning the disposal of former Tekelioğulları wealth, where there is mention only of Mehmed Ağa, his son İbrahim and his relative Mısırlı Mustafa. But in a detailed inventory of the family's holdings, we do find a special listing of Bekir Paşa's properties. Until further information becomes available, we may assume that Bekir Paşa was a connection of the Tekelioğulları who somehow got swept up by the events leading to the overthrow of this dynasty. Nor did unrest in the area abate after this event: thus, in 1230/1814-15, a certain Civitoğlu İsmail purchased the right of possession to one of the more important ex-Tekelioğulları landholdings. But a few years later he himself was in flight, without having paid the purchase price, and the process of reassignment began all over again.²⁸

The Documents

This process of confiscation and reassignment generated a considerable amount of correspondence. As usual, confiscation was accompanied by the compilation of inventories; these cover especially the numerous agricultural landholdings (*çiftlik*) that the Tekelioğulları had accumulated during their years in power. In addition, the attempts to sell off the confiscated holdings for the benefit of the Ottoman treasury generated yet further documentation. Among the buyers there figured with some prominence the Bektashi lodge of Abdal Musa just outside the town of Elmalı, not very far from Antalya, in addition to a large number of less well-known local notabilities.²⁹ Thus once again we have come to possess a file of documents similar to that which has been well studied in the Karaosmanoğulları case, even though it is admittedly a good deal smaller.³⁰ Yet because of the wealth of information the Tekelioğulları files contain about a town and a region that in spite of their present-day importance are very little known to the Ottomanist historian, the documents concerning confiscation and reassignment merit a closer investigation.

28. BOA, section Maliyeden Müdevver, no. 9728 (1231/1815-16).

29. S. Faroqhi, *Der Bektaschi-Orden in Anatolien (vom späten fünfzehnten Jahrhundert bis 1826)* (Vienna 1981), 61.

30. For an earlier and very instructive study of a local notable from the Amasya region, see Y. Cezar, 'Bir Âyanın Muhallefatı: Havza ve Köprü Kazaları Âyanı Kör İsmail-Oğlu Hüseyin (Musadere Olayı ve Terekenin İncelenmesi)', *Belleten*, 41/161 (1977), 41-78. For a book-length monograph see Y. Nagata, *Tarihte Ayânlar: Karaosmanoğulları Üzerinde Bir İnceleme* (Ankara 1997).

It is yet a further boon to the researcher that for the early nineteenth century the *kadı* registers of Antalya happen to survive; however, these documents also have been little studied. The registers compiled by the scribes of the local judges hold records concerning sales of ex-Tekelioğulları possessions that are sparsely documented in the Ottoman central archives; but even more significantly, they allow us to gauge the importance of the dynasty's possessions by permitting a comparison with other holders of agricultural properties in the region. In brief, these texts all show that there was more commercial, agricultural and 'political' activity going on in the region of Antalya around 1800 than has usually been assumed by historians – geographers and ethnologists always have tended to be more realistic. Perhaps at times relative remoteness from Istanbul may have permitted local power-holders a level of resource accumulation that would have been difficult in regions where the central government's control was tighter.

Ownership of Urban Real Property

As a first remarkable feature, we might mention the sizeable number of private houses owned by the Tekelioğulları in Antalya and elsewhere. These are of special interest because like gardens and vineyards, they were normally freehold property (*mülk*), that could be sold and bought by private agreement without any intervention by the state administration. Some were probably 'ordinary' dwellings, what our texts call *hane*; in the town itself there were at least five of them. If the price paid by the new buyers is any guide, the quality of these residences must have varied a great deal.³¹ Three buildings were described as *konak*, and thus must have been larger and/or better built. In fact two of the three houses in question possessed outer and inner courtyards, as was typical of wealthy dwellings throughout Anatolia. All these buildings had been named after people not part of the Tekelioğlu family and thus must have been acquired *ex post facto*. Whether this was because of tax obligations on the part of the former owners or else debts of a private character cannot at present be determined; but it does suggest that the Tekelioğulları were in a position to put considerable pressure on their fellow townsmen. Some of the houses had belonged to people in official positions: a fortress commander (*dizdar*) and even two pashas were among them. Were these perhaps adherents of a faction defeated by the Tekelioğulları whose properties the victors had taken over?

Local power could be acquired and deployed in the years around 1800 by controlling the required sales of grain (*mubayaa*) for the benefit of the Ottoman

31. Outside Antalya, in the little town of İstanos (today: Korkuteli) there were also wealthy residences described as *saray*, namely the houses of Ali Paşa and Bekir Paşa; whether these were still more opulent than the *konaks* unfortunately remains unknown. However, these were not part of the properties of the Tekelioğulları. Compare Antalya Kadı Sicilleri (hereinafter: AKS) II, f. 24a (1234/1818-19). These registers are now in the National Library (Milli Kütüphane) in Ankara. When I consulted them, they were still located in the Antalya Museum.

armed forces and also of the inhabitants of Istanbul. This the Tekelioğulları had not neglected to do; for among the houses, empty pieces of land and other real estate listed, there was also a structure described as “the store house for *mubayaa* [grain]”.³² Probably the Tekelioğulları had stored wheat and barley in this building before delivering it to the nearby port for shipping. Such an activity made sense not only from the local notables’ point of view, because of the opportunities for patronage provided, but also from that of the Ottoman central administration. After all, in an outlying area like Antalya, the more important notables must have been *the* major power in the land, and they were more likely to get the grain moving in spite of possible local discontents than any recent arrival from Istanbul.³³ Thus, even after the Tekelioğulları had disappeared from the political scene after 1812, the role of notables in the transportation of grain to Istanbul did not cease. The *kadı* registers of Antalya show that by the mid-1850s there existed a family of local notables known as the Mübayaacızade, who probably had taken over, directly or indirectly, where the Tekelioğulları once had been obliged to leave off.³⁴

The modalities of the *mubayaa* have been studied mainly with respect to the Balkan peninsula, especially Moldavia and Wallachia, which in the early nineteenth century still functioned as Istanbul’s bread-basket.³⁵ We are less well informed about Anatolia, but the ground rules were the same everywhere. While *mubayaa* deliveries, as the name indicates, supposedly were purchases and not taxes, this aspect became relevant mainly through the consequence that people who enjoyed exemption from extra-ordinary taxes still were obliged to deliver grain for the *mubayaa*. Payment was made according to two different schedules: one, the so-called *miri*, was so low as to be confiscatory in practice, but even the so-called *rayiç*, while somewhat higher, still lay below the market price. Presumably this system, while ensuring the supplies needed for court, army and capital, explains the relatively low level of agricultural production throughout the Empire. As, at least in principle, if not necessarily in practice, all grain not needed for own-consumption or seed could be subjected to the *mubayaa*, there would have been few resources available for investment, and even less incentive. The high prices of the Napoleonic era, with which we are concerned here, were the exception that proved the rule.

That the Tekelioğulları had placed their faith in trade is also apparent from the khan and numerous shops that they had either acquired or constructed. Admittedly the *bedesten* (covered market), which Evliya tells us lay outside the walls, did not belong to the family.³⁶ But the khan registered as Tekelioğulları property, known as the *Rumoğlu hanı* and located across the street from a building called the *lonca*

32. AKS II, f. 24a (1234/1818-19).

33. Aynural, *İstanbul Değirmen ve Fırınları*, 8-12.

34. S. Faroqhi, ‘Two Women of Substance’, in C. Fragner and K. Schwarz (eds), *Osmanistik, Turkologie, Diplomatie: Festgabe an Josef Matuz* (Berlin 1992), 37-56; see p. 42.

35. Aynural, *İstanbul Değirmen ve Fırınları*, 5-16.

36. *Evliya Çelebi*, 9: 288.

was of impressive size.³⁷ It contained, among other things, 45 upper rooms and six shops “for merchants” possibly located on the outside of the building, where they would have been easier to reach for prospective customers.³⁸

Antalya being famous for its gardens, it is not surprising that the Tekelioğulları had also secured what must have been a sizeable share of this resource for themselves.³⁹ Unfortunately, the register which describes in detail the town quarters or extra-mural lands where these gardens were located, does not tell us anything about the fruit and vegetables that were grown there. Moreover this register only records the revenues collected from these properties in 1227/1812, 1228/1813 and 1229/1813-14, that is after the fall of the family, when some of the lands in question had been abandoned and no longer produced any revenues.

The Fate of the Tekelioğulları Pious Foundations

As we have seen, Hacı Mehmed Ağa founded one mosque and probably repaired at least one other. Whether the properties that in our register were listed as “the khans, public baths and shops turned into pious foundations by Tekelioğlu” were meant for the upkeep of these particular mosques, or for other pious purposes, is not recorded.⁴⁰ But probably the mosques benefited at least in some cases.⁴¹ The locations of the foundation holdings were described with special care; and indeed this topographical precision would be of great interest to us if only we had old maps of Antalya available; for then we would be able to describe the town’s ‘business district’ before the modernisation campaigns of republican times. From our inventory we learn about the existence of streets devoted to particular crafts, so typical of Ottoman and sometimes post-Ottoman towns, a shop-lined street known as the *suk-ı sultanî*, in addition to at least one row of shops located just outside of the city walls.⁴² A further cluster of such stores was located in the vicinity of the *Pazar hamamı*. Many of the shops placed in mortmain by the Tekelioğulları were situated in a part of the downtown area known as the *İşpazarı*, and there were others higher up the hill, in the location known as the *Yukarı Pazar*. But even with the limited

37. This might be a derivation from the Italian word *loggia*, but there is no further information on such a structure in Antalya. However, it may have been located on the site of the so-called Frankish bazaar, long demolished but going back to the Middle Ages: De Planhol, *De la plaine pamphylienne*, 387.

38. BOA, section Kâmil Kepeci (hereinafter: KK) 2458, Muhallefat-Beytülmal no. 25 (no pagination, top of p. 7 according to my count). Unfortunately there is some damage to the paper. It is not clear whether this structure was identical to the *Urum Ali hanı* mentioned by Evliya: *Evliya Çelebi*, 9: 288.

39. KK 2458, Muhallefat-Beytülmal no. 25 (no pagination).

40. Ibid., p. 6 according to my count.

41. It is also possible that the first section of our register, concerning the gardens, was also concerned with *vakıf* holdings; but the relevant entry is difficult to read.

42. De Planhol, *De la plaine pamphylienne*, 38. Evliya also commented on the commercial liveliness of the outer suburbs (*varış*) of Antalya: *Evliya Çelebi*, 9: 288-89.

possibilities at our disposal for contextualising this topographical information, it is quite clear that with one khan, three public baths, one oil-press and 39 shops given over to pious foundations, the family's charities must have occupied a dominant place in Antalya's town centre.⁴³

While pious foundations often were established with the hope of protecting at least some of the family properties from confiscation, this strategy did not apparently work out well in the Tekelioğulları case. For although the items under review all were pieces of real estate that according to Ottoman law could be private property, and therefore might legally be turned over to pious foundations, our register records them in exactly the same fashion as other holdings of the disgraced dynasty. Thus, yearly rents were specified in detail with no reference to the charities that they should have benefited. This form of recording would have made little sense if the mosques and other foundations of the Tekelioğulları had been the recipients. We can thus assume that in this period of financial stringency the dynasty's pious foundations were not spared confiscation, even though it was scarcely possible to use the old ploy that these charities were illegal (*gayr-i sahih*) because they had been instituted on land that was really state property.⁴⁴

Control over the Countryside

In a largely rural area like the southern coast of Anatolia, the basis for all fortunes must have been land. This impression is confirmed by an observation of Beaufort's; when he and the 'young *bey*' Hacı Muhammad exchanged gifts, the latter sent goats, oxen, fowl and vegetables, and Beaufort reciprocated with gunpowder, alcoholic drinks and some English manufactured goods.⁴⁵ We have already seen that in addition to the Antalya area properly speaking, the Tekelioğulları held much property in Korkuteli, which served as a refuge for the inhabitants of the town during the hot and malaria-ridden summer months. Now in spite of geographical proximity, there is a marked climatic contrast between the coastal plain of Antalya on the one hand, with its long hot summers and mild winters, and a much dryer and cooler mountainous zone on the other. Thus, it made sense for those with money to invest in fields and gardens to diversify their holdings, and this is evidently what Hacı Mehmed Ağa and his relatives had undertaken. Moreover, the Antalya plain with its need for elaborate irrigation and draining was not the most suitable place for grain cultivation, but in the conjuncture of the years around 1800, growing this crop was where most money could be made. That the plateau was difficult of access, and grain prices thus were increased by the need to feed oxen and camels, was of course a serious problem; but in years of very high demand that difficulty was probably not insuperable.

43. KK 2458, Muhallefat-Beytülmal no. 25, p. 9 according to my count.

44. This was the typical excuse used when destroying the pious foundations of the Bektashi lodges about a decade later: Faroqhi, *Der Bektaschi-Orden*, 112.

45. Beaufort, *Karamanien*, 76.

An undated register, compiled after 1230/1814-15 but before 1234/1818-19, provides a record of the rural holdings of the Tekelioğulları.⁴⁶ These were organised as so-called *çiftlik*s, each with a name and clearly delimited in the topography of the region. By the time the inventory was being compiled, the dynasty had come to an end and the lands in question had been managed by other people for some years. Apparently the register had been put together in order to demand accounts from these recent administrators, who are often mentioned by name. A bone of contention was the numerous plough oxen that had 'disappeared', either because they had died or else presumably because they had been transferred, illegally, to other holdings. In addition, the central government had evidently ordered local administrators to pass on the lands to sharecroppers, and now demanded information on the amounts of seed grain supplied, the monetary value of this grain, the amount of land sown and the appurtenances of some *çiftlik*s. Apparently this documentation was to serve as a basis for the payments the administrators would be required to make.

While it is usually no longer possible to locate the *çiftlik*s themselves, the districts in which they were situated are for the most part easy to find, and it is possible to say something about the geography of the area where the Tekelioğulları had established themselves. Without any doubt, the centre of their power was in İstanos/Korkuteli, where 14 of their 38 *çiftlik*s were to be found. For the most part these were not in 'old' villages, that is, those that had existed in the sixteenth century.⁴⁷ Unfortunately our register does not tell us whether there were any peasant settlements in the vicinity of the landholdings, as the latter alone were of interest to the Treasury in this context. The immediate vicinity of Antalya was important but much less so (4 *çiftlik*s), while the district of Elmalı housed 5 Tekelioğulları landholdings. To the east of Antalya the dynasty's presence was limited, perhaps once again because the district of Serik, close to the ancient ruins of Perge and Aspendos, was too unhealthy in the summer to be of much interest for grain cultivation. But by stretching out 'feelers' in this direction, the Antalya dynasty evidently was likely to compete with the family of Kadı Paşa, a personage who under Selim III had possessed an Empire-wide influence with which Mehmed Ağa could in no way compete. It is also worth noting that the former Tekelioğulları holdings were not limited to their home province (*sancak*) of Teke. Thus, we find them further north, in the region of Burdur, Tefenni and Ağlasun; unfortunately it has not yet emerged by what manoeuvres members of the dynasty were able to establish themselves so far from their home base.

Our register contains data on plough teams present on the different *çiftlik*s, the seed grain distributed to sharecroppers, the monetary value of this grain, and the

46. BOA, KK 2457, Muhallefat 24.

47. Compare Binark *et alii* (eds), *166 Numaralı Muhâsebe-i Vilâyet-i Anadolu Defteri*, map of Teke on p. 192. I have located only Bayat (no. 11 in the Table), while Dadköyü (no. 35) in all probability corresponds to the village of Tat. Among the Elmalı holdings, the only 'old' village that gave its name to a Tekelioğulları holding is Mürsel. This confirms the statement by McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe*, 69 that *çiftlik*s were often set up on land that had been common pasture or else abandoned by peasants taking flight.

amount of sown land. Even though these data are incomplete more often than not, at first glance this appears to be precious information. After all, even on an Empire-wide basis, our data on the size of the landholdings controlled by local magnates is not very ample. However, when evaluating the records of ex-Tekelioğulları properties, we come up against a number of problems. To begin with, the seed grain is expressed in *keyl*, a measure of volume that differs widely from one area to the next. In most cases there is no information about the type of *keyl* intended, so that we may optimistically assume that we are dealing with the Istanbul variety (25.7 kg of wheat, 22.25 kg of barley).⁴⁸ If, however, we are pessimists, or perhaps just realists, it is perfectly reasonable to posit that the scribes were referring to a *keyl* of Antalya, a local measure about which nothing is known, or else to the *keyl* of Korkuteli, about which we have only contradictory information. In a few instances we are told that the grain had been reckoned in *keyl* of Kızılkaya, a rural agglomeration to the north-west of Elmalı; and once again local people in the 1970s, when these measures were no longer in use, gave contradictory information concerning the size of this unit.⁴⁹ It is therefore not possible to give any meaningful totals.

Other problems concern the manner in which the sown land was measured. As usual in Ottoman records, the *dönüm* was used, which officially is calculated at 939.3 m². But it is quite possible that local measures were intended which may or may not have resembled the official *dönüm*. Moreover, these data are particularly incomplete, which means that we cannot use this figure to get an overall view of the extent of the Tekelioğulları holdings. A rough estimate, without much claim to accuracy, is all these figures can provide. If consistently included, the monetary value of the seed grain would have provided at least a standard for comparison between different *çiftlik*s, as well as a basis for further calculations; but once again these figures have been entered too inconsistently to be of much help.

As a result, the number of plough oxen present, of course, before the latter had 'disappeared', provides a means of estimating the amount of land available; for at least these figures have been consistently supplied. But even here caution is in order: thus, the *çiftlik* of Enhar (İstanos) had 40 plough teams in combination with 561 *keyls* of seed grain, while in the landholding of R-v-nd/Z-v-nd, situated in the very same district, a mere 11 plough teams corresponded to 1,168 *keyls* of grain, distributed in order to cultivate 2,173 *dönüms*. Probably some of the sharecroppers owned plough teams and thus were able to obtain better conditions; but this situation, while fortunate for them, does not make the historian's life any easier. However, if we assume that a peasant family wealthy enough to possess a full holding was also likely to own a plough team, we can say that the 38 *çiftlik*s that once had belonged to the Tekelioğulları and their immediate dependents corresponded to the holdings of at least 790 better-off peasant families. Moreover, there being no reference in our list to at least one landholding that on the basis of another unrelated document is known

48. W. Hinz, *Islamische Masse und Gewichte umgerechnet ins metrische System* (Leiden 1955).

49. Faroqhi, *Der Bektaschi-Orden*, 54-55.

to have been the property of Tekelioğlu İbrahim, we must assume that our list of 38 landholdings is incomplete, but it is impossible to say how many *çiftlik*s have been omitted.⁵⁰

But one message comes through loud and clear: the lands held as *çiftlik*s were used for the purpose of grain cultivation and for little else. For among the appurtenances, there figures only one *mezraa*, which conceivably might have furnished pasture in addition to fields. Of course, some flocks may have been raised in the open highland steppe, a fact that the officials would have had no reason to record. In some places, there were walnut trees, but in numbers so limited that their fruit must have served mainly for local consumption. Nowhere do we find major flocks, and even the cows indispensable for the renewal of the plough teams are in evidence only in a few places. Once outside the Antalya district, gardens and vineyards also were of very limited significance. In a few localities we find millet and beans, while cooking oil was provided by unspecified edible seeds (*çekirdek*) and some sesame. Maize was making a timid appearance in the region of Burdur and Tefenni, although as yet it had by no means ousted millet. But all these items were as nothing compared to the all-important cultivation of wheat and barley.

Intriguing questions are raised by the presence of mills on some of the former Tekelioğulları holdings. Windmills were a feature of the Aegean coast, and observed by Beaufort; but we do not know whether they functioned in inland villages as well. Watercourses were available in some places but not in others. This means that certain mills may have been horse-driven, as was normal practice in Istanbul.⁵¹ But if so, where were the horses? More importantly, the presence of mills denotes local consumption, as grain to be exported was left un-milled. Possibly the mills registered for Enhar, Gördük and Öyük, Belen, Maslama (?), Mandırla and Çomak (?) mean that the adjacent settlements were more important than most; but we have no way of being certain.

We have already mentioned the probable presence of sharecroppers; but whether they were at all widespread is also a matter for discussion. As an alternative, one might imagine *çiftlik*s run by a few slaves on a year-round basis, with wage labourers (*aylakçı*) hired for the harvest only. Such arrangements had been common for instance in the Edirne region during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁵² In the province of Antalya, with its easy connection to Egypt, the importation of mostly black slaves was probably not unknown, and in fact our records refer to a man called *Rüstem köle*.⁵³ However, this was the one and only instance, so that slavery was of no importance in the running of the former Tekelioğulları farms. As a result, sharecropping seems the most likely alternative: some of the families involved may have brought their own implements and plough teams. As to the less fortunate ones, they procured their necessities from the possessors of the landhold-

50. BOA, Maliyeden Müdevver 9766, p. 8.

51. Aynural, *İstanbul Değirmen ve Fırınları*, 85-87.

52. Ö. L. Barkan, 'Edirne Askeri Kassamı'na Ait Tereke Defterleri (1545-1659)', *Belgeler*, 3/5-6 (1966), 1-479; for an example see p. 239.

53. BOA, KK 2457, Muhallefat 24, p. 1 of the inventory.

ings they worked, which would explain the presence of ploughshares and carts in the records of certain *çiftlik*s. At the present stage, the existence of 'peasant housing' on some of the holdings but not on others poses a problem. Were these houses meant for year-round occupation, that is, for sharecroppers, or were they temporary lodgings that housed agricultural labourers hired only at harvest time? Given the sparseness of the local population, the former alternative seems likely, but it is best to keep an open mind.

Monetary Gains

For the Ottoman central administration, immediately available cash was probably of more importance than rural holdings or animals. In fact we possess an overview of the revenues gained from the confiscation of Tekelioğulları property. The register is dated 1231/1815-16, when the disposal of the former holdings of the magnate family and its dependants had been largely completed. The total gain to the Treasury amounted to 2,785,828 *guruş*, including the revenues gained from the relevant agricultural holdings during the years when they had been administered on behalf of the Ottoman financial administration. For the period following the fall of the dynasty, the total also included the taxes payable to the state by local inhabitants (218,750 *guruş*).⁵⁴ If this latter figure is subtracted as not forming part of the Tekelioğulları fortunes, we arrive at the still substantial figure of 2,567,078. This included over 386,106 *guruş* in cash and a sum of 1,057,205 that the Tekelioğulları family was owed by different people in the town of Antalya and its surroundings. Given these figures, the people who told Beaufort that Tekelioğlu Ahmed had taken a million *guruş* from his brother at least seem to have relayed the correct order of magnitude.

In addition, it would appear that several of the 'men of business' associated with the dynasty also lost their lives when İbrahim and Mısırlı Mustafa were killed. Our records mention a former treasurer named Keçecioğlu, a *kethüda* of the Antalya gardeners, another *kethüda* in charge of the dynastic harem and what seems to have been a shop-owner (*dükkânî*) in the family's service.⁵⁵ Their estates, which in some cases ran to tens of thousands of *guruş*, were confiscated as well. Others managed to escape, leaving part of their property behind for the Treasury to collect. That the takeover was far from peaceful is also apparent from the fact that certain inhabitants fled the region. In 1229/1814, the administration wanted these families returned to their original places of residence; with what success is difficult to determine.⁵⁶

Wise After the Event: The Fate of 'Sahipsiz' Holdings

When dealing with confiscated lands, the Ottoman authorities of the years around 1800 were confronted with a problem that has bedevilled others before

54. BOA, Maliyeden Müdevver 9728, pp. 559-60. For the purposes of this calculation the Ottoman gold coin (*yaldız altunu*) was calculated at 13 *guruş*.

55. Possibly *dükkânî* is a mistake and we should read the more usual *dükkâncı*.

56. BOA, Maliyeden Müdevver 9728, p. 159.

and after them: how to make sure that once the administrators put in place by the Tekelioğulları had lost their authority, the *çiftlik*s were not despoiled by the neighbours, following the example set by these magnates themselves when they appropriated the possessions of Kadı Paşa? Apart from such land-grabbing and livestock-rustling, there was the question of responsibility for the necessary investments: who would supply the oxen, seed grain and the food for any wage labourers who might happen to be employed? For without an at least moderately secure title, whoever held power in Antalya during those troubled years would certainly not defray those expenses himself.⁵⁷

This problem was discussed in a sultanic edict addressed to the current governor Mehmed Vahid Paşa and dated 1230/1814-15.⁵⁸ Here we learn that the previous harvest had been deplorable because of the lack of necessary investment; it was calculated that 80,000 *guruş* would be needed to secure a better harvest for the following year. This was a predominant concern for those twelve *çiftlik*s that the administration wished to reserve for the 'sultanic foundations' (*vakf-ı hümayun-ı mülûkâne*), but also for those twenty-six holdings that were destined to be sold; after all, a run-down *çiftlik* could only fetch a low price.

Selling off the right of possession to the former Tekelioğlu properties, at least in certain cases, seems to have taken a considerable amount of time. Thus, it was only in 1241/1825-26 that the *Leylek* ('stork') *çiftliği*, formerly in the hands of the executed Tekelioğlu İbrahim, finally found a buyer. Sixteen fields of a total area of 425 *dönüms*, to be worked by three pairs of oxen, in addition to substantial vineyards/garden lands (25 *dönüms*), as well as a large storehouse altogether netted the central administration the sum of 12,500 *guruş* as a down payment (*muaccele*).⁵⁹ Quite possibly it was the end of the Napoleonic wars and the subsequent fall in grain prices that made possible purchasers wary of investing in land; in addition, the insecurity of property-holding, as demonstrated so graphically by the fate of Kadı Paşa and the Tekelioğulları household, may well have further discouraged investment at least for a while.

The Relative Status of the Tekelioğulları

How dominant was the position of this dynasty in the region? Were there other magnates of similar stature and how did the Tekelioğulları relate to the 'lesser gentry' in the area? While unfortunately an inventory specifying the wealth of the family of Kadı Paşa has not as yet come to light, we do have a fairly good idea of the posses-

57. Faroqhi, *Der Bektaschi-Orden*, 66 cites similar experiences when it came to the disposal of the landholdings of the Bektashi lodge of Abdal Musa after 1826. The situation was not apparently much different when all dervish lodges were closed down in 1925: only the possessions of the main Mevlevi lodge were kept together because the institution was immediately transformed into a museum.

58. BOA, Maliyeden Müdevver 9728, p. 267.

59. BOA, Maliyeden Müdevver 9766, p. 8.

sions of the Bektashi lodge of Abdal Musa near Elmalı, which Evliya Çelebi had noted for its generous hospitality towards travellers.⁶⁰ Now this lodge possessed about 9,500 *dönüms* of agricultural land, substantially less than the 12,282 *dönüms* recorded for the eighteen *çiflik*s of the Tekelioğulları for which figures are available. Roughly speaking, we can thus estimate that the agricultural lands controlled by this magnate family were much more than twice as large as those in the hands of the Bektashi dervishes. As to plough teams, the lodge possessed 84 of them, about twelve for the home farm and the remainder entrusted to sharecroppers. In this respect the dervishes were also much weaker, relatively speaking, for the Tekelioğulları owned 790 teams. Moreover, the magnates held considerable real property in Antalya and İstanos, while the dervishes had only the – admittedly well-equipped – lodge itself and a few small dependencies. Thus for them it would have been totally impossible to compete with the magnate dynasty in terms of monetary revenues. On the other hand, even if our estimate perhaps errs in favour of the Bektashis, this state of affairs should have meant that the Tekelioğulları could not have it all their own way, once they left the centres of their power in Antalya and İstanos.

In a different perspective, the inventory of a prosperous peasant from the *kadı* registers of Antalya provides yet another yardstick by which to measure the power of the Tekelioğulları.⁶¹ Hacı İsmail from the village of Zivind in the district of İstanos, where the Tekelioğulları had once held a *çiflik*, possessed property worth more than 9,900 *guruş*, and must have been what the French so picturesquely call a *coq de village*.⁶² In addition to a horse, rather a valuable possession, he owned four camels and thus may have been active in the transport business.⁶³ Other signs of wealth were a one-hundred-head flock of sheep, 50 goats, at least four plough teams and 30 *kıyyes* (38 kg) of copperware.⁶⁴ Unfortunately for us, Hacı İsmail had farmed land belonging to the sultan (*çiflikat-ı hümayun*) and this did not figure in his inventory. But as the harvest of wheat and barley was valued at 2,200 *guruş*, that is, it was worth more than the deceased's four camels, we may assume that the amount of land at his disposal had also been substantial. Yet if we compare

60. *Evliya Çelebi*, 9: 273-74. For a discussion of the holdings of this dervish lodge in 1826, at the time the Bektashis were forcibly suppressed, see Faroqhi, *Der Bektaschi-Orden*, 55-68.

61. AKS V, f. 23b (1250/1834-35).

62. As the 1830s were a period of dramatic debasement of the currency, the property items held were a better measure of Hacı İsmail's wealth than their monetary value: Ş. Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge 2000), 193-207. A 'village rooster' denotes a rich peasant.

63. Camels were in use in the Antalya region even in the late 1970s, where I observed them returning from the summer residences of the inhabitants in the autumn.

64. At this point the scribe computing the register made a bad mistake, unless it was I myself when doing the copying, but it has not been possible to verify this. We learn that there were 8 oxen worth 50 *guruş* apiece, totalling 1,200. Since the correct figure should be 400, we are left guessing whether Hacı İsmail did not perhaps possess 24 oxen. But to be on the safe side, we will assume that he had only eight.

his four (or perhaps twelve) plough teams with the almost eight hundred owned by the Tekelioğulları, it becomes obvious that the rural holdings of the latter may well have corresponded, at the very least, to those of about 65 *coqs de village*, and perhaps even to about two hundred of them.

In Conclusion

Throughout, the properties and holdings of the Tekelioğulları give the impression of being quite well integrated. If, as is likely, the role of Mehmed Ağa – and perhaps his ancestors – in the *mubayaa* was a major source of the family's wealth, then we may regard the *mubayaa* storehouse as, in a sense, the core of the agglomeration of lands and real estate owned by the Tekelioğulları. Viewed from another angle, 'personal' instead of political, this core consisted of the *konaks* inhabited by different family members in Antalya and İstanbul. Other houses were probably acquired from impecunious debtors; while proof is impossible, it is still likely that such debts were often linked to the taxation process. Given the prominence of the Tekelioğulları in the Antalya region, we may assume that they were in charge of distributing the taxes assessed globally upon the entire area (*tevzi*).⁶⁵ A prominent position in the tax collecting sector easily translated into a dominant position in Antalya's not very extensive but at least for a time rather lively business district. Moreover, the dynasty also imprinted its stamp on the cityscape through its sponsoring of mosques. However, this aspect was but modestly developed if we compare it with the extensive religious and charitable construction activity of the Karaosmanoğulları, to say nothing of the Calilis in Mosul and the Georgian Mamluks of Baghdad. And while it has been noted that in Ottoman Egypt or Iraq, the female members of magnate dynasties had an important role to play, no such activity, charitable or otherwise, is on record for the Tekelioğulları.⁶⁶

In a sense the dynasty occupied a middle position between major magnates such as the Karaosmanoğulları or the Calilis on the one hand, and minor players such as Kör İsmailoğlu Hüseyin of the Amasya region or Müridoğlu Hacı Mehmed Ağa of Edremit.⁶⁷ For while the latter especially seems to have concentrated on making money pure and simple, through lending out money and managing his olive trees, the Tekelioğulları had set their sights far higher. Presumably the accumulation of an important treasure in cash had something to do with these ambitions. In the same way, the brutal elimination of Kadı Paşa and his family, and the ultimately disastrous prevarication in handing over this dignitary's property were part of an

65. İnalçık, 'Military and Fiscal Transformation', 335ff.

66. On Egypt see A. L. Al-Sayyid Marsot, *Women and Men in Late Eighteenth-Century Egypt* (Austin 1995); on the Baghdad region, see Lier, *Haushalte*.

67. S. Faroqi, 'Wealth and Power in the Land of Olives: The Economic and Political Activities of Müridoğlu Hacı Mehmed Ağa, Notable of Edremit (died in or before 1823)', in Ç. Keyder and F. Tabak (eds), *Landholding and Commercial Agriculture in the Middle East* (Albany, N.Y. 1991), 77-96.

attempt to expand family power beyond Antalya and Korkuteli. After all, İbradı being located to the north-east of Antalya, the takeover, if it had succeeded, would have advantageously completed the holdings of the dynasty, which for the most part were located to the west of the town. But Tekelioğlu İbrahim, and Muhammad, if indeed the two were not one and the same person, had succeeded to his/their position only while the struggle for Kadı Paşa's inheritance was already in full swing. In consequence he/they may not have been experienced enough to avoid the dangers inherent in the family's strategy of aggrandisement.

Moreover, we can assume that on their part, the Karaosmanoğulları had hopes of expanding their influence southward. This was probably a major reason why one of their members helped the rebellious Ahmed Bey to procure a sultanic command that awarded him Antalya. In addition, the Karaosmanoğulları must have considered the monetary gain that would have been theirs, had Mehmed Ağa's treasury not been seized on the way to Kuşadası and sent back to Antalya.⁶⁸ Thus, it appears that the rivalries among provincial magnates, which the central government exploited as far as it could, were real attempts to expand territorial control, and did not just concern sources of monetary revenue or personal animosities. It is perhaps not a matter of chance that Beaufort mistook the magnates with whom he dealt for legitimately appointed governors: for gaining such an official position was probably another major step towards the long-term aim of regional control that Hacı Mehmed Ağa and his sons attempted to obtain.⁶⁹

Viewed from a different angle, by the early nineteenth century, fortunes in the Ottoman realm could be made rather conveniently if a given entrepreneur could participate in the trade with Europe.⁷⁰ Beaufort's observation that the prosperity of Antalya was based on the exportation of grain applied, more specifically, to the Tekelioğulları themselves. By controlling the product of 790 full peasant farms, the family had ample surpluses available. Thus, the British observer's remark that local *ağas* tolerated smuggling because they received a percentage, in the case of the Tekelioğulları should probably be expanded to mean that they themselves participated in the trade, maybe through middlemen such as their relative Mısırlı Mustafa and his *dükkâncı*.

Like their larger and more successful rivals, the Karaosmanoğulları, Mehmed Ağa and his relatives furthered the 'incorporation' of the region they controlled

68. Beaufort, *Karamanien*, 55-57.

69. It is likely that the Tekelioğulları also held important tax farms, but the surviving documents do not contain any significant information on this score.

70. Not that this was the only way of getting rich: thus, some of Aleppo's merchants during this period managed to revive their links with India: E. Wirth, 'Aleppo im 19. Jahrhundert: ein Beispiel für die Stabilität und Dynamik spätosmanischer Wirtschaft', in H. G. Majer (ed.), *Osmanische Studien zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte. In Memoriam Vančo Boškov* (Wiesbaden 1986), 186-205. However, if the truth be told, in the early nineteenth century the sub-continent was already largely controlled by the East India Company.

into the European-dominated world economy. Thus, they fit the older image of the *çiftlik*-holder searching for gains from export trade, in addition to the more modern view of the power-holder directly creaming off whatever was available in his locality in order to bolster his political position. As the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries were a period of economic crisis in the Ottoman Empire, it is not unreasonable to think that resources hitherto available locally had now come to be insufficient, and whoever needed wealth on a major scale was obliged to obtain it through connections with the outside world. Given the geographical position of the province of Teke, this 'outside world' could only be a European state or empire.

In the present state of our knowledge, I would describe the Tekelioğulları as attempting to carve out a more or less coherent autonomous domain, similar to those already existing in western Anatolia, Tunisia or Iraq. Mehmed Ağa hoped to realise his plans by aiming for the succession of the defeated Kadı Paşa, but perhaps his brother was more realistic when attempting to buy the support of a dynasty more powerful than his own. In order to maintain and aggrandise their domains, the Tekelioğulları used whatever resources were at hand, in this particular conjuncture, particularly the exportation of grain. But for such ambitions to have been realistic once Mahmud II had established himself on the throne, Antalya, remote from Istanbul though it may have been, was probably not quite remote enough.

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Table
*Çiftlik*s of the Tekeliogulları (BOA, Kâmil Kepeci 2457)

Name of <i>çiftlik</i>	District	Plough oxen (pairs)	Seed grain in <i>kile</i> (1814-15)	Seed grain in <i>guruş</i> (1814-15)	Appurtenances	Sown land (<i>dönüm</i>) (1814-15)
1. Enhar	İstanos	40	wheat 359 barley 202 ¹	wheat 2516 barley 808	2 buffaloes, 4 mills, 4 storehouses	
2. Karakuyu	İstanos	17	wheat 190 barley 260 ²	wheat 840 barley 650	2 storehouses	545
3. Kargın	İstanos	40	wheat 136 barley 180	wheat 952 barley 722	garden, 2 storehouses, 40 peasant houses	566
4. Karadiken	İstanos	6 (prob.)	wheat 48 barley 53	total 216	44 walnut trees, 1 storehouse	167
5. Gördük and Öyük	İstanos	1	wheat 32 barley 28		garden, vineyard, mill, ploughshares	115
6. Zivind	İstanos	11	wheat 580 barley 588		<i>mezraa</i> , 3 foals, 94 goats, 2 storehouses, cows, mill in the village of Belen	2,173
7. Hanumanlar	Antalya	8	millet 8 ³			
8. Karakoyunlar	Antalya	4			1 large country seat	1,537
9. Belen	İstanos	20	wheat 120 barley 110 ⁴		vineyard and large storehouse	
10. Maslama (?)	İstanos	14	wheat 226 barley 125		storehouse, mill, dwelling, separate room, barn/stable, ploughshares and carts	3,617 (or perhaps only 815) ⁵
11. Bayat	İstanos	15	wheat 106 barley 95		25 walnut trees, 15 ploughshares	381
12. Sinekli (?)	İstanos	2.5	wheat 197 barley 190		16 rooms	595 (perhaps 555)
13. not read	İstanos	27 ⁶	wheat 185 barley 123		peasant housing	wheat 360 barley 123
14. Sulak	Antalya	5	wheat 4 barley 19 ⁷			
15. Mandırla	Antalya				1 or 2 mills, 1 mare, 60 cows and calves	
16. Kurma	unknown	12 ⁸	wheat 25 barley 25		sheep, cows, calves and mares sent from other holdings	
17. Haslar	Burdur	16.5 oxen	wheat barley maize millet ⁹	2675 967 60 64	buffaloes with calves, donkeys, cart, ploughshare, horse and winnowing equipment	

¹ *Keyl* of Kızılkaya. Monetary values lower than 1 *guruş* have been rounded off.

² Ditto.

³ No wheat or barley, but 170 *knyye* of some kind of edible seed (*çekirdek*), 25 *knyye* of black-eyed beans, perhaps some sesame.

⁴ *Keyl* of Kızılkaya.

⁵ The larger piece of land documented, but in 1814-15 only the smaller piece was actually in use.

⁶ In addition, 29 teams outside the *çiftlik*, not included because perhaps not part of original stock.

⁷ *Keyl* of Antalya; in addition 8 *keyl* of millet, 140 *knyye* of edible seeds (*çekirdek*), 25 *knyye* of black-eyed beans, 3 *knyye* of sesame.

⁸ In addition, some oxen outside the *çiftlik*, not included because perhaps not part of original stock.

⁹ Unit not identified.

Name of <i>çiftlik</i>	District	Plough oxen (pairs)	Seed grain in <i>kile</i> (1814-15)	Seed grain in <i>guruş</i> (1814-15)	Appurtenances	Sown land (<i>dönüm</i>) (1814-15)
18. Çeltükci	Ağlasun	120	wheat 1937 barley 1437 millet 378 ¹⁰	9685 4311 1131	fruit trees, mostly walnut, <i>bağ</i> ¹¹	
19. Keçilü	İncir	24	wheat 728 barley 384 ¹²			
20. Seydiköyü	İncir				crossed out, no further data	wheat 166 barley 45
21. Bucak	Elmalı	5	wheat 362 barley 244		ploughshares, 4 <i>konak</i> in ruins	
22. Kara Aliler	Kızılkaya	10			5 storehouses, 1 cart, 8 horses	wheat 890 barley 235 millet 190
23. Çomak (?)	Elmalı	20 ¹³	wheat 1340 barley 470 millet 95		2 ploughshares, 2 storehouses, 1 mill	wheat 221 barley 86
24. Yalnızdam	Elmalı	12	wheat 571 barley 430		12 ploughshares, 1 storehouse in ruins	wheat 385 barley 110 millet 40
25. Mürsel	Elmalı	9	wheat 970 barley 550 millet 40		7 horses and foals, 2 ploughshares, 11 almond trees, 1 <i>konak</i> , 6 buildings, 3 sheds for oxen, 3 <i>bağ</i>	
26. Uğurlu	Kızılkaya	6	wheat 390 barley 318		2 storehouses, 38 walnut trees	wheat 419 barley 118
27. Cedid	Elmalı	64	wheat 1050 barley 586 millet 65		20 ploughshares, 3 storerooms	
28. Boğazlık	Serik	11	wheat 82.5 barley 82.5 ¹⁴ sesame 5 millet 10 edible seeds 1,000 ¹⁵			
29. İstavros	Serik	30	wheat 57.5 barley 47 millet 16.5 edible seeds 880 ¹⁶ , sesame over 13 <i>keyl</i> ¹⁷		5 houses, 50 mares and foals	
30. Kızılcağağaç	Kızılkaya	24	wheat 455 barley 378		1 storehouse, 2 wagons, 1 <i>bağ</i>	wheat & barley 754 maize 66 millet 153
31. Pınarbaşı I	Tefenni	25	wheat 971 barley 290 maize 33 millet 51 ¹⁸		1 wagon, 8 walnut trees, 200 other trees	wheat & barley 929 ¹⁹

¹⁰ Measured in *keyl* of Kızılkaya.¹¹ Garden or vineyard.¹² Measured in *keyl* of Kızılkaya.¹³ 28 including later acquisitions.¹⁴ Measured in *keyl* of Kızılkaya.¹⁵ Measured in *knyye* (1.28 kg).¹⁶ Measured in *knyye* (1.28 kg).¹⁷ All except edible seeds measured in *keyl* of Antalya.¹⁸ A *keyl* of millet = 6 *knyye* = 7.68 kg. One plough team acquired later.¹⁹ A *keyl* of millet = 6 *knyye* = 7.68 kg.

Name of <i>çiflik</i>	District	Plough oxen (pairs)	Seed grain in <i>kile</i> (1814-15)	Seed grain in <i>guruş</i> (1814-15)	Appurtenances	Sown land (<i>dönüm</i>) (1814-15)
32. Pınarbaşı II	Kemer-i Hamid	23	wheat 847.5 barley 474		5 mares, 8 foals, 2 cows, 2 calves	
33. İvaz(?)köyü	Ağlasun	about 81	wheat over 1,414 barley over 1,062 millet 260 ²⁰	7070 3189 720		
34. Dağarcık and Seydiköyü and Kemhalu		30-41	wheat 625 barley 475 millet unknown		1 <i>saray</i> in ruins, 2 storehouses, 2 wagons, 1 dwelling, 8 buffaloes, 2 heads of cattle, 2 donkeys	wheat 130 barley illegible
35. ²¹ Dadköyü	İstanos	30	wheat 52 barley 36		garden, 1 storehouse, 5 walnut trees	
36. K.vva	İstanos	8	wheat 1070 barley 479.5		14 cows and calves, 3 buffaloes, 2 storehouses	
37. Kumköyü and Çakallık	Serik	15	wheat 123.5 barley 86 ²² millet 15 edible seeds 1060 <i>kıyye</i> sesame 2.5		124 head of cattle (prob.)	
38. ²³ Azebce ²⁴	İstanos	4			1 <i>bağ</i> , ploughshares, 1 storehouse, 3 wagons	

²⁰ Measured in *keyl* of Kızılkaya.

²¹ From here onwards, the original owner was Mısırlı Mustafa.

²² Measured in *keyl* of Antalya.

²³ Belonged to Mirahor Süleyman.

²⁴ The register also contains one *çiflik* called Koyunlar, district and former owner unknown, registration still in process: 20 pairs of oxen, in addition to 24 animals in the hands of local people. 315 *keyl* of wheat sown on 630 *dönüm*, 210 *keyl* of barley sown on 210 *dönüm*.

ARCHITECTURAL PATRONAGE OF *AYAN* FAMILIES IN ANATOLIA

Filiz YENİŞEHİRLİOĞLU

The patronage of architecture in certain parts of Anatolia at the end of the seventeenth century shifts from the patronage of governors nominated by Istanbul to that of members of the *ayan* families who dominated and governed the provinces. Villages and towns flourished under their patronage and in some cases whole geographical areas were populated for the first time under their authority. This paper will look at the building construction activities undertaken by landowning dynasties of local notables, the *ayan* families in Anatolia:¹ two in western Anatolia (Karaosmanoğulları and Cihanoğulları), one in central Anatolia (Çapanoğulları), and one in eastern Anatolia (Çıldıroğulları) (map 1).² These families were among the most influential *ayan* in Anatolia and fought and dominated other smaller local *ayan* families. The permanence of lineage and local recognition encouraged the acceptance of these families, who claimed in many cases tribal origins. The unpretentious patronage of smaller *ayan* families was almost insignificant compared with the patronage of the prestigious ones, who probably secured their political power not only through economic endeavour but with a subtle agreement with governmental authorities on guaranteeing regional security. The modest heritage of İsmailoğlu Hüseyin, *ayan* of Havza and Köprü, when compared with that of the four families mentioned above, reveals an insignificant building activity where no public buildings are mentioned.³ In this paper I will try to demonstrate how the choices of patronage in building activities reflect the specific economic, social and political way of life of these families. Therefore, my paper is not based on historical written documents but, since architecture is in itself a historical ‘document’, on the interpretation of this visual material and on the statistical distribution of this patronage.

1. On the *ayan* see Y. Özkaya, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Âyânlık* (Ankara 1977); idem, ‘XVIII. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Yerli Ailelerin Âyânlıkları Ele Geçirışleri ve Büyük Hânedânlıkların Kuruluşu’, *Belleten*, 42 (1978), 667-723.
2. The Çıldıroğulları were pashas nominated as governors to the region prior to becoming a powerful dynastic family. In this respect, they were different from most *ayan* families.
3. Compare Y. Cezar, ‘Bir Âyanın Muhallefatı’, *Belleten*, 41/161 (1977), 41-78 with M. Aktepe, ‘Manisa Âyanlarından Kara Osman Oğlu Mustafa Ağa ve Üç Vakfiyesi Hakkında bir Araştırma’, *VD*, 9 (1971), 367-82; idem, ‘Kara Osman Oğlu Hacı Osman Ağa’ya Ait İki Vakfiye’, *VD*, 10 (1973), 161-75; idem, ‘Kara Osman Oğlu Mehmed Ağa bn. Hacı Ömer Ağa’, *VD*, 11 (1976), 57-66.



Map 1: The Domains of the *Ayan* Families

During the Beylicate (fourteenth-fifteenth centuries) and the Classical (sixteenth-seventeenth centuries) periods of Ottoman architecture, the sultan and members of his family, the *akıncı beyleri*, members of the administration and members of the court were the main patrons in architectural activities. They endowed mainly *külliyes*, that is, architectural complexes, which included a variety of buildings accommodating religious, economic, social and cultural institutions. These large complexes played an important role in the formation of neighbourhoods in cities and thus contributed to the urbanisation process of settlements. Their monumental appearance formed landmarks relating art and architecture to political power and ideology to urbanisation.

Architecture and art were organised through court institutions and were shaped in accordance with the preferences of the ruling class. The corps of royal architects (*hassa mimarları*) was responsible for the construction of buildings sponsored by these classes. This institution also had offices in the large cities of the Empire and when members of the administration were sent as governors to provincial cities, they could obtain architects either from these local offices or from the centre in Istanbul. Similarities in architectural plan from one region of the Empire to another show that even though local architectural features could have dominated the construction of a building, the plan and the general configuration of the monuments reflected the same architectural source, which originated in the capital. Therefore, traditions, forms and details innovated in the capital were consequently spread to the provinces through the taste of the sponsors sent from Istanbul. These officials could ask for the construction of various buildings in different places of the Empire following the pace of their nomination from one place to another and they could endow large *vakıfs* with a view to keeping up and upgrading these buildings.

At the end of the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century, however, the patronage shifted to members of the *ayan* families, local notables who increased

their power first by the advantages of an official nomination by the state and then by the increase of land and money gained through the advantages of this administrative power.

Archival sources reveal important information on architects and on the construction of buildings when imperial patronage is involved. When it comes to the patronage of *ayan* families we mainly rely on endowment deeds, land registers and to some extent on the *kadı sicilleri* (when a legal issue arose). Therefore, information on the architect of a building, money spent for its construction, the origin of the construction material, etc. are issues hard to follow up within the history of the architectural construction system. Therefore, there is no evidence concerning involvement of the royal architects in the building activities of these local architectural patrons. This activity had to be based on the income of the *ayan* family and it also had to reflect its prestige as mighty and influential landlords who were capable of protecting and concerning themselves with the people of the region, looking after their public needs, and establishing order.


The Karaosmanoğlu Family

Let us first look at the patronage of the members of the Karaosmanoğlu family, one of the most influential *ayan* families of western Anatolia. Archival material shows that the members of this family were actively involved as *ayan* around Manisa and Bergama from the end of the seventeenth century to the beginning of the nineteenth century. İnci Kuyulu has published a catalogue of buildings built by the Karaosmanoğulları; the bibliography of her book also gives all references to the archival material on members of this family.⁴ Kuyulu's research relies both on field surveys and on *vakıf* documents and therefore constitutes the most complete monographic research on the patronage of this family.

The building activity of the Karaosmanoğulları covers mainly urban centres, such as Bergama, Manisa, İzmir, Aydın, Kırkağaç, Akhisar, Gördes, Turgutlu, Kınık, and Soma. Rural centres, that is, villages or small settlements like Örenli, Tatarislaıköy, Kaynacık, Kaşemiye, Bayındır, Ahmetli, Parsa, Gelenbe, and Çobanisa were endowed with only one building each. The family lands were concentrated in and around Zeytinliova. Almost every member of the family from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century constructed a public building or a mansion in or near Zeytinliova. As the name of the settlement suggests (Olive Plain), land in this region must have been extremely rich for cultivation, as the other lands owned by the same family in western Anatolia were.

Even though the Karaosmanoğulları were rich landlords, their architectural patronage suggests that they were much more interested in trading their agricultural production in other regions and lands. In fact, they constructed 25 city khans in

4. İ. Kuyulu, *Kara Osman-oğlu Ailesine Ait Mimari Eserler* (Ankara 1992). The list of buildings referred to in this paper has been compiled from this book.




List 1: Karaosmanoğulları khans (1742-1862)


various urban and rural settlements with a concentration in the cities of Manisa and Bergama (list 1).

City khans are commercial buildings which confirm regional and transit-trade-orientated activities within a city (ill. 1-2). It is an architectural type of building common in Ottoman lands from the fourteenth century onwards and the khans' architectural plan was not much transformed in all the provinces of the Ottoman Empire until the second half of the nineteenth century. Khans in Bursa, Tokat, Istanbul, Damascus, and Aleppo were important examples which also revealed the extent of commercial activity in a region. These khans were two-storey buildings constructed around a courtyard where the merchandise arriving by caravans was unloaded. The stores and the stables were on the ground floor, whereas the offices of the merchants were on the first floor. In some cases the upper-storey rooms could be rented for the night. The general appearance of the buildings was almost standard with alternative layers of brick and stone construction in general, an imposing entrance and galleries overlooking the courtyard. The rooms were simple without any decoration and the only change in architectural style would be in the form of the arches or in the proportions of the khan's various architectural parts according to historical periods; for instance, pointed arches were used before the eighteenth century and round ones afterwards.

The distribution of Karaosmanoğulları khans both in urban and rural areas suggests that these buildings were constructed probably following a network of roads which led to places where the trading material would first be gathered at first hand and would consequently be directed to regional urban centres like Manisa and Bergama for its distribution. Bridges (two) were probably constructed as link spots



List 2: Karaosmanoğulları mosques (1742-1862)

List 3: Karaosmanoğulları *konaks* (1742-1862)

in this network. The patronage of these buildings by one family would also suggest a control and maybe even a monopoly on transit trade in the region.

The mosques constructed were half as many as the khans (list 2). Most of them are known only through the endowment deeds, which suggest that they were small *mesçids* in rural areas. The mosque of Hacı Mustafa Ağa in Zeytinliova (eighteenth century) and the New Mosque in Bergama built by Karaosmanoğlu İbrahim Nazif Ağa (nineteenth century) are both relatively modest buildings built in part of rubble stone. Not dominating the town's urban fabric, they both have a single rectangular space as a prayer hall divided by wooden columns into a gallery placed on three sides of the building except for the mihrab wall. The ceiling is a flat wooden one

showing the simple neo-Classical decorative woodwork of the century. The *son cemaat yeri* flanking its north side and thus the street facade of the building attracts the attention with its arcades and plastered walls. Wall-paintings representing – in accordance with the fashion of the period – natural landscapes or floral decorations adorn in bands the upper part of the inner walls just below the wooden ceiling.⁵ Special attention was generally given to the ablutions fountain (*şadırvan*), decorated in stone relief with the floral ornamental repertory of the eighteenth century.

Unlike the mosques, the number of *konaks* built by members of the Karaosmanoğlu family equals that of the khans (list 3). It is as if the money earned from commercial activities was reinvested in houses, which suggests a close relation between investment in commerce and investment in housing. Many of these mansions have not been preserved to our day and those which could have been conserved are largely renovated and changed from their original state (ill. 3). These mansions were constructed within a large garden or a large courtyard with other ancillary buildings including stables, bath, kitchen, a fountain, etc. The mansions of the Karaosmanoğlu family were not lavishly decorated, but specific places like fountains, fireplaces and the central part of the ceilings were reserved for decorative panels in relief on stone, plaster or wood, representing the three-dimensional floral patterns of the eighteenth-century Ottoman baroque style.

Intellectual activity was not neglected either since we find four *medreses*, a primary school and four libraries constructed by the members of the same family. A hospital, a caravanserai, three baths, a *tekke* and two bridges complement the variety of the building activity undertaken by the Karaosmanoğlu family. The bath in Zeytinlioğlu which belongs to the *konak* is lavishly decorated as a private bath with painted high relief in plaster representing bouquets of flowers.

The patronage of the Karaosmanoğulları covers a large range of building activities and demonstrates how this notable family felt the need to provide for various aspects of social and cultural life of the region, and endowed and distributed parts of their income for this purpose. As they were based as landlords in Zeytinlioğlu, the settlement flourished through the patronage of the *ayan* family and was animated by its presence. The members of the family were mainly engaged in commerce and transit trade, a reason why their patronage covers cities and towns, but rarely villages. In other words, urban life was preferred to rural life. In this respect they resemble the Italian landlords who preferred to live in cities even though rural lands and cultivation provided most of their income.

The Cihanoğlu Family

The Cihanoğlu family was geographically almost a neighbour to the Karaosmanoğlu family since it was influential around Aydın. The origin of the family is considered to go back to the sixteenth century to a Turkish tribe. Cincin village near

5. For more information on wall-paintings see R. Arık, *Batılılaşma Dönemi Anadolu Tasvir Sanatı* (Ankara 1976); G. Renda, *Batılılaşma Döneminde Türk Resim Sanatı* (Ankara 1977).

Aydın is considered to be the capital of the *ayanlık*, as Zeytinliova was for the Karaosmanoğulları. Koçarlı, Haydarlı, and Dedeköy were the other main settlements of this family where one can find also their architectural patronage.⁶

The variety of the buildings undertaken by the Karaosmanoğlu family mainly in urban areas of western Anatolia does not apply to the Cihanoğulları. Their patronage was mainly in rural parts and in small villages and settlements. As landlords they dominated their lands and protected them with their soldiers. Their mansions included high towers and protective walls around their immediate area of settlement.

The 'fortress', various mansions, the tower, the bath and the mosque built at Cincin village show a feudal organisation in space representing a self-protective approach rather than an open and expanding concept of shared space.⁷ Various buildings, rose gardens, oil manufacturing places, the *haremlık* and *selamlık* parts of the Cihanoğulları *konak*, and a cemetery were placed on different terraces on different levels of the fortress. Buttresses supported what was left over from the walls of this fortress.

The mosque, built by Abdülaziz bin Mehmed bin Abdullah at the opposite side of the fortress in the middle of the eighteenth century, showed regional features such as a single hall covered by a wooden ceiling (ill. 4-5). A gallery supported by wooden columns was placed on three sides of the mosque from the outside. The elaborately painted plaster mihrab and its twisted columns on both sides are unique in Ottoman architecture, representing features of Ottoman baroque style.⁸ Reminiscent of the baldachin in St Peter's at the Vatican, the form of the mihrab does not have an earlier precedent in Ottoman art and did not lead to other subsequent examples either. A carpet now in a Polish collection was exhibited during the Turkish-Polish Exhibition at the Museum of Turkish and Islamic Arts in Istanbul; it dated from the eighteenth century, came from western Anatolia, and showed the same twisted columns as on the mihrab, which suggests that this particular form might have been preferred on decorative elements rather than on architectural forms. The design and the monumentality of this mihrab are in complete dichotomy with the proportions of the village mosque and its extremely simple and modest appearance. No such mihrab existed at this period in Istanbul or in other parts of the Empire and might suggest the work of craftsmen (Italian?) specially commissioned for the job. In fact, the western Anatolian *ayan* families, like the ones in the Balkans, were in

6. A. Arel, 'Ege Bölgesi A'yanlık Dönemi Mimarisi: 1986-1991 Çalışmaları', in *X. Araştırma Sonuçları Toplantısı: Ankara, 25-29 Mayıs 1992* (Ankara 1993), 231-47.
7. Eadem, 'Aydın Bölgesinde Âyan Dönemi Yapıları', in M. Başakman (ed.), *Ege'de Mimarlık Sempozyumu* (İzmir 1986), 148-64; eadem, 'Cincin Köyünde Cihanoğullarına Ait Yapılar', in *IV. Araştırma Sonuçları Toplantısı: Ankara, 26-30 Mayıs 1986* (Ankara 1987), 43-75.
8. D. Kuban, *Türk Barok Mimarisi Hakkında Bir Deneme* (İstanbul 1954); A. Arel, *Onsekizinci Yüzyıl İstanbul Mimarisinde Batılılaşma Süreci* (İstanbul 1975); eadem, 'Gothic Towers and Baroque Mihrabs: The Post-Classical Architecture of Aegean Anatolia in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries', *Muğarnas*, 10 (1993), 212-18.

direct commercial relations with Europe in the eighteenth century.⁹ This could have facilitated the direct infiltration of decorative forms to western Anatolia without the impact of the capital since the quality of style shows differences between the centre (the palace – the capital city) and the periphery (*ayan* – regions).

A similar decorative approach can be found in the mosques of the Cihanoğulları in Aydın and Koçarlı. Here again, in both cases, the voluptuous decoration of the interior is in contrast with the modest construction material and the simple provincial appearance of the building. The painted plaster mihrab and the part below the squinches in Aydın have a three-dimensional technical execution unique in Ottoman architectural decoration (ill. 6). The modulation of the C and S forms characteristic of baroque style reveals in this case, as do the twisted columns of Cincin mosque, non-Anatolian origins.

The mosque building, located on a terrace and reached by stairs underneath a medieval-looking vaulted gallery on street level, highlights the cityscape of Aydın as if to reinforce the Cihanoğlu presence in the city itself. Even though the family was a rural one preferring to live at the countryside, the monumental mosque and the later addition of a modest *medrese* building can be interpreted as a political statement. In fact, Aydın itself was a relatively new city which flourished under the authority of the Cihanoğlu family. The *sebil*, flanking on the side on the street level below the terrace and the decorated panel above it, has been interpreted by Arel as a heraldry sign of this *ayan* family (ill. 7).¹⁰

The stone relief panels decorating the facets of the *şadırvan* at the terrace level below the spectacular Italian-type palace stairs leading to the *son cemaat yeri* of the mosque combine baroque floral forms and plates filled with fruit like those one finds on the eighteenth-century facades of public fountains in Istanbul and on wood and wall paintings of the period (ill. 8). Tombstones, as examples of stone relief work in the region, are important in regard to the diffusion of the baroque style in the Aegean region. In fact, not only flowers and fruit but also representation of mosques and buildings were carved on tombstones, on *minbers*, and various other types of panels.¹¹ The scenes represented on stone also have their counterparts in the ornamental wall-paintings of domestic architecture or that of prayer halls of the mosques in the region.¹²

Similar stylistic features can be observed in the patronage of the Cihanoğulları in Koçarlı. The painted plaster work of the mihrab of the modest-looking mosque with its sculpture like flower bouquet is in this case almost kitsch. The decorative stone relief on the *kürsü* with its curvilinear form and its baroque stairway has its origins in churches (ill. 9-10).

9. G. Veinstein, '«Âyân» de la région d'Izmir et commerce du Levant (deuxième moitié du XVIII^e siècle)', *EB*, 1976/3, 71-83.

10. A. Arel, 'Taht-ı Kadim Bir Şehristan ile Güya İnciye Benzer Bir Cami-i Münevver ve Musanna ve Müferrih', *Dergi*, 3 (1980), 3-32.

11. G. Tunçel, *Batı Anadolu Bölgesinde Cami Tasvirli Mezartaşları* (Ankara 1989).

12. İ. Kuyulu, 'Geç Dönem Anadolu Tasvir Sanatından Yeni Bir Örnek Soma Damgacı Camii', *Arkeoloji-Sanat Tarihi Dergisi*, 4 (1988), 67-78.

The tower house in Koçarlı, on the other hand, represents not only the feudal organisation of the family as landlords (in fact no commercial building built by this family has been preserved) but, as Arel has pointed out in her excellent studies, the functional lineage of such buildings to fourteenth-century estates (*çiftlik*) and their architectural lineage to the medieval tower houses of the Mediterranean (ill. 11).

The Çapanoğlu Family

The Çapanoğlu *ayan* family was influential in central Anatolia, around contemporary Yozgat, then named Bozok Sancağı. Yozgat itself was a small village which flourished under the Çapanoğlu family from the eighteenth century onwards; Ahmed, the founder of the family, was born in the small settlement of Yozgat. Members of the family, like the Karaosmanoğulları, dominated the region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Unlike the case in western Anatolia, which was highly urbanised, the patronage of the members of the Çapanoğlu family extended mainly to small towns and villages (Kuşçu Köyü, Lök Köyü, Çalapverdi, Beyyurdu, Kadılı Köyü, Sarayköyü, Eskiköy, Kazlıuşağı, Şahmuratlı, and Yukarısarıkaya). There were not many established towns and cities in Bozok and if one follows up the chronology of building construction in Yozgat and its region, one gets the impression that a considerable effort was made to populate these isolated lands.¹³ Settling the new immigrants or the already existing nomadic tribes seems to have been a priority. This would explain why one can find so many small mosques and other modest buildings in numerous villages. A number of monumental public buildings were built in established towns, like the mosques and baths in Yozgat as well as the palace of the Çapanoğulları, but the main patronage is reflected in small settlements with small mosques and baths predominating. Unlike the Aegean families, nothing proves that the landlords cultivated their terrain. If one considers the nomadic tradition of the region that existed then and the lack of urbanisation before the eighteenth century, then one could suggest that the Çapanoğulları were engaged in stock-breeding rather than being agricultural landlords. Not many educational or any social welfare buildings were constructed either.

The monumental mosque built under the patronage of this family in Yozgat had to be enlarged because of an increase in the population of the city (ill. 12).¹⁴ The interior neo-Classical style of the building, the choice of the construction materials of cut stone and marble for certain architectural details, and the quality of the wall-paintings are reminiscent of the style of buildings in Istanbul. The clock-tower was constructed later in the nineteenth century in front of the mosque and transformed the place into a square. Small mosques were built in the modest tradition of single prayer halls with wooden galleries on three sides and a wooden ceiling. Wall paint-

13. The study by Hakkı Acun on the monuments of Bozok Sancağı, Yozgat and the Çapanoğlu family is in press. I would like to thank him for letting me see the manuscript before its publication.

14. R. Arık and M. Sözen, *Türk Mimarisinin Gelişimi ve Mimar Sinan* (Istanbul 1975), 301-04.

ings and floral decorations follow the style of the eighteenth century as in most parts of the Empire.

The patronage of the Çapanoğlu family covered the *vilâyet* of Bozok. This rich but architecturally modest patronage (except for the main mosque of Yozgat) successfully supported the urbanisation of the region and, in a landscape where no other constructions exist to form rival statements to those of the Çapanoğulları, it signifies novel changes in the region. Local stonemasons and local craftsmen were probably involved in the construction process; the earlier models for the monumental buildings and their architectural decoration had their roots in the style of the buildings in Istanbul.

The Çıldıroğlu Family

The Çıldıroğulları, a dynastic family in eastern Anatolia, differ from the preceding three. The members of this family were all pashas and were appointed governors of Çıldır. The palace of İshak Paşa constructed in 1784 like a bird's nest on top of a steep hill dominating the region could be seen from the plain below (ill. 13).¹⁵

The palace buildings, a mosque, a kitchen, the harem section and the mausoleum of its founder among various halls are organised around two courtyards with spectacular portals leading to each one. The organisation of space within these courtyards and the monumentality of the complex are completely different statements when compared with the '*çiftlik*' origins of the *ayan*'s estates in western Anatolia. The topographical use of the landscape for the expression of the power of the pasha refers also to an alienation of the governor from the everyday life of the region and fosters a natural area of protection and aura.

The surprising eclecticism in architectural planning and the decorative styles of the palace has always astonished the scholars who navigate between the revivalist, traditional and innovative elements of this architectural complex. The use of courtyards placed on a vertical axis, entrance to each courtyard being emphasised by monumental doors like the one in Topkapı Palace, is reminiscent not only of the Abbasid Palace of Samarra but also the Middle Eastern palaces of the seventeenth and eighteenth-century governors in Lebanon, such as the palace of Bedreddin.

The architectural structure and the decorative scheme of the courtyard portals make reference to the Seljuk period caravanserais of Anatolia from the eleventh to the thirteenth century. Similarities to these portals, as well as the medieval vaulting system of the kitchen, can also be seen in the nearby buildings of Ani, the capital of the Armenian kingdom before the eleventh century (ill. 14).

New decorative motifs and compositions in the baroque style were innovated by the local stoneworkers, connecting the new style of the Doğubayazıt Palace to the palace style in Istanbul at the same period.

15. Y. Bingöl, *İshak Paşa Sarayı* (Ankara 2000); M. Akok, 'Ağrı-Doğu Bayazıt İshak Paşa Sarayı Röleve ve Mimarisi', *Türk Arkeoloji Dergisi*, 10 (1960), 30-48.

The presence of a mosque and a mausoleum within the palace complex is rare in the Ottoman architecture of Anatolia and the Balkans. The Bağcesaray Palace constructed by the Crimean khans in Crimea shows in this respect similarities to the Doğubayazıt Palace (ill. 15).

Baroque Style and Ayan Architectural Patronage

A gradual change in the Classical style of Ottoman art and architecture can be perceived from the beginning of the eighteenth century onwards. New architectural forms and decorative motifs from the West, alien to Ottoman art, appear on the buildings of the capital. This new style, first seen as isolated forms or as foreign artistic quotations within a Classical context, gradually acquires a new expression mainly in the architectural decoration of the period. The dominant features of the new style were reminiscent of the baroque style found in various European countries.

Ottoman encounters with baroque art fostered in the eighteenth century the formation of the Ottoman baroque style, which has both similarities to and differences from its prototype(s). It is generally accepted that there is not a single baroque style but baroque styles. In fact, different versions of this new style can be seen mainly in Istanbul both in private and public buildings constructed by members of the palace or members of the high administrative class. The latter were also the mediators of this style in Anatolia; yet, the real patrons were the *ayan* who gained political and economic power in the provinces, almost creating a Western-type feudal system.

The Ottoman baroque as a style has at least two faces in the eighteenth century. One is formed by the direct imitation of European baroque's features and stylistic vocabulary; the other is designed by the re-interpretation of the perceived baroque principles within an Ottoman vocabulary. Changes in rhythm and the modular system, a growing taste for the voluminous and the curvilinear, defunctioning of architectural forms into ornaments were understandings of this baroque art that seem to have guided the Ottoman architect and the craftsmen in the formation of new 'baroque' forms unique to Ottoman art.¹⁶



One should not however look out in a building for a holistic baroque space conception based on optical illusion with a multitude of luxuriously disposed senseless details. The transcendental space of baroque could not have existed in the Ottoman world. The baroque style is a new dress on an already existing Classical structure; therefore, it is reduced to a relatively low-profile architectural decoration when compared with its counterparts in Europe, but displays, on the other hand, a variety of fresh solutions *alla turca* for the Ottoman architectural decoration of the eighteenth century.

Eclecticism and the use of new and traditional elements at the same time seem to be a characteristic feature of all the *ayan* buildings discussed above. However, the dominant style is the baroque, which, with its expressive forms that are almost

16. F. Yenişehirlioğlu, 'Western Influences on Ottoman Architecture in the 18th Century', in G. Heiss and G. Klingenstein (eds), *Das Osmanische Reich und Europa, 1683 bis 1789: Konflikt, Entspannung und Austausch* (Vienna 1983), 153-79.

different from each other from one region to another, must have impressed the beholder. It is as if the members of the *ayan* families chose the baroque style as a new and modern visual expression of the period and of their status. The eclecticism involved in this style was a means of defining an original visual grammar of their own alone, different from the palace style in Istanbul, and also different from that of the other *ayan*. In fact, the choice and quality of this baroque is provincial rather than palatial and is definitely more kitsch than the baroque decorative style of Istanbul. Thus, it became a style of the nouveaux riches – the *ayan* families – rather than a mere desire to imitate the sultan and his entourage.


(Başkent University – Ankara)



Ill. 1: Manisa – Karaosmanoğlu city khan
plan (plan by İnci Kuyulu)



Ill. 2: Manisa – Karaosmanoğlu khan (Photograph by İnci Kuyulu)



III. 3: Zeytinliova – Karaosmanoğlu *konak* plan (plan by İnci Kuyulu)



III. 4: Cincin village – Cihanoğlu mosque mihrab



III. 5: Cincin village – Cihanoğlu mosque



III. 6: Aydın – Cihanoğlu mosque (plasterwork)



III. 7: Aydın – Cihanoğlu *sebil* (detail)



III. 8: Aydın – Cihanoğlu mosque (detail from the *şadırvan*)



Ill. 9: Koçarlı mosque (Cihanoğulları) (plasterwork)



Ill. 10: Koçarlı mosque (Cihanoğulları) (*kürsü*)



Ill. 11: Koçarlı tower house (Cihanoğulları)




Ill. 12: Yozgat – Çapanoğulları mosque



III. 13: Doğubayazıt Palace (Çıldiroğulları)



III. 14: Doğubayazıt Palace
(Çıldiroğulları): Portal



III. 15: Doğubayazıt Palace (Çıldiroğulları):
Mausoleum within the Palace courtyard

PART FOUR

PROVINCIAL ELITES IN THE LATE OTTOMAN PERIOD

LES ÉLITES URBAINES A L'ÉPOQUE DU TANZIMAT : LE CAS DE SALONIQUE

Émilie THÉMOPOULOU

Au XIX^e siècle, l'Empire ottoman connut des transformations économiques et sociales plus profondes qu'aux siècles précédents. Les changements apportés par la pénétration occidentale, les mutations survenues dans la société ottomane suite aux réformes du Tanzimat et la réorganisation de la structure intérieure des *millet* entraînèrent le renouvellement du tissu social dans les grands centres urbains.

L'essor extraordinaire des échanges commerciaux avec l'Europe, dû à la concurrence occidentale pour la suprématie sur les marchés de la Méditerranée orientale et notamment dans les villes-ports de l'Empire ottoman comme Salonique et Smyrne, eut pour résultat des mutations dans la structure économique et sociale de ces villes. L'évolution et la concentration des transactions vers les villes eurent pour conséquence le développement de l'économie urbaine. Le progrès de l'urbanisation impliquait l'apparition de nouvelles élites, dont la puissance provenait non seulement de leur position économique mais également de leur position sociale.

Nous allons examiner ici dans une première étape les facteurs spécifiques de la formation des élites au cours de la seconde moitié du XIX^e siècle à Salonique, les changements survenus dans leur composition par rapport à l'époque antérieure au Tanzimat, et rechercher quels étaient les groupes dominants en insistant sur les élites socio-économiques et sur les mutations sociales observées du fait de l'apparition de ces nouvelles élites urbaines.

Au début du XIX^e siècle et jusqu'aux années 1840, dans une société fragmentée qui évoluait jusqu'alors selon une ségrégation des groupes ethno-confessionnels, parmi les notables qui avaient la prééminence dans la société salonicienne figuraient les autorités locales, les rentiers et les propriétaires terriens, musulmans dans leur quasi-totalité, les grands négociants et les agents de change, dont la majeure partie étaient des non musulmans. Au milieu du XIX^e siècle, l'évolution de Salonique en fonction des besoins du marché et les mutations sociales de l'époque du Tanzimat eurent pour conséquence la formation de groupes socio-économiques nouveaux. La ville attirait en effet des hommes d'affaires orientés vers de nouvelles branches d'activités, comme par exemple le domaine bancaire, le domaine des assurances, des compagnies maritimes,¹

1. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de France (AMAE), C.C.C. Salonique, vol. 26, f. 117.

ou des représentants des établissements occidentaux et des professions libérales, leur nombre ne cessant de croître parmi les musulmans et les non musulmans de la ville du fait du développement de l'éducation. L'adaptation du commerce de la ville² aux conditions du commerce international engendra donc la diversification professionnelle dans la société, par l'existence de nouveaux métiers adaptés aux conditions de l'époque. Le développement économique et l'industrialisation de la ville se manifestaient par l'existence de nouveaux groupes sociaux, qui contribuèrent à leur tour au renouvellement de la stratification sociale à l'intérieur de chaque communauté, évolution qui est en fait l'expression de la transformation du tissu social de Salonique.

Les effets du Tanzimat sur les populations non musulmanes et les changements intervenus dans les conditions du commerce favorisèrent la formation de groupes socio-économiques puissants. Au cours de cette époque, les commerçants ne se contentaient plus, comme au début du XIX^e siècle, du commerce d'importation et d'exportation et élargissaient le terrain de leurs activités. Ils devenaient donc des hommes d'affaires³ et des banquiers,⁴ des fondateurs et actionnaires de banques privées,⁵ des entrepreneurs, des fermiers des impôts,⁶ et aussi des industriels au moment de la création des premières industries à Salonique et dans la région de Macédoine. Ces hommes d'affaires aux activités très variées, des musulmans, des Grecs et en majeure partie des juifs, tenaient entre leurs mains une partie importante de l'économie de la ville⁷ et de l'arrière-pays. Le développement des centres urbains comme centres d'exportation des produits agricoles, vers le milieu du XIX^e siècle, engendra autour des villes la formation de régions dépendant d'elles,⁸ leurs

2. AMAE, Nouvelle Série, No 479, f. 43-50.

3. Le *Salname* de 1890, par exemple, mentionne 22 grandes entreprises commerciales, dont 4 appartenaient aux musulmans, 4 aux Grecs, et le reste aux juifs ; AMAE, C.C.C. Salonique, vol. 24, f. 123-28.

4. Public Record Office, Londres : Foreign Office (FO) 78/441, f. 130-31 ; AMAE, C.C.C. Salonique, vol. 24, f. 128-30 ; E. Hekimoglou, *Τράπεζες και Θεσσαλονίκη 1900-1936. Όψεις Λειτουργίας και το Πρόβλημα της Χωροθέτησης* [La Section bancaire à Salonique 1900-1936. Fonctionnement et distribution spatiale] (Salonique 1987), 23-35 ; *id.*, *Θεσσαλονίκη, Τουρκοκρατία και Μεσοπόλεμος* [Salonique pendant la domination ottomane et la période entre les deux guerres] (Salonique 1996), 217-34.

5. E. Hekimoglou et E. Danacioglou, *Η Θεσσαλονίκη πριν από 100 Χρόνια. Το Μετέωρο Βήμα προς τη Δύση* [Salonique en XIX^e siècle. La marche vers l'Occident] (Salonique 1998), 21.

6. Les frères Abbott furent les associés du gouverneur Yusuf Paşa dans l'affermage des impôts ; AMAE, C.C.C. Salonique, vol. 24, f. 226 ; FO 78/441, f. 131.

7. E. Themopoulou, « Salonique 1800-1875 : Conjoncture économique et mouvement commercial », Thèse de doctorat, Université Paris I Panthéon – Sorbonne, 1994, 4 : 252-56, 291-97.

8. S. Faroqhi, « Coping with the Central State, Coping with Local Power: Ottoman Regions and Notables from the Sixteenth to the Early Nineteenth Century », in F. Adanır et S. Faroqhi (éds), *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography* (Leiden 2002), 364-65.

relations étant fondées sur les échanges commerciaux. La suprématie de Salonique, notamment, après le développement des communications maritimes et terrestres, sur les régions rurales environnantes favorisait en effet la position de ses négociants et entrepreneurs et l'influence économique qu'ils exerçaient sur la population rurale.⁹ C'est donc au cours de cette période, après les transformations du système ottoman de la propriété foncière,¹⁰ que l'on constate l'introduction dans la propriété de la terre des hommes d'affaires¹¹ et des capitaux provenant du commerce.

Ces groupes nouveaux dominaient la scène sur le plan économique¹² et social et, étant souvent les représentants de leur communauté d'appartenance, ils furent des intermédiaires entre le pouvoir ottoman et la population non musulmane. Leur position économique était par ailleurs favorisée par leurs rapports avec les autorités locales, question sur laquelle nous reviendrons par la suite. Leur développement étant dû en majeure partie aux mutations de la structure économique et sociale de Salonique, ils essayèrent d'établir leur suprématie en développant aussi une activité sociale dans l'ensemble de la société de la ville. L'expansion commerciale occidentale dans les provinces européennes de l'Empire contribua à son tour au renforcement de la position d'une « nouvelle » bourgeoisie issue des négociants, des entrepreneurs, des banquiers et des professionnels libéraux, en majeure partie parmi les non musulmans.

L'examen de la formation des élites locales à Salonique au cours de la seconde moitié du XIX^e siècle nous conduit à observer qu'elles ne sont pas constituées principalement des autorités locales, notamment militaires de carrière, des propriétaires terriens et des hommes d'affaires, une composition similaire à celle de l'époque antérieure au Tanzimat. A la formation des élites participèrent en effet des éléments nouveaux, issus des transformations survenues dans la société en pleine transition que fut celle de Salonique. Un point important, donc, dans la constitution des élites est la participation, en dehors des autorités locales, des fonctionnaires de

9. FO, 175/196, f. 74-80 ; 78/952, f. 172-75.

10. Ö. L. Barkan, *Türkiye'de Toprak Meselesi* (Istanbul 1980).

11. AMAE, C.C.C. Salonique, vol. 24, f. 408.

12. FO 195/176, f. 299-300. Les familles puissantes juives de Morpurgo, Allatini, Fernandez, Modiano, Misrachi, la famille Abbott (d'origine britannique, installée depuis la fin du XVIII^e siècle dans la ville), les familles grecques Gravari, Antoniadi, Zanna, Angelaki, Dimitriadis, Rogotti et aussi la famille Papazoglou furent des négociants, des banquiers et des propriétaires terriens. Voir aussi J. Nehama, *Histoire des Israélites de Salonique* (Salonique 1978), VII : 658-66, 701-05 ; K. Moskof, *Θεσσαλονίκη: Τομή της Μεταπρατικής Πόλης* [Salonique: Anatomie d'une ville compradore] (Salonique 1978), 98-99 ; A. Vakalopoulos, *Ιστορία της Θεσσαλονίκης* [Histoire de Salonique] (Salonique 1983) ; K. Tomanas, *Οι Κάτοικοι της Παλιάς Θεσσαλονίκης* [Les habitants de l'ancienne ville de Salonique] (Athènes 1992), 37-38 ; E. Hekimoglou, « The Jewish Bourgeoisie in Thessaloniki, 1906-1911: Assets and Bankruptcies », in K. Hassiotis (éd.), *The Jewish Communities of Southeastern Europe* (Salonique 1997), 175-83 ; M. Anastassiadou, *Salonique, 1830-1912. Une ville ottomane à l'âge des réformes* (Leiden-New York-Cologne 1997).

l'administration publique formant la nouvelle classe des bureaucrates et celle des membres de la « nouvelle » bourgeoisie de la ville. Les efforts du pouvoir central pour renforcer son influence dans l'administration provinciale, dans le cadre de la réorganisation administrative, impliquaient la création de nouveaux postes dans la fonction publique locale et dans la municipalité. Des musulmans, en grande majorité, employés comme fonctionnaires constituaient la nouvelle classe des bureaucrates. La participation des autorités locales aux élites nous amène à mieux comprendre les rapports entre le pouvoir central et l'administration provinciale. Aux mutations de la société salonicienne participèrent les notables, les *muteberan* de l'époque, désignés dans les *Salname*,¹³ qui étaient des éléments nouveaux ayant la prééminence dans la société salonicienne : le gouverneur du *vilâyet*, pour commencer, qui était aussi gouverneur de la ville, mais aussi le président de la municipalité et les membres du conseil municipal, le président du tribunal, les contrôleurs des compagnies ferroviaires, le directeur du service de la poste, et enfin les directeurs des banques, particulièrement ceux de la Banque Ottomane et de la Banque Agricole. Toutefois, les officiers, les professionnels libéraux et les journalistes faisaient également partie des élites. Il ne faut pas non plus oublier les consuls occidentaux et les Européens résidant en ville. La liste est donc longue, du haut fonctionnariat local, qui se trouvait en relations étroites avec les hommes d'affaires et les entrepreneurs de la ville, tous faisant partie des nouvelles élites. Le développement de l'économie urbaine impliquait en effet des rapports étroits entre les hommes d'affaires et les hauts fonctionnaires de l'administration locale, dans le but d'investir dans le développement de la région. Toutefois, les relations des hommes d'affaires avec les autorités locales étaient dûes aussi au fait qu'ils constituaient des éléments nouveaux approuvant les initiatives dans la société de la ville.

Les conceptions nouvelles mises en œuvre dans l'administration urbaine impliquaient la présence d'une partie des élites de la ville. Dès 1864, le Règlement des provinces, *Vilâyet Nizamnamesi*, et en 1867 le Règlement pour l'organisation des municipalités, des *belediye*, et des conseils municipaux, furent des étapes importantes dans l'administration des villes. Les travaux d'infrastructure comme la construction des ports et des routes, effectuée par l'État dans le but de renforcer sa position dans les provinces, faisaient apparaître des protagonistes nouveaux. Car tous ces ouvrages étaient placés en fait sous le contrôle direct des gouverneurs du *vilâyet*, avec la collaboration de la municipalité. A Salonique par exemple, en 1869, Sabri Paşa reçut de l'État les pleins pouvoirs pour la démolition des remparts de la ville,¹⁴ la construction du quai de débarquement et le tracé de l'avenue principale du marché, qui portait son nom. Il supervisa personnellement les travaux et se trouva à la base des initiatives de projets importants de rénovation de l'espace public. La présence relativement brève d'Ömer Fevzi Paşa et celles de Midhat Paşa, en 1873, auteur de la première Constitution, et de son successeur, Galip Paşa, entre les années 1880 et 1890, ancien ministre des finances d'Abdülmeçid, sont liées à

13. Selânik Vilâyeti Salnamesi, 1318 (1902-03).

14. AMAE, C.C.C. Salonique, vol. 26, f. 72, 78.

des grands projets de réaménagement de l'espace urbain. La présence des autorités locales dans les marchés publics, mais également dans les soirées et les réceptions dans lesquelles on observe la coexistence des différentes composantes de la population, les plaçait donc parmi les élites urbaines.

Au cours de la seconde moitié du XIX^e siècle, la participation des grands propriétaires fonciers, des négociants et des entrepreneurs à certains conseils administratifs provinciaux¹⁵ (*vilâyet idare meclisi*), avec les autorités locales, les mit dans une situation favorable vis-à-vis des habitants de la province et renforça leur position sociale dans la ville. Les conseils administratifs locaux, qui exprimaient la volonté de renforcement et de consolidation du pouvoir central, assuraient en effet la participation des grands propriétaires fonciers musulmans et des hommes d'affaires, dont deux non musulmans, dans l'administration de la province. Par leur participation, les membres des élites furent donc un intermédiaire entre le pouvoir ottoman et la population locale. Quant à ces derniers, il faudrait toutefois prendre en considération qu'ils furent choisis en fonction de leur activité professionnelle comme représentants de la population non musulmane de Salonique.¹⁶ Leur participation, également, aux tribunaux mixtes de commerce dans les grands centres urbains de l'Empire, comme à Istanbul et Salonique, après la promulgation du Code commercial, renforça leur position dans l'ensemble de la société ottomane mais également à l'intérieur de leur communauté d'appartenance.

L'occidentalisation, en tant qu'idée directrice de la période des réformes, eut pour répercussion l'introduction de comportements nouveaux dans plusieurs aspects de la vie urbaine. Au cours de cette époque, on assiste à de nouvelles formes de sociabilité. Les réceptions et les soirées qui avaient lieu impliquaient la coexistence du gouverneur de la province, des hauts fonctionnaires de l'administration locale, des hommes d'affaires, des représentants des non musulmans au conseil administratif de la province, des consuls et des Occidentaux habitant dans la ville. La création d'associations, dont la plus importante, le « Cercle de Salonique », placée sous la présidence du gouverneur, du *vali* lui-même, favorisait la rencontre des gens aisés, en assurant une sociabilité entre chrétiens, musulmans et juifs qui jouissaient d'un certain « prestige social ». Il faudrait toutefois dire que la sociabilité élargie que l'on observe avait lieu en direction des groupes socio-économiques dominants et des dirigeants qui faisaient partie des nouvelles élites de Salonique.

Ces nouvelles formes de sociabilité impliquaient l'introduction de comportements aussi interculturels que la constitution de sociétés d'études, d'associations culturelles et de cercles sociaux. Le progrès économique de la ville favorisait le développement culturel, la création d'écoles, la publication de journaux et de revues et les actes de philanthropie soutenus par des hommes d'affaires qui, désormais, ne se contentaient plus d'une bienfaisance destinée à leur communauté d'appartenance, mais s'adressaient à l'ensemble de la société de la ville.

15. FO 198/14, f. 456-57 ; İ. Ortaylı, *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Yerel Yönetim Geleneği* (Istanbul 1985), 60-75.

16. FO 78/952, f. 167-68.

Les progrès socio-économiques de la ville favorisèrent le développement des élites intellectuelles, qui, toutefois, se situaient en dehors du cadre des relations sociales décrit plus haut. Car, vers la fin du XIX^e siècle, dans la région de Macédoine, la formation des élites intellectuelles fut aussi en partie liée aux aspirations nationales des groupes ethniques. Il s'agit plutôt d'une « conciliation » des aspirations nationales émergentes des *millet* avec le concept d'État ottoman.

La modernisation ottomane eut pour effet des transformations dans les grandes villes. Le développement de l'urbanisation, en tant qu'élément unificateur d'une société fragmentée qui avait évolué jusqu'alors selon une ségrégation des groupes ethno-confessionnels, contribua à l'aménagement de nouveaux espaces dans la ville,¹⁷ désormais accaparés par des groupes socio-professionnels. Le développement et le début d'industrialisation se manifestèrent par l'existence de nouveaux groupes socio-économiques puissants, faisant partie des nouvelles élites urbaines, qui sont en fait l'expression du renouvellement de la structure sociale, dans une société en pleine mutation comme le fut celle de Salonique à l'aube du XX^e siècle.

(Université d'Ioannina)

17. A. Yerolympos et V. Colonas, « Un urbanisme cosmopolite », in G. Veinstein (éd.), *Salonique 1850-1918. La « ville des juifs » et le réveil des Balkans* (Paris 1992), 158-76 ; A. Karadimou-Yerolympos, *Μεταξύ Ανατολής και Δύσης: Βορειοελλαδικές Πόλεις στην Περίοδο των Μεταρρυθμίσεων* [Entre l'Orient et l'Occident. Les villes de la Grèce du Nord à l'âge des Réformes] (Athènes 1997), 132-60 ; M. Cerasi, *Osmanlı Kenti: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda 18. ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Kent Uygarlığı ve Mimarisi* (Istanbul 2001), 47-60 ; V. Hastaoglou, « Από τις Σκάλες του Λεβάντε στις Σύγχρονες Εμπορικές Προκυμαίες » [Des échelles du Levant aux quais contemporains], in *Πρακτικά του Β' Διεθνούς Συνεδρίου: Η Πόλη στους Νεότερους Χρόνους. Μεσογειακές και Βαλκανικές Όψεις (19ος-20ός αι.)* [Actes du 2^{ème} Congrès International: La ville aux temps modernes. Aspects méditerranéens et balkaniques (XIX^e-XX^e siècles)] (Athènes 2000), 51-68.

**ABD AL-RAHMAN PASHA AL-YUSUF,
A NOTABLE IN DAMASCUS (1873/74-1920)***

Martin STROHMEIER

Provincial elites have occupied a prominent place in the history of Ottoman Syria (1517-1918), although their relations with the central government and its local officials varied considerably during these four centuries. Members of these elites came to serve as intermediaries between the provincial administration and the population since Ottoman governors (*vali*) were “perceived as outsiders” and not familiar with local conditions and the vernacular.¹ Therefore, they had to rely on influential indigenous groups to support them in their duties. Badly paid government officials could easily be bought off by notables (*a'yan*); corruption was widespread. However, the state was not entirely powerless vis-à-vis the notables. Since they competed with each other for influence, state recognition and posts, the administrators tried to play them off against each other. The *a'yan*, particularly in the nineteenth century, were usually well informed about the intentions of the provincial administration because clients or sons and other relatives were employed in government offices. Governors could hardly take any measure or send a report to the *mahruse* without the knowledge of the notables. This fact considerably reduced the scope for action of *valis*. In many cases the notables had good contacts in government circles in the capital, e.g., as deputies. They were able to enforce the removal of governors or other officials who did not serve their interests.²

Traditionally, the notables consisted of three groups: the learned class (*ulama*, *ilmiyye*), the leaders (*aghawat*) of the local janissaries (*yerliyye*) who were involved in manufacturing and trade, and a third group of tax-farmers and merchants whose influence in administrative affairs was negligible until well into the first half of the nineteenth century. A merging of these groups in Damascus towards the middle of

* I would like to thank my colleague Jim Gelvin (University of California, Los Angeles) for making available to me records concerning Abd al-Rahman al-Yusuf in British and French archives. In addition to these records, I have also examined further material in the Archives Diplomatiques (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères) in Nantes.

1. P. S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1860-1920* (Cambridge, Mass. 1983), 2.
2. I have attempted to analyse the ways in which two governors in Aleppo and Beirut dealt with the ‘politics of notables’: ‘Die Erfahrungen zweier osmanischer Valis in Bilād aş-Şām’, *ArchOtt*, 21 (2003), 219-43.

the century led to the appearance of a new group which combined landownership and the holding of administrative posts.³ The wealth of these notables derived from their considerable land properties which they were able to acquire legally thanks to the practice (but not the intent) of the Tanzimat land laws.⁴ Other factors strengthening the control of the notables over their land and increasing its value were the termination of nomadic disturbances, the commercialisation of agriculture⁵ and “the development of modern means of communication and transport”.⁶ In Damascus, the most powerful members of this rather new group in the provincial elite numbered approximately twelve families, followed by a group of about fifty families whose prestige was somewhat more limited.⁷

One of those dozen families of notables was the al-Yusuf. This family of Kurdish stock was, in comparison to long-established dynasties such as the Azms, not only an “upstart”, but also a “relative newcomer” to Damascus.⁸ In less than a century, the Yusufs rose from rather insignificant immigrants to members of the provincial elite. Not much is known about the origins of the Yusufs. Apparently they came to Damascus at the end of the eighteenth century “from Diyarbakir where they had been livestock merchants”, probably with ties to the Bilad al-Sham.⁹ A possible motive for the migration of the family might have been the introduction of Kurdish troops, especially in Damascus, to protect the pilgrimage routes to the Hijaz;¹⁰ this motive has a certain plausibility as the post of commander of the caravan of pilgrims (*amir al-hajj*) became more or less a prerogative of the Yusufs in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The first member of the family who settled in the city was a certain Muham-

3. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 12.

4. D. Quataert, ‘The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914’, in H. İnalcık with D. Quataert (eds), *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 2: 1600-1914 (Cambridge 1999), 856 ff.

5. *Ibid.*, 848-53.

6. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 4-5.

7. *Ibid.*, 44-45.

8. B. Abu-Manneh, ‘The Genesis of Midhat Pasha’s Governorship in Syria 1878-1880’, in T. Philipp and B. Schaebler (eds), *The Syrian Land: Processes of Integration and Fragmentation. Bilād al-Shām from the 18th to the 20th Century* (Stuttgart 1998), 251-67; here: 261.

9. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 39. The Yusufs were not the only notable family of Kurdish origin in Damascus. Another famous family with a Kurdish background was al-Muradi, associated with the *ashraf* nobility (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) of the city: L. Schatkowski Schilcher, *Families in Politics: Damascene Factions and Estates of the 18th and 19th Centuries* (Stuttgart 1985), 19; A. Badran, *Al-Kawakib al-durriyya fi tarikh Abd al-Rahman Basha al-Yusuf* [The Shining Stars in the Era of Abd al-Rahman Pasha al-Yusuf] (Damascus 1339/1920-21), 8 (unfortunately, this book contains more eulogies than hard facts about the life of Abd al-Rahman).

10. N. Fuccaro, ‘Die Kurden Syriens: Anfänge der nationalen Mobilisierung unter französischer Herrschaft’, in C. Borck, E. Savelsberg and S. Hajo (eds), *Ethnizität, Nationalismus, Religion und Politik in Kurdistan* (Münster 1997), 301-26; here: 303.

mad ibn Yusuf; hence, the family came to be called al-Yusuf. In the 1830s, one of their offspring, Ahmad Agha (born in Damascus, died 1864),¹¹ was in the service of the Amir Bashir II al-Shihabi (1788-1840), ruler of Lebanon in the first decades of the nineteenth century, and received from him the village Majdal Anjar in the Bīqa plain.¹² After the re-establishment of Ottoman control in Lebanon and Syria, Ahmad, by now a pasha, managed to acquire even higher positions by becoming *amir al-hajj* and district governor of Hawran. Ahmad's son Muhammad (born 1255/1839-40, died 1896) was appointed commander of the caravan of pilgrims in 1277/1860-61; he also served as *qa'immaqam* of Homs and *mutasarrif* of al-Balqa, as well as district governor of Acre, Hawran, Tripoli and Hama. And, like many others of the new group of notables, Muhammad also became a member of the Administrative Council of the Province of Syria (*meclis-i vilâyet*) in the 1890s.¹³

The rise of the Yusufs and other leading notables suffered only a temporary setback during the governorship of Midhat Pasha in Syria in the years 1878 to 1880.¹⁴ The former Grand Vizier had been recalled from exile to reinforce the grip of the central government and to reduce the power of the notables in Damascus. Midhat dismissed Muhammad al-Yusuf as *mutasarrif* of Hama in 1878.¹⁵ The *vali* also tried, unsuccessfully, to undermine the position of Muhammad Sa'īd Shamdin, then *amir al-hajj*, by proposing to carry the pilgrims by sea via Beirut for economic reasons instead of using the usual overland route to Mecca. However, Midhat's plan was not received favourably at the Sublime Porte since Sa'īd Pasha enjoyed the support of high-ranking circles in the capital. A Foreign Office report described him as a man who "...uses his power to stir up troubles in the provinces if the *vali* does not submit to his dictation",¹⁶ a dictum with which the Ottoman authorities would certainly have agreed. The dismissal of the leading notables from their offices did not really affect them since they were firmly in the saddle. It was Midhat, then, who came off worst.

The Yusufs could not have acquired their extensive fortune and power if they had not allied themselves with another Kurdish clan, whose name I have just mentioned, the Shamdin. Unfortunately, the origins of this family are unclear as well. Its

11. Badran, *Kawakib*, 8. Schatkowski Schilcher, *Families in Politics*, 151-53, provides detailed information on the Yusufs.

12. Badran, *Kawakib*, 9; Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 39.

13. Badran, *Kawakib*, 10; Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 39-40.

14. His predecessor had been the celebrated historian Ahmed Cevdet Pasha who, according to a British diplomat in Istanbul, was said to have been "the most corrupt *vali*" in Damascus: Abu-Manneh, 'Genesis', 253; Cevdet himself had denounced corrupt officials: cf. C. K. Neumann, *Das indirekte Argument. Ein Plädoyer für die Tanzimāt vermittle der Historie. Die geschichtliche Bedeutung von Ahmed Cevdet Paşas Ta'rīh* (Münster 1994), 248-49.

15. The other notables whose terms of office were terminated by Midhat were Uthman Mardam Bey, *mutasarrif* of Hawran, and Hulu al-Abid, sub-governor of Nablus: Abu-Manneh, 'Genesis', 261.

16. Ibid.

eponym, Shamdin (d. 1860), was the son of a tribal leader called Musa from Acre. Towards the end of the eighteenth or beginning of the nineteenth century, Shamdin seems to have moved to al-Salihiyya, then a village to the north-west of Damascus, today a suburb. Here he succeeded in building up a power base among the Kurds of the local janissary garrison (*verliyye*) and acquiring the title of *agha*. The disbanding of the garrison in Damascus in 1859 did not bring about a loss of power of the family, as Shamdin's son, Muhammad Sa'id (d. 1900), became commander of a newly formed garrison (*awniyye*), again consisting of Kurdish irregulars.¹⁷ Yet, only one year later, Sa'id was banished to Mosul¹⁸ because his troops had joined the mob of Damascus in attacking the Christian quarter, Bab Tuma, and massacring its inhabitants in July 1860.¹⁹ Sa'id's exile did not result in a downturn of his career because of his success in restoring law and order in Mosul. Not only was he allowed to return to his home town, but he gained even higher offices. As district governor of Hawran he took the place of Ahmad al-Yusuf and as *amir al-hajj* he replaced Muhammad Pasha al-Yusuf (his future or already son-in-law) in the late 1860s.²⁰ These offices established or at least contributed considerably to the wealth of the family. It enabled Sa'id to buy large property, farms and villages in the Ghuta (the green belt surrounding Damascus), the Hawran and al-Qunaytira; he was also given land by Sultan Abdülhamid.²¹ By the 1890s, Sa'id was allegedly the biggest landowner in the whole Province of Syria.²²

The wealth and the landholdings of the family became even greater through a marriage alliance between the Shamdin and Yusuf clans. In the 1860s, Sa'id married his only daughter²³ to Muhammad Pasha al-Yusuf. The couple had one son, Abd al-Rahman, who inherited most of both families' fortune, property and offices.²⁴ We do

17. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 40; Schatkowski Schilcher, *Families in Politics*, 147-49.

18. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 40; Schatkowski Schilcher, *Families in Politics*, 149, mentions that he was exiled to Istanbul, but soon after accompanied the newly appointed governor, Namik Pasha, to Baghdad; perhaps it was during this period that he stayed in Mosul for some time.

19. L. Tarazi Fawaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860* (Berkeley 1994), 88.

20. 'Zu'ama al-Akrad': Khalid al-Azm, *Mudhakkarat Khalid al-Azm* [Memoirs of Khalid al-Azm] (Beirut 1973 [2nd ed.]), 1: 12.

21. Report, German Foreign Ministry, AA 177, R 14039, A 40985, 6; henceforth abbreviated German Report (the Report is translated *in toto* in the Appendix).

22. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 40.

23. Ibid., 39. Schatkowski Schilcher, *Families in Politics*, 153, mentions this daughter as being the only child.

24. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 39. Muhammad Pasha had thirteen children from four wives; see the family tree in Schatkowski Schilcher, *Families in Politics*, 152. According to Badran, *Kawakib*, 24, Abd al-Rahman was born in 1290/1873-74; Muhammad Kurd Ali, quoted by Badran, mentions as his year of birth 1284/1867-68. The German Report states that Abd al-Rahman was 50 to 53 years old in 1918. FO 882/24/128-34, 14 May 1919, 'Who's Who in Damascus', gives his age as 45 years. I am inclined to believe that this last date is more probable; hence, the lifespan referred to in the title of this article.

not know reasons and details for this alliance, but it seems fair to guess that since both families competed for influence among the Kurds of Salihyya, they might have decided to combine their wealth and power. Perhaps they realised that acting separately was less advantageous than united action; one might also suspect a certain Kurdish solidarity; finally, the above-mentioned loss of offices of the Yusufs to the Shamdins, happening at around the same time, might also have contributed to the combining of power and fortune.

After the death of his father in 1896, Abd al-Rahman became the head of the family and as such was responsible for the clans of the Shamdins and Yusufs. With the rise of the family to power, living in Salihyya no longer befitted the rank of the Yusufs, although many distantly related Shamdins continued to live there. Abd al-Rahman's father and grandfather had already moved to a more fashionable part of town, the extramural Suq Saruja, on account of its abundance of space and water as well as its strategic location between the walled city and al-Salihyya.²⁵ At the end of the nineteenth century the three wealthiest families of Damascus, the Abids,²⁶ Yusufs and Azms all lived in this quarter.²⁷ Their huge houses – the surface area of the Yusuf house was 2,070 square metres²⁸ – featured large ceremonial rooms where the notables held court and developed a network of relations with their neighbours.²⁹ More than that, these families became relatives by marriages which were likely to lead to political alliances.³⁰ It was in these mansions that they

25. Probably in the 1870s; Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 35, writes that the families still lived in Salihyya in the 1860s.

26. The most prominent member of this family was Ahmad Izzat Pasha (1851-1924), a close collaborator of Abdülhamid II; he is frequently confused with Ahmed İzzet Pasha (Furğaç) (1864-1937), a general who served as Grand Vizier during the Armistice period and as minister with various portfolios 1919-22. S. J. Shaw and E. Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol. II: *Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975* (Cambridge 1977), 214, write that Furğaç served as scribe to Abdülhamid and was behind the Hijaz railroad scheme; however, this person was Ahmad Izzat Pasha al-Abid. L. S. Schilcher, 'Railways in the Political Economy of Southern Syria 1890-1925', in Philipp and Schaebler (eds), *The Syrian Land*, 97-112 (here: 111), as well as in her *Families in Politics*, 156, mentions that al-Abid was Grand Vizier after World War I, but this person was Furğaç. Furğaç's memoirs were published under the title: *Denkwürdigkeiten des Marschalls Izzet Pascha. Ein kritischer Beitrag zur Kriegsschuldfrage*, trans. and ed. K. Klinghardt (Leipzig 1927).

27. The quarter was named after a Mamluk *amir* who had built here a small market (*suwayqa*) in the fourteenth century: A. Moaz, 'The Urban Fabric of an Extramural Quarter in 19th-Century Damascus', in Philipp and Schaebler (eds), *The Syrian Land*, 165-83; here: 165-66.

28. *Ibid.*, 169.

29. Many of these houses are described in Brigid Keenan's beautifully illustrated book: *Damascus: Hidden Treasures of the Old City* (London 2001).

30. The families of the Abids, Azms and Yusufs intermarried: Abd al-Rahman took the daughter of Khalil Pasha al-Azm as his wife; Hulu Pasha al-Abid was also married to an Azm girl; two of his grandsons (the children of Ahmad Izzat Pasha, the influential scribe of Sultan Abdülhamid) married two sisters of Abd al-Rahman; another sister was

served as arbitrators and mediators in disputes. Suq Saruja came to be called ‘Petit Istanbul’ because of the wealth and refined lifestyle of its inhabitants.³¹ Indeed, the Yusufs as well as other notable families established contacts not only with the imperial capital, but also with distinguished foreign personalities, thus acquiring a cosmopolitan outlook.³²

Whereas Abd al-Rahman hardly had any education beyond high school (*rüşdiye*),³³ his eldest son, after having attended the secondary school (*sultanî*) in Galatasaray (Istanbul), studied at the famous Theresianum in Vienna;³⁴ the younger sons went to school in Beirut; the daughters were educated by a French governess.³⁵ Abd al-Rahman is described as “not intelligent, self-opinionated, but not fanatical”.³⁶ On the other hand, his plans concerning the exploitation of his estates suggest that he was not lacking in ideas.³⁷ Furthermore, he is described as a “strict” Muslim, although he did not fast during Ramadan. He employed many Christians in his service and took very seriously the duty of giving alms. During the famine in Lebanon in World War I, Abd al-Rahman generously distributed grain to the poor.³⁸

For roughly half a century the Yusuf and Shamdin families provided the *amir al-hajj*, the commander of the pilgrim caravan which went from Damascus to Mecca every year. However, this post was not acquired free of charge; Abd al-Rahman had to pay an extraordinary sum, two thousand gold pounds, to keep his office.³⁹ The post not only gave prestige to its incumbent, but also profit and influence; the *amir al-hajj* could assign jobs for people and trade. The office brought Abd al-Rahman into contact with high-ranking personalities in the entire Muslim world.⁴⁰

In his capacity as *amir al-hajj*, Abd al-Rahman came into conflict with the Sharif of Mecca, Husayn ibn Ali, and suffered one of his – apparently – rare defeats. In early January 1909, at the end of the pilgrimage season, Abd al-Rahman complained to the recently appointed Sharif about the prevailing insecurity because tribesmen had attacked the railway around Medina.⁴¹ He was even said to have resigned from office in protest against the failure of Husayn to give protection to

married to Abdullah Mardam Bey, who did not have quite the same status as the three ruling families; cf. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 49.

31. Moaz, ‘Urban Fabric’, 166.

32. E.g., the Austrian and the German Kaiser; see German Report, 7-8.

33. He also had a private teacher; he knew Turkish and Arabic very well, and spoke some Kurdish, but knew only a few words of French: Badran, *Kawakib*, 25.

34. Ibid., 100; German Report, 1.

35. Ibid.

36. FO 882/24/128-34, 14 May 1919, ‘Who’s Who in Damascus’, quotation provided by Jim Gelvin.

37. German Report, 3.

38. Ibid., 6.

39. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 48.

40. German Report, 6.

41. E. Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism* (Urbana, Ill. 1973), 6. Husayn’s son Abdullah denies Abd al-Rahman’s allegation: Abdullah ibn al-Husayn, *Mudhakkirati* [My Memoirs] (n.p. 1998 [2nd ed.]), 42.

the caravan on its return to Damascus.⁴² In any case, Abd al-Rahman declared that the caravan would return by sea. This was regarded by the Sharif as an attempt to undermine his function of providing security for the pilgrimage at a crucial time, because this was the first *hajj* which took place under Husayn as recently appointed *amir* of Mecca (summer 1908). On the other hand, it seems that the Sharif saw this as an opportunity to make the government aware of his authority among the tribes or perhaps even to humiliate the government of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), all the more since Abd al-Rahman was a Unionist.⁴³ Therefore, Husayn opposed the intention of the *amir al-hajj* and appointed his brother Nasir and his son Abdullah to lead the caravan which proceeded without incident from Mecca to Medina and from there, by train, to Damascus.⁴⁴ Abd al-Rahman, on the other hand, returned on board the steamer 'Aida' via Beirut to Damascus without his retinue.⁴⁵ Abd al-Rahman's defeat increased the prestige of Sharif Husayn. Whereas the establishment of the Hijaz Railway (symbolising the presence of state authority in the Arabian Peninsula) had already reduced the significance of the *amir al-hajj*, the victory of Husayn further contributed to the decline of that office. Abd al-Rahman was "relieved of his duty" and the abolition of the office was considered.⁴⁶ Apart from that, it is hardly conceivable that Abd al-Rahman after the humiliation suffered ever again returned to the Holy Cities, at least not in his capacity as *amir al-hajj*.⁴⁷

Damascene notables such as the Azms and Yusufs had not been on friendly terms with Husayn even before his appointment as *amir* of Mecca. But this incident made Abd al-Rahman a fierce enemy of the Sharif.⁴⁸ Thus, when some years later the Arab movement gained momentum in Syria and received encouragement from the Hashemites, Abd al-Rahman and his fellow notables opposed the movement. We can assume that Abd al-Rahman had been a loyal follower of the Sultan, given his family's involvement with the post of *amir al-hajj*, especially in the context of the Panislamic policies of Abdülhamid and his land gifts. On the other hand, the Yusufs were on the Young Turks' side during their struggle against the absolutist regime of the Sultan.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, it seems rather unlikely that a sympathiser of the opposition Commit-

42. H. Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkeley 1997), 150.

43. J. Teitelbaum, *The Rise and Fall of the Hashimite Kingdom of Arabia* (London 2001), 56.

44. Abdullah, *Mudhakkarati*, 42-43.

45. al-Azm, *Mudhakkarati*, 90.

46. Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 151, 246.

47. The German Report suggests that he was still commander of the caravan in World War I. However, after the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in 1916 the caravan did not travel: *Records of the Hajj: A Documentary History of the Pilgrimage to Mecca*. Vol. 5: *The Hashimite Period (1916-1925)* (Chippenhams 1993), 51.

48. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 87.

49. J. L. Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire* (Berkeley 1998), 57.

tee of Union and Progress held such a significant post. In any case, we hear that Abd al-Rahman was among the supporters of Young Turk activities in Damascus in 1897 and even that "government measures" were taken against him and Muhammad Fawzi Pasha al-Azm, then president of the municipality.⁵⁰ Abd al-Rahman was in close contact with Tal'at Pasha. There is the story that he helped him to get out of jail for a sum of 20,000 to 30,000 pounds.⁵¹ Whatever the truth of this information, Abd al-Rahman had excellent relations with the Young Turks after 1908. He was elected on the ticket of the CUP to parliament in 1908 and re-elected in 1912.⁵² Abd al-Rahman proved to be a strong opponent of the nascent Arab movement: for example, he did not join the short-lived Arab Party (*al-Hizb al-Arabi*), a group which included nearly all Arab deputies supporting Arab interests (such as the demand for Arabic as the language of instruction in schools) in the Ottoman Empire.⁵³ Although not a member, he attended a group meeting in early April 1911, where he opposed the foundation of an Arab party and voiced the opinion that the "Turks were the rightful rulers of the empire and that their rule, under the CUP, was essentially enlightened and benevolent in nature".⁵⁴ Of course, there were protests among the other speakers.

By 1912, Abd al-Rahman was one of the three (out of 21 Syrian deputies) followers of the CUP in parliament; most of the Syrian deputies supported the Arabists in their demands for decentralisation and reform, although the government succeeded in dividing the Arabists.⁵⁵ Abd al-Rahman and Muhammad Fawzi Pasha al-Azm opposed the Arab Congress, which met in Paris in 1913, by denying that it was representative of the Arab provinces. Before the elections of 1914, which saw a marked increase in the number of Arab deputies, several leading notables from the Arab provinces, among them Abd al-Rahman, were selected for the *Meclis-i Ayan*.⁵⁶

When Cemal Pasha, the Commander of the IVth Ottoman Army, set himself up as the unrestricted ruler over Syria in World War I, he became suspicious of Abd al-Rahman on account of his extraordinary influence. But not even Cemal, referred to by his staff as Salah al-Din-i sani ('the second Saladin'),⁵⁷ dared to take action against Abd al-Rahman, who was clever enough to show him a certain degree

50. He served as Minister of Pious Foundations in the Cabinet of Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha in 1912/13; cf. Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 123; M. Gross, 'Ottoman Rule in the Province of Damascus, 1860-1909', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1979, 446, 466, quoted by A. Duri, *The Historical Formation of the Arab Nation: A Study in Identity and Consciousness*, trans. L. I. Conrad (London-New York-Sydney 1987), 262 n. 20.

51. German Report, 7.

52. R. Khalidi, 'Ottomanism and Arabism in Syria Before 1914: A Reassessment', in R. Khalidi, L. Anderson, M. Muslih and R. S. Simon (eds), *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York 1991), 50-69; here: 59.

53. S. Seikaly, 'Shukri al-'Asali: A Case Study of a Political Activist', in *ibid.*, 73-96; here: 86.

54. *Ibid.*

55. Khalidi, 'Ottomanism', 59.

56. Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 140, 176.

57. A. F. Erden, *Birinci Dünya Harbinde Suriye Hatıraları* (Istanbul 1954), I: 191.

of loyalty. At Cemal's request, he led a Kurdish unit, which he had equipped at his own expense, into the first of the two disastrous expeditions against the Suez Canal.⁵⁸ Enver, always distrustful of Cemal, tried to sound out Abd al-Rahman about Cemal's activities in Syria. But the Damascene notable told him that he did not know anything and that he did not want to get involved in politics. After Cemal Pasha left at the end of 1917, Abd al-Rahman was probably the most powerful civilian in Syria; he was often called on to arbitrate quarrels.⁵⁹

At the end of the war, however, Abd al-Rahman's prospects were not promising. The empire in which he and his family had risen to status and power had collapsed, the government and the party he had supported were gone. In Syrian politics the cards were reshuffled. The notables were ousted by their opponents, the victorious Arabists – officers of the Sharifian army and nationalists from modest backgrounds. Faysal, the son of Abd al-Rahman's arch-enemy Husayn, now became the dominant player in Damascene politics, together with the groups that had supported him. Among them were the Bakris, a family which did not belong to the *crème de la crème* in Damascus. At the end of the nineteenth century they had allied themselves with the Abids and competed with the Yusufs and Azms. Whereas the Bakris and Abids were followers of the Sultan, the latter supported the CUP.⁶⁰ The Bakris had been instrumental in making contacts between the Hashemites and the secret *al-Jam'iyya al-Arabiyya al-Fatat* (Young Arab Society, abbreviated: *al-Fatat*) in 1915. Relations of the Bakris with the Yusufs were therefore strained. Once again, the instrument of marriage alliance helped the Yusufs to stay on top and to continue to play a role in post-Ottoman Syria, if only for a short time. In 1919, one of Abd al-Rahman's daughters was married to Sami al-Bakri. In this way the anti-Hashemite Yusufs and the pro-Hashemite Bakris allied themselves, an indication that political affiliation and ideology were less important than the continued influence, welfare and status of the families.⁶¹

When the formerly secret *al-Fatat*, the most important Arab nationalist group during the war, founded the Arab Independence Party (*Hizb al-Istiqlal al-Arabi*) in order to gather public support, Abd al-Rahman and his long-standing ally, Muhammad Fawzi, demanded to become members. Against the initial resistance of the party leadership, which saw both as protagonists of the *ancien régime*, Faysal recommended that they be admitted to the party as he needed a broad power base.⁶² The same strategy was behind his call for a Syrian Congress which was elected in June 1919. The overwhelming number of delegates were members of the 'old guard' and included Abd al-Rahman.⁶³

58. German Report, 6; Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 189.

59. German Report, 6-7.

60. Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties*, 57.

61. Gelvin points out that the commitment of the Bakris to "... 'Arab nationalism' was not firmly rooted in ideology..." (ibid., 57-58). One of Sami's brothers, Fawzi, was the "personal bodyguard" of Sharif Husayn.

62. Ibid., 60.

63. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 87.

As the nationalists became increasingly dissatisfied with Faysal's rule, they withdrew their support, prompting him to turn to the notables for help.⁶⁴ But the fact that the old guard was able to retain its influence in the Syrian Congress (whose vice-president Abd al-Rahman was) did not prevent them from being deeply concerned about their future and considering measures to re-establish their control.⁶⁵ Faysal, who had become more and more isolated, managed to be reconciled with Abd al-Rahman and persuade him and other like-minded notables to found a new party, the Syrian Patriotic Party (*al-Hizb al-Watani al-Suri*).⁶⁶ When on 7 March 1920, the Syrian General Congress voted for the independence of Greater Syria (i.e., including Lebanon and Palestine) with Faysal as monarch, the relevant decision was presented to him by a delegation which included Abd al-Rahman.⁶⁷ At the Conference of San Remo (April 1920), Syria was placed under French mandate, leading to angry protests on the part of Syrian nationalists. Faysal could no longer evade the pressure of the nationalists and was driven even further into their arms. The increasing influence of the Arab nationalists made non-Arab minorities consider an insurrection. This, in turn, would have served the French by putting Faysal and the nationalists in their place.⁶⁸

64. On the other hand, the notables were no less dissatisfied: "...and would prefer Turks or French to Arabs...", FO 882/24/128-34, 14 May 1919, 'Who's Who in Damascus', quotation provided by Jim Gelvin.

65. "...plusieurs grandes propreteurs [sic], celles de Abderrahman Pacha Youssef entre autres, viennent d'être récemment pillées, chose qu'on n'avait jamais vue sous les Turcs...le fanatisme de la basse classe a été dangereusement excité pour raisons politiques", Archives Diplomatiques, série Beyrouth (Mandat Syrie Liban), no. 2344, Damas, 23 September 1919. In a letter to Haqqi al-Azm, written by a former officer of the Arab army from Jaffa and made available to the French authorities, four different political currents were distinguished. The fourth was described as follows: "Le quatrième parti comprend les anciens fonctionnaires du régime déchu, les retraités civils et militaires, et, en général, tous ceux qui avaient quelque pouvoir ou influence sous le gouvernement turc, tels Abderrahman Pacha Youssef, Mohammed Pacha el Azem et leurs créatures. Tous ceux la regrettent l'ancien régime et souhaitent son retour. Si les temps et les circonstances les y aidaient, ils n'hésiteraient pas à déclencher un mouvement réactionnaire", Archives Diplomatiques, série Beyrouth (Mandat Syrie Liban), no. 2368, Damas, 25 March 1919, Cousse à Monsieur le Haut Commissaire de la République en Syrie et en Arménie.

66. Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 90.

67. Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties*, 247-48.

68. "A Damas, la proclamation de Feysal comme souverain marquant un triomphe momentané du Parti arabe, décide à la résistance, et même à l'insurrection, les éléments non arabes (Kurdes, Circassiens, Druzes, etc.) 1° - Kurdes. Hadj Abderrahman Pacha El Youssef reste toujours un ennemi irréductible de Feysal, et nous envoie un émissaire pour nous certifier que tous les éléments kurdes sont décidés à l'insurrection ouverte. Il nous remet en présence du dilemme suivant: ou bien nous sommes d'accord avec Feysal, au quel cas nous pouvons lui demander de laisser venir ici 45 cavaliers kurdes comme premier échelon, sous couleur de les prendre comme escorte d'honneur du Général, en stipulant que leurs familles habitant Damas ne seront pas inquiétées par le Gouvernement Chérifien, – ou bien nous ne sommes pas d'accord avec Feysal, au quel cas les Kurdes

After the occupation of Damascus by French forces in July 1920, one of Faysal's last acts as 'King of Syria' was to appoint a government to hand over authority to the French. It was headed by Ala al-Din al-Durubi as Prime Minister, and one of its members was Abd al-Rahman al-Yusuf, who at the same time was 'President of the Consultative Council' (*ra'is al-majlis al-shuri*).⁶⁹ One month later, in August 1920, Durubi and Yusuf (the French authorities had allowed them to remain in office), travelled south by train as members of a delegation charged with solving a conflict with the population of Hawran. At a station named Khirbat al-Ghazala ('Ruin of the Gazelle')⁷⁰ unidentified attackers shot both Durubi and Abd al-Rahman.⁷¹ The circumstances of "the first state-level assassination of a Syrian urban notable by a peasant in modern times",⁷² or, in the words of Badran, "the inauspicious event which worried the population of Syria",⁷³ were never cleared up.⁷⁴ Rustum Haydar, Faysal's right-hand man, mentions in his memoirs an "armed gang" as perpetrators of this assassination.⁷⁵ The funeral procession for Abd al-Rahman Pasha was attended by large numbers of the population, the leading lights of Damascene society, and General Goybet.⁷⁶

viendront individuellement se mettre à notre service, en chargeant leurs frères restés au pays de venger toutes représailles éventuelles aux quelles les Chérifiens pourraient se livrer contre leurs familles. D'autres éléments suivraient sans doute à premier échelon. [Other non-Arab elements follow.] L'avantage de cette politique serait de décongestionner la zone Ouest et de démontrer au Damasquins eux-mêmes que la fameuse unité arabe n'est pas réellement au point ou ils croyaient l'avoir amené": "Forces à utiliser en zone est", Haut Commissariat...en Syrie et Cilicie, no. 2346, Dossier 1, 1920, s/d 15 (after 7 March 1920).

69. Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties*, 294; Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 92; Z. N. Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence: Western Diplomacy and the Rise and Fall of Faisal's Kingdom in Syria* (Delmar, N.Y. 1977 [2nd ed.]), 168 n. 27.

70. Some miles north-east of Dar'a, mentioned by T. E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph* (Garden City, N.Y. 1935), 627.

71. Badran, *Kawakib*, 112-14; according to this source, based on a newspaper report, Abd al-Rahman was killed at the beginning of October.

72. Schilcher, 'Railways', 111.

73. Badran, *Kawakib*, 112.

74. P. S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945* (Princeton 1987), 99: The French administration punished the local Druze community collectively by imposing a high compensation payment. In 1921 attempts on the lives of General Gouraud, the French High Commissioner in Syria, and Haqqi al-Azm, Governor of Syria, failed. Cf. P. Fournié and J.-L. Riccioli, *La France et le Proche Orient 1916-1946: Une chronique photographique de la présence française en Syrie et au Liban, en Palestine, au Hedjaz et en Cilicie* (Tournai 1996), 71, 85.

75. N. F. Safwat (ed.), *Mudhakkarat Rustum Haydar* [Memoirs of Rustum Haydar] (Beirut 1988), 702, under the date of 22 August 1920. Some information concerning the early career of this most important and intriguing figure of the Arab national movement can be found in M. Strohmeyer, *al-Kullīya as-Salāhīya in Jerusalem. Arabismus, Osmanismus und Panislamismus im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart 1991), 39-40.

76. Badran, *Kawakib*, 114.

The end of Ottoman rule in Syria made the term ‘provincial elite’ obsolete. While many notables who had constituted that elite were able to retain their influence during the French mandate and after,⁷⁷ Abd al-Rahman was the last powerful notable of the Yusufs. Eventually, the family also lost most of its assets, especially the landholdings. Muhammad Sa‘id, the Austrian-educated eldest son of Abd al-Rahman, ran up large debts to finance his lavish lifestyle. Moreover, the land rents sank enormously because of the depression so that the use of land as security for borrowing money became nearly impossible.⁷⁸ In their economic plight, the Yusufs considered selling the large property of al-Btayha on the eastern shores of Lake Tiberias to the Jewish National Fund (1934). The outcry aroused by the imminent deal caused the French administration, pressured by the National Bloc, to promulgate a decree which was made retrospective and “prohibited the sale to foreigners of lands on the frontiers of Syria-Lebanon with Palestine-Transjordan”. In spite of that, the deal was pursued with Chaim Weizmann, the leader of the World Zionist Organisation, visiting the residence of the Yusufs in Suq Saruja. Finally, under the aegis of the Syrian President al-Abid (a brother-in-law of the late Abd al-Rahman), a company was established with the aim of buying al-Btayha from the Yusufs, but nothing came of this scheme. Although Jewish organisations continued to try to buy the property, the Syrian government and the Mandate authorities stuck to their veto.⁷⁹

(University of Cyprus)

77. Haqqi al-Azm became governor in 1920 and later Prime Minister; in 1932, the son of Ahmad Izzat al-Abid, Muhammad Ali al-Abid, became President of Syria: Khoury, *Urban Notables*, 39. Muhammad Ali married Abd al-Rahman’s sister: Schilcher, ‘Railways’, 111.

78. The landowners preferred to mortgage their properties rather than to sell them: Khoury, *Syria*, 446: “Rarely did families reinvest in the agricultural productivity of their lands or in agricultural-based industries”. It seems that the far-reaching plans of Abd al-Rahman concerning his landholdings, as described in the German Report, were a remarkable exception to that rule. Incidentally, the financial decay of the big landowning families also led to internal conflicts.

79. *Ibid.*, 448-49.



Abd al-Rahman Pasha al-Yusuf (1873/74-1920)

Courtesy of Dr Sabah Kabbani

(taken from B. Keenan, *Damascus: Hidden Treasures of the Old City* [London: Thames & Hudson, 2001], 157)

APPENDIX

*Translation of document in Auswaertiges Amt
(German Foreign Ministry), AA 177, R 14039, 40985
(underlining is in the original text)*

The following report sheds an interesting light on the personal status of Abd al-Rahman, his relations with both foreign celebrities and the Young Turk triumvirate and the efforts of Austria and Germany to win him over to business transactions. The report is rather detailed as concerns Abd al-Rahman's properties; furthermore, it shows which plans and ideas the Pasha, probably influenced and advised by foreigners (Germans, Austrians, Belgians and French), had for the future.

COPY

Damascus, 10 September 1918

Record on the Ottoman Senator Abdurrahman Pasha

The Pasha is a Kurd of noble lineage by birth,⁸⁰ but feels entirely Arab. He is fifty to fifty-three years old,⁸¹ has only one wife, a Turkish woman,⁸² and nine children, four of whom are boys. The oldest son is 19 years old.⁸³ All of the sons are being educated at the college in Beirut; the oldest, who is to become a diplomat, is currently attending the Theresianum in Vienna. The daughters have a French lady as teacher. The Pasha speaks Arabic and Turkish, and knows only very little French.

The Pasha can be considered the biggest landowner in Syria.⁸⁴ He does not know exactly the size of his property, but estimates it to be about 100,000 hectares. Part of it is located close to Damascus, approximately 7,500 hectares of orchards, hemp, lucerne, vegetables, wine, poplar forest, anise, and olives all of which can be irrigated. A hectare here costs 15,000 to 20,000 francs today. A second part of his landholding is east of Damascus at the edge of the desert; it can also be irrigated from a canal (cultivation of grain and maize). Furthermore, the Pasha owns about 40 villages in the Jawlan,⁸⁵ east of Lake Tiberias (cultivation of grain). He himself cultivates only the orchards near Damascus; in particular the estate of Chiavre, one

80. "A Kurd and looked upon as Chief of that community in Damascus", FO 882/24/128-34, 14 May 1919, 'Who's Who in Damascus', quotation provided by Jim Gelvin.

81. See footnote 24.

82. This is wrong, since Abd al-Rahman's wife Fa'iza was the daughter of Khalil Pasha al-Azm.

83. See the family tree in Schatkowski Schilcher, *Families in Politics*, 152.

84. Cf. FO 882/24/128-34, 14 May 1919, 'Who's Who in Damascus': "the wealthiest landowner in Syria", quotation provided by Jim Gelvin.

85. Commonly known as Golan.

hour east of the city, must be mentioned. Its size is about 500 hectares and its value according to current land prices amounts to approx. 8 to 10 million francs. The rest of the land is rented out to *fellahs* in the usual way in exchange for a third of the harvest. A large part of excellent land, however, lay fallow even before the war, because of a lack of tenants. The Pasha wants to cultivate these areas himself with the aid of motor ploughs and all modern labour-saving machines under the direction [page 2] of Europeans. I estimate the value of these quite badly managed estates to be approx. 80 million francs according to today's land prices. Proper management should at least double the value. The Pasha made a profit of 800,000 francs from the estates before the war, i.e., 1% of the land value. A large part of the income, he says, is being stolen by dishonest employees. His income was not sufficient because of his splendid lifestyle, so that he was in debt before the war. He had already thought about increasing his income before the war. A French-Belgian capital investment company had offered to manage his land and to pay him an annually increasing income. After 30 years, 1/4 of the estates would go to the company as property. The outbreak of the war frustrated this deal. It seems very probable to me that this company will come back to this offer after the war. We must seek to prevent this from happening. I told the Pasha that the French and Belgians would first have to rebuild their ruined cities and would have no money left; but if he wanted I would find the money in Germany. He told me first to examine his estates, to draw up a plan and to calculate how much money we would need for the development of the estates. He said he had saved some money during the war and wished to invest the money; I should obtain the rest for him. The development of the estates, however, will cost such a large sum that the Pasha cannot accomplish anything with his own money. It is not possible to assess clearly whether the lease to a German company or the establishment of an Ottoman company with a German capital investment should be proposed. One must always take the political circumstances into account here, and the Pasha knows that. Today the Turks frown upon the purchase of land by foreigners [page 3] and may be able to hinder a lease. An Ottoman company with German capital investment would not arouse suspicion and would make it possible to win over rich and influential Turks to business by granting them bonus shares and percentages of the profits. Most of all, this would allow the influence of the Pasha as its principal shareholder to be exploited. At any rate the technical aspects of the business must be put in the hands of competent German farmers partly from Palestine, partly from Germany. The Pasha is aware of this necessity. He fully recognises not only the dishonesty of his present employees (he told me that a book keeper with a salary of 15 pounds had purchased land for 40,000 pounds during the war), but also their technical incompetence, which had transformed a threshing machine and other agricultural implements which he had unfortunately bought from an English company for Chiavre into a heap of rubble. An indirect advantage of a German management is that naturally all orders will be made in Germany. The business amounts to many millions of marks, since not only numerous, at least twenty, motor ploughs, but also threshing machines and other modern machines are required. Moreover, the Pasha is thinking of taking direct control of the processing of the

agricultural products of his estates, e.g., flour mills, macaroni and pasta factories, modern oil-presses and refining plants, winepresses, dairies, jam factories, wool laundering, hemp processing plants, production of mutton tallow, egg-white factories, and factories producing fruit preserves. He is very interested in the possibility of establishing a sugar beet factory and a brewery; the question must be examined, however, as to whether such plants and factories are feasible. A lot depends [page 4] on the Turkish customs tariff. These plants would also have to be run by Germans, thereby bringing big orders for machines to our industry.

Another advantage of this enterprise is that it would be a permanent display of German commercial industriousness and concrete evidence of the quality of German technology. What a respected and influential man such as Abdurrahman Pasha does will most certainly be copied by other big landowners in Syria and Turkey. It is impossible to conceive of better propaganda for our Germanness and the excellence of German products.

At the request of the Pasha, I started with the survey of his estates at the beginning of August. It became apparent immediately that it would be possible to introduce the use of motor ploughs in the plain stretching to the edge of the desert. Moreover, the so-called 'desert' – which is none at all, but has wonderful soil, at least at the edge – can be cultivated with motor ploughs according to the principle of dry farming. The land does not belong to anybody, and whoever cultivates it receives it as Miri (feudal property). A man such as Abdurrahman Pasha has no difficulties with the Bedouins; he is on good terms with their sheykhs and has nothing to fear from them. The Pasha left for Vienna, Karlsbad and Berlin on 20 August. He wants to bring back immediately two motor ploughs – the factory is in Berlin – as well as threshing and other machines. The Pasha has taken with him the money for these purchases which amounts to approx. 100,000 marks. The commander of the motorised units in Syria, Captain Wiss, a manufacturer of motor ploughs, who is currently on leave, will assist and advise Abdurrahman Pasha with the purchase, the approval of the [page 5] export permit and the transport difficulties; he will also engage a German mechanic for the care of the machines. In Turkey proper, the Pasha will be able to overcome all transport problems with his extraordinary influence; there is no cause for concern. I have also seen to it that the Pasha will be shown factories in Berlin. If possible, the Pasha would like, during the war, to get the big machines going which can plough, roll and harrow up to 8 hectares daily. He hopes that the German military authorities will support him by selling fuel and oil. In turn he intends to commit himself to sell the harvest of the motor plough stations to German troops at a fixed price. If the ploughs arrive at the end of October and everything is well-organised, they can prepare 800 hectares for sowing this year and produce 1,660,000 kilograms of grain (wheat and barley), i.e., bread rations for 10,150 men for one year; in my opinion this would be a great help for the German troops, especially since the ploughs will operate only 2-3 hours from Damascus and the transport of the grain for the supply of the big German garrison in Damascus will not be difficult. As soon as the ploughs are bought and in transit, I will receive a telegraphic message and prepare everything for the instant start of

work and be in charge of the enterprise myself. I will then approach the German military authorities with the request for their support of the enterprise. Perhaps the consulate could use its influence to make sure that the Pasha will be given the export permit in Berlin and the transport will be made easier. As I mentioned above, it is in the interest of the bread supply of the German troops.⁸⁶

Abdurrahman Pasha is the leader of the holy pilgrims' caravan (Emir al-Hajj) which travels from [page 6] Damascus to Mecca every year. This distinguished post secures great prestige and influence for him so that not even Jemal Pasha (when he was in Syria) dared to lay hands on that man – although at first he intended to do so – but rather preferred, after being advised by influential Turks, to make his peace with him and to enlist his support. If my information is correct, Abdurrahman Pasha even equipped troops of his own at his own expense for the expedition against Egypt at the start of the war and put them at the army's disposal.⁸⁷ His position as emir al-hajj had made him well-known in the entire Muslim world. He has connections with Muslims from Morocco to India, especially with Indian Muslim rulers, with whom he has exchanged presents.

The Pasha is a strict Muslim – although he does not observe fasting in the month of Ramadan – but by no means a fanatic; for example, there are many Christians in his service. He takes the duty of giving alms very seriously; he supports the entire Kurdish colony in Salihyya and gives a large part of his grain to the poor. I had the opportunity to see him moved to tears at the sight of the misery in Lebanon and he distributed grain in such quantities that only he can afford. I was able to see for myself several times the respect and admiration he enjoys in the country. Especially after the departure of Jemal Pasha he is in a better position than ever before; he is often called upon to be arbitrator in quarrels.

The Pasha's friendship with Abdülhamid went back to his grandfather Sa'id Pasha, who owed his vast landholding to the Sultan. However, Abdurrahman has adapted himself to the new circumstances and has made his peace with the Young Turks. [page 7] He has very close relations with the Grand Vizier Tal'at Pasha. It is said that [sc.: during the rule of Abdülhamid] the Pasha helped Tal'at Pasha get out of prison by paying 20,000-30,000 pounds. He gets on well with Enver Pasha, too. Last winter Enver supposedly tried to sound out Abdurrahman Pasha about the activities of Jemal Pasha in Syria. (It is said that Enver Pasha deals with all influential people from Syria in this way in order to gain evidence against Jemal Pasha.) Abdurrahman Pasha, however, explained to him that he did not know anything, and that he did not want to get involved in politics. He is also a good friend of the commander of the military railway, Ismail Hakki Pasha, and of many other influential Turks in Istanbul (he speaks Turkish well).

86. Obviously, these plans did not materialise; however, Abd al-Rahman had a contract with the Turkish army to supply 20 million kilos of wheat and 10 million kilos of barley: FO 371/2781/no. 248940/Arabian Report N.S. No. XX, source provided by Jim Gelvin.

87. These troops were a Kurdish unit; other such units were Druze under Shakib Arslan: Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks*, 189.

In view of this man's high position, the Austrians did not hesitate to get in touch with him. It is common knowledge that the activities of the Austrians in Syria aim at winning over the population and establishing economic relations. The Austrian Archduke Franz Salvator was Abdurrahman Pasha's guest and saw to it that Abdurrahman Pasha during his last visit to Europe in the winter of 1917/18 was presented to the Emperor Karl. The Emperor and Empress asked him to dine *en petit comité*. The 19-year-old son, although not sufficiently prepared, was admitted to the Theresianum – where the Kaiser occasionally inquires after him and is shown his marks. The Pasha received the decoration of the 'Knights of the Iron Crown' (first class).⁸⁸ The Pasha has been awarded the 'Commander of the Order of Hohenzollern' decoration (star and cross); I believe it was awarded to him at the time of the visit of His Majesty to Damascus.⁸⁹ [page 8] The fact that the Emperor Karl asked the Pasha to order the machines for a sugar factory in Austria proves that the Austrians have approached Abdurrahman Pasha in the economic field, too. The Emperor himself, he said, would see to a prompt delivery. The Pasha wanted to bring back this factory on his present trip to Vienna, although he does not know yet how sugar beet will grow. I have talked him out of that and taken measures to conduct experiments with growing sugar beet with irrigation at the estate of Chiavre.

The Emperor Karl has again invited him to court during his present visit to Vienna (where he stays at the Hotel Bristol); certainly, the Austrians will continue the policies they started. Through Captain Wiss I have done my best to persuade the Pasha's travelling companion to make the purchases as much as possible in Berlin (commission promised). But at present we have nothing to match the splendour of an imperial court and the kindness of the Austrian Kaiser and I know that Abdurrahman Pasha, like every Oriental, is much influenced by these factors. It is not in our interest that we shed our blood and spend our good money in Turkey while the Austrians gain economic advantages. Therefore, I would like to suggest that the Imperial Consulate makes clear in Constantinople and Berlin how important Abdurrahman Pasha is for our German interests, and considers whether one should not formally invite the Pasha to Berlin and receive him officially. He intends to travel to Berlin for 10 days at the end of September and to stay at the Hotel Adlon. (The Pasha does not know enough French; thus a Turkish or Arabic-speaking interpreter would have to be found.) [page 9] A presentation to their Imperial Majesties and the award of a decoration equal to the Austrian one would be highly desirable. The Pasha is a personal acquaintance of the commander of the motorised units, Captain Wiss, who is on holiday at the moment in Gernsbach in the Murg Valley/Baden. Captain Wiss will be able to provide the necessary information in Berlin, in case it

88. The reason given for this decoration is as follows: "He is one of the foremost notables of Damascus and has an extraordinary influence on the population. He has a large following. His views are very important for us"; Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Vienna, 'Kabinettskanzlei', Kurrentbillette B 87c/1917. I am grateful to Dr Ernst Petritsch of the Austrian State Archives for providing me with this information.

89. In 1898; cf. Badran, *Kawakib*, 110.

is impossible to send it from here to Berlin in time. This may still be possible via a courier or an officer who is just now travelling home.

However, I ask that Berlin be advised that the Pasha must not, under any circumstances, be approached about the transformation of his landholding into a German enterprise. If he thinks of this himself, so much the better. You always have to expect an Oriental to be very suspicious of Europeans; the Pasha might all too easily believe that we would like to get our hands on his property to his disadvantage. The distrust of the Turkish Government, too, could be aroused and difficulties could be caused not only for us, but also for Abdurrahman Pasha. I will make the estimate for the exploitation of his estates and provide him with a precise calculation of the large sums which he will need. Then he will approach us on his own, and we will gain much more favourable terms for the capital investment than if we were to impose ourselves on him.

On the basis of the projection and the survey of the land we will be able to approach German capitalists. We do not yet know if the land is 90,000 or 120,000 hectares; I have not yet seen the areas in the Jawlan. The Pasha wants to take me there after his return from Germany.

